Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000174
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/58118/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 19 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

KJ
(Anonymity ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Alex Coyte, Fountain Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Sian Rushworth, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 20 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties are entitled to apply on notice to vary this direction.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant, a national of Iran, appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Bowen (“the Judge”) dated 8 October 2025 dismissing his international protection and human rights claim.
2. The hearing before me is to consider whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. If I find that there is a material error of law in the decision, then it will have to be remade. If I find that there is no material error of law in the Judge’s decision then the decision dismissing the Appellant’s appeal will stand.
The Grant of Permission to Appeal
3. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal Judge by way of a decision dated 30 December 2025.
4. In a renewed application permission to appeal was granted by Deputy Chamber President Plimmer by way of a decision sealed on 10 February 2026. That grant of permission states:
“1. The substance of the complaint against the screening interview is that it does not accurately reflect what the appellant said at the time. This is contained in the appellant’s witness statement, which was prepared after the appellant instructed solicitors and is supported by the points made at 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 of the renewal grounds. Ground 1 is arguable.
2. Grounds 2 and 3 have less merit but are nonetheless arguable.”
The Correct Approach to Appeals from the First-tier Tribunal
5. I remind myself that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688. In particular the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 makes clear:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
6. The legal test to be met by the Appellant to show a material error of law is to be found in the Court of Appeal’s decision in R(Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm. A.R. 535.
The Hearing Before Me
7. The Appellant provided a bundle comprising 168 pages.
8. Mr Coyte said he relied on the 3 grounds of appeal. He said that the permission had been granted on all 3 grounds and were accepted as being arguable. He said the emphasis was that the most arguable was the first ground in respect of the screening interview. He said the second ground was the error of fact in respect of the KDPS material and the third was the ‘pinchpoint’. Mr Coyte said if the grounds were made out then the matter ought to be remitted for rehearing.
9. I look at matters more specifically by referring to the written grounds of appeal.
10. Ground 1 contends that the Judge had erred by “Placing determinative weight on the Appellant’s screening interview record”. The grounds state that the Appellant was not legally represented until after the Respondent had refused his appeal. It is said that the Appellant would have been inherently unaware that the screening interview would be relied upon by the Respondent. There was reference to the screening interview being only 17 minutes long. The Judge had referred to YL (rely on SEF) China [2004] UKIAT 00145 when refusing permission and that it was accepted that there were interpreting issues during the substantive interview (not the screening interview).
11. Ground 2 contends that there was an error of fact because at paragraph 48 of his decision the Judge had wrongly said that the Appellant had given an evolving account as to whether he had always collected the political leaflets from ‘S’.
12. Ground 3 contends that in there was inadequate assessment of the ‘pinch point’ argument. The grounds state, “…we do not suggest that the appellant’s expression of political conviction he does not hold is protected by the principles in HJ (Iran); the submission…is that even if the appellant’s political convictions are not found to be genuine, he cannot be expected to conceal the content of his asylum claim from the Iranian authorities when questioned on return.”
13. On behalf of the Respondent Ms Rushworth submitted that the ground 1 amounted to a complaint about the weight and it was not an error of law. She said that the Judge had considered the limitations of screening interviews and that the expectation was that there would be a short interview.
14. In respect of Ground 2 Ms Rushworth said that there was simply no mistake of fact.
15. In respect of Ground 3 Ms Rushworth referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in OM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1585. YIP LJ with whom Singh and Newey LJ had agreed had dealt with similar issues. That stated that “Having rejected the appellant’s claim that he was genuinely a political activist, the central issues for the judge were whether his contrived sur place activities were likely to have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities or whether they were likely to do so at the pinch points of applying for travel documents and returning to Iran. The judge explained why the appellant was unlikely to already have come to the Iranian authorities’ attention. She rejected his claim that he wished to continue to protest in Iran and would not delete his Facebook account. On the express findings made by the judge, it can properly be inferred that the appellant would not be expected to volunteer information about his contrived activities in the UK when questioned on arrival in Iran. In those circumstances, as in S, the judge was entitled to reach the conclusion she did that the appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution, serious harm or Article 3 ill-treatment.” Ms Rushworth relied on paragraph 52 of the Court of Appeal’s decision.
16. In reply Mr Coyte said that Ground 1 was not just a matter of weight. The Judge had said that the Appellant had claimed to have limited recollection of his interview but also claimed have specific responses which were not contained within the oral or written evidence. The Appellant had been unrepresented at the time of the interview. Mr Coyte said that there had been an error in transcription. The interview was just 17 minutes long.
17. In respect of Ground 2 the Appellant’s evidence was that the Judge had made an assumption about when the Appellant was working for Hassan.
18. In respect of Ground 3 Mr Coyte said he accepted that this was the weakest ground. He said there would be monitoring of internet activities. The Appellant would not volunteer false information. He would be returning on an Emergency Travel Document and Kurds were already suspected of being activists by the Iranian authorities.
19. I had reserved my decision.
Consideration and Analysis
20. The Judge had specifically stated that it was necessary for him to assess credibility in the round. The Judge said at paragraphs 13 to 15 as follows:
“As is apparent from the issues that I have detailed as being in dispute, the Respondent fundamentally considers the Appellant’s account lacks credibility. I remind myself that the assessment of credibility is a holistic exercise of judgment which requires the Tribunal to consider all the relevant evidence in reaching a conclusion. An assessment 3 Appeal Number: PA/58118/2024 of credibility can only be properly made against the background evidence. An individual’s account must also be assessed on the basis of its cultural and societal context. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. The approach to the assessment of future risk is a single-stage process of evaluating all the evidence for what it is worth (Karanakaran v Home Secretary [2000] 3 All ER 449). The approach to the evidence as set out in that case does not entail the decision maker purporting to find ‘proved’ facts, whether past or present about which it is not satisfied on the balance of probabilities, but means that it must not exclude any matters from its consideration when it is assessing the future, unless it feels that it can safely discard them because it has no real doubt that they did not in fact occur. In KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 00491 (IAC), the Upper Tribunal held that the ‘Credibility Indicators’ identified in the Home Office Asylum Policy Instruction, Assessing credibility and refugee status Version 3.0, 6 January 2015 (which can be summarised as comprising sufficiency of detail; internal consistency; external consistency; and plausibility), provide a helpful framework within which to conduct a credibility assessment. However, they are merely indicators, not necessary conditions; they are not an exhaustive list; assessment of credibility being a highly fact- sensitive affair, their main role is to help make sure, where relevant, that the evidence is is considered in a number of well-recognised respects; making use of these indicators not a substitute for the requirement to consider the evidence as a whole or ‘in the round”.
21. Thereafter the Judge referred to the need to consider the Country Guidance cases which he cited and the background material. At paragraph 19 the Judge referred to the “hair trigger” approach to those suspected or perceived to be involved in Kurdish political activity.
22. In my judgment importantly the Judge referred at paragraph 20(i) to (v) matters which he found in favour of the Appellant. This shows a completely fair and rounded assessment by the Judge. It is against that background that the rest of the Judge’s decision needs to be considered.
23. In respect of Ground 1, in my judgment the Judge was patently aware that the screening interview was a limited interview, but the Judge also noted that the screening interview was on 5 January 2022 and that the questionnaire was on 3 August 2023. The Judge noted at paragraph 22(ii) of his decision that the Appellant was asked to explain ‘all’ the reasons why he could not return to Iran. The Appellant had not mentioned being accused of or committing an offence. Nor did the Appellant say that he has been involved with or accused of being involved in a political organisation.
24. The Judge then noted the discrepancies and referred to them at paragraph 23 to 25, including as follows:
“When asked why he had come to the UK, the Appellant stated that “When I was a kolbar I was carrying alcohol into Iran and itis forbidden, and I will be hanged.” “[SCR 3.1] When asked to briefly explain all of the reasons why he cannot return to his home country, the Appellant stated “I cannot return as when I was a kolbar I was caught carrying alcohol. I fear the authorities. I fear I will be hanged if I return.” [SCR4.1] The Appellant stated he had never been accused of or committed an offence. [SCR 5.3] The Appellant stated that he had never been involved with, or accused of being involved with a political organisation. [SCR 5.5]. The transcript for the Screening Interview does not record the Appellant having mentioned transporting/distributing KDPI materials, S, the suspected raid the claimed arrest of his father. These aspects of his claim are recorded for the first time or in the ‘Continue asylum claim’ questionnaire of 3 August 2023, in which it is stated:- “Before I came here shortly S asked me to help him carry leaflets and statements of the KDP. He talked about how the party are active for the freedom of Kurdistan and the Kurds. I supported them and started helping S. He took me with him and introduced me to the person from whom we received the boxes he told ne [sic] that you can call me with Rasho name they tells any one there [sic] actual name. I am not illiterate [sic] myself, but I asked S what the boxes contained. He said that they contained statements and leaflets and we took the to 2 different palce Rasho told us to always part ways after receiving the boxes. I did this 3 times and all 3 times I delivered the trust [sic] safely. Last time when we collected our boxes after delivery it was dark at night. I was heading back home when I saw intelligence cars and soldiers surrounding my house from a distance. I was very scared....” Within the questionnaire, the Appellant also stated that “I attended to demonstrations but I do not have any proof or pic to not putting risk on my family.” have The Appellant also sought to make amendments to the Screening Interview in the questionnaire — amending his name, the name of his village and clarifying that his maternal uncle had helped him with his journey. I mean no disrespect in quoting the various spelling and grammatical errors in the questionnaire, but have reproduced them in circumstances where they are potentially relevant to how the Appellant says the document was prepared.”
25. Ultimately the Judge concluded this could not be accepted but he only did so after noting that the interview was just 17 minutes long and other observations with reference to the decision in YL (rely on SEF) China [2004] UKIAT 00145 which calls for caution before relying on screening interviews. The Judge referred at length to the potentially traumatic journey to the UK and issues with the recording of the interview and its interpretation. Again, the Judge said he was prepared to accept that there were some issues with the interpretation of the different substantive interview at paragraph 34 of his decision.
26. The Judge concluded:
“Screening interviews are by their very nature, relatively short and I acknowledge that there can be inherent limitations with them. I accept that the Appellant may well have been asked to keep his answers relatively brief, but I do not accept, however, that he was asked to only answer “Yes” or “No” and the transcript, which shows a number of more detailed responses, weighs against this suggestion — to include the more detailed answers to the questions at 3.1 and 4.1 of the Screening Interview. Despite clearly having been given the opportunity to provide detailed answers, the transcript makes no mention at all of political materials, the raid on his home or his father’s arrest. I am wholly satisfied that if reference to this had been made, it would have been interpreted and recorded in the transcription. In my view, these are not the vagaries of whether an appropriate translation is ‘slogan’ or ‘statement’, they are matters that go to the very heart of the basis of the claim and their omission is significant. The core of the Appellant’s claim, as now presented, is that having delivered political materials for the KDPI, he fled Iran within 24 hours of his house being raided by the authorities and his father being arrested. I find that the Appellant’s failure to mention this factual matrix in screening interview weighs significantly against his account and represents a material inconsistency. These matters are at the very heart of why the Appellant now says he fears return and if he genuinely feared return for these reasons at the time of his screening interview, he could have had few greater priorities than highlighting them in his asylum claim at the earliest opportunity. That the Appellant mentioned matters pertaining to alcohol, which are peripheral to his claimed fear, but not these central aspects in an interview which took place more than 2 weeks after arrival is a matter to which I give considerable weight.”
27. In my judgment, the Judge fully, clearly and lawfully dealt with the screening interview and the questionnaire and substantive interview. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that the Judge provided unimpeachable reasoning, supported by case law why in this case the Appellant’s version of matters could not be correct. In my judgment there is no material error of law which arises from Ground 1. The Appellant submissions are a mere disagreement with the Judge’s decision and an attempt to reargue the case. The Judge dealt with the matters raised before him. The fact that the Appellant does not agree with the Judge is not a material error of law.
28. Ground 2 raises the issues of the KDPI material, but again this was dealt with in an exemplary manner by the Judge in my view. As the Judge explained at paragraphs 43 and 44 of his decision, the Appellant’s claim had changed. The Judge was entitled to note that and to make a decision as to whether it affected the Appellant’s credibility. There is no material error when the Judge explained as follows:
“…also find that the Appellant gave a somewhat evolving account of events pertaining the delivery of leaflets at the hearing. When asked if he and S had worked together on the three occasions, they delivered materials the Appellant specifically said “Yes. We went together to collect the leaflets but would deliver them separately.” However, when subsequently asked how long it had been since he had seen S, the Appellant stated ‘that on that occasion I did not see S.....on the last occasion no, we did not go together. I saw him the night before. The timeslot to pick up and deliver was different. All arranged by Rashu”.
Since raising the political materials, the Appellant has consistently maintained that he had delivered leaflets on 3 occasions. I find that the Appellant’s oral evidence as to whether S was with him when collecting leaflets for delivery was not consistent and that this weighs against his account — although it is a matter to which I give only limited weight.”
29. These were clearly matters for the Judge. He had the benefit of seeing and hearing from the Appellant at the hearing. He also heard from Mr Coyte at the hearing.
30. In respect of Ground 3, the Judge dealt extensively with the Appellant’s claimed political activities and his sur place activities at paragraphs 46 to 60. This included as follows when in my judgment the Judge lawfully and clearly concluded as follows:
“The Appellant has asserted that even if not found to be credible, he would face a real risk of mistreatment on return to Iran. I at have taken account of the illegal Exit CPIN which indicates that a person will not be real risk of persecution or serious harm based on their illegal exit alone [2.4.9] — such position also being in keeping with XX (PJAK) and that there is no law in Iranian legislation that makes applying for asylum abroad a punishable offence [5.3.1]. As the Appellant left Iran illegally and states that he has no original ID, if returned to Iran, he would potentially be travelling on emergency documents that would trigger the “pinch point” of the authorities, either when applying for those documents or on arrival in Iran. I bear in mind that he is a Kurd and find it is likely that at either time, the Appellant’s background would be researched. He has not, however, engaged in sur place activity and denied using social media at all in oral evidence, such that there is no as publicly available account of any stated political views. I also accept that on return a that Kurd, who had illegally exited and who had been returned, he would be likely to face questioning, including his reasons for leaving Iran. In circumstances where I have found the Appellant has no genuine political opinions which a fundamental aspect of his belief or personality, not disclosing the basis of his claim or his purported political opinion would not infringe the HJ(Iran) principle. represent 56. 57. Even allowing for his individual characteristics and ethnicity, I am not satisfied that the Appellant would be at risk on return solely as a result of his illegal exit/failed asylum claim. kolbar. I The Appellant also seeks to suggest that he would be at risk for smuggling alcohol as a note the position in the ASA is somewhat at odds with the Appellant’s assertion in the asylum interview that he had no fears in relation to his claimed smuggling of alcohol.”
31. Again, the Judge dealt fully with the risk on return, including citing the correct law with reference to the background material. In my judgment, the Judge’s assessment of the risk on return is exemplary.
32. Therefore, despite Mr Coyte saying all he could on behalf of the Appellant, I conclude that there is no material error of law in the Judge’s decision.
33. Accordingly, I dismiss the Appellant’s appeal against the Judge’s decision. Therefore, the Judge’s decision which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds stands.

NOTICE OF DECISION
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain a material error of law.
Therefore, the First-tier Tribunal Judge’s decision which had dismissed the appeal on all grounds stands.
The Appellant’s appeal remains dismissed on all grounds.

12 August 2026
Abid Mahmood
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber