Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000211
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67095/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 15th of April 2026

Before

DEPUTY TUPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DEAKIN

Between

Mr SM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THESECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms K Tobin (counsel) instructed by Fadiga & Co
For the Respondent: Mr M Pugh (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)

Heard at Field House on 11 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. SM appeals, with permission, against the 25 October 2025 decision of FTJ Row to dismiss his appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision to refuse his asylum claim.

2. I have weighed the confidentiality of the material provided against the important principle of open justice and concluded that the anonymity order should be maintained.

3. References “[x]” are to pages in the Upper Tribunal bundle. “(§x)” without qualification refers to paragraphs in the Judge’s decision.

Material Background

4. SM is a Pakistani national, date of birth 15 February 1995.

5. SM entered the United Kingdom on 15 October 2022 on a student visa (valid until 29 January 2024).

6. SM claimed asylum on 5 September 2023. In his substantive asylum interview on 13 May 2024 SM explained that he feared persecution at the hands of the Government of Pakistan and its security agencies as a result of his involvement in the United Kashmir Peoples’ National Party [‘UKPNP’] and his having arranged a protest outside the Pakistani High Commission in June 2023.

7. The Secretary of State refused this claim by decision of 11 June 2024. The Secretary of State was of the view that SM had provided inconsistent and insufficiently detailed evidence and so did not accept that material facts relied on to support SM’s claim to be at real risk of persecution.

8. SM appealed against this decision to the First-tier Tribunal. In his Appeal Skeleton Argument at §6, SM explained that, following the June UKPNP Protest outside the High Commission, Pakistani authorities visited his family home in Pakistan on two occasions and made threats about him. He also explained that he feared “…religious extremists and the general community who believe that members of UKPNP are Indian-agents and are anti-Islam because of their nationalist and secular views.” (Appeal Skeleton Argument at §7).

9. The Judge accepted that SM was a member of the UKPNP but found that he “… have never been anything other than a low-level member or supporter…” and that a low-level member or supporter of the UKPNP would not be at risk of either from the state or non-state actors in Pakistan (§54-55). The Judge also found that SM had fabricated his claim that the Pakistani authorities had visited his parents in Pakistan (§52). The Judge accordingly dismissed the appeal.

10. SM now appeals against the Judge’s decision on five grounds. I will address them in turn below.

Ground 1: Low Level Supporter

11. SM argues that the Judge erred in concluding that SM had never been anything more than a low-level member or supporter of the UKPNP. SM maintains, in particular, that the Judge:
a. failed to give any reasons for his finding;
b. failed to give appropriate consideration to the documentary evidence before him and failed to have regard to the fact that SM’s name and photograph had been published in Pakistani print media; and
c. failed in all the circumstances to give the requisite anxious scrutiny to the evidence before him.

12. It is not clear from the Appeal Skeleton Argument that SM did press the claim that he was a “leader” of the UKPNP before the First-tier Tribunal. Indeed, the Appeal Skeleton Argument appears to contrast “leaders” with “activists or outspoken critics” such as SM. Mr Pugh submitted that the Judge appears to have responded to the case as it was put and that the Judge’s short reasons were adequate to address the appeal before him.

13. While there is force in Mr Pugh’s submissions, I do not accept them. The issue of whether SM was a “low-level” or more senior member of the UKPNP was highly relevant to the Judge’s conclusions as to whether SM was at risk on return (see in particular §§41; 50; 54-55 of his decision) and the evidence before the Judge does raise a significant question as to SM’s seniority within the UKPNP. I refer, in particular to:
a. a 12 December 2024 letter from the Deputy General Secretary of the UKPNP which stated in terms that SM “… is a leading figure of United Kashmir People’s National Party” [216];
b. the screenshot of the UKPNP website listing members of the “Newly Elected Cabinet of UKPNP Croydon” and naming SM as “Organiser”[98];
c. letters from 13 April 2024 and 9 October 2024 from the President of the UK Chapter of the UKPNP confirming SM’s role as organiser; and
d. §43 of SM’s witness statement of 27 September 2024 [42].

14. I recognise that the First-tier Tribunal is an expert Tribunal and, further, that it is not necessary for a judge to “identify all of the evidence relied upon in reaching its findings of fact, to elaborate at length its conclusions on any issue of law, or to express every step of its reasoning” (see para. 6 of the Senior President of Tribunals’ Practice Direction: Reasons for Decision). However, where reasons are given they must be “…adequate, clear, appropriately concise, and focussed on the principle controversial issues…” Reasons must “explain to the parties why they have won and lost…” and must “enable an appellate body to understand why the decision was reached, so that is able to assess whether the decision involved the making of an error on a point of law…” (ibid. para. 5).

15. Whether SM was a “low level” supporter or member was an important issue in this appeal and, given the apparently contradictory evidence before him, it is necessary to be able to understand the basis on which the Judge concluded that SM was, in fact, a low level supporter or member of the UKPNP. In my judgment the Judge’s reasoning on this point is not sufficiently clear and I am unable to assess whether his conclusions were rationally reached. In my judgment this constitutes a material error of law.

16. As to SM’s claim that the Judge failed to take documentary evidence into account or failed to approach this evidence with anxious scrutiny, I accept (as set out above) that there is no requirement for a Judge to rehearse every detail of the issues raised in a case. But it is necessary for the Judge to identify and resolve key conflicts in the appeal. The Judge was presented with a significant amount of documentary evidence, including evidence that SM was named as a UKPNP organiser in Pakistani media. It is unclear whether the Judge took this material into account or, if he did, how he considered it to impact SM’s appeal. Again, in my judgment this constitutes a material error of law.

Ground 2: Pakistani Authorities’ Interest

17. SM argues that the Judge failed to provide reasons for rejecting SM’s account of Pakistani authorities’ interest in him and, in particular, his evidence of their visits to the family home. SM relies on the headnote of MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 00641 (IAC) – which provides as follows:
(1) It is axiomatic that a determination discloses clearly the reasons for a tribunal’s decision.
(2) If a tribunal finds oral evidence to be implausible, incredible or unreliable or a document to be worth no weight whatsoever, it is necessary to say so in the determination and for such findings to be supported by reasons. A bare statement that a witness was not believed or that a document was afforded no weight is unlikely to satisfy the requirement to give reasons.

18. In my Judgment there was no such error in the Judge’s approach. The Judge considered the evidence of Mr GZ and found that he had no direct knowledge of events in Pakistan (§48). The Judge addressed the evidence of Prof. Moeen and noted that she could not speak to the veracity of SM’s claims (§49). The Judge noted that SM had failed to provide the evidence from his parents that he could have been expected to provide (§51). Against that background the Judge concluded that the SM had fabricated the claim that his family had been visited by Pakistani authorities and that he had claimed asylum as his student visa was due to expire (§§52-53). While SM disagrees with the Judge’s findings, the reasons for those findings are clear and Ground 2 discloses no error of law.

Ground 3: Credibility Assessment

19. SM argues that the Judge erred in attaching weight to SM’s failure to provide an explanation for his not providing evidence from his parents about officials visiting the family home when this was not put to SM.

20. SM relies on §51 of the Judge’s decision: “The appellant could give no explanation why it had not been obtained. One explanation is that the events claimed did not happen. …” and submits that: “The appellant was never asked to provide an explanation for the absence of corroborating evidence from his family and he was therefore never given an opportunity to explain the absence of such evidence.” (Grounds of Appeal §9).

21. I do not accept that the Judge erred in his approach. “Particular passages in a decision should not be analysed as though they emanated from a Parliamentary draftsman” (see Y v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1223, per Keene LJ, at [24]. I consider the Judge’s findings on this point to be clear, namely that SM’s failure to provide corroborative evidence from his parents or to explain why he could not do so, weighed against him and I find that there was no unfairness in the Judge so finding. It appears from the note of proceedings [24] that SM was asked if he had “any letters of statements from family members” to evidence these visits and SM responded “No I don’t have any documentary evidence or letters but whenever they visited my family home my family will call me and tell me what happened.” The Judge was entitled to draw inferences from SM’s answer and fairness did not require further questions to be put before he could do so.

Ground 4: Non-State Actors

22. SM argues that the Judge erred in failing to make credibility findings in relation to SM’s claim that his family had also faced threats at the hands of “extremist Mullahs, who have become aware of his involvement with the UKPNP in the UK” (Grounds §10).

23. It is clear from §7 of the Appeal Skeleton Argument that the issue of threats from non-state actors was live before the First-tier Tribunal.

24. The Judge addressed this at §41, where he found that Prof. Moeen’s evidence provided “… little evidence to depart from the conclusion of the CPIN that low Level members and supporters of the UKPNP are not at risk … from … Non-state Actors” (the CPIN here refers to Country Policy and Information Note – Pakistan: Political Parties and Affiliation (May 2023)) and §50 “I find that the conclusion in the CPIN that the available evidence does not support the contention that low-level members of and supporters of separatist movements are at risk in Pakistan from the state or from non-state actors is correct.”

25. SM addressed the Mullahs’ interaction with his family at §48 of his 27 September 2024 witness statement [43] and at §7 of his 21 October 2025 witness statement [480]. These passages refer to “pressure” and warnings and SM’s father being “taunted” and asked why SM is now “anti-Islam” and refer to SM’s being called “anti-Islam and a traitor”. It is correct that these passages were not explicitly addressed by the Judge and that is a matter of concern. However, in my view this does not constitute a material error of law. The Judge’s conclusions turned on his finding that SM was a “low level” member or supporter of the UKPNP and that, applying the CPIN, low level supporters are not at risk from non-state actors. The evidence before the Judge suggesting that SM in particular was at risk from non-state actors was not such as to render the Judge’s reliance on the CPIN irrational. I find that the Judge was entitled to apply it as he did on the basis that SM was a low level member or supporter of the UKPNP and that Ground 4 discloses no error of law. (As set out above, I find that the Judge erred in his approach to the prior point – namely his approach to the issue of whether SM was a low level supporter or member of the UKPNP).

Ground 5: Approach to Background Evidence

26. SM argues that the Judge erred in his approach to the background evidence. In particular:
a. The Judge erred in drawing inferences from the lack of background evidence suggesting ill-treatment of Kashmiri separatists addressing evidence suggesting that this was due to a lack of reporting on the issue;
b. The Judge failed to engage to background evidence to which he had expressly been directed towards in submission;
c. The Judge failed to engage with evidence as set out in SM’s Country Schedule;
d. The Judge failed to engage with evidence relating to a media campaign in Pakistan suggesting that India has been funding the UKPNP.

27. Given my findings in respect of Ground 1, I can address Ground 5 and its 4 sub-grounds fairly briefly.

28. SM argues that the Judge “automatically” assumed that the absence of evidence of Kashmiri separatists’ ill-treatment pointed to the fact that such ill-treatment was not occurring and that he erred in failing to engage with the background material on this issue (in particular Prof. Moeen’s report and the Response to an information request Pakistan: UKPNP and political participation in Pakistan-administered Kashmir [‘COIR’] (15 January 2025)). I do not accept SM’s submissions on this point. The Judge considered Prof. Moeen’s report in detail at §22-41. At §34 the Judge correctly noted Prof. Moeen’s observation at §33 of her report that “there is very little evidence of objective evidence of Kashmir separatists’ ill-treatment in recent times…” and properly went on to rely on §36 of Prof. Moeen’s report in which she stated in terms “In my opinion, Pakistan has come a long way since incidents of abduction and unacknowledged detention of citizens by security and intelligence agencies first began to be recognised as a pattern around 2004. Today, the practice is acknowledged and condemned as manifestly illegal.” In my view the Judge’s reasoning was clear. He plainly had regard to Prof. Moeen’s report and the COIR (see §37) and he was not required to make explicit reference to reference to comments in those documents to the effect that human rights reporting was limited.

29. SM argues that the Judge was required to have explicit regard to a number of passages from the COIR that were referred to in submissions and that his failure to do so constituted an error of law. I do not accept that the Judge erred in this way. A Judge is not required to make reference to every point raised by a litigant. As set out above, a Judge’s reasoning must be “…adequate, clear, appropriately concise, and focussed on the principle controversial issues…” The Judge was not required to make express reference to the fine-grained points of detail in the COIR relied on by SM, even if these were raised in submissions. Save as set out above in relation to Ground 1, the reasons for his conclusions are clear.

30. Similarly in relation to SM’s argument that the Judge failed to have explicit regard to the Country Schedule: UKPNP, I do not accept that his failure to do so constitutes an error of law. I note that SM accepts, in his Grounds of Appeal, that the Judge was “not required to go through each and every source of background evidence relied upon” but goes on to state (without particulars) that the Judge “should have provided more substantial reasoning, which engaged or least acknowledged this evidence”. In my judgment he was not required to do so. I have no reason to consider that that Judge was not aware of the background material in this (see e.g. §§17 and 41) and (save in relation to Ground 1) the Judge’s reasons for his conclusions are clear.

31. Finally SM argues that the Judge failed to engage with SM’s evidence and submissions to the “relating to the existence of a media campaign in Pakistan, which suggests that India has been funding the UKPNP” (Grounds §11(d)). I do not accept that the Judge was required to address this material. Evidence of media reports suggesting that India had funded the UKPNP seems to me to be, at best, of tangential relevance to the Judge’s conclusion that, as a low level member or supporter of UKPNP, SM was not at risk from non-state actors. Save as set out in relation to Ground 1, I find the Judge’s reasons to be adequate.

Conclusion

32. I therefore allow SM’s appeal on Ground 1. Given the likely importance of the issue of SM’s role in the UKPNP to any future determination, I set aside the Judge’s decision in its entirety and remit this matter to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing.

Notice of Decision

1. Appeal allowed.
2. Appeal to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing by a different Judge.
3. For the avoidance of doubt, no findings are preserved.

Andrew Deakin

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 April 2026