Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000208
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/04066/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 15th of May 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COLE

Between

DA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr C Timson, Counsel instructed by Faraj Law Ltd
For the Respondent: Dr S Ibisi, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 8 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant.

Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a citizen of Iran. He arrived in the UK on 3 December 2023 and claimed asylum. His protection claim was refused, and his appeal to the First-tier Tribunal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal in a decision dated 11 November 2025. The appellant now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.

Background

2. The appellant is an Iranian citizen of Kurdish ethnicity. He claimed to have distributed leaflets for the KDPI at the behest of his uncle. He stated that his uncle and his two co-distributors were arrested and that his home was raided. The appellant then left Iran illegally.

3. In the UK the appellant has attended demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy in London and has posted material against the Iranian government on Facebook.

4. The respondent refused the protection claim. It was accepted that the appellant was Iranian and Kurdish and that he left Iran illegally. The respondent did not accept the appellant’s account of events in Iran and so concluded that he was not of adverse interest to the Iranian authorities.

5. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. The appeal was heard by Judge Fox on 28 August 2025.

6. Judge Fox dismissed the appellant’s appeal in a decision dated 11 November 2025.

7. The appellant submitted grounds of challenge, and First-tier Tribunal, Judge Le Grys granted permission on the following terms:

1. The application is in time.

2. The grounds assert that the Tribunal erred in:

i. Misapplying the lower standard of proof.
ii. Failing to assess the evidence in the round.
iii. Engaging in speculation and conjecture.
iv. Failing to consider the impact of illiteracy on social media evidence.
v. Materially mischaracterising the sur place activity.
vi. Failing to apply country guidance on illegal exist and Kurdish ethnicity.
vii. Failing to engage with the core of the claim.
viii. Procedural unfairness in respect of the treatment of late evidence.

3. I shall primarily address ground six as this appears to be the most arguable. It is clear from an overall reading of the decision that the Judge did not accept the core of the Appellant’s account, or that he was a genuine political protester in the UK. It is arguably unclear, however, that the Judge considered whether there would remain any residual risk on account of the facts as he had found them. The reference in this respect at [45] is an arguable misdirection, as it suggests that the Judge required the Appellant to show a pre-existing adverse interest, and so does not address the hair-trigger approach of the authorities.

4. The remaining grounds are weaker and may amount to no more than a disagreement with the Judge’s findings of fact. As the grounds are all closely linked, however, I do not restrict the grant of permission.

8. Thus, the matter came before me to determine whether Judge ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law.

The Hearing

9. Mr Timson relied on the grounds as drafted. He then went through the grounds and expanded upon each of them. Mr Timson submitted that Grounds 1 and 2 set the tone. He highlighted the lack of reasons for the findings and the strange terminology of the decision. Mr Timson submitted that there was a significant amount of speculation by the Judge and a lack of consideration of the appellant’s accepted illiteracy. In relation to Ground 6, Mr Timson highlighted the lack of consideration of the relevant Country Guidance case.

10. Dr Ibisi relied upon the Rule 24 Response. She submitted that the Judge had given himself the correct self-direction and had applied the correct standard of proof. Dr Ibisi submitted that the decision must be read as a whole and that the findings were sufficiently reasoned. She submitted that the Judge had considered the sur place activities and had reached sufficiently reasoned conclusions.

11. Dr Ibisi submitted that the Judge had correctly applied XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC). She submitted that the appellant was not of interest to the authorities. Dr Ibisi submitted that the appellant’s activities were opportunistic and so he could delete his Facebook account.

12. In relation to Ground 6, Dr Ibisi submitted that there were no additional risk factors and so the Judge’s decision was sufficient on this issue.

13. Mr Timson briefly responded. He stated that the decision made very unusual descriptions of certain matters which indicated that the overall reasoning did not make sense. He submitted that there were clear errors of law in the decision.

14. After hearing the submissions, I reserved my decision.

Discussion and Analysis

15. When considering whether the judge made a material error in law in dismissing the appellant’s appeal, I have reminded myself of the following principles.

16. It is not permissible for the Upper Tribunal to simply disagree with the result or the way in which it was reached (see paragraph 36 of South Bucks County Council v Porter [2004] UKHL 33).

17. I take note of the narrow circumstances in which an appellate Tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility by the fact-finding Tribunal. In Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, the Court of Appeal confirmed that unless the First-tier Judge's decision is “rationally insupportable”, the Upper Tribunal should not interfere with findings of fact by the First-tier Judge who had seen and heard the oral evidence.

18. I also remind myself that the Upper Tribunal is required to exercise judicial restraint in its oversight of the First-tier Tribunal's reasoning, as detailed by the Court of Appeal in paragraph 26 of Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201.

19. I will deal with Ground 6 first because, as identified in the grant of permission, this is the strongest ground.

20. Judge Fox acknowledged that risk on return due to the accepted facts of the appellant’s Kurdish ethnicity and illegal exit was an issue for consideration (see paragraph 8(b)). The most recent relevant Country Guidance case, HB (Kurds) Iran (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) CG [2018] UKUT 430 (IAC), was referenced by the appellant and the respondent in their pleadings. The appellant’s Country Information Evidence Schedule referred to several reports on the situation in Iran which post-dated HB (Kurds).

21. However, the Judge’s consideration of this issue amounted to one sentence at paragraph 45 of his decision. The Judge stated, “Following SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran (CG) [2016], I am satisfied that there is no risk accruing to the Appellant upon return to Iran, as he has failed to demonstrate to the relevant standard that the authorities would have an adverse interest in him.”

22. This fails to adequately address the key issue of risk on return. The Judge references the incorrect Country Guidance case. The headnote of HB (Kurds) states, “(1) SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran CG [2016] UKUT 308 (IAC) remains valid country guidance in terms of the country guidance offered in the headnote. For the avoidance of doubt, that decision is not authority for any proposition in relation to the risk on return for refused Kurdish asylum-seekers on account of their Kurdish ethnicity alone.” Thus, it was incumbent on the Judge to consider HB (Kurds).

23. Furthermore, the country information produced by the appellant indicated a deterioration in the human rights situation for Kurds in Iran since the promulgation of HB (Kurds) and so it was necessary for the Judge to address his mind to the country information provided.

24. Overall, I find that Ground 6 is made out and the Judge materially erred in law in this aspect of his decision.

25. In relation to the appellant’s sur place activity, and particularly his Facebook activity, I find that the Judge’s decision discloses errors of law such that Ground 5 is made out.

26. The Judge makes no reference to XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC). Although specific reference to case law is not necessary if the relevant principles have been applied, I find that the Judge has failed to apply the relevant principles.

27. There is no analysis of the appellant’s “social graph” and whether the appellant has curated a “social graph” of sufficient prominence to establish that he has drawn enough attention to himself by the extent of his “real world” activities to have become the subject of targeted social media surveillance. I note that the appellant has 5,000 ‘friends’ on Facebook and has many interactions (likes and comments) on his posts. Thus, this was an issue that had to be addressed by the Judge.

28. Furthermore, the Judge states in paragraph 41 that “There is nothing in them to persuade me that the contents would generate an adverse interest in him, if the posts were known to the Iranian authorities.” It is not clear what the Judge was viewing when he reached this conclusion. The appellant’s Facebook posts are of a highly provocative and incendiary nature which would clearly result in a real risk of adverse treatment if seen by the Iranian authorities.

29. Finally on the Facebook issue, the Judge states at paragraph 42, “As I have found that the Appellant’s political disposition is a fiction, he would have no difficulty in deleting his social media accounts and not volunteering information to the authorities at the usual pinch points that he had such accounts.” The correct issue for assessment is whether the appellant would delete his Facebook account and would not volunteer information about his sur place activities; the fact that these actions would not be difficult is not the necessary finding to be made.

30. Therefore, the Judge materially erred in law in his assessment of the Facebook evidence.

31. The last issue to consider is whether the Judge’s findings regarding the credibility of the appellant’s claim are sustainable. The challenges to the Judge’s decision on this issue are not as clear cut and I have carefully analysed the decision, reminding myself of the principles set out in paragraphs 16 to 18 above.

32. As identified by Mr Timson in his submissions, there are certain phrases used by the Judge that are problematic. These are certainly suggestive of a failure to approach the evidence in a coherent manner. I find that I agree with Mr Timson that the decision is difficult to discern. I am not sure of the meaning of the Judge’s statement that “This feeds directly into a mitigation on his credibility.” There are several examples of confusing expressions.

33. Furthermore, there are several examples of the Judge stating that “something more is required” and “one would expect more”, or the appellant’s evidence is “not enough”. However, the Judge fails to indicate what “more” he required for the appellant’s claim to meet the relevant standard of proof. There is nothing in the decision to indicate that the Judge requested “more” information or detail from the appellant, or that the suggestion that his evidence was “not enough” was put to the appellant. This is procedurally unfair.

34. Paragraphs 29 and 30 of the decision contain unreasoned (and confusing) findings by the Judge. In paragraph 29 the Judge states regarding the appellant not being captured in Iran, “The authorities did not find him on his farm, nor when in hiding…He may well have been traced. He was not. He does not give any account of a close call or being aware of any searches.” It is unclear what the Judge means by this statement. Then is paragraph 30 the Judge states, “As he had a phone of his own, it is likely that he would retain some knowledge of phone numbers that he may have previously possessed.” It is not clear how the Judge reached this conclusion as it is unreasoned; I know that I have almost no knowledge of the phone numbers on my phone.

35. A further example of confusing and unreasoned findings is in paragraph 32. The Judge states, “If genuinely not in contact with his family, then I believe this is a deliberate ploy to enhance the asylum claim.” It is not clear in what manner the lack of contact with his family would enhance the appellant’s asylum claim. If the appellant was undertaking “a deliberate ploy to enhance the asylum claim”, then he would surely claim something along the lines that he had contacted his family who had told him that the authorities were regularly coming to their home looking for him? It is not clear the point the Judge is making in this paragraph, and his conclusions lack any reasoning.

36. Finally, in relation to the appellant's sur place activities, Mr Timson referred to paragraph 36 of the Judge’s decision and highlighted the unusual nature of the findings. It is not clear how the Judge delineates between a “demonstration” and a “gathering”; certainly, “passing gatherings” is an unexplained phrase that in my judgment does not accurately reflect the photographs produced. All the relevant photographs appear to be taken opposite the Iranian Embassy in London. There are groups of men (including the appellant) with anti-Iranian placards and there are police and barriers. I find that the Judge has failed to lawfully assess this aspect of the appellant’s evidence.

37. Overall, I find that there is a lack of adequate reasons provided by the Judge for his conclusion that the appellant’s account is not credible. In my judgment the findings of the Judge in relation to the credibility of the appellant’s account disclose material errors of law. I have considered the whole of decision as urged upon me by Dr Ibisi, but I find that the decision is legally flawed and must be set aside.

38. Therefore, in conclusion, I find that the decision of the Judge discloses material errors of law and must be set aside in entirety.

39. I have carefully considered the issue of disposal. There is a significant amount of fact-finding to be undertaken. Thus, applying the guidance in paragraph 7 of the Senior President's Practice Statement and AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC), given the issues and the amount of fact-finding that will be required to do, I am satisfied that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision

The First-tier Tribunal has been shown to have made an error of law material to the decision to dismiss the appeal. The determination is set aside. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal, Manchester for a de novo hearing before any judge other than Judge S T Fox.

C R Cole
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12 May 2026