Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000215
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01341/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 23rd April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KHAN

Between

N C
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M. Spencer, instructed by Duncan Lewis Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr M. Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 30 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (‘the Upper Tribunal’). The Upper Tribunal is an independent decision-making body with powers given to it by an Act of Parliament. This decision is made in the context of the Upper Tribunal’s role in considering statutory appeals from decisions made by the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (‘the First-tier Tribunal’).
2. The losing party in an appeal before the First-tier Tribunal can apply for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. If permission is granted, the Upper Tribunal will consider the legal arguments put forward by both sides in the appeal. The Upper Tribunal only has power to set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal if it concludes that the arguments put forward by the party that applied to appeal show that the decision involved the making of an error of law: see section 12 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (‘TCEA 2007’).
3. If the Upper Tribunal finds that a decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law, the First-tier Tribunal decision will stand. If a decision of the First-tier Tribunal is found to involve the making of an error of law the Upper Tribunal has power to set aside the decision. The Upper Tribunal will then decide whether it will remake the decision or whether the appeal might need to be reheard in the First-tier Tribunal.
4. The appellant (NC) is a dual national of Hungary and Serbia. By these proceedings she appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 2 December 2025 to dismiss her human rights claim against a decision of the respondent (‘SSHD’) to deport her following her conviction on 4 April 2022 of possession of cocaine with intent to supply (and other lesser offences) and subsequent sentence of 28 months imprisonment.
5. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Lawrence on 7 January 2026.
6. The matter now comes before me to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal erred in law, and, if so, whether any such error was material and whether the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside.
7. The appellant and respondent were ably represented by Mr Spencer and Mr Parvan, respectively. I am grateful to them for their very helpful submissions.
8. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity direction and that direction is maintained.
Grounds
9. Although permission was granted on grounds 1 & 2 (Ground 1: Error in holding no separate Withdrawal Agreement consideration, and Ground 2: Error in the assessment of Articles 3 and/or 8 ECHR) only ground 2 was pursued at the hearing on the basis that ground 1 had since been overtaken by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Molnar and Vargova v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 31.
10. In a very helpful skeleton argument prepared by Mr Spencer, ground 2 was presented in three limbs:
(i) The First-tier Tribunal judge (‘FTTJ’) took into account an irrelevant consideration and/or failed to rationally assess the medical evidence from Professor Sen in relying on the fact that the appellant is not currently in treatment and her condition is stable.
(ii) The FTTJ failed to consider the relevance of the extent of the appellant’s past self-harm, and in particular that she would only seek medical help after she had self-harmed.
(iii) The FTTJ failed to have regard to the material evidence including whether the appellant’s family would be likely to support her financially on return.
Findings and reasons
11. I have considered the First-tier Tribunal decision, the documentation that was before it, the grounds of appeal, and the submissions made at this hearing, before coming to a decision in this appeal. It is not necessary to summarise the oral submissions because they are a matter of record, but I will refer to any relevant arguments in the decision.
12. I bear in mind that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of a specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings: see HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 49. When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v FTT (SEC) [2013] UKSC 19.
Ground 2 (i) – Assessment of Appellant’s likelihood of establishing herself in Hungary/Serbia
13. Turning to limb (i), the appellant submits that there is a logical gap/unexplained reasoning in the FTTJ’s reasoning when assessing the likelihood of the appellant establishing herself in Serbia or Hungry. In this respect, Mr Spencer relies on section 5 of Professor Sen's Expert report (‘the report’) which sets out his expert opinion about the appellant.
14. At paragraph 5.2. of the report, Professor Sen confirms a diagnosis of emotionally unstable personality disorder (‘EUPD’) which is a psychiatric condition that indicates vulnerability starting from adolescence. The condition affects all aspects of the appellant’s life leading to a liability to become involved in unstable interpersonal relationships, mood instability, attachment difficulties and attempts at self harm. At paragraph 5.6 of the report, it states that the appellant has a previous history of self-harm and that the preferred treatment is dialectical behavioural therapy. In this regard, Professor Sen states that while he is not able to comment on the depth of health services in Hungary or Serbia, he can say that even in the UK which has some specialist borderline personality disorder services, it has been found difficult to manage patients with EUPD especially when they present in a crisis following any psychosocial stressor.
15. At paragraph 5.5. of the report, Professor Sen confirms that EUPD makes the appellant vulnerable to psychosocial stressors which act as triggers leading to a deterioration in the symptoms of the appellant’s condition. He states removal from the UK would be a severe stressor because all of the appellant’s family (parents and sibling) with whom she is very close live in the UK.
16. At paragraph 5.6. of the report, Professor Sen states that the appellant would perceive her removal as a severe psychological stressor as it would involve being removed from her family and ‘if there was a worsening of her symptoms of [EUPD] of the borderline type like not being able to do anything, feeling empty and lacking interest in anything, symptoms which she currently reports, the likelihood of her establishing herself in Hungary or Serbia is low’.
17. In the addendum report of August 2025, Professor Sen remained ‘pessimistic about the prospect of the appellant establishing herself in Hungary or Serbia’ observing that the appellant rarely left the house (where she lives with her parents) and suffers from significant social anxiety which would likely worsen if she were deported.
18. The appellant’s challenge is made to the FTTJ’s conclusion at [75] of the decision. This states ‘I have not attached much weight to Professor Sen’s conclusion that there was a low likelihood that the appellant would be able to re-establish herself in Hungary from a psychiatric perspective because her treatment needs are complex. This is because the appellant is currently stable and she is not undergoing any treatment. I have not seen the appellant’s recent GP records, but there is no evidence before me that dialectic behavioural therapy, which is what he advised, has been pursued by or given to the appellant in the UK.’
19. The criticism made of the FTTJ’s findings is that they focus mainly on the appellant’s current stable situation without addressing the inherent nature of the appellant’s medical condition [EUPD] which makes her vulnerable to psychosocial stressors.
20. I have carefully reviewed the decision as a whole. It is clear that the FTTJ did consider the appellant’s vulnerability to psychosocial stressors. At [67] the FTTJ states ‘I have attached due weight to the appellant’s mental health condition. It is the most significant factor in her favour. The appellant does not currently receive active treatment for her condition. She does engage with her GP but does not, for example, attend appointments with specialist practitioners. Nonetheless, her mental heath condition is an important element of her private life because she suffers from social anxiety and has been diagnosed with depression and anxiety. She lives with her family, which is important to her and being deported and separated from her family is likely to make her feel even more isolated. Further, the appellant’s long-term diagnosis of [EUPD] means that she is likely to find deportation to Hungary and separation from her family as a significant psychosocial stressor which increases her risk of self-harm and suicide. I have attached weight to Professor Sen’s evidence in this regard and take account of the effect of the appellant’s mental health condition and support that is available (as detailed in my consideration of Article 3 ECHR) in this Article 8 proportionality assessment.’
21. At [90] the FTTJ stated, ‘She is not currently under active treatment, and although she is in a much better mental place at the moment and does not require active treatment, I accept Professor Sen’s evidence that psychosocial stressors would likely prompt a deterioration.’ Further at [102], the FTTJ states ‘If the appellant were to find deportation to Hungary or separation from her family as a psychosocial stressor, which Professor Sen says is likely, then she would be able to seek emergency hospital treatment.’
22. At [91]-[93] of the decision, the FTTJ refers to the appellant’s evidence where she stated that if deported, she would like to return to work and make new friendships. The FTTJ also noted that once employed the appellant would be able to access full healthcare, but while looking for work she would only be able to access basic healthcare. In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the judge did have in his mind the appellant’s vulnerability to psychosocial stressors and the likely deterioration in her condition but against a backdrop where she would be able to access medical support in Hungary. The decision makes sense when read as a whole.
23. In the circumstances, I do not accept that the FTTJ only had in mind the appellant’s current stable situation to the exclusion of the appellant’s vulnerability to psychosocial stressors in reaching the findings at [75]. It is clear from the findings in the decision that the FTTJ accepted Professor Sen’s opinion about the impact of psychosocial stressors and also took into account the availability of healthcare to the appellant on return. In this regard, Mr Spencer confirmed that no challenge was being made by the appellant regarding access to healthcare on return.
24. Accordingly, I find that there was no error of law in the FTTJ’s findings. In reaching this conclusion, I recall the First-tier Tribunal is a specialist tribunal and the Upper Tribunal should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the First-tier Tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning has been fully set out in one place. Decisions should be read as a whole: see Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA 201 at [26].
Ground 2 (ii) -Assessment of self-harm risk
25. Turning to limb (ii), the appellant submits that the FTTJ failed to consider the relevance of the extent of her past self-harm, and in particular that she only sought medical help after she self-harmed.
26. Mr Spencer argued that while it was accepted that the appellant had sought medical assistance in the past and would do so again in Hungary, what the FTTJ missed was that the appellant previously only sought medical assistance after she had already self-harmed.
27. Mr Parvar on behalf of the respondent submitted that this limb was misconceived. He relied on paragraph [101] of the decision where the FTTJ stated ’The appellant’s significantly improved metal health is relevant. She has shown insight into her condition and on what helps and what would hinder her mental state. …She engages positively and has shown that she is prioritising her mental health. If the appellant were to be deported, I find that she would seek mental health medical assistance in Hungary. I find that she would engage with healthcare professionals in Hungary. That could take the form in the first instance of GPs and hotlines. The hotlines are a fundamental part of mental health support, crisis intervention, and suicide prevention.’
28. Further at [102] the FTTJ stated, ‘Just as the appellant engaged with and relied on the healthcare system in the UK at stressor points (including in prison and immigration detention), I find that she would do the same in Hungary and that there is adequate medical support available.’
29. Mr Parvar concluded that the FTTJ did not find that she would definitely self-harm. Rather, it was clear that the appellant’s ability to cope in the past could not be said to be the same in the future given her improved insight. It was also important to recall that her self-harming took place during the specific circumstances of incarceration which was a wholly different situation compared to moving back to Hungary.
30. I have carefully considered limb (ii). The FTTJ heard live evidence from the appellant and against a backdrop of previous self-harming was unarguably entitled to make an evaluative judgment that took account of the appellant’s improved mental health, her ability to engage with healthcare professionals, the availability of emergency healthcare, and the fact that self-harming had occurred in the very specific context of incarceration. In this regard, the FTTJ’s conclusions at [101]-[102] were plainly open on the evidence and there is nothing in the appellant’s skeleton argument or limb (ii), to suggest that the FTTJ made an error of law.
31. Likewise, based on the evidence of improved mental health there is nothing to suggest that the appellant’s arguments about the risk of self-harming before seeking medical assistance comes anywhere close to triggering the high threshold set by Article 3 ECHR: see AM (Art 3; health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 00131 (IAC).
Ground 2 Limb (iii) – Assessment of family support
32. The appellant submits that the FTTJ’s conclusion that the appellant’s family would support her financially on return, including by funding medical assistance was perverse and/or unexplained and/or failed to take into account relevant evidence because the FTTJ confused the family’s willingness to provide financial support with their ability to do so.
33. The appellant points to her parents’ low paid work, no savings and bank statements showing they were consistently overdrawn. Their most up to date joint witness statement dated 7 August 2025 states at [14] ‘We don’t have spare money that we would be able to use, should [NC] be sent overseas. We wouldn’t be able to support her.’ And at [19] We don’t have savings, so again regrettably we would not be in a position to help [NC] if she were to be removed from the UK.’
34. In relation to the appellant’s brother, his witness statement dated 23 February 2024 stated that it was not a realistic option for him or his family to support [NC] from the UK. He said that although he paid for some private dental care for the appellant, he did not have available money to help her on an ‘ongoing basis.’
35. At [68] of the decision, the FTTJ stated that he attached weight to the emotional and financial support that the appellant’s family would provide her and the fact that any necessary medical treatment would be available and accessible to the appellant in Hungary.
36. At [69] the FTTJ referenced that the appellant’s brother’s evidence was that he had previously provided financial support and that he could offer direct financial support in case of emergencies. Finally, at [71] when asked during cross-examination about how she would go about finding accommodation, the appellant stated that she would have the support of her family who would help her logistically and financially to arrange accommodation and she would look for work, the income from which she would use to pay her rent.
37. Mr Parvar on behalf of the respondent submitted that it was open to FTTJ to place more weight on the live evidence heard at the hearing than the earlier witness statements. In this regard, he recalled that the appellant’s father had stated that he had just finished paying off a loan. Further, he observed that the appellant‘s skeleton argument was wrong to mention that the appellant’s family could provide ‘extensive’ financial support. That was not suggested in their evidence.
38. The appellant was currently living at home with her parents and being supported by them financially and emotionally. That was not in dispute and therefore small monetary amounts currently incurred for her upkeep could be transferred to help her in Hungary until she found a job, with her brother contributing in emergencies. The FTTJ never suggested that the appellant’s financial support would be extensive, nor indefinite.
39. It was clear on the evidence that the appellant intended to find a job and with an income she would pay the rent for her accommodation. Additionally, at [30] & [34] the FTTJ referred to the country evidence from the Streetlawyer organisation which stated that the appellant would be entitled to a state financial benefit called ‘benefit for persons in active age’ as well as local allowances when she registers as a resident in a municipality in Hungary.
40. Looking at the evidence in the round, it is clear that some aspects of the appellant’s and her brother’s oral evidence was at odds with the family’s stated financial position in their earlier witness statements . That said, I agree with the respondent that it was open to the FTTJ to make an evaluative judgment based on the whole picture of financial support available to the appellant on return, including what weight to assign to the live evidence, the latter being the quintessential matter for the Tribunal. Ultimately, the FTTJ’s conclusions [73] that there would not be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration in Hungary because she is a Hungarian citizen, she speaks the language, she is keen to work and would then be able to rent accommodation for herself was unarguably rational and adequately reasoned.
41. The narrow focus on the family’s financial support to the appellant on return was only one strand of the overall financial support package on return. The evidence before the FTTJ was far broader and more nuanced taking into account the appellant’s eligibility for state benefits, municipality allowances, and her intention to work and secure an income for herself. In the circumstances, the appellant has been unable to show that when the family’s financial support is placed within the wider context of whether there would be very significant obstacles to her integration in Hungary, the FTTJ findings were plainly not perverse or unexplained.
42. For the reasons given above, I conclude that none of the grounds put forward on behalf of the appellant show that the First-tier Tribunal decision involved the making of an error of law. The decision shall stand.

Notice of Decision
The First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision shall stand.

K.A.Khan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 April 2026