Tribunal decisions

The decision

In the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: UI-2026-000229
IA/07795/2022
PA/51913/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House
On 20 March 2026 Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 15 April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANBURY

Between

M L
(anonymity direction MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Unrepresented
For the Respondent: Mr E Terrell, a Senior Home Office presenting officer

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and/or any member of his family is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person or persons referred to). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Uganda who was born on 20th of December 1970.
The Appellant’s Immigration History
2. The appellant entered the UK on 30th of April 2006 and applied for asylum. The respondent refused the application. However, Immigration Judge Rintoul dismissed his appeal, finding the appellant to have been incredible. He made a further protection claim which was also refused by the respondent on 3 May 2022. An appeal against that decision came before FTT Judge Norris who promulgated his decision on the 12 September 2023. The appellant appealed that decision, asserting that Judge Norris had erred in his approach to a request for an adjournment and in relation to the extent to which the FTT had correctly followed the guidelines given in the leading case of Devaseelan. Following the grant of permission on 2 October 2023 by FTT Judge Dainty. Upper Tribunal Judge Saini decided that there were material errors of law in the decision of the FTT, including a failure to grant an adjournment in order to afford the appellant an opportunity to “present their case to the best of their ability” and the matter was remitted to the FTT. There were preserved findings in relation to the article 8 decision and in relation to the prospects of reintegration, dealt with at paragraphs 70 – 74 (see the Upper Tribunal’s decision at paragraph 14). Although the Upper Tribunal’s decision in that case was not provided in the bundles of documents produced, a copy is publicly available on Bailii and Mr Terrell helpfully sent me a link during the lunch adjournment. It appears that Judge Saini’s remittal resulted in the appeal hearing before FTT Judge Greenwood on 20 August 2024. Judge Greenwood again found that the appellant would not be persecuted if he were returned to Uganda, nor had he established the need for humanitarian protection in that he did not face a risk of serious harm. Judge Greenwood’s (the judge’s) decision is the decision to which the current appeal to the Upper Tribunal relates.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
3. The appellant again applied for permission to appeal, relying on his grounds, which were settled with the assistance of counsel (at page 27 et seq of the “Appellant Second Additional Bundle” (AAB2) in electronic format). The grounds argue that the judge made a number of positive findings. On the basis of those findings it is contended to the lower standard applicable to asylum and humanitarian protection claims that the appeal ought to have been allowed. Those findings included that the appellant had at some point been “wanted by the Ugandan authorities” and that he was in touch with the chairman of the FDC Kampala District in 2018. Although the judge recognised the evidence provided by the appellant was of some age, he considered nevertheless that the regime had not essentially changed, which gave arguable grounds for considering that the objective evidence supported the appellant’s claim. The judge accepted that the appellant’s wife had been arrested and tortured to death which made it arguable that the appellant’s account of his activities in Uganda and membership of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) was an important part of the background. Other background material included the fact that opposition supporters, journalists and other protesters were subject to arbitrary arrest by security forces, which brought the appellant’s claim within the background evidence.
4. On 23rd December 2025 Judge Adio considered the grounds summarised above. He found that the grounds raised arguable errors of law. In accepting aspects of the appeal, which the judge found to be credible, it was arguable that those parts of the evidence which the judge had accepted discharged the lower standard of proof. Judge Adio considered it to be at least arguable that a higher standard of proof had been applied than was appropriate (see paragraph 6 of the grounds at page 5 of AAB2). It was also arguable that the background evidence was generally supportive of the appellant’s claimed risk on return.
The hearing
5. The appellant attended without representation. He did not apply for an adjournment, pointing out that he had simply “run out of funds” and therefore had to conduct the hearing in person.
6. I had three electronic bundles for the hearing - one described as “Appellant’s Bundle in Upper Tribunal” (AB), another called “the appellant’s additional bundle under rule 15-2A” (AAB) and a bundle described as “the appellant’s second additional bundle” (AAB2). AB contains 254 pages. The other bundles have 13 and 38 pages respectively Unfortunately, the appellant did not have copies of these electronically but I understood him to have hard copies. I have all three bundles in electronic format.
7. The appellant pointed out that there were at least four pieces of evidence which he relied on in support of his assertion that he would be at risk if he returned to Uganda as a result of his political activities prior to his departure 20 years ago. These were set out at paragraph 27 of the decision, namely:
(i) The fact that there was a letter from the FDC dated 18 September 2018 (referred to in A’s skeleton argument at AB page 53);
(ii) There was a death certificate dated 14 September 2018 relating to his wife (referred to at paragraph 27 of the judge’s decision at page 11 of AAB2);
(iii) There were photographs of his wife’s funeral and gravestone of (referred to in the same paragraph).
8. The judge had correctly identified these pieces of evidence as being “key”, it was submitted. The appellant in his oral submissions emphasised the violent nature of the regime, stating that extra-judicial killings and the suppression of political opponents are the way that the regime operates.
9. The thrust of Mr Terrell’s submission was that the appellant’s evidence had been considered “holistically” by the judge, who was not required to accept all that was said or written. It was pointed out that the judge had not accepted that the appellant’s wife’s killing had been politically motivated and had been unrelated to the appellant’s alleged political activities.
10. The appellant’s evidence had been recorded at paragraph 34 of the decision (at AAB2 page 12). It records that the appellant’s wife had been interrogated twice over a ten-year period but the judge had been entitled to conclude that she was not involved in political activity herself nor were these events connected with his political activity. The judge was entitled to conclude that in view of the substantial lapse in time since the appellant had left Uganda it was not credible that he would be at risk on return there. Furthermore, Mr Terrell pointed out that just because evidence was “plausible” did not necessarily mean it was true or that the judge had been bound to accept it.
11. The grounds of appeal in the current appeal (found at AAB2 at page 27) made a number of assumptions which were not all accepted by the respondent. In particular, the suggestion that the judge had accepted in full that the appellant’s wife was tortured and murdered was not precisely what the judge had said (see paragraph 37 at AAB2 page 12). The judge did not accept that the appellant’s wife had been shown to be killed because of the appellant’s political activities. A letter dated 29th of August 2018 and the death certificate confirming her death on 14 September 2018 (referred to at paragraphs 29- 31 of the decision at page 11 of AAB2) were referred to. The judge stated that the information in the letter of 18 September 2018 “provides some evidence that at some point the appellant was wanted by the Ugandan authorities” but no more than that.
12. It was clear, for example from paragraph 34 of the decision at page 12 of AAB2, that the judge was critical of the evidence produced in relation to the appellant’s wife having been stalked and later tortured to death and did not accept it was because of the appellant’s political activity. The judge commented in that paragraph on a substantial lapse of time since the relevant events, the interrogations having been between 2008 and 2018. The appellant had not mentioned it in his witness statement and stated that there was “no particular reason” why he would do so believing he did not want to involve her. She was not politically active and he had limited contact with her. There had been no contact at all for the two years prior to her death in 2018. Although the judge had evidence supportive of the appellant’s claim and accepted the appellant’s wife died in suspicious circumstances his findings went no further than that. Just because the judge accepted that the appellant’s wife died in suspicious circumstances and the fact that some of the evidence supported the appellant’s claim did not mean that he accepted the whole of the claim. The appellant’s wife’s (Gladys Namakula’s) death in suspicious circumstances did not support her husband’s case, nor was the judge satisfied that the appellant’s wife’s death would necessarily have been because of her husband’s activities or be linked with the appellant's activities more than 20 years previously.
13. I was referred to the manner in which the judge had dealt with Judge Rintoul’s decision at paragraphs 65 – 66 at page 17 of AAB2. From those passages it was important to note that the judge had also found the appellant to be incredible for various reasons “independent of those given by IJ Rintoul”. These included the appellant’s failure to mention that his wife had been detained and interrogated twice before her death. This was central to his “fresh claim” (i.e. the claim in 2022 which triggered the most recent two appeals). The judge was also concerned about the appellant’s failure to previously mention his “scars”. It was the judge’s task to consider the evidence “In the round” not just documentary evidence available at the time of Judge Rintoul's decision which had been back in 2006. He did that.
14. In terms of Devaseelan, the starting point for the consideration of the earlier evidence before Judge Rintoul was of course Judge Rintoul’s decision (found at AB 189). However, the judge was entitled to ask, as he did at paragraph 50 on page 14 of AAB2, why the appellant have been able to produce evidence before him that could have been produced before Judge Rintoul, i.e. why he had not produced that evidence any earlier (see also paragraphs 54-55 at page 15 of AAB2). The judge therefore chose to treat it with “circumspection”, a word also used by Judge Norris to refer to this evidence. It was noted that the evidence appellant now seeks to rely on was obtained in November 2006 and no explanation been provided why that could not been supplied at that hearing earlier in 2006. The evidence, from the national chairman of the FDC, had been provided for the later hearing. The attempt to blame this late evidence on lack of funding might have been plausible but clearly, he was able to obtain such within a short time of the 2006 hearing, which suggests that this was not the true reason for this deficiency. In any event Judge Rintoul had comprehensively dealt with this at paragraph 5.8 of his determination at page 195 of AB. In that part of his decision, Judge Rintoul explained why it was not difficult to obtain a letter from the relevant person and it was argued that this did not constitute an obvious error. Whilst the appellant still said that his life was in danger, he did not say he had established that he was still being pursued 20 years after leaving Uganda.
15. In relation to paragraph 37 of the FTT decision (at page 12-13 of AAB2) consideration of the whole of that paragraph suggested that the way that the ground had been drafted by counsel at ground 1 did not reflect accurately the judge’s true finding. That had been to the effect that “at some point the appellant was wanted by the Ugandan authorities” and furthermore that at some point he was in touch with the chairman of the FDC in his local area.
16. One of the bases for the attack on the decision of FTT Judge Norris, who found against the appellant on 30 August 2023, was that the appellant should have been given the opportunity to obtain evidence from Dr Okungu and Mr Kisekka. However, it was noteworthy that having been given that opportunity the appellant had chosen not to call these witnesses to give evidence at the new hearing which had ordered by the U T (see the decision of Judge Saini referred to above). The appellant still has not produced a witness statement accompanied by a statement of truth from Dr Okunga nor had he given evidence despite being resident in Sweden (see paragraph 51 et seq at page 16 of the decision currently under appeal). Nor had he produced medical evidence to back up the alleged scars (see paragraph 60). Without evidence of the causation of these injuries, the judge had been justified in rejecting the appellant’s case and finding that that the appellant was merely a low-level support of the FDC. It was submitted that not all supporters of the FDC were the subject of a risk of persecution or serious harm and the appellant in this case was merely a supporter. I was referred to paragraph 83 of the decision in this case (at page 32 of AAB2).
17. Finally, I was referred to the application which asks tribunal to allow the appellant to adduce additional evidence under rule 15 (2-A). This did not go to the question of error of law and I was invited to find there was no error. In the event an error was found, I did not understand Mr Terrell to object to the additional evidence being considered by the Upper Tribunal.
18. The appellant responded to the effect that he had been living in Uganda between 2003 and 2006. He accepted there was some confusion over dates but he did explain before the FTT that he wrote in 2023 to the FDC to which he received a reply to the effect that he was a “staunch member” of the FDC (see page 84 of AB). He explained the nature of the party. He said his wife was tortured to death. She was not political herself but had clearly been associated with his politics. The judge behaved irrationally and failed to draw the obvious conclusion that she had been murdered because of her association with her husband. She was not intimately involved in his political activity, nevertheless, her involvement was sufficient to link the two. The judge had failed to mention that his wife had been tortured while being interrogated twice. The death certificate was dated 14 September 2018 but she had been abducted on 29 August 2018. The events concerned were typical of the behaviour of the authorities in Uganda faced with political opponents. The judge had not applied the lower standard of proof required for this type of case. Had he done so he would not have reached the same conclusion and he ought to have found that the appellant had made out his case.
Discussion
19. There are two questions before the tribunal:
(i) Whether in the light of the judge’s findings, which are not impugned in the current appeal, he was entitled to conclude that the appellant had failed to discharge the burden of proof which rested on him?
(ii) Assuming the appellant satisfied the judge as to his account of his activities in Uganda, whether in the light of the objective evidence the judge was entitled to conclude that the appellant did not face a material risk of persecution, inhuman or degrading treatment or a risk of serious harm?
20. The judge made nuanced findings in relation to the following:
(i) He noted that witnesses, which in an earlier appeal had been put forward as vital for the appellant’s appeal, had not prepared admissible witness statements or been called at the hearing before the judge;
(ii) He found the appellant’s wife to have been tortured and murdered in suspicious circumstances which could not be linked to the appellant’s earlier political activities. However, the failure to mention his wife’s incarceration had damaged the appellant’s credibility;
(iii) There was “some evidence” that the appellant had been wanted by the Ugandan authorities in relation to activities there and that he had contact with the chairman of the FDC but treated the appellant’s evidence of his detention with circumspection. The level if his activity for the FDC since coming to the UK was described as being at a “low level”;
(iv) Given the lateness of much of the appellant’s evidence the judge rejected it, believing it to be evidence which could easily have been produced at the earlier hearing before Judge Rintoul and this affected the weight he gave it, particularly in relation to Dr Okunga, who claims to have been incarcerated with the appellant;
(v) The judge did not consider that costs considerations adequately explained the appellant’s failure to put forward relevant supportive evidence at the earliest opportunity.
21. If those findings stand, given the long period since the events described occurred, they support the conclusion that the appellant was not be at risk on return.
22. The amount of weight to attach to a piece of evidence is a matter for the tribunal hearing that evidence. It is well established that an appellate body should be reluctant to interfere with that assessment on appeal. The tribunal below had the opportunity to hear and assess the witnesses and consider the documentary evidence.
Conclusions
23. This is the second appeal the appellant has made to the Upper Tribunal. It is notable that his original asylum claim was not appealed, as far as can be seen and, subject to the limitations on the Devaseelan principle, therefore stands. The hearing before the judge was the set against the refusal in 2022 to grant him international humanitarian protection on the grounds that he would suffer serious harm if he were returned to Uganda. The appellant’s appeal was also considered on asylum grounds and under articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
24. Upper Tribunal Judge Saini was principally concerned over the failure to grant the appellant an adjournment so he could “present all of his evidence so that the matter could be brought to a final conclusion”. It is regrettable that in early 2026 it is necessary to hear yet another challenge to the adverse conclusion reached in his case by another judge hearing the relevant evidence for the first time. It is striking that every judge before whom the appellant has given evidence, to varying degrees, has rejected that evidence largely on credibility grounds. I repeat the remarks I have made above up over the respect an appellate tribunal affords of the fact-finder -i.e. the tribunal below in this appeal.
25. For the following reasons I find that the judge was entitled to reach the conclusions he came to:
(i) I agree with Mr Terrell’s submission that the grounds settled by Mr Davison somewhat misrepresent the judge’s findings. This would not have been deliberate but simply a result of taking parts of a lengthy and nuanced decision out of context. There were a number of positive fact findings identified in the grounds of appeal, including those in relation to the torture and death of Gladys Namakula, the perceived risk of his brother-in-law sending documents in support of his case and the appellant's past involvement with the FDC. Those positive findings need to be set against the background of the significant aspects found to be incredible. The evidence he had produced, as the judge was careful to point out at paragraph 65 of his decision, was given little weight for the reasons given. Attaching little weight to evidence is not the same as attaching no weight to it. The judge gave clear reasons for giving little weight to parts of the evidence, pointing out as in some respects could have been produced before Judge Rintoul or even Judge Norris. As Judge Norris pointed out, Dr Okunga’s evidence (also referred to as Dr Okungu by Judge Saini) could have been produced before the respondent and might have been dealt with in her refusal. It is noteworthy that one letter was dated 2006 and another dated from 2007. Despite having plenty of opportunity to deal with these points, the appellant was still unable to do so when his appeal came before the judge;
(ii) The judge was careful to point out that he attached some weight to some of the documents but the judge said the amount of weight was reduced by a number of factors. It is striking that the judge found the appellant to be incredible in material respects and he pointed out that Dr Okunga’s evidence was not entirely consistent with the documents. The same had also been pointed out by Judge Norris;
(iii) The appellant seeks to blame the lack of evidence on a lack of funding but this was not plausible as the appellant had been represented by competent solicitors and barristers throughout. Those representing him before the tribunals had an ample opportunity to request documents or seek a further adjournments. The appellant’s previous firm of solicitors, who represented him before Judge Norris, successfully challenged the decision of Judge Norris on the basis of the need for the evidence of Dr Okunga and Mr Kinsekka. Mr Davison, who represented him before the FTT in the appeal giving rise to this appeal to the Upper Tribunal, also emphasised the importance of those witnesses evidence. In my view it was a proper inference for the judge to draw that the absence of those witnesses, who were unable find a way to provide oral evidence or even in each case a signed witness statement, meant that they had been used as a means of assisting the appellant to make a further appeal and did not in fact support the appellant’s case in the manner described;
(iv) The judge dealt with the objective evidence, for example, at paragraph 63. He dealt fully with the risk factors including any arising from sur place activities, pointing out the extent of such activities in which the appellant engaged were largely historic and in any event that the level of surveillance asserted had not been supported by evidence. I note that Judge Norris had also been critical of the appellant’s alleged sur place activities.
26. Overall, therefore, the judge was entitled to come to on the conclusions he came to on the evidence, which he found lacking in material respects.
Notice of Decision
27. I have concluded that there was no material error of law in the decision of the FTT. In as far as the asylum claim remained extant before the FTT, in the light of the Upper Tribunal's decision in November 2023, the appellants asylum claim was rightly dismissed by the judge. His human rights and protection claims were also properly dismissed.
28. Accordingly, this appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.
Direction Regarding Anonymity – rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008
Unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify him or any member of their family. This direction applies both to the Appellant and to the Respondent.

Signed Dated 31March 2026

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Hanbury