Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000242
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52701/2024
LP/03869/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 23 July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE D. CLARKE

Between

ED
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Marziano, Legal Representative, instructed by Westkin Associates.
For the Respondent: Ms Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 8 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant and any member of his family is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
INTRODUCTION
1. The Appellant, a citizen of Albania, appeals against the Decision of First-Tier Tribunal Judge Nolan promulgated on 27 October 2025 (“the Decision”), dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the SSHD’s decision dated 20 January 2024 (“RFRL”), refusing the Appellant’s further submissions dated 12 July 2023.
BACKGROUND
2. The Appellant entered the UK on 22 August 2022 and claimed asylum on 23 August 2022. On 2 May 2023 the Single Competent Authority found Conclusive Grounds to accept that the Appellant was a victim of modern slavery and on 30 March 2023 the Appellant’s asylum claim was refused. The Appellant was instead granted UASC leave until 18 July 2023. On 12 July 2023 the Appellant submitted further submissions, which were refused on 20 January 2024. It was against this decision that the Appellant appealed to the FTT.
Decision of FTIJ Nolan dated 27 October 2025
3. At paragraphs [14] – [16] the FTIJ found that the Appellant did not fall within a Particular Social Group (“PSG”) for the purposes of the Refugee Convention and instead went on to consider the Appellant’s claim on Humanitarian Protection grounds. This finding is not challenged in the grounds before me, and I say no more about it.
4. For the purposes of the grounds before me, I set out the salient paragraphs of Judge Nolan’s Decision as follows:
13. The appellant argues that in reality there is no sufficiency of protection in Albania from his father or his father’s family upon return, and he says that he is also unable to internally relocate to minimise any risk. He also argues that there are particular factors in his case which would put him at an increased risk of serious harm upon return, and that he cannot rely on the Albanian authorities to protect him from those he fears.
14. I accept that the objective background information shows that in general adult males may not be at risk upon return, but the appellant relies on a number of additional factors in his case which he argues would put him at risk, in particular his youth; his mental health problems, and his lack of family support and connections.
15. Although the appellant claims that he cannot look to his family for support because of his father, by his own evidence he has been in contact with his mother and his siblings. In oral evidence he claimed that his mother had told him that she and his siblings were leaving Albania, but she did not tell him where they were going, and nor had she contacted him since she had left. He claimed that he did not have the mobile phone numbers of his two siblings who are around his own age as he had always contacted them through his mother. I do not accept this claim as credible. In his witness statement the appellant makes no mention of any issues with contacting his mother, and he has provided no evidence to support his claim. It is not credible that a young man such as the appellant would not have any contact details at all for his mother and his two siblings, either through telephone, email or any other social media methods. I find the claim that the appellant has lost contact with his mother and siblings to be untrue and not credible. The appellant entered the UK when he was still a minor, but he is now an adult, and he is a reasonably fit and healthy young man in his late teens who has obtained education in the UK, and who now speaks English.
16. The only medical evidence relied upon by the appellant is a letter from a psychiatrist dated 2nd June 2024. In that letter, the doctor recommended that the appellant begin taking an anti-depressant medication (Sertraline), and that he be signposted for psychological therapies. The appellant’s evidence was that he did take Sertraline for a short period of time but not was not currently doing so, and that he had not attended any other form of therapy. I conclude and find that the appellant does not currently have any significant mental health problems, and that he is reasonably physically healthy.
17. The appellant relies upon an expert report written by Dr James Korovilas dated 12th June 2024. In his report, Dr Korovilas sets out his experience and qualifications as an academic researcher specialising in the areas of Albania and Kosovo, and I accept him as an expert in his stated field. Dr Korovilas says that he finds it ‘difficult to accurately assess the extent of the risk’ that the appellant would face on return at the hands of his father but does confirm that honour killings and blood feuds do occur in Albania. He says that the Albanian police are ‘reluctant’ to get involved in family disputes, and that the appellant’s concerns may not be taken seriously if he were to report those concerns to the police. He goes on to say that it is more difficult in Albania to access housing and employment without family connections, and that it is difficult to maintain anonymity due to the social structures there.
18. By the appellant’s own evidence his father is not a person of power or influence in Albania he is a café owner. In his oral evidence the appellant sought to claim that his father’s family were wealthy and influential, but he has not made that claim previously and has provided no evidence to support that claim. I do not accept that the appellant’s father (or his father’s family) would be able to find the appellant if he were to return to Tirana or to another town or city in Albania, as I find they have no connections to the state, and they are not people of power or influence. I conclude that the appellant would not be at risk of serious harm from his father or his father’s family upon return. The appellant would be returning to Tirana as an adult, and he is no longer at risk of forced child labour. I do not accept the appellant’s claim that his mother and siblings have now left Albania, nor that he has lost contact with them. He would therefore have some family connections on return, from his mother, his siblings and his maternal family.
19. I have considered all those factors as discussed above, including the report of Dr Korovilas, and I find that the appellant would not be at any risk on return for any reason. As I have found he would not be at risk on return, the issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation do not arise. Even if the appellant would be at risk on return, which is not accepted, I find there would be a sufficiency of protection available. The background evidence shows that there is a functioning police system in Albania, and Albanian citizens have basic rights which are enforceable. There are measures in place to combat any corruption still remaining in the criminal justice system. In addition, as discussed above, the appellant could reasonably relocate to another town or city in Albania other than Tirana. The appellant would reasonably be able to obtain anti-depressant medication and treatment on return if required, although it is noted that he has not taken any medication for his claimed mental health problems for over a year. He therefore does not qualify for a grant of HP.
Grant of PTA and Grounds of Appeal
5. On 18 March 2026 Upper Tribunal Judge Rastogi granted the Appellant permission to appeal the Decision of Judge Nolan without restriction. However, it is to be noted that in addition to the pleaded grounds, Judge Rastogi also found it arguable that Judge Nolan had failed to consider any risk of serious harm from domestic violence.
6. In grounds of appeal settled by Michael Marziano, a Senior Associate at Westkin Associates, dated 15 January 2026, The Appellant continued to rely upon his 3 grounds of appeal to the FTT dated 21/11/25.
7. In summary, under ground 1 the Appellant argues that the FTIJ’s credibility assessment was “insufficient”. In so doing, the ground notes that the FTIJ found against the Appellant in terms of the availability of family support and his father’s reach and influence. The ground argues that the FTIJ’s rejection of the Appellant’s claim to no longer be in contact with his family was cursory, inadequately reasoned and without regard to the oral evidence and witness statement. In terms of the FTIJ’s rejection of the father’s reach and influence, the ground argues that no reasons are given for this finding other than reference to late assertions in oral evidence.
8. Under ground 2, the Appellant argues that the FTIJ made insufficient and perverse findings regarding the Appellant’s mental health. The ground argues that it does not logically flow from the medical and oral evidence that the Appellant is free of mental health problems.
9. Under ground 3, the Appellant argues that the FTIJ made insufficient findings on state protection and that he had “entirely failed” to take into account the comments of the country expert, concerning why the Appellant would be unable to obtain effective state protection.
10. Whilst not pleaded as a separate ground of appeal, the grounds further argue in their conclusion that in the light of the FTIJ’s mental health and family contact errors, the very significant obstacles to integration findings in the Article 8 assessment are unsustainable.
11. There was no Rule 24 reply.
12. The matter now comes before me to determine whether there is an error of law in the Decision of the Judge pursuant to s.12(1) of the Tribunal Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. If I find an error, I must then determine whether the error is material, such that the Decision should be set aside. If the Decision is set aside, I must decide whether to remake the Decision in the Upper Tribunal or remit the appeal to the First-Tier Tribunal, pursuant to s.12(2) of the 2007 Act.
ERROR OF LAW HEARING
Preliminary Matters
13. At the outset of the hearing, I ensured that the parties had before them a stitched hearing bundle consisting of [153] pages (“SB”) and an ASA dated 1 June 2026, settled by Mr Marziano. In discussions with the parties, whilst Ms Everett confirmed that she did not have the SB, she confirmed that she had compiled all of the necessary papers. Mr Marziano then also emailed the SB to Ms Everett and Ms Everett confirmed that she was ready to proceed.
DISCUSSION
14. When considering the grounds and the Appellant’s invitation for me to interfere with the Decision of Judge Nolan, I am mindful of Lord Hamblen’s guidance at [72] of HA Iraq SC [2022] UKSC 22, that “it is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal” and that the following principles are to be applied,
(i)   They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently - see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii)  Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account - see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii)  When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out - see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope.
Grounds 1: Insufficient Credibility Assessment
15. The first point taken under ground 1, is that the FTIJ’s rejection of the Appellant’s claim to have lost contact with his family was cursory, inadequately reasoned and reached without reference to the oral evidence or WS.
16. I find this complaint without any merit.
17. At [15] the FTIJ records the Appellant’s oral evidence as follows,
“[….] he claimed that his mother had told him that she and his siblings were leaving Albania, but she did not tell him where they were going, and nor had she contacted him since she had left. He claimed that he did not have the mobile phone numbers of his two siblings who are around his own age as he had always contacted them through his mother.”
18. When rejecting the credibility of this evidence the FTIJ reasoned,
“[…..] In his witness statement the appellant makes no mention of any issues with contacting his mother, and he has provided no evidence to support his claim. It is not credible that a young man such as the appellant would not have any contact details at all for his mother and his two siblings, either through telephone, email or any other social media methods. I find the claim that the appellant has lost contact with his mother and siblings to be untrue and not credible […..]”.
19. Contrary to the suggestion in the grounds that the FTIJ failed to have regard to the oral evidence and WS, I find it plain that he evidently did:
20. The first reason given for rejecting the credibility of lost contact was because it was disclosed late in oral evidence in circumstances where the WS was silent in respect of the same. I note that the AIR at [14] – [15] confirms that the Appellant retained contact with his mother in January 2023 and having reviewed the WS at SB [51], I agree with Judge Nolan that the Appellant is silent about any lost contact. I further note that the ASA dated 21 June 2024 before the FTT at SB [45], did not seek to argue that the Appellant had lost contact with his family.
21. The second reason given by the FTIJ is that it is not credible that a young man would simply have no contact details for any family members whatsoever, in circumstances where it was the Appellant’s oral evidence that his mother had told him of her intention to leave Albania with his siblings and his siblings were of a similar age to the Appellant. In this regard I am mindful that the Appellant was 16 years old when he entered the UK and 18 years old at the date of the FTT hearing.
22. Drawing these strands together I find the FTIJ has provided cogent reasons for rejecting the credibility of the Appellant’s claim to have lost contact with his family and he has clearly taken into account the written and oral evidence when reaching his finding that the Appellant had not lost contact. I find that these reasons make it perfectly clear to any reader why the FTIJ rejected the claimed lost contact. If it is to be inferred that the grounds are really complaining about the weight given by the FTIJ to the evidence, as confirmed by Lewison LJ at paragraph [2 (iv)] of Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, weight is pre-eminently a matter for the judge below. Equally, I note at paragraph [2(vi)] the Court of Appeal confirmed that,
Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
23. Accordingly, I find that the FTIJ’s findings are adequately reasoned, within a reasonable range of responses and that the complaint in the grounds is no more than disagreement.
24. The second point raised under ground 1, is that apart from the Appellant suggesting late in his oral evidence that his father had the necessary reach and influence to trace him in Albania, the FTIJ gave “no reasons” for rejecting this claim.
25. I find this complaint without any merit.
26. At [18] Judge Nolan first notes that the Appellant’s evidence had hitherto been that his father was not a person of power and influence and was simply a café owner. In this regard, I note that the Appellant gave the following evidence in his AIR at [90] – [94],
[90] Q: How would he be able to find out you had moved to a city on the other side of the country, such as Vlore?
A: He has got friends and relatives who would tell him.
[91] Q: Who are these friends?
A: I don’t know.
[92] Q: Are they powerful?
A: I don’t know.
[93] Q: Does your father or his friends have any connection to the state authorities?
A: I don’t know.
[94] Q: And is anyone in his family influential or connected to the state?
A: No.
27. I further note that the Appellant in his WS states as follows in relation to his father,
4. [….] My father, who owned a bar, spent all his earnings on alcohol, neglecting to pay for food or bills.
[….]
6. [….] one evening I came home late from celebrating my best friend’s birthday. My father freaked out, yelled at me for being late and not bringing enough money, and then beat me severely, almost disfiguring my face.
7. [….] he also abused my mother and siblings. Even though I am far away now, I am terribly worried for them because he takes his anger out on them and forces them to bring him money for alcohol.
28. Judge Nolan sets out the Appellant’s oral evidence at [18] as follows,
“[…] the appellant sought to claim that his father’s family were wealthy and influential, but he has not made that claim previously and has provided no evidence to support that claim. I do not accept that the appellant’s father (or his father’s family) would be able to find the appellant if he were to return to Tirana or to another town or city in Albania, as I find they have no connections to the state, and they are not people of power or influence. I conclude that the appellant would not be at risk of serious harm from his father or his father’s family upon return.”
29. I find it clear that the FTIJ did not simply reject the Appellant’s evidence of reach and influence on the basis of late disclosure alone, but also because the Appellant’s oral evidence was inconsistent with his earlier evidence. I find this reasoning wholly consistent with the evidence set out above and find his rejection of state connections, wealth, power and influence within a reasonable range of responses to the evidence before him.
30. In submissions Mr Marvontiz sought to expand upon the pleaded grounds, by arguing that the Judge failed to have regard to the expert country report of Dr Korovilas at SB [112]. In this regard, Mr Mavrontiz argued that the expert made reference to the Appellant dishonouring his father in the context of the Albanian honour system, which would have given the father the necessary motivation to trace the Appellant. Mr Mavrontoniz further argued that the expert also confirmed that the Appellant could be traced through municipal records due to the high level of state corruption.
31. At [17] the FTIJ clearly has regard to the expert report, accepts that Dr Korovilas is an expert in his stated field and notes that the expert says that it is ‘difficult to accurately assess the extent of the risk that the appellant would face on return at the hands of his father but does confirm that honour killings and blood feuds do occur in Albania.” I find that this summary reflects the expert’s section on “Honour Killings in Albania” at SB [118] – [153],
“[…..] [the Appellant] is concerned that he has defied his father by leaving Albania without his permission. It is plausible that Mr Domi’s actions have offended the honour of his father. In the event that [the Appellant’s] father is traditionally minded and follows the Albanian code of honour (the Kanun of Leke Dugakjini) then it is further plausible that he might seek to restore his honour by inflicting a suitable punishment upon his son. Under extreme circumstances this suitable punishment could take the form of an honour killing.
It is difficult to accurately assess the extent of the risk that [the Appellant] would face in Albania at the hands of his father. However, I can confirm that honour killings and blood feud killings do occur in Albania […..]”
32. It is in this context, that the FTIJ then makes his findings at [18] rejecting the Appellant’s claim that his father’s family are wealthy and influential or have any state connections. As such, contrary to Mr Mavrontiz’s able submissions, I am satisfied that the FTIJ clearly had in mind the expert’s findings on risk in the context of the Albanian honour system when concluding at [18] that the Appellant would not be at risk from his father or his father’s family.
33. Whilst Mr Mazrontiz argued that the finding of there being no risk at [18] is unreasoned, I disagree. The critical feature of paragraph [18] is the rejection of the Appellant’s late claim that his father’s family are wealthy and influential and the FTIJ’s preference for the Appellant’s previous representations to the contrary. It is in this context that the FTIJ concludes that the Appellant’s father would be unable to trace the Appellant,
“I do not accept that the appellant’s father (or his father’s family) would be able to find the appellant if he were to return to Tirana or to another town or city in Albania, as I find they have no connections to the state, and they are not people of power or influence.”
34. I find it implicit in the finding that the father and his family had “no connections to the state, and they are not people of power or influence”, that the FTIJ clearly had in mind the use of state corruption to trace the Appellant.
35. In terms of the expert’s findings that the Appellant could be traced through municipal records system with the assistance of state corruption, at SB [124] the expert states as follows,
This requirement for local registration means that a municipal records office will have the details of a person’s current location and this could be used to trace someone. The issue of how easily a person can be located through the municipal records is one that I have been asked to address on countless occasions and following investigations with my colleagues at the university of Tirana, I consider that given the high level of corruption with the Albania state, should a person wish to trace someone, it would be relatively easy to gain access to the municipal records and establish where they are currently registered.
36. As discussed with Mr Mavrontoniz at the hearing, whilst corruption may well be a mechanism to obtain municipal records, the expert does not quantify what he means by “easy”, or what this would entail in terms of who to approach or how much it would cost. There is no suggestion that it would be free and the FTIJ found that the father had no state connections and rejected the oral evidence of wealth and influence, preferring the Appellant’s previous evidence. I find it self-evident from the WS that the father was not a wealthy man, spending all of his earnings on alcohol, not paying for food or bills, whilst being reliant upon the Appellant, his mother and siblings to give him money.
37. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the FTIJ’s tracing findings covered the use of state corruption and that tracing was rejected because the FTIJ was not satisfied that the father and his family had the necessary state connections or the money to utilise corrupt state officials.
38. As such, I find that FTIJ’s conclusion on tracing adequately reasoned and within a reasonable range of responses.
39. I therefore find that ground 1 does not disclose any material errors of law.
Ground 2 – Insufficient/Perverse Findings in Respect of Mental Health
40. Under ground 2 the Appellant argues that the FTIJ’s findings on the Appellant’s mental health were irrational, that is that no reasonable Tribunal Judge could have reached the same conclusion.
41. The ground notes that the FTIJ took into account a psychiatric letter dated 2 June 2024, which recommended antidepressants and psychological therapy, notes that the Appellant’s oral evidence was that he no longer took Sertraline and suggests that the FTIJ found that the Appellant does not have a mental health condition. As such, argues the ground, it does not logically follow that the appellant is completely free of any mental health difficulties given the relatively recent evidence from a psychiatrist.
42. I find this ground misconceived.
43. The hearing before Judge Nolan took place on 27 October 2025. As confirmed at [16] – and it was not disputed before me – the only medical evidence before the FTIJ was a singular letter from a psychiatrist dated 2 June 2024. The FTIJ then fairly summarises the letter (to be found at SB [153]) as follows,
In that letter, the doctor recommended that the appellant begin taking an anti-depressant medication (Sertraline), and that he be signposted for psychological therapies. The appellant’s evidence was that he did take Sertraline for a short period of time but not was not currently doing so, and that he had not attended any other form of therapy.
44. I note that the FTIJ further found at [19], which again was not disputed by Mr Mavrontiz, that the Appellant had not taken any medication in over a year at the date of hearing.
45. I find that there was no other medical evidence of any kind before the FTIJ.
46. It is in this context that the FTIJ found “I conclude and find that the appellant does not currently have any significant mental health problems, and that he is reasonably physically healthy”.
47. Whilst the ground of appeal suggests that the singular piece of medical evidence was “recent”, it was evidently not, being some 16 months old at the date of hearing. The Appellant was no longer taking the recommended medication and had not undergone the recommended therapy.
48. As such, I find that it cannot be said that no reasonable Tribunal Judge could have come to the same conclusion as Judge Nolan on the evidence before him; that is, “that the appellant does not currently have any significant mental health problems, and that he is reasonably physically healthy”.
49. Accordingly, I dismiss ground 2.
Ground 3 - Insufficient Findings on State Protection
50. Under ground 3 the Appellant argues that the FTIJ erred at paragraph [19] by failing to take into account the expert report when reaching his conclusions on the availability of state protection. In particular, it is argued that the expert found that the police would not take the Appellant’s claims seriously and in so doing, the expert had cited various country information reports. As such, in the light of the FTIJ’s acceptance of the expert report at [17], the findings at [19] are unsustainable.
51. I note that at paragraph [18] the FTIJ found that the Appellant “is no longer at risk of forced child labour” and that the Appellant is not at risk from his father or his father’s family. The FTIJ predicates this reasoning upon the Appellant now being an adult and the father and his family having no state connections, wealth, power or influence. I find it plain that the FTIJ makes this finding in relation to the Appellant’s home area, as well as in terms of internal relocation, as considered under ground 1 above.
52. I am reinforced in this view by Judge Nolan’s findings at paragraph [19], which distinguishes between a finding of no risk on return and an alternative finding that internal relocation is reasonably available.
I have considered all those factors as discussed above, including the report of Dr Korovilas, and I find that the appellant would not be at any risk on return for any reason. As I have found he would not be at risk on return, the issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation do not arise. Even if the appellant would be at risk on return, which is not accepted, I find there would be a sufficiency of protection available. The background evidence shows that there is a functioning police system in Albania, and Albanian citizens have basic rights which are enforceable. There are measures in place to combat any corruption still remaining in the criminal justice system. In addition, as discussed above, the appellant could reasonably relocate to another town or city in Albania other than Tirana. The appellant would reasonably be able to obtain anti-depressant medication and treatment on return if required, although it is noted that he has not taken any medication for his claimed mental health problems for over a year. He therefore does not qualify for a grant of HP.
[emphasis added]
53. As is clear from this reasoning, the FTIJ relied upon his findings at [18] that there is no risk in the home area and a reasonable option of internal relocation, to conclude that the issue of state protection does not arise.
54. In UTJ Rastogi’s grant of permission it was noted that whilst Judge Nolan found that the Appellant is no longer at risk of forced child labour, he did not consider the risk of serious harm from domestic violence.
55. I find that domestic violence is clearly relevant to risk in the home area, and I agree that it was not considered by Judge Nolan, particularly in the context of the evidence of past domestic violence and immigration rule 399K. However, in the light of my conclusion that the FTIJ’s internal relocation and tracing findings are sustainable under grounds 1 and 2, I find no material error in any purported failure to consider the risk of domestic violence in the home area at the hands of the Appellant’s father.
56. Equally, in the light of my rejection of grounds 1 and 2, regardless of any merit in ground three’s criticism of the FTIJ’s approach to state protection, ground 3 must necessarily fail for want of materiality given the sustainable finding that the Appellant can reasonably internally relocate.
57. Accordingly, I find no material error of law under ground 3.
Article 8
58. In the “conclusions” of the pleaded grounds the Appellant argues that in the light of the errors pleaded under ground 1, the FTIJ erred in his assessment of very significant obstacles. However, given my rejection of ground 1, I find that the FTIJ did not err in his Article 8 assessment.
CONCLUSION ON ERROR OF LAW
59. For the reasons above, I find that Decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Nolan does not disclose any material errors of law.
NOTICE OF DECISION
1. The Decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Nolan does not contain any material errors of law and therefore stands.
2. The Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

D. Clarke

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

9 July 2026