Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000212
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62742/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

3rd September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PICKERING

Between

SC
(ANONYMITY ORDERED)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Aghyaere of Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Tufan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission of the Upper Tribunal, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his claim for asylum.
2. The appeal came before me at an error of law hearing. For the reasons set out below, I have decided that the First-tier Tribunal did not err in law and I decline to set aside the Tribunal's decision. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing the appellant's appeal shall stand.
Background
3. The appellant claimed to be a member of the BNP both in Bangladesh and in the United Kingdom. He contended that, as a consequence of his BNP membership and activities, he came to the attention of the Awami League in Bangladesh. He claimed that false criminal cases had been lodged against him. He also asserted that he had received threats and would be at risk on return because of his UK based activities. His case was that, notwithstanding the change of government in Bangladesh, he would remain at real risk on return.
4. In terms of the Judge's findings, the Judge did not accept that the appellant had any involvement with the BNP in Bangladesh. The Judge's reasons for rejecting that aspect of the appellant's claim are set out at paragraphs 45 to 84 of the determination.
5. The Judge found that the appellant did not have a false criminal case lodged against him.
6. In terms of the appellant's UK activities, the Judge accepted that the appellant:
(a) was a member of the BNP in the UK;
(b) had been active in his opposition to the former Awami League government whilst in the UK;
(c) had attended approximately six protest meetings and demonstrations;
(d) was very low-level in his activism against the Awami League;
(e) had not been the subject of targeting by the Awami League; and
(f) had not told the truth about his home being visited by the police in Bangladesh whilst he was in the UK.
7. Ultimately the Judge went on to dismiss the appellant’s asylum and human rights claim.
The basis of the application
8. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. Their initial application to the First-tier was refused, but on a renewal to the Upper Tribunal permission was granted. Whilst the Upper Tribunal did not restrict the grant of permission, the clear focus of the grant of permission was on the Judge’s treatment of the Country Policy and Information Note: Bangladesh: Political Situation, Version 1.0, December 2024 ("the 2024 CPIN") and arguments why the appellant would be at risk.
9. When considering the original grounds of appeal together with the renewed grounds seeking permission, there are, in substance, thirteen grounds. I have attempted to group these together in my analysis and have addressed them in the following way.
Ground 1 of the original application submits that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons.
Ground 2 of the original application advances that the Judge failed to resolve conflicts of fact.
Ground 3 of the original application avers that the Judge's credibility findings were perverse and/or irrational.
Ground 4 of the original application, together with grounds 3, 4 and 5 of the renewed application, advance that the Judge did not adequately assess risk to the appellant in light of the positive sur place findings and failed properly to consider the background evidence and the arguments advanced as to why the CPIN should not be followed.
Grounds 5 and 7 of the original application concern the appellant's health and advance that the Judge adopted a flawed approach to Article 3 medical grounds.
Ground 6 of the original application, together with grounds 1, 2 and 6 of the renewed application, all address procedural unfairness.
Discussion and decision
Grounds 6 of the original application, 1, 2 and 6 of the renewed grounds
10. Taking the grounds out of turn, I can dispose of grounds 1, 2 and 6 of the renewed application relatively briefly, as they largely fall away because, irrespective of the decision of the Upper Tribunal not to restrict the grant of permission, a decision by the Upper Tribunal to grant permission supersedes the decision of the First-tier Tribunal refusing permission.
11. That said, these matters were aired before me, and I make the following brief observations.
12. Ground 1 alleges that the Judge of the First-tier Tribunal, when refusing permission, deferred to the seniority of the Judge who dismissed the appeal because that Judge also sat as a Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal. It is said that the Judge refusing permission felt obliged to refuse permission because of the seniority of the Judge who had determined the appeal.
13. That ground is wholly without foundation.
14. Judges take an oath to do right to all manner of people without fear or favour, affection or ill will. It is against that backdrop that the refusal of permission must be viewed. There is nothing in either the form or substance of the refusal decision which indicates that the Judge was influenced in any way by the fact that the Judge dismissing the appeal also sat as a Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal.
15. As to Ground 2, there is nothing to suggest that the Judge directed himself to the wrong legal test. The applicable test was whether the grounds were arguable, as is evident from paragraph 5 of the refusal of permission decision.
16. As can be seen from my overall decision, contrary to what is advanced in ground 6 there is no cumulative impact of individual errors of law such as to render the decision unsafe
Ground 1 of the original application
17. Returning to the order of the grounds as set out above, Ground 1 asserts that the Judge gave inadequate reasons for finding that the appellant had not had a false case lodged against him notwithstanding the Judge's acceptance that, viewed against the country evidence, it was plausible that such cases do occur.
18. The recent authority of MN (Vietnam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 485 helpfully summarises the law concerning adequacy of reasons. The relevant principles may be summarised as follows:
(a) reasons must be intelligible and adequate;
(b) they must enable the losing party to understand why they have lost;
(c) reasons need not be lengthy or elaborate; and
(d) appellate restraint is required: an appellate tribunal should not assume error merely because every step in the reasoning process is not expressly set out.
19. The Judge addressed the false case allegation specifically at paragraphs 102 to 118 of the determination. Those findings must also be considered in the context of the wider credibility findings.
20. Put another way, the fact that the country material demonstrated that false cases can be lodged did not require the Judge to conclude that this appellant was one of the individuals against whom such a false case had been brought.
21. The Judge weighed the evidence in the round and explained the reasons for finding that the appellant did not have false cases lodged against him. Those findings were open to the Judge on the evidence.
Ground 2 of the original application
22. In substance, Ground 2 criticises the Judge for failing to take the appellant's mental health difficulties into account when finding that the appellant had given inconsistent evidence.
23. At paragraph 33 of the determination, the Judge recorded that he decided to treat the appellant as a vulnerable adult witness in accordance with Joint Presidential Guidance Note No. 2 of 2010: Child, Vulnerable Adult and Sensitive Appellant Guidance.
24. As a consequence of that decision, the Judge made adjustments to facilitate the giving of evidence, including directing that cross-examination be conducted appropriately and that the appellant could take breaks as required. The Judge noted that no further requests for adjustments were made.
25. At paragraphs 48 to 69 of the determination, the Judge explained the impact of his decision to treat the appellant as vulnerable upon his assessment of the evidence. Ultimately, having analysed the medical evidence, the Judge concluded that it did not adequately explain the inconsistencies in the appellant's account.
26. Contrary to what is advanced in the grounds, the Judge plainly did consider the appellant's mental health and gave reasons that were open to him for finding that it did not materially affect his assessment of the appellant's credibility.
Ground 3 of the original application
27. Ground 3 alleges perversity in the credibility findings. Specifically, it is said that it was irrational for the Judge not to accept that the appellant was a member of, or active for, the BNP in Bangladesh when positive findings had been made regarding his involvement with the BNP in the United Kingdom. It is further argued that the irrationality lies in the undisputed background evidence demonstrating that BNP activists have been targeted and that the appellant had a family association with the BNP.
28. Two points arise.
29. First, the Judge expressly acknowledged that the appellant's account of adverse interest from the Awami League was consistent with the background material contained within the 2020 CPIN (paragraphs 46 and 47 of the determination). However, the fact that aspects of the country material were capable of supporting the appellant's account was not determinative of the appeal.
30. Secondly, perversity is a high threshold. It is not sufficient to demonstrate that another judge might have reached a different conclusion. The question is whether the finding was one no reasonable judge could have reached. Paragraphs 46 to 120 of the determination set out the Judge's credibility findings in considerable detail. The Judge gave extensive reasons explaining why he ultimately rejected the appellant's account. It was a matter for the Judge, having weighed all of the evidence, to conclude that the country material was insufficient to persuade him that the appellant had in fact been involved with the BNP in Bangladesh as claimed.
Ground 4 of the original application and Grounds 3, 4 and 5 of the renewed application
31. A discrete point was raised that the Judge wrongly characterised the appellant's UK activism as "low-profile".
32. The grounds refer to paragraph 125. However, that paragraph contains the Judge's conclusion and must be read in the context of the determination as a whole, including paragraphs 85 to 96. When read in that way, the Judge's characterisation was one that was open to him on the evidence.
33. The grant of permission from the Upper Tribunal focused primarily upon the substance of Ground 4 and Grounds 3, 4 and 5 of the renewed grounds, which can be distilled into concerns surrounding the adequacy of the Judge's treatment of the change in country conditions and his approach to the 2024 CPIN.
34. The difficulty for the appellant is that the challenge to the CPIN assumes the appellant had established a political profile giving rise to risk. The Judge's primary finding was that he had not done so. In circumstances where the factual core of the claim had been rejected, the significance of the country evidence was materially reduced. The Judge was therefore entitled to conclude that even if aspects of the country evidence demonstrated continuing political instability, that did not establish a real risk to this appellant.
35. The grant of permission expressed concern as to whether, in the context of an otherwise detailed determination, the Judge had adequately dealt with the challenges made to the 2024 CPIN and the associated country evidence.
36. There is no requirement for a judge to refer to every item of evidence. At paragraph 32 of the determination the Judge expressly recorded the documentary material before him, including the supplementary bundle.
37. The Judge found that there was no evidence that the appellant held views opposed to the Yunus Government. The Judge relied upon the 2024 CPIN in reaching his conclusions.
38. The skeleton argument set out the reasons why the CPIN was said to be out of date or unsafe to rely upon:
(i) post-publication evidence in 2025 demonstrated continued political violence, mob lynchings, high crime and public-order crackdowns;
(ii) protection capacity was markedly degraded nationwide;
(iii) security sector impunity continued without substantive reform; and
(iv) the interim government was not truly "all-party" in nature because there was no meaningful BNP representation.
39. The skeleton argument submitted that limited weight should be attached to the CPIN and that preference should be given to later and better sourced material.
40. Whilst it is correct that the Judge did not deal expressly with each of these points in turn, there was no requirement for him to do so. MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 49 confirms that, even where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned, an appellate tribunal should be slow to infer that it was not taken into account.
41. The appeal skeleton argument invited little weight to be attached to the CPIN. Properly understood, therefore, this ground is principally a disagreement about weight. Weight is a matter for the Judge.
42. Further, the skeleton argument does not, beyond assertion, clearly identify how the criticisms of the CPIN were supported by evidence such as to require a different conclusion.
43. At paragraphs 125 to 127 the Judge specifically considered the fall of the Awami League government, the composition of the Yunus administration and developments within state institutions. Whilst the appellant contends that different weight should have been attached to competing evidence contained within the supplementary bundle, the determination demonstrates engagement with the central issue.
44. The Judge was entitled to prefer the CPIN evidence and, having rejected the appellant's account of adverse interest and political profile, it was rationally open to him to conclude that the appellant was not at risk on return.
45. These grounds properly characterised as disagreement with findings open to the Judge rather than an arguable inadequacy of reasoning.

Grounds 5 and 7
46. Ground 5 concerns the Judge's approach to AM (Art 3; health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 00131 (IAC).
47. The Judge directed himself correctly as to the applicable test and concluded that the appellant had not established that he was a seriously ill person. The Judge considered the medical evidence in detail at paragraphs 48 to 67 of the determination. The conclusion reached as to the limited weight to be attached to aspects of that evidence was one that was open to the Judge.
48. The Judge's ultimate finding was that the evidence fell a long way short of demonstrating that the appellant was a seriously ill person within the meaning of the relevant jurisprudence. That finding was open to him.
49. Ground 7 advances a mistake of fact argument in relation to the medical evidence. It is not suggested that the Judge failed to consider the GP letter. Rather, it is said that the Judge misunderstood its contents.
50. The grounds contend that the letter referred to suicidal thoughts, referral on a severe depression pathway, poor sleep and poor appetite and that these matters were directly relevant to cognitive functioning and reliability of recall
51. However, that latter proposition is not stated in the GP letter itself.
52. The GP did not express the opinion that those matters affected the appellant's cognitive functioning or his ability accurately to recall events. The contention that such a conclusion ought to have been drawn is a submission. It does not establish a factual mistake by the Judge.
53. Accordingly, no error of law is disclosed.
Conclusion
54. None of the grounds of appeal discloses a material error of law in the reasoning or conclusions of the First-tier Tribunal. I decline to set the decision aside.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law.
The appellant's appeal is dismissed.

RA Pickering