Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000236
First-tier Tribunal No: EU/58082/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 3 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CANAVAN

Between

SAJ NAHER BEGUM
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER (UKVI)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: In person, by video link
For the Respondent: Mr E. Terrell

Heard at Field House on 28 April 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Summary

1. This is a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (“the Upper Tribunal”). The Upper Tribunal is an independent tribunal established by Parliament with powers set out in law. This decision is made as part of the Upper Tribunal’s role in deciding appeals against decisions of the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (“the First-tier Tribunal”).

2. The appellant appealed a decision of the respondent dated 11 October 2024 to refuse to grant entry clearance under Appendix EU (Family Permit) of the immigration rules as the ‘family member of a relevant EEA citizen’. The appellant lodged an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal under The Immigration (Citizens’ Rights Appeals) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020.

3. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the appeal in a decision sent on 15 October 2025. The First-tier Tribunal judge proceeded with the appeal in the absence of any appearance by either party. He concluded that the appellant had failed to produce sufficient evidence to show that she was dependent on the relevant EEA citizen sponsor for her essential living needs.

4. The losing party in an appeal before the First-tier Tribunal can apply for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. If permission is granted, the Upper Tribunal will consider the legal arguments put forward by both sides in the appeal. The Upper Tribunal only has power to set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal if it concludes that the arguments put forward by the party that applied to appeal show that the decision involved the making of an error of law: see section 12 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (“TCEA 2007”).

5. If the Upper Tribunal finds that a decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law, the First-tier Tribunal decision will stand. If a decision of the First-tier Tribunal is found to involve the making of an error of law the Upper Tribunal has power to set aside the decision. The Upper Tribunal will then decide whether it will remake the decision or whether the appeal might need to be reheard in the First-tier Tribunal. In this decision, the Upper Tribunal is only deciding whether the First-tier Tribunal decision involved the making of an error of law.

6. The Upper Tribunal finds that the First-tier Tribunal decision involved the making of an error of law. The decision is set aside and the appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing.

Decision and reasons

7. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh who applied for entry clearance under Appendix EU (Family Permit). The appellant did not apply to enter the United Kingdom under the EUSS until 16 September 2024, several years after the UK had left the EU and after the ‘grace period’ of 30 June 20211. The appellant applied to join her daughter’s husband who is an Italian national who is said to have lived in the UK since 11 September 2020, shortly before the UK exited from the EU. The appellant’s sponsor, Mr Towhidul Islam, was granted pre-settled status under the EUSS on 30 September 2020.

8. The application was refused in a decision dated 11 October 2024. The respondent was not satisfied that the appellant had produced sufficient evidence to show that she was dependent on the relevant EEA citizen for her essential living needs. She had produced copies of money transfers from June 2023, December 2023 and February-September 2024. No evidence was produced relating to her domestic circumstances in Bangladesh, such as residence costs, utility bills or any other expenses. Nor was there any evidence of her financial circumstances, such as bank statements or other evidence of income to determine whether she could meet her essential living needs without support from the sponsor. The respondent was unable to verify that the appellant’s sponsor was resident in the UK at the date of the application.

9. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. The appeal form provided the appellant’s and the sponsor’s details and was accompanied by a number of documents, including letters from the sponsor and from the appellant’s son, Mr Chowdhury, both dated 12 September 2024. The letter from Mr Islam confirmed that he was an Italian national who had been living in the UK since September 2020. He provided his visa details. He confirmed that he was willing to sponsor his mother-in-law. Beyond that bare statement, no other information was provided to explain the nature or extent of the support that he might provide. Mr Chowdhury’s letter confirmed that his mother ‘is financially mostly dependent on my brother in law Mr Towhidul Islam since my father passed away.’ He confirmed that his mother did not have a bank account so any monies sent by Mr Islam came to his account instead. It is reasonable to infer that a copy of a death certificate from Mr Mostafa Kamal Chowdhury related to the appellant’s husband. This indicated that Mr Chowdhury died on 21 September 2022. This evidence indicated that the appellant only began to receive some financial support from the sponsor after the UK exited from the EU. There was no evidence to show that she was dependent on him prior to 31 December 2020.

10. The First-tier Tribunal’s records show that a series of notifications and directions were made in late 2024 and early 2025, which were sent to the email address or mobile phone number given for the sponsor. The records of applications made to the First-tier Tribunal indicate that communications were sent on behalf of the appellant, indicating that the sponsor, or someone else on behalf of the appellant, seemed to be able to access the MyHMCTS system to ask for an update on the progress of the appeal and to provide information about requirements for the hearing. The last communication from the appellant enquiring about the progress of the appeal was on 09 June 2025. MyHMCTS indicates that the hearing notice was uploaded on 12 June 2025, setting a date for the hearing on 15 October 2025. However, it is notable that the notifications section on MyHMCTS does not include a notification of the hearing notice to either party on that date. The request for a remote hearing by video link was later refused. If neither the appellant nor the sponsor received notification of the hearing, it is unclear why no further enquiries were made to chase the progress of the appeal in the 3 months before the hearing date.

11. There was no appearance on behalf of either party at the First-tier Tribunal hearing. First-tier Tribunal Judge Cohen (‘the judge’) dismissed the appeal in a decision sent on 15 October 2025. The appeal was dismissed because the Judge was not satisfied that the appellant had proved she was financially dependent on the sponsor for her essential living needs. Although some money transfer receipts were provided, there was no evidence of support before 2023 despite claims that the sponsor had supported her over a long period. The Judge considered this inconsistent with genuine dependency and inferred that the appellant was likely to have other sources of income or support.

12. The judge also found significant gaps in the evidence. The transfers were sent to the appellant’s son rather than directly to her, and there was no reliable evidence that the money was actually used for the appellant’s essential needs. The appellant failed to provide a full picture of her financial circumstances in Bangladesh, including income, expenditure, assets and other support available to her. The judge attached little weight to the bank statements produced and noted that the failure to provide this information had been a central reason for the original refusal.

13. In addition, the judge doubted the extent of the sponsor’s ability and commitment to support the appellant. The sponsor’s income was modest and largely derived from benefits, yet no evidence of his own expenses was provided. The sponsor did not attend the hearing to give evidence, had not shown any recent visits to the appellant, and provided no photographic evidence of their claimed close relationship. The judge found that the appellant was supported by her children in Bangladesh and was adequately cared for there. Accordingly, the appellant had not established dependency as required by the EUSS rules.

14. It seems that the appellant received notification of this decision because an application was made for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal in response. The grounds of appeal said that the ‘appellant and sponsor does not received hearing notice by post… no hearing notice was received by the appellant and no hearing notice was received by the sponsor’. They went on to say that ‘sponsor provided his email address and postal address but no communication was made by the tribunal.’. Although there was no witness statement or letter from the appellant or the sponsor to provide any more detailed explanation, the grounds indicate that neither of them received notification of the hearing date, either by post or electronically.

15. I bear in mind that the appellant does not have the assistance of a legal representative. The rest of the grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal made a series of statements. In general terms, it was asserted that the judge did not give adequate consideration to the appellant’s dependency on the sponsor or the explanation given by her son as to why she did not have a bank account. The sponsor was on a low income for a period of time due to heart disease. The appellant was also suffering from ‘physical and mental health difficulties’.

16. A judge of the First-tier Tribunal refused permission to appeal in an order sent on 7 January 2026. It was noted that the judge had proceeded with the hearing on the basis that the notice of hearing had been properly served. There was evidence to indicate that the appellant and her sponsor were aware of the fact that the case was on MyHMCTS. The judge gave adequate reasons for his findings.

17. A judge of the Upper Tribunal granted permission in an order sent on 20 February 2026. She considered that it was arguable that the First-tier Tribunal judge strayed beyond matters raised by the respondent in the decision letter, which was problematic given that the sponsor had not attended the hearing. She noted that it was unclear whether the appellant continued to rely on the assertion that she was unaware of the hearing, but was not precluded by the Upper Tribunal judge from arguing the point at the hearing.

18. The appellant appeared by video link from abroad with the assistance of an interpreter. I was told by her son, Mr MD Alauddin Chowdhury, that she had some hearing loss. Given that the appellant had some difficulty in hearing aspects of the conversation by video link, the hearing was eventually conducted in an informal manner with some assistance from Mr Chowdhury, who was in the room with the appellant.

19. I have considered the First-tier Tribunal decision, the documentation that was before the First-tier Tribunal, the grounds of appeal, and the information obtained through the discussion at the hearing, before coming to a decision in this appeal. It is not necessary to summarise the oral submissions because they are a matter of record, but I will refer to any relevant arguments in the decision.

20. Many of the judge’s findings relating to the substance of the appeal were likely to be open to him to make on the limited evidence before him. No clear grounds of appeal have been particularised beyond asserting that the appellant is financially dependent on the sponsor.

21. However, a review of the records contained on MyHMCTS indicates that there might be some force in the appellant’s assertion that she and the sponsor were not made aware of the hearing date. While there is no further evidence from the sponsor to explain why he might not have continued to chase the progress of the hearing after 09 June 2025, the fact that there is no record of either party being sent formal notification of the hearing in addition to the hearing notice simply being uploaded, and the fact that neither party attended the hearing, does suggest that there might have been an error in notifying the parties of the hearing date in this case. This is not a case where the appellant and the sponsor had failed to engage at all with the appeal process.

22. Although the judge stated that the hearing notice had been properly served, the information contained in MyHMCTS suggests that his decision to proceed with the appeal in the absence of the sponsor might have been based on a mistake of fact. For this reason, I will give the appellant the benefit of the doubt. The appellant and the sponsor have not had an opportunity to present their case before the First-tier Tribunal it is appropriate to find that there has been an error of law on grounds of a mistake of fact and procedural unfairness and to remitted the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing: Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC).

23. The First-tier Tribunal decision involved the making of an error of law and is set aside. The appeal will be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing. The appellant and the sponsor should ensure that they continue to monitor the progress of the appeal on My HMCTS.

Notice of Decision

The First-tier Tribunal decision involved the making of an error on a point of law

The decision is set aside

The case is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing

M. Canavan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23 July 2026