Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No:
UI-2026-000252
UI-2026-000253

First-tier Tribunal No:
EU / 57615 / 2023; LE/04018/2024
EU / 57617 / 2023; LE/04019/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 27 July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KAMARA

Between

XHEVAIR SERDARI
VALBONA SERDARI
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Entry Clearance Officer
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms G Rea, counsel instructed by Turpin Miller LLP
For the Respondent: Ms R Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 19 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellants have been granted permission to appeal the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing their appeals following a hearing which took place on 14 October 2025.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on 15 January 2026.
Anonymity
3. The First-tier Tribunal did not issue an anonymity order. I take into account the principle of open justice and see no reason to make an order, so none is made.
Factual Background
4. The appellants are nationals of Albania, now aged in their fifties. They are the father-in-law and step-mother-in-law of Mrs Arlinta Kotsaki, the relevant EU (Greek) national (the sponsor) who is married to the appellants’ son/stepson Mr Elidon Serdari.
5. On 18 August 2023, the appellants applied for an EU Family Permit under Appendix EU (Family Permit) of the Immigration Rules on the basis that they were dependent upon their son and daughter in law in the United Kingdom.
6. Those applications were refused by way of decisions dated 27 November 2023 on the basis that inadequate evidence was provided to show dependency. The respondent commented that she expected to see evidence of living costs for which the appellants used the funds sent by the EEA sponsor and that this had not been provided.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
7. The First-tier Tribunal judge did not accept that the second appellant could be considered a family member because she was a stepparent. For reasons set out between [64-73], the judge concluded that the sponsor had not provided a full picture as to how the appellants spend the funds sent to them. Nor was the judge satisfied as to the level of support each appellant received, their essential living costs or the individual circumstances of each appellant. In short, dependency had not been established.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
8. The grounds of appeal can be summarised as follows:
1. There was an error in overlooking the sponsor’s supplementary statement and corroborating evidence, which led to an erroneous finding as to the lack of support provided by the appellants’ other children.
2. There was a failure to make a finding on a material issue and/or provide any/adequate reasons for rejecting the sponsor’s oral and documentary evidence as to the absence of alternative sources of income.
3. Permission to appeal was granted on the basis sought, with the judge granting permission making the following remarks.
The Tribunal did not make reference in the Decision to medical evidence or student status, which the grounds state corroborate the sponsor’s evidence that the Appellants’ have no other sources of income. The Tribunal did not make any explicit adverse credibility findings against the sponsor. It is at least arguable that the Tribunal expected to have more evidence of payments to the Appellants than may be realistically or reasonably available – the Tribunal had proof of money transfers in considerable amounts, to both Appellants, for months before their application date, and witness evidence that in person cash payments were also made. It is also at least arguable that if the Appellants’ had established their only source of income was the sponsor, then the precise detail of their outgoings was not of material importance in determining dependency.
9. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response dated 30 January 2026 in which the appeals were opposed for detailed reasons. The point was made that the appeal of the second appellant could not succeed in any event, given the unchallenged conclusion that she was not a family member of the sponsor owing to being a stepparent.
The error of law hearing
10. The matter comes before the Upper Tribunal to determine whether the decision contains an error of law and, if it is so concluded, to either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so.
11. A bundle was submitted by the appellant containing, inter alia, the core documents in the appeal, including the appellant’s and respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal.
12. The hearing was attended by representatives for both parties as above. Ms Rea drew my attention to a supplementary bundle which was uploaded to CE File on the day of the hearing. This bundle had been before the First-tier Tribunal and contained the evidence relied upon in support of the grounds of appeal. Both representatives made submissions and the conclusions below reflect those arguments and submissions where necessary.
13. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.
Discussion
14. In the light of the guidance given by the Court of Appeal, including at paragraph [77] of KM [2021] EWCA Civ 693, judicial restraint should be exercised when examining the reasons given by a First-tier Tribunal Judge for their decision and that it should not be assumed too readily that the Judge misdirected themselves. In this case [77(3)] is pertinent in that a court or tribunal should be slow to infer that where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned that it has not been taken into account.
Ground one
15. The first ground contains a contention that the judge overlooked the 77-page supplementary bundle which contained evidence relating to the appellants’ other three adult children. There is no indication from the decision that this evidence was overlooked. This was a particularly detailed and careful decision. At [53] the judge states that he has taken into account all the evidence with which he has been provided. He acknowledges that he may not refer to it all but states that it has been considered ‘holistically.’ There is no reason to reject the judge’s indication here. After a discussion of the issues, the judge confirms at [62] that he has considered the documentary evidence provided by the appellants as well as the oral evidence from the sponsor and her husband.
16. The focus of Ms Rea’s submissions was on [70] of the decision, where the judge stated that statements had not been provided by the appellants other three children and nor was there any other evidence from them to demonstrate that they are not providing the appellants with financial support. The judge was plainly right to refer to the absence of any witness statements or evidence directly from them on this point.
17. I consider that the judge clearly had in mind, when making that observation at [70] of the supplementary witness statement from the sponsor which made a series of claims as to the inability of these adult children to provide any financial support to the appellants.
18. That statement says that Aristotel is residing in the United Kingdom ‘with no status.’ While I accept that it is hard to prove a negative, however there is no evidence as to whether Aristotel is even in the United Kingdom, let alone an explanation as to whether he is an unlawful entrant, overstayer, asylum-seeker or whether he occupies any other category which means he is not permitted to work as claimed. Ms Rea had no instructions on the point.
19. While the judge was not required to refer to every single document adduced on the appellants’ behalf, I note that the evidence in the supplementary bundle which was the focus of Ms Rea’s arguments, is not referred to in the appellant’s skeleton argument nor in the judge’s record of the submissions made.
20. One of those children, Aleksander is said to be unable to work full-time because he has diabetes and is a single father. While evidence of his condition was adduced. It cannot seriously be contended that this amounts to evidence of an inability to work full-time or the conclusion that he does not provide his parents with any financial support.
21. There is also a daughter, Pranvera, regarding whom evidence was provided indicating that she is studying for a master’s degree in law in Albania. Again, this does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that she is impecunious and unable to contribute towards the support of her parents.
22. Therefore, the judge made no error at [70] in noting that there was no supporting evidence from the appellants’ three other adult children as to their circumstances and whether they helped to support the appellants.
23. In the alternative, even had the judge overlooked the two documents relating to Aleksander and Pravera, there is no prospect, given the judge’s wholesale rejection of the case advanced, that their consideration would have resulted in a material difference to the outcome of the appeals.
Ground two
24. It is argued that the judge failed to make a finding whether he accepted or rejected the appellant’s case that all their essential living needs were met by the sponsors. It is further argued that the judge did not adequately address the appellants claims as to their circumstances. A particular focus is on the first appellant’s explanation for not being in work and evidence which purports to show that they are not in receipt of benefits in Albania.
25. Again, I would refer to the paragraphs where the judge has confirmed that he has considered all the evidence before him which also apply here. Therefore, this aspect of the ground is not made out.
26. At [64] onwards the judge discusses aspects of the documentary evidence which go directly to the issue in dispute. At [65], he notes that funds have been regularly sent to the appellants by the sponsor but rightly concluded that this, without more, did not demonstrate dependency, applying Lim [2015] EWCA Civ 1383.
27. At [66] the judge observed that the first appellant’s bank statements did not confirm if the funds were received from the sponsor or their spouse. The judge considered evidence of travel to Albania and was entitled to conclude that this alone did not demonstrate that the appellants had been provided with money or other support during those trips.
28. The judge took into consideration an income and expenses table but found that little weight could be attached to it. Among his concerns was the fact that there was no detail as to who this document related. There is no challenge to any of these discrete findings. Overall, despite his best efforts, the judge, at [69] found it difficult to establish whether the appellants could meet their essential living needs without the financial or material support of the sponsors.
29. It is strongly contended that the judge did not reject the account put forward by or on behalf of the appellant. While the judge did not say, in terms, that he rejected the credibility of the account put forward, it can be inferred from [70] that he was not prepared to accept the sponsor’s largely unsupported account when it came to the appellants’ other children.
30. The judge had the benefit of hearing directly from the sponsor and her husband. That the judge did not accept much of the rest of the account he had been given is further apparent from [73] which follows his discussion of the long list of concerns he had with the evidence of dependency. In that paragraph, the judge states that he is ‘not satisfied that he has been provided with a full picture of how the appellants spend money sent to them and for what purpose. ‘
31. In addition, at [74], the judge reiterates and expands his concerns that the sponsor has not given a full picture of the level of support the appellants receive, their essential living costs or their particular circumstances.
32. The grounds amount to little more than disagreement and an attempt to reargue the case.
Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

T Kamara

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 July 2026

NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS

1. A person seeking permission to appeal against this decision must make a written application to the Upper Tribunal. Any such application must be received by the Upper Tribunal within the appropriate period after this decision was sent to the person making the application. The appropriate period varies, as follows, according to the location of the individual and the way in which the Upper Tribunal’s decision was sent:

2. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is in the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, and is not in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 12 working days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

3. Where the person making the application is in detention under the Immigration Acts, the appropriate period is 7 working days (5 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

4. Where the person who appealed to the First-tier Tribunal is outside the United Kingdom at the time that the application for permission to appeal is made, the appropriate period is 38 days (10 working days, if the notice of decision is sent electronically).

5. A “working day” means any day except a Saturday or a Sunday, Christmas Day, Good Friday or a bank holiday.

6. The date when the decision is “sent’ is that appearing on the covering letter or covering email