Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000251
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65657/2023
LP/04281/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

27th October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BUTLER

Between

AQ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Martin, counsel, instructed by UK Immigration Law Chambers
For the Respondent: Ms N Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 5 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and his family members are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant or his family members, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a citizen of Pakistan who has made a protection claim is based on his fear of the Ahle Hadith sect. He states that he and his family are members of the minority religious group Ahle Sunnat. The Appellant states that Ahle Hadith mullahs accused him of blasphemy and he and his family subsequently faced a number of reprisals. This decision follows a de novo hearing of his claim in the Upper Tribunal, further to my determination promulgated on 21 July 2026 in which I found material errors of law in the previous First-tier Tribunal determination in his appeal, which dismissed his claim on credibility grounds.
2. There has been a significant development in the case since the First-tier Tribunal hearing, namely that the Appellant’s brother, sister-in-law, and their children have been recognised as refugees by the Respondent following a determination issued by FTTJ Cotton. Their claims overlap significantly with those of the Appellant and are similarly based on their persecution as members of the Ahle Sunnat religious group.
Hearing before me
3. The Appellant attended the rehearing of his protection claim. An Urdu interpreter was used, who confirmed that she and the Appellant (and his sister-in-law) understood each other.
4. At the outset of the hearing, Ms Nolan confirmed that the Respondent no longer disputed risk, sufficiency of protection, or internal relocation in light of the determination of FTTJ Cotton (which has not been appealed). However, she maintained that the Appellant’s individual credibility was challenged.
5. I asked Mr Martin whether any vulnerable witness directions were required in light of the evidence in the bundle that the Appellant had previously suffered from mental health issues. He confirmed that no specific directions were needed and the Appellant did not request any further adjustments during the hearing.
6. The Appellant was called to give evidence, confirmed his witness evidence and supporting documentation, and was then cross-examined. His evidence is set out in full in the Tribunal’s record but I highlight the key issues in my analysis below.
7. I note that video evidence was filed by the Appellant shortly before the hearing. While arrangements were made for this to be played at the hearing, Mr Martin did not ask me to view the video evidence nor made any submissions on it. Ms Nolan similarly made no submissions on the video evidence. In the absence of either party explaining the videos or inviting me to reach any conclusion on them, I have not considered them substantively as part of my determination.
Assessment of evidence and findings
8. As this case turns on credibility, I remind myself of s. 32(2)(b) of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, which provides:
“The decision-maker must first determine, on the balance of probabilities, […] whether the asylum seeker does in fact fear such persecution in their country of nationality (or in a case where they do not have a nationality, the country of their former habitual residence) as a result of that characteristic”
9. In JCK (s. 32 NABA 2022) (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 00100 (IAC) UTJ Bruce provides helpful and nuanced guidance on this provision. Key conclusions in JCK are:
“… decision makers could be forgiven for thinking that this question is all about the credibility of the claim.” (§16);
“The provision simply requires the decision maker to consider whether the asylum seeker “does in fact fear”: it is what is otherwise referred to as the ‘subjective fear’ test. Assessing that fear is a discrete exercise from assessing whether past events occurred. […] case. There will be cases in which the acceptance or rejection of historical facts presented by a claimant will inform the decision on whether or not he is “in fact afraid”. As it happens, this is one of them. That is not however always the case. Section s32(2)(b) asks decisionmakers to consider a different question, and in doing so relegates the matter of ‘credibility’ to where it belongs in the refugee risk assessment: it can be relevant, but will not on its own be determinative” (§17)
10. Therefore, my task is to assess the Appellant’s subjective fear on the balance of probabilities, followed by an assessment of the risk he faces on the lower standard. For the reasons given below, I consider that the Appellant more likely than not does have a subjective fear of persecution on the grounds of religious affiliation. I also consider that he is at a real risk of persecution as a result of the matters which give rise to that fear.
11. In reaching my determination, I have considered the case in full and have had regard to all the material before me. I have also considered and borne in mind the determination of FTTJ Cotton. While I am not bound by that determination and while the Appellant’s claim raises distinct factual claims and separate events concerning him personally, I do consider that the determination is relevant to my findings, as set out below. I start by describing the Appellant’s account as given in his documentary evidence then move on to the oral evidence and points taken against him by the Respondent.
12. The Appellant is man in his forties. He comes from a family who belong to the Ahle Sunnat sect of Islam. His family are prominent in this movement and he states that his father built the first mosque in his home area. His father is the imam of that mosque. While resident in Pakistan, the Appellant explains that he acted as secretary of the mosque. The Appellant has also provided evidence that his family run a family business manufacturing equipment for manicures and pedicures. He describes this as allowing his family a good standard of living. There was no challenge to this element of the Appellant’s claim.
13. The Appellant describes an instigating incident in October 2019 when mullahs from the Ahle Hadith sect came to his office and demanded that he stop organising certain religious celebrations. During this meeting, the Appellant accidentally knocked some books onto the floor, one of which was a copy of the Hadiths (Islamic religious texts). The mullahs became angry, accused him of blasphemy, and threatened his life. The Appellant describes escaping and going to live with his father for two months.
14. The Appellant describes a further incident in February 2020 when he was shot at en route to his family’s factory. He managed to escape and went to the police station with his brother to lodge a complaint. He states that the police did not take any action.
15. In July 2020 the Appellant organised a Sunni celebration of the type the mullahs had asked him to stop. At the end of the evening, he was suddenly attacked by many men who told him he would be killed if he did not abandon his sect. Some of his fellow religious adherents came to his rescue. He again went to the police station with his brother, and they again refused to allow him to file a first information report (i.e. a criminal complaint).
16. The Appellant then travelled to the UK, where he arrived on 29 July 2020 on a visit visa. He did not claim asylum upon arrival, nor in a timely manner thereafter. His explanation is that he did not want to claim asylum; his intention was to return to Pakistan where his family remained and continue his business there. He also developed depression.
17. The appellant did not claim asylum until after he was arrested by the Home Office as an overstayer on 11 May 2022.
18. After the Appellant left the UK, there were further relevant events in Pakistan. I take the following information from the determination of FTTJ D Cotton, dated 25 May 2026, in the appeal brought by the Appellant’s brother, sister in law, and their children (PA/77584/2024 and ors). That determination has not been appealed and has not been challenged in these proceedings. While I am not bound by Judge Cotton’s findings, I nevertheless treat them as authoritative and see no reason to depart from them.
19. The Appellant’s brother and his family are also members of the Ahle Sunnat sect. They described a history of abuse and difficulties with the Ahle Hadith, which particularly affected “the boys of the family”. On 1 October 2023 two people on a motorbike tried to abduct one of their children. After this, they fled the country and travelled to the UK where they claimed asylum. They described the Appellant’s father-in-law as an imam and gave a consistent account of the family being part of the Ahle Sunnat sect. They were found to be credible and at risk on the basis of religious persecution if they were to return to Pakistan, and have since been recognised by the Respondent as refugees.
20. As noted above, I heard evidence from the Appellant and his sister-in-law. His brother, although being more closely involved in the events of the Appellant’s case than his sister-in-law, did not attend the hearing. When I enquired why he had not attended, Mr Martin told me he had an appointment on the morning of the hearing which he could not miss. No details of that appointment were provided, no updating statement from his brother was provided, nor was an application to adjourn the hearing made. I consider that the failure by the Appellant’s brother to attend to give evidence or provide any clear evidence of why he was absent, when he was a potentially corroborative witness, is a relevant factor which militates against a finding in favour of the Appellant’s truthfulness. However, I do not put any significant weight on this as (i) his sister in law did attend, as did the family neighbour who assisted during the attempted abduction, (ii) the brother was treated as a truthful witness by FTTJ Cotton, and (iii) I do not otherwise find the evidence so finely balanced that the absence of this evidence makes a material difference to my conclusions.
21. I find the Appellant and his sister-in-law to be truthful witnesses. They gave clear evidence and did not appear to be seeking to exaggerate their answers or give ‘helpful’ evidence. I deal with the Respondent’s specific criticisms of the Appellant’s evidence below.
22. Ms Nolan made a number of points in submissions and during her cross-examination which she invited me to find meant that the Appellant was not credible. I now consider each of these points in turn.
a. First, she argued that the Appellant had failed to give an explanation as to why, despite working for the mosque since 2005, the mullahs suddenly became aggressive in 2019. I do not consider that there is any implausibility here. The Appellant explained in oral evidence that there had been previous, low-level issues from the Ahle Hadith before the 2019 incidents but that the accidental knocking over of the books was treated as blasphemy. Mr Martin in closing submissions reminded me of a case in Pakistan in which a Sri Lankan businessman who took down a print of the Koran from his wall was murdered. I therefore find it plausible that (i) the Ahle Hadith are hostile to the Ahle Sunnat (which is consistent with the background information, (ii) that they would be on a ‘hair trigger’ for perceived slights, and (iii) that the 2019 incident arose against that background.
b. Second, it was argued that the Appellant had not been consistent. Ms Nolan placed heavy emphasis on the Appellant’s statement in his screening interview; when asked about his claim he referred to the Ahle Hadith (it is written in the record as ‘el hadid’, but no suggestion was made that this was anything other than a transcription error) and said “they came to our mosque and created trouble”. In cross-examination, the Appellant said that he did not understand and that he was struggling with mental ‘pressure’, a reference to his depression. I accept that the Appellant has been broadly consistent in his account. The screening interview is expressly stated to be a brief exploration of an asylum-seeker’s claim and this particular question asks for a brief explanation of the basis of claim. The mosque and the issues with the Ahle Hadith were at the heart of the Appellant’s claim. The 2019 incident was the inciting incident, but the Appellant explained that there had been consistent issues with the Ahle Hadith in relation to his work at the mosque. I do not find that there is any significant inconsistency here, if there is an inconsistency at all. I also consider that the imprecise use of language is adequately explained, if necessary, by the use of an interpreter, the shortform nature of screening interviews, and the Appellant’s mental state at the time (which was not challenged and which is supported to some extent by medical evidence in the bundle).
c. The Appellant gave slightly fuller answers to some of the questions put to him in cross examination than reflected in his written evidence. For instance, he said that – after relocating to his uncle’s house in Lahore to avoid the Ahle Hadith – they had become aware of his whereabouts and his uncle had asked him to leave. In the Appellant’s witness statement his evidence is: “[…] my uncle was also in fear as he did not want to become a target of these people for providing me with shelter”. While I accept that the Appellant has added material new information in cross-examination, none of his witness statements are lengthy or particularly detailed, and I find it plausible that he would be able to provide further detail when asked to expand on his evidence. In any event, his answers under cross-examination are not inconsistent with the evidence in his witness statement; they are consistent with his uncle being fearful of being targeted by the Ahle Hadith.
d. A significant point against the Appellant is his delay in claiming asylum. Despite coming to the UK in 2020 (on a visit visa) for his safety (as he described it), he did not claim asylum until 2022 after he was arrested by immigration enforcement. I have considered section 8 of the 2004 Act in this context. I accept that the Appellant had a reasonable opportunity to claim asylum substantially earlier than he did. He is a professional and an educated person who does not suggest that he was ignorant of the existence of asylum or how to claim it. I accept that he had mental health problems after his arrival, but I do not consider that the evidence shows that these were so severe that he could not take the relatively modest step of claiming asylum. I therefore accept that this case falls within s. 8(6) of the 2004 Act which I am accordingly required to take into account as damaging the Appellant’s credibility. While I am required to take this into account as damaging his credibility, the 2004 Act does not dictate the weight which I should put upon this element of the Appellant’s case as part of my holistic assessment of his credibility. I put some weight upon it but I do not place significant weight on it. This is because I accept the Appellant’s account that he wanted to return to his comfortable life in Pakistan and his family there, and so hoped that the issues would resolve themselves during his absence. He has always been clear that he has substantial professional and personal ties in Pakistan and I accept his written and oral evidence that he would have preferred to return home rather than remain in the UK. Nevertheless, I do consider that the Appellant had an opportunity to claim asylum and that his failure to do so is a negative feature as regards his credibility.
23. I have also considered the refusal letter and the credibility points raised therein. There are some points made in the refusal decision regarding the asylum interview, which were neither put to the Appellant nor raised by Ms Nolan. It is therefore unclear whether the Respondent stands by them. Nevertheless, I do not place substantial weight on the apparent inconsistencies in the Appellant’s answers given in his asylum interview. First, some of these are not in fact inconsistencies, for example one involves a requirement of corroboration (“you have provided no evidence to support this claim”). Corroboration is of course not required in asylum claims and, in any event, I consider that substantial corroboration is provided by the Appellant’s brother and sister-in-law’s claim. Insofar as there are any true inconsistencies between the asylum interview and his other evidence, I consider these to be minor discrepancies in accounts which are wholly unsurprising where the Appellant has given different accounts in different contexts at different times, whilst suffering from depression.
24. I place substantial weight on the judgment of FTTJ Cotton. This is an unchallenged decision which accepts the credibility of the Appellant’s family members. While their appeal did not concern the events in 2019 and 2020 which the Appellant relates, they substantially overlap as they confirm (i) the family’s history of religious activism and (ii) ongoing reprisals by the Ahle Hadith. The Appellant’s sister-in-law gave oral evidence before me. While she candidly accepted that she had not seen the interactions between the Appellant and the Ahle Hadith, she explained that she was aware of these events at the time and described the Appellant returning home after the 2019 incident and leaving to report the incident at the police station with his brother. She was accepted as a witness of truth by FTTJ Cotton and I accept that she told the truth at the hearing before me.
25. Therefore, having reviewed the evidence in the round and having carefully considered the criticisms of the Appellant’s credibility made by the Respondent, I conclude that he is a credible witness (as are his supporting witnesses) and I accept his evidence.
26. Ms Nolan accepted that the sole issue in this appeal was credibility. She accepted that, if I were to find the Appellant to be at risk, he would be at a real risk of persecution on return to Pakistan, that he could not seek effective protection, or internally relocate. I therefore allow the appeal.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed.

Miranda Butler

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 October 2026