Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000170
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/02743/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 19 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

ES
(Anonymity ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Aziz of counsel instructed by Haris Ali Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Sian Rushworth, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 20 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties are entitled to apply on notice to vary this direction.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant, a national of Albania appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge O’Garro (“the Judge”) promulgated on 30 April 2025 dismissing his international protection and human rights claim connected to deportation.
2. The hearing before me is to consider whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. If I find that there is a material error of law in the decision, then it will have to be remade. If I find that there is no material error of law in the Judge’s decision then the decision dismissing the Appellant’s appeal will stand.
The Grant of Permission to Appeal
3. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal Judge by way of a decision sealed on 5 January 2026.
4. In a renewed application permission to appeal was granted by Deputy Chamber President Plimmer by way of a decision sealed on 10 February 2026. That grant of permission was in respect of protection issues only and refused in respect of Ground 2.
The Correct Approach to Appeals from the First-tier Tribunal
5. I remind myself that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688. In particular the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 makes clear:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
6. The legal test to be met by the Appellant to show a material error of law is to be found in the Court of Appeal’s decision in R(Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm. A.R. 535.
The Hearing Before Me
7. The Appellant provided a bundle comprising two tranches. One with 168 pages and another with 145 pages. I remind the Appellant’s solicitors of the need to provide a composite and electronically navigable bundle. This is not a new requirement and the failure of the Appellant’s solicitors to comply with the directions is disappointing.
8. Ms Aziz said she relied on the renewal grounds of appeal. She said there were 2 grounds. Mr Aziz submitted that the main point was that the Judge has stated that the money lenders were a fabrication. This was at paragraphs 65, 67 and 71. The Judge said that there was no threat from the money lenders. Mr Aziz said that the appeal had not been given anxious scrutiny. The Crown Court sentencing judge had said that the Appellant’s offence had been connected to the pressure of others.
9. I was referred to page 101 at paragraph 40 of the first part of the bundle. I was also referred to page 95 of the 168 paged part of the bundle. I was referred to page 132 of the 145 bundle which referred to the Crown Court sentencing judge noting that the Appellant had pleaded guilty to Class A supply of drugs offences leading to a long sentence of imprisonment of just under 4 years. Ms Aziz submitted that the Appellant was at criminal risks and ongoing risks. She submitted that the Judge had not taken that into account. She submitted that there was also the country evidence. She submitted that there was insufficient reasoning by the FTT Judge. If the Judge had not accepted certain matters, then that required detailed reasoning. She submitted that there was also the risk of tracing by the criminal elements.
10. Ms Aziz submitted that cumulatively looking at all of the issues and material reasons there had been inadequate reasoning. She submitted that the Judge’s decision was unsafe.
11. Ms Aziz also referred to paragraph 88 of the Judge’s decision and said that the material had not been given anxious scrutiny by the Judge. She stated that substantial country evidence had been referred to in the skeleton argument before the Judge. She said there was corruption in Albania and that Albania is a small country. She submitted that the Judge had not correctly applied the Horvath test.
12. Then after these submission, Ms Aziz said that she wished to make another point. She said that permission to appeal had not been granted in respect of the Article 8 ECHR issues. She said that the Article 8 ECHR findings could not be safely preserved because the matters were intertwined with the protection issues. She said I should allow the appeal on Article 8 too.
13. Ms Rushworth on behalf of the Respondent said in respect of Ground 1 that it was clear that the wording of paragraph 40 of the Refusal Letter was clear that there was no concession being made in respect of the substantive appeal.
14. Ms Rushworth said that page 47 of the 168 paged bundle set out the issues. Credibility was an issue. I was referred to page 51 of the 168 paged bundle. The issues included credibility.
15. Ms Rushworth said that there was a limitation of the Crown Court’s judge’s sentencing remarks whereby it just referred to “pressure” and not by whom. She also submitted that the OASys report at page 145 of 168 had referred to there being drug debts. Ms Rushworth said that the Judge was entitled to consider credibility. But that even if I was against her, paragraphs 68 and 72 of the Judge’s decision referred to alternatives such “Even if there is any truth” and “Even if there...”
16. In respect of Ground 2 Ms Rushworth said that there was no error in respect of the of sufficiency of protection issue. The Judge referred to the Horvath. Standard of protection being available but not guaranteed. At paragraph 68 the Judge confirmed in her decision that there was corruption in Albania. Internal relocation was also referred to. Ms Rushworth said that in any event, there was no challenge to the Judge’s findings that there was no interest in the Appellant 3 years after the event. Ms Rushworth invited me to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal. She resisted Ms Aziz’s attempts to include Article 8 ECHR and that said I should not consider them.
17. Ms Aziz in reply said she had nothing to add and said that all she could say was that it was Robinson obvious that there was an error of law in respect of the Article 8 issues.
18. I had reserved my decision.
Consideration and Analysis
19. The Judge had referred to the correct burden and standard of proof. The Judge had provided a separate section of “Consideration and Findings” at paragraph 53 onwards of her decision. The Judge set out the Appellant’s fear of money lenders at paragraph 64 of her decision. The Judge noted the lack of contact from the assailants/money lenders at paragraph 65 of her decision. The Judge noted at paragraphs 66 and 67 that the Appellant had no made effort to repay the debt in any event. At paragraph 67 the Judge said the claimed debt was a fabrication and but said importantly at paragraph 68 said, “Even if there is any truth to the appellant’s claim about money lenders threatening him, I find there is [a] sufficiency of protection…”.
20. The Judge then referred at paragraphs 69 onwards to the background material and to the House of Lords decision in Horvath. The Judge then specifically considered the risks at paragraphs 70 to 75. Including in respect of re-establishing himself with the family and others he has in Albania. The Judge noted matters which relate to internal relocation such as the Appellant being a fit and healthy young man.
21. The Judge considered Article 8 at some length at paragraphs 76 to 108 including with reference to the correct law and the application of the law.
22. In assessing Ms Aziz’s submission, I deal first with her attempt to enlarge the grounds to include Article 8 ECHR. There is no basis for me to do accede to that application. Permission was not granted in respect of Article 8 ECHR by the First-tier Tribunal or by the Upper Tribunal. In any event, there is nothing which begins to enable me to conclude that the Article 8 ground was Robinson obvious. It is not. That is why permission was not granted. But in any event, having looked at the matter for myself, in my judgment the Article 8 ground is unarguable because the Judge dealt with Article 8 at length with the family and private life issues, including in respect of deportation and the effect on Ms Radu. The matters were not ‘intertwined’ in the manner suggested by Ms Aziz.
23. In respect of Ground 1 it is clear to see in the Respondent’s decision at paragraph 40 it was stated that, “Your claim has been considered at its highest, that is as if the events that you describe occurred as claimed. This is not a concession that the material facts of your claim would be accepted in their entirety if a detailed consideration of any credibility issues surrounding your claim was conducted”. In my judgment it is abundantly clear that there was no concession that the Appellant’s claim was being accepted by the Respondent in her decision.
24. Had it been necessary, one only needs to look at the Appellant’s own Appeal Skeleton Argument dated 2 October 2024 and signed by Ms Vidal which set out that credibility needed to be assessed and that the “…Tribunal must undertake a holistic assessment of the Appellant’s credibility…”. It was therefore no surprise to Ms Vidal who appeared before the Judge to deal with such issues and for the Judge to make the finding that she did.
25. In any event, the Judge provided alternatives to her decision with the references to “Even if” meaning that if the Judge was wrong, nonetheless, she would still have dismissed the appeal.
26. There is no material error of law in respect of the matters raised in Ground 1.
27. Ground 2 does not show any material error because the Judge fully and comprehensively dealt with the background material and the issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation in a lawful and adequate manner. In my judgment Ground 2 is an attempt to reargue the appeal. The Judge dealt with the issues which were put before her in a comprehensive way. The Judge dealt with matters such as corruption.
28. Ground 2 is a mere disagreement with the Judge’s decision and an attempt to reargue the appeal.
29. As I have stated above, the higher court authorities make it clear that an appeal judge must respect the expertise of the first instance judge. The Judge had the benefit of seeing and hearing from the Appellant at the hearing. The Judge also had the benefit of hearing from the Appellant’s barrister at the hearing. It was not necessary for the Judge to refer to each and every document or to each and every possible argument which might have arisen. The Judge’s decision dealt with matters in a lawful and adequate manner.
30. Accordingly, I dismiss the Appellant’s appeal against the Judge’s decision. Therefore, the Judge’s decision which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds stands.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain a material error of law.
Therefore, the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision which had dismissed the appeal on all grounds stands.
The Appellant’s appeal remains dismissed on all grounds.

12 August 2026
Abid Mahmood
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber