Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000175
First-tier Tribunal No: IA/10102/2021

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 17th of June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

DAI VAN BUI
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: No-one present
For the Respondent: Ms Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 1 May 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Background
1. The appellant appeals, with the permission of the Upper Tribunal, a decision of a First-Tier Tribunal Judge (“the FTTJ”) promulgated on 5 August 2025 dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision of 21 July 2021 to refuse his human rights claim made whilst applying to revoke the deportation order made against him on 15 December 2009. That deportation order was made after the appellant’s sentence on 3 February 2009 to 14 months’ imprisonment for an offence arising from presenting a false Norwegian passport upon arrival in the UK in January 2009.
2. The appellant produced, as part of his case, expert evidence suggesting that he would not be able to obtain a Ho Khau document or otherwise redocument himself and therefore would face very significant obstacles to reintegration into Vietnam.
3. The FTTJ found that the appellant had not established that he would be unable to redocument himself and those were part of his reasons for finding that there were no very compelling circumstances meaning the appellant’s deportation would be disproportionate (the appellant could not satisfy the private life exception and the FTTJ found on the facts that he did not satisfy the family life exception as although it would be unduly harsh for the appellant’s partner to go to Vietnam with him, it would not be unduly harsh for her to remain in the UK without the appellant).
4. When granting permission, the deputy judge drew the parties’ attention to an unreported decision of the Upper Tribunal finding that a person removed to Vietnam with only an ETD could be redocumented on return. He noted that this would make it difficult for the appellant to show that any failure by the judge was material.
5. The deputy judge also directed the appellant should obtain forthwith a transcript of the hearing before the FTT and that if either party wished to rely on further evidence they should file it with an application under rule 15(2A) of the Upper Tribunal Procedure Rules no later than 14 days before the hearing of the appeal.
6. The respondent filed a rule 24 response denying that there was an error of law, and seeking to rely, for materiality purposes, on the unreported decision of the Upper Tribunal and the two witness statements filed in that appeal concerning the ability of those who obtain an ETD to redocument.
7. The appellant did not obtain a transcript of the hearing before the FTT. The appellant did not even file a composite electronic bundle in accordance with directions, despite a reminder of 20 April to do so.
8. The appellant’s former solicitors came off the record. On 23 April, the Upper Tribunal administration having received information that new solicitors were acting for the appellant, invited them to send a letter of authority. By return letter of the same date, the solicitors said that following their advice, the appellant had instructed that he did not wish to pursue the appeal further and that they were “in the process of formally notifying the Tribunal of withdrawal” and therefore they did not propose to come on record. They were informed that they needed to be on record to adduce a notice of withdrawal. The new solicitors did not come on record and did not file a notice of withdrawal.
The hearing
9. No-one attended the hearing. I checked the Upper Tribunal’s records and a notice of hearing for the correct date was sent to the appellant’s last known address by post on 20 March 2026. The tribunal clerk attempted to telephone the appellant at the phone number on tribunal records, but the phone rang straight through to voicemail.
10. I considered rule 38 of the Upper Tribunal Procedure Rules. This enables the Upper Tribunal to proceed in a party’s absence if the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that the party has been notified of the hearing or reasonable steps have been taken to notify the party of the hearing and that it is in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing.
11. I was satisfied that the appellant had been notified of the hearing. A notice of hearing was sent directly to his last known address well in advance of the hearing, and, additionally, those who were advising him about withdrawal corresponded with the Upper Tribunal with a subject heading giving the appellant’s name and the date of the hearing.
12. I considered it was in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing in the absence of the appellant. It was apparent that the appellant was not interested in pursuing his appeal. He had not obtained a transcript or filed a bundle of evidence and the representatives advising him indicated that he did not wish to pursue the appeal. That strongly indicated that there would be no purpose in adjourning to another date to see if the appellant might attend on another occasion.
13. I told Ms Clewley that I would be proceeding in the absence of the appellant and invited her to make submissions, which she did. At the conclusion of her submissions, I reserved my decision. I also explained that I might consider a notice of withdrawal if it was filed after the hearing, and she made submissions against that. In the event, no notice of withdrawal has been received.
The grounds; my conclusions
14. Whilst I have the grounds, the FTTJ’s decision, the permission decisions, the rule 24 response and evidence submitted by the respondent, the appellant has not submitted a bundle, and because the appeal in the First-Tier Tribunal was remitted to the First-Tier Tribunal by the Upper Tribunal, the appeal is not on the myHMCTS database. I do have access to the evidence which was before the Upper Tribunal when they made the decision remitting to the FTTJ, but one of the expert reports postdates that decision (referred to as “CER3”) by the FTTJ. I have not seen that report.
15. The first part of the grounds avers that the FTTJ committed a procedural or other irregularity by deciding a material aspect of the appeal on an issue that only occurred to him on preparation of his decision, without giving the appellant an opportunity to address the issue. It was said that issue had not been addressed or raised in argument and it caused prejudice to the appellant.
16. The FTTJ found at [28] that the expert reports were fundamentally undermined as regards the appellant’s ability to obtain a Ho Khau document, or register under the new system, by the fact that the expert did not explicitly consider the appellant’s conviction in Vietnam or prison sentence and escape. That was relevant to the documents which might be held on the appellant by the Vietnamese authorities and therefore his ability to redocument. Dr Tran would have needed to consider whether the authorities would have records of such a person and if not why not [29]. The FTTJ explained that point only became apparent when preparing the decision and on a scrutiny of the evidence and the chronology [30].
17. I do not consider there to have been any unfairness to the appellant. It is right that the matter has had a long history, but the expert appears to have been aware of the appellant’s prison history and did not deal with the issue. The appellant’s representative would have been aware of what the appellant was saying about being in prison and it was an obvious point to raise and ask the expert to consider or clarify. The respondent did not raise this specifically and the respondent did have an opportunity to take specific issue with the expert evidence, but I agree with the rule 24 response that the respondent did not have to point out the gap; the appellant had to prove his case.
18. The second part of the grounds avers that the FTTJ failed to provide adequate reasons for finding that the expert reports were fatally undermined. CER3 had said that the appellant would need to apply for a new citizen ID card requiring some other compulsory Vietnamese identification papers and various background checks. The expert opined that the appellant would be unlikely to be issued with a new citizen ID card as the authorities were not likely to be satisfied that he was who he claimed to be without some form of ID, and that as there was uncertainty as to the period for which paper records were kept the authorities were unlikely to be able to access records relating to his previous ID card/papers.
19. However, as appears from the rule 24 response and as Ms Clewley has pointed out, the grounds do not challenge the FTTJ’s decision at [31] and [32] about the serious inconsistencies in the appellant’s chronology and his inconsistency about whether he had a Ho Khau or not. Firstly, it seems unlikely that prison records would not be accessible purely because they were paper. Secondly, the expert was unclear about the length of time for which paper records were kept but given the FTTJ’s findings at [31] – [32] the FTTJ could not be satisfied that the appellant would not have access to documentation which would assist him in proving his identity. Accordingly, the FTTJ’s reasoning on the point was adequate.
20. The grounds also say that the FTTJ failed to provide adequate reasons because the appellant’s UK criminal record was sufficient to give rise to risk. The expert report however did not mean that the criminal record would give rise to risk in itself, rather that if a person was looking for a job, their profile/CV had to be approved by the local police and if there were negative comments because the person had a criminal record that would make it difficult to obtain a decent job with good payment and working conditions. The FTTJ considered at [50] all the points made and accepted that the appellant would face difficulties finding work, but was not satisfied given the issues with the expert report and the limited other evidence that he would face very significant obstacles to integration. Given the inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence and that the FTTJ found that the expert report had not considered all the circumstances, the FTTJ’s conclusion was perfectly adequately reasoned.
21. There is therefore no error of law in the FTTJ’s decision.
22. The respondent seeks to adduce evidence that even if there had been an error of law, it would not be material because the new evidence, and the unreported decision, show that a person removed to Vietnam with only an ETD can use that ETD to redocument. I consider that there is a real difficulty in adducing this material at the error of law stage because both witness statements from the respondent pre-date the FTTJ decision and so the evidence could have been produced to the FTTJ. For an error to be immaterial, it must be clear on the materials before the FTTJ that any rational tribunal must have come to the same conclusion.
23. However it would obviously be in the interests of justice for this evidence to be adduced on any remaking hearing if an error of law had been found, and in the absence of any further evidence produced by the appellant (and none has been) it is difficult to see how the appellant’s appeal could ultimately succeed, even had I found an error of law in respect of the FTTJ’s treatment of the expert evidence about redocumentation and the reasoning given for redocumentation.
Notice of Decision
The judge’s decision contains no error of law and stands. The appellant’s appeal fails and is dismissed.
A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 June 2026