UI-2026-000221
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000221
First-tier Tribunal: PA/01399/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 27 March 2026
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE J F W PHILLIPS
Between
A A
(Anonymity decision made)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms C Johnrose, Brodie Jackson Canter
For the Respondent: Mr M Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House by CVP link on 19 March 2026
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 10 November 2025 dismissing his appeal against the Respondent’s decision refusing his protection and human rights claim.
Background
2. The Appellant a citizen of Afghanistan claimed, in summary, that he was at risk of persecution by the Taliban on account of his Westernisation arising from long absence from Afghanistan and his adoption of Western values.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
3. The Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge Alis in a hearing on 22 October 2025. The Judge found that the Appellant had not established a well-founded fear of persecution or risk of serious harm on a return to Afghanistan and that his return would not place the United Kingdom in breach of Article 8 ECHR.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
4. First-tier Tribunal Judge O’Garro granted permission to appeal on 31 December 2025 in the following terms:
In summary, the grounds of appeal assert that the judge assessment of the evidence is flawed because in undertaking the article 3 assessment of risk on return as a westernised Afghan, the judge failed to undertake a holistic assessment of the characteristics which makes up the profile of the appellant westernised lifestyle, against the background evidence.
I find there is arguable merit in the grounds and permission to appeal is granted.
The hearing
5. Ms Johnrose relied on the grounds and said that the Judge had failed to undertake a holistic assessment of the Appellant’s profile taking into account the evidence as a whole. She said that the Appellant’s westernised appearance and behaviour would place him a particular social group (PSG). She referred to the Appellant’s aspiring modelling career, his promotion of western culture style and fashion, his failure to wear a beard, his coloured and cropped hair none of which are specifically referred to in the decision. This is all material to the way that he would be perceived on return. The First-tier Judge accepted that the Appellant has been outside Afghanistan since the age of 16 and that he had a relationship with his then girlfriend in Afghanistan before fleeing together. These were actions against the accepted norms and this had not been properly assessed against the country information. The Judge recites a lot of country of origin information but does not apply the material factors of the Appellant’s profile. It is the Taliban’s aim to purify Afghan society and a person perceived as westernised due to their behaviour and appearance is likely to be targeted.
6. For the Respondent Mr Parvar referred the headnote of YMKA and others (‘westernisation’) Iraq [2022] UKUT 00016 which suggests two ways in which the Convention may be engaged being whether a westernised lifestyle reflects a protected characteristic or where the individual would be unable to mask his westernisation. The Appellant’s circumstances do not come close to either. He never said that he had deeply held ideological beliefs and never claimed to be unfamiliar with the prevailing culture in Afghanistan. He will not be able to go to night clubs or drink alcohol. The photographs provided go nowhere near the depth of what is described in YMKA. He provided a witness statement and does not say in that statement that the lifestyle he enjoys in the west will continue. The shift to PSG betrays his own position as the ASA put forward religion and political opinion. The judge grasps the evidence put forward by the Appellant and deals with it.
Findings – Error of Law
7. The grounds of appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal make no mention of Convention reason. Before the First-tier Tribunal Ms Johnrose put forward religion and imputed political opinion due to westernisation and before me Ms Johnrose suggested that ‘westernisation’ placed the Appellant in a particular social group. I reject both assertions. YMKA and others makes it clear that ‘westernisation’ of itself does not demonstrate a Convention reason. “The Refugee Convention does not offer protection from social conservatism per se. There is no protected right to enjoy a socially liberal lifestyle.” Although this was not put forward as a ground of appeal I find that the Judge’s decision that the Appellant’s claim did not demonstrate a Convention reason was correct and there is no error of law in this respect.
8. The Judge went on to consider ‘westernisation’ from paragraph 53 onwards by reference to Article 3 ECHR. In my judgment this was the correct approach. The consideration in this respect is detailed and clear. In the grounds and in oral submissions Ms Johnrose asserts that the consideration was not holistic. I disagree. The evidence of ‘westernisation’ was not of such depth that it could be said to be an immutable characteristic. The evidence did not show that ‘westernisation’ would remain apparent and, to the extent that it could, would be unacceptable in Afghanistan. The Appellant’s witness statement for the First-tier Tribunal contains 74 paragraphs. Westernisation is mentioned in only two of those paragraphs and then in general rather than detailed terms.
Paragraph 28 “Whilst I was living in Sweden I worked in a coffee shop. I made many friends in Sweden which included Swedish people and different nationalities. I became westernised and drank alcohol. I also went to clubs and listened to music. I also attended church in Sweden because I had Swedish friends who attended the church. When I first arrived in Sweden I considered myself a Muslim however over time my views changed, and I turned away from Islam.”
Paragraph 74 “I am no longer a Muslim as I am continuing my journey with Christianity, and I intend to baptise. I am also westernised because I have spent my formative years living in western countries. I drink alcohol, wear bright clothes and ripped jeans. I also wear jewellery and wear an earring. I do not hold Islamic views and I consider this will bring me to the attention of the Taliban.
9. A considerable number of photographs were put forward in evidence to the First-tier Tribunal. They are in general ‘posed’ photographs that appear to have been taken in furtherance of the Appellant’s proposed modelling career. Some show the Appellant with coloured hair, some without. Some show the Appellant wearing ripped jeans, some show regular trousers. Some show brightly coloured shirts, some show less colourful shirts. Some show a necklace and wristband, some do not. All show an earring in the left ear. All show a close cropped beard.
10. A letter dated 28 July 2025 was provided to the Tribunal from Graham Webb the retired founder pastor of the Jubilee Church in Liverpool. He says that he has met thousands of asylum seekers in the last 3 years and gives a good reference for the Appellant but does not suggest that the Appellant is on the road to conversion.
11. The grounds assert (at paragraphs 5 and 7) that the Appellant’s consumption of alcohol would be perceived negatively in Afghanistan but fail to take account of the fact that alcohol is not readily available in Afghanistan. It is asserted that his clothing or the way he dresses would not be acceptable in Afghanistan. However, the photographs provided show that the Appellant is adept at changing his clothing. It is asserted that his failure to wear his beard or hair in the way that one would be required to wear it in Afghanistan would be unacceptable, yet the photographs again show that he is able to and does change style.
12. I accept that the Appellant may want to continue to drink alcohol, dress in western ways, be of western appearance and enjoy the greater freedoms that exist outside Afghanistan but not only are these not protected characteristics but also the loss of these freedoms does not in my judgment demonstrate serious harm for the purposes of Article 3 of the ECHR.
13. In my judgment the decision of the first-tier Tribunal does not show a material error of law. From paragraphs 53 to 63 of the decision the Judge conducts a holistic assessment based upon the evidence that was before him and considers that assessment against the country evidence. The assertion in the grounds (paragraph 16) that the Judge absolves himself from the obligation to make an assessment because “the picture is not clear cut” is a misreading of the decision which in fact reads “the picture is not as clear cut as Ms Johnrose sought to argue”. The Judge applies the lower standard of proof and finds that the Appellant is not at real risk of serious harm on a return to Afghanistan.
14. I am satisfied that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain an error of law material to the decision to dismiss this appeal.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.
Judge J F W Phillips
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
25 March 2026