Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000161
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/53259/2024
LH/08066/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 1st May 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RUTH

Between

HAFIZ SHEFU
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
(No ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Pipe of Counsel, instructed by Waterstone Law.
For the Respondent: Ms MacKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 20 April 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 20 October 2025, of First-tier Tribunal Judge Degirmenci (‘the judge’) to dismiss his appeal on human rights grounds.

Background

2. The procedural background and key aspects of the immigration history which led to the appeal proceedings are not in dispute between the parties.
3. The essence of the matter is that the appellant’s application for entry clearance as the spouse of the sponsor, a Greek citizen with settled status under the EU Settlement Scheme (‘EUSS’), was rejected by the respondent on the basis he had ‘contrived in a significant way to frustrate the intention of the immigration rules’. That conclusion flowed from the appellant having illegally entered the UK on three occasions, twice as a child in 2014 and once as an adult following a voluntary departure in August 2021, after which he delayed seeking to regularise his position for some time. He had also remained without permission on various occasions, including following the dismissal of a previous asylum appeal in 2019, only then coming to light when encountered by police in January 2021 and giving a false name. Having not received a conclusive response from the NRM after a trafficking referral in 2019 or from the Home Office after an application for administrative review of his rejected application as a partner under the EUSS on 10 January 2023, he had then departed voluntarily again on 17 February 2024. He made the most recent application for entry as a partner on 19 February 2024. He remains in Albania.

Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal

4. The appeal was heard by the judge on 18 August 2025 and dismissed on human rights grounds on 20 October 2025. For the purposes of the present proceedings, the following key matters emerge from the decision:

• The judge referred to the immigration history of the appellant between [12] and [22], noting those aspects not disputed between the parties. Where the history was disputed, the judge makes specific findings. At [13] she concludes that the initial removal of the appellant to Albania in 2014 was at the cost of the carrier and not voluntary. At [15] and [17] she finds the respondent has not established the appellant had failed to comply with reporting restrictions either during his asylum claim, rejected in 2019, or after removal directions had been set in January 2021. At [19] she notes the appellant attempted to enter the UK as a spouse on 13 December 2021. She finds the appellant had cleared immigration control in Calais believing he would be able to enter lawfully, although he was not granted entry and was removed on the same day. At [20] the judge notes the appellant then re-entered the UK illegally on an unknown date and failed to depart when issued with removal papers in December 2021. She finds, at [21], that there was an unexplained delay on the part of the Home Office in considering the application for administrative review of 10 January 2023, but concludes the application could not have succeeded in any case.

• At [25] the judge places little weight upon the first two illegal entries, which took place when the appellant was a child, but notes he was an adult by the time of the end of his asylum appeal in 2019 and knew he had no basis to remain in the UK.

• At [26] and [27] the judge finds the appellant had failed to engage with the respondent after exhausting his appeal rights in 2019, including failing to respond to a request from the NRM for further information on 20 April 2023.

• At [29] the judge concludes the appellant had shown a ‘blatant disregard for immigration laws’ when entering illegally again in 2021, taking the view the difficulties being experienced by the sponsor as a result of separation were no justification.

• At [32] the judge found the appellant had indeed contrived in a significant way to frustrate the intention of the immigration rules, including because of his most recent illegal entry and his delay in seeking to regularise his position thereafter. She referred, at [33], to the guidance as to the exercise of the relevant discretion under the immigration rules in PS (paragraph 320(11) discretion: care needed) India [2010] UKUT 440 (IAC).

• The judge concluded, at [35]-[36], that the respondent was right to refuse the appellant’s application under paragraph 9.8.2 of the immigration rules, although not on suitability grounds under S-EC.1.5 of Appendix FM of those rules.

• Considering the requirements of Article 8 ECHR from [37], the judge notes the conclusions of a psychologist, from [42], that both the appellant and sponsor suffer from mental health conditions as a result of their separation and potential move to Albania. She concludes, at [45] and [46], that the absence of GP records or evidence the couple have actually sought treatment suggests these findings are largely based on self-reporting. She finds, at [50], that both have exaggerated their mental health conditions for the purposes of the appellant’s application.

• Noting, at [53], that both the appellant and sponsor are Albanian by origin and familiar with that country and, at [59], that they can also live in Greece as a couple, the sponsor noted to be fully aware of the appellant’s immigration status at [60], the judge concludes there would be no unjustifiably harsh consequences and no breach of Article 8 ECHR at [61].

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

5. The appellant applied for permission to appeal in reliance, essentially, on the following grounds, which I summarise:

• Ground 1 – the judge’s conclusion that the respondent had made out her refusal under paragraph 9.8.2 of the immigration rules was missing a vital component. The judge had failed to balance the appellant’s family situation against his conduct when assessing the exercise of discretion to refuse in line with the principles in PS (paragraph 320(11) discretion: care needed) India [2010] UKUT 440 (IAC).

• Ground 2 – The judge had failed to attach proper weight to the appellant’s most recent voluntary departure as required by PS(India) and had failed to factor in the outstanding administrative review and NRM decision when concluding his departure was ‘too little, too late’.

• Ground 3 – The judge had erred in concluding the psychological assessment was largely based on self-reporting, given the writer had undertaken psychological testing and used her knowledge and experience.

6. Leave having been refused in the First-tier Tribunal on 30 December 2025, the appellant renewed the grounds on essentially the same basis and leave was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Grey on 9 February 2026. Judge Grey stated:

“1. Whilst the Judge’s detailed and careful written decision may withstand scrutiny, I am just persuaded that it is arguable that she erred in her consideration of whether the respondent had made it out their refusal under paragraph 9.8.2 of the rules in failing to consider the appellant’s personal and family circumstances in the exercise of discretion.

2. In relation to the appellant’s voluntary departure from the UK, at a time when he had a pending administrative review and outstanding NRM claim, it is arguable that the Judge erred in her assessment of whether the appellant had contrived in their significant way to frustrate the intentions of the rules, having regard to the guidance in PS (paragraph 320(11) discretion: care needed) India [2010] UKUT 440 (IAC).”

3. All grounds may be argued.

7. At the error of law hearing I had the composite bundle of 513 pages and a rule 24 response from the respondent. There was no skeleton argument from the appellant.
8. I heard detailed submissions from both parties and deal with any submissions of significance below.

Discussion

Ground 1 – The Exercise of Discretion under the Rules

9. In relation to this ground, I agree with the submissions made on behalf of the respondent. The judge plainly was aware of the guidance in PS(India) and its applicability in exercising discretion under the relevant rule, as she sets it out explicitly in paragraph [33] of the decision.
10. Furthermore, she does balance the personal and family circumstances of the appellant against his behaviour in paragraph [29], when she refers specifically to the difficulties the sponsor was experiencing as a result of the separation, but concludes they do not sensibly explain the appellant’s illegal re-entry in 2021, that re-entry being the key issue in the judge’s conclusion the application of paragraph 9.8.2 of the rules was justified, at [34].
11. While, at this stage of the decision, the judge has not set out every aspect of the family and personal circumstances relied upon by the appellant, her reference to them here was adequate. This is so particularly since it is quite clear, looking at the decision as a whole, that the judge was fully aware of all of those circumstances, the key being the alleged difficulties of the sponsor in dealing with her separation from the appellant. I do not accept Mr Pipe’s contention that the fact the judge referred to those circumstances in greater detail when assessing the Article 8 claim outside the rules means she did not have them adequately in mind when assessing the matter under the rules. While the tests at the two stages are different, the factual matrix was the same and the judge was plainly fully aware of that factual matrix and carried out the necessary balance adequately.
12. Ground 1 discloses no material error of law.

Ground 2 – The second voluntary departure – Too little, too late?

13. Dealing with the second part of this ground first, and the contention that the judge failed to consider the outstanding NRM application and the significantly delayed administrative review in the context of the weight to be given to his second voluntary departure, I reject the submissions made on behalf of the appellant.
14. The judge finds, at [16] and [26], that the appellant had failed to cooperate with the NRM and failed, without explanation, to respond to an e-mail requesting further information about the trafficking claim in 2023. The judge concluded, in essence, that the appellant did not come to this matter with clean hands and that the outstanding NRM decision could not assist him.
15. Furthermore, in relation to the administrative review, the judge concluded that despite the delay by the respondent, at [21], there was no prejudice to the appellant because he could not have succeeded under the law in any case and the administrative review was bound to fail.
16. In those circumstances, the approach of the judge to the guidance in PS(India) and the weight to be given to the appellant’s second voluntary departure, in the context of those two outstanding applications, was well within the bounds of what was reasonably open to her.
17. Furthermore, this is an individual who had entered illegally on two previous occasions, albeit as a child, who had then remained without permission for a significant period, gave false information when arrested and who, crucially, had already made one voluntary departure and then re-entered the United Kingdom illegally once again, delaying his subsequent attempt to regularise his position by almost another year.
18. In such circumstances, the policy considerations set out in PS(India), of encouraging those without status to return home and regularise their position, carry significantly less weight. The judge has set out those policy considerations explicitly in [33], recognised the appellant’s second voluntary return and given adequate reasons for concluding that the subsequent illegal return and further delay in regularising his position was of greater weight than the second voluntary return, at [34].
19. Ground 2 discloses no material error of law.

Ground 3 – Flawed Assessment of the Medical Evidence?

20. Contrary to the submissions made on behalf of the appellant, the judge does refer to the fact the psychologist has provided the criteria by which she assessed the mental health of the appellant and sponsor, at [45]. She nevertheless notes that the psychologist did not have sight of any relevant GP records, at [45], and did not seek to reconcile her findings with the lack of any relevant GP records.
21. Furthermore, between [45]-[47] the judge notes that there was no good evidence that either the appellant in Albania or the sponsor in the United Kingdom had been undertaking any treatment for their asserted mental health conditions or had even reported their alleged mental health concerns to a GP.
22. The judge also finds a serious inconsistency between the finding of the psychologist that the sponsor has a ‘profound impairment in daily functioning’ and the evidence of the sponsor herself that he holds down a full-time job and is studying for a Level 5 NVQ, at [50].
23. In the light of these factors, and the guidance in HA (expert evidence; mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 00111 (IAC), the conclusions of the judge that the findings of the psychologist are largely based on self-reporting, at [45], and that the mental health problems of both the appellant and sponsor have been exaggerated for the purposes of the application, at [50], were well within the bounds of reasonable findings open to her on the evidence.
24. Ground 3 discloses no material error of law.

Conclusions

25. For the foregoing reasons I conclude the decision of the judge did not involve the making of material errors of law. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the judge did not involve the making of material errors of law. I dismiss the appeal brought by the appellant. The decision of First -tier Tribunal shall stand.

Evan Ruth

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 April 2026