Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000259
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00805/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

29th June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE D. CLARKE

Between

JAHANARA AKTAR ANSARI
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Litigant in Person
For the Respondent: Mr Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 18 May 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
INTRODUCTION
1. The Appellant, a citizen of Bangladesh, appeals against the Decision of First-Tier Tribunal Judge Alis promulgated on 11 December 2025 (“the Decision”), dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the SSHD’s decision dated 6 June 2024 (“RFRL”), refusing the Appellant’s Human Rights application dated 28 November 2023

BACKGROUND
2. The Appellant, a Bangladesh national born on 7 January 1944, entered the UK with a visit visa on 26 May 2023 with LTR until 2 November 2023. On 28 November 2023 the Appellant submitted a Human Rights claim based upon her ill-health and dependence upon her family in the UK.
3. In the RFRL dated 6 June 2024, the SSHD notes the Appellant’s application and that she has been “diagnosed with anxiety and chronic depression, cataracts, partial deafness, diabetes, dementia, Hypertension, swollen glands, muscular pain, gastric problems and difficulties from a previous broken ankle and you are receiving medication for these illnesses”, and noted that the Appellant had provided letters from medical professionals.
4. The RFRL first considered the application on Article 3 ECHR medical grounds by reference to the guidance in AM (Art 3; health cases) Zimbabwe [2022] UKUT 00131. In so doing the SSHD noted that the medical reports stated that return to Bangladesh would have an impact on the Appellant’s health, but concluded that she had not provided sufficient evidence that she would be unable to receive medication for her conditions or would be unable to seek support and treatment for her conditions or day to day life on return to Bangladesh. In this regard, the SSHD reasoned,
“You have not provided substantive evidence to outline exactly what help and support that you need or that this support is only available in the UK. You have lived in Bangladesh for over 79 years of your life, and it is not accepted that you would be unable to access help and support for your day to day needs as well as the medications you need on return to Bangladesh especially as it is noted that you brought your current prescriptions with you to the UK from Bangladesh.”
It is noted that you have stated that your adult children provide emotional physical, practical and financial support to you. However, it is not accepted that they would be unable to continue supporting you financially and emotional on your return to Bangladesh and if they so wished they could relocate to support you physically and practically in Bangladesh or if preferred you would be able to receive support and help from the health system in Bangladesh. It is not accepted that you would be unable to access help and support on return to Bangladesh.
5. The RFRL sets out passages from paragraphs [2.1], [5], [6], [7], [10] and [16] of the CPIN Bangladesh: Medical treatment and healthcare, dated July 2022 (“the CPIN”), to evidence the availability of treatment and finds insufficient evidence that the Appellant would suffer a rapid or decline in health or reduction in life expectancy. Accordingly, the SSHD found that the Article 3 threshold would not be breached on removal.
6. The RFRL then moves on to consider Article 8 ECHR; finds that neither Appendix FM or Appendix Private Life are met; and finds that the Appellant’s removal would not engender unjustifiably harsh consequences, such that removal would be disproportionate.
Decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Alis dated 11 December 2025
7. For the purposes of the grounds of appeal before me, I summarise the salient parts of Judge Alis’s Decision as follows:
• At [5] and [6] the Appellant confirmed that Article 3 ECHR was not pursued and that the singular issue was Article 8.
• At [10] the FTIJ records the Sponsor’s oral evidence as follows:
“The Sponsor’s daughter adopted her statement and gave oral evidence. She stated that prior to her mother coming to this country in 2023 the Appellant lived in a house with people who she sent money to and provided for her daily needs. Her medical complaints were longstanding but after the Appellant arrived here the Sponsor observed a deterioration in her condition to the extent, she now relied on the Sponsor totally for her daily care. In particular, her dementia and mobility had worsened, and the Sponsor did not believe she would be fit enough to travel home and even if she was able to transport her mother to Bangladesh, she would not have any family support in Bangladesh.”
• At [14] the FTIJ finds that the Appellant cannot meet Appendix Adult Dependent Relative, because the Appellant was not in the UK with leave under that route of the immigration rules.
• At [15] the FTIJ notes that if such an entry clearance application had been made, the Appellant would have needed to demonstrate “(a) long-term personal care to perform everyday tasks due to age, illness, or disability; (b) that care must be unavailable or unaffordable in the country where they live and (c) the UK-based sponsor must be able to provide adequate maintenance, accommodation, and care without recourse to public funds. There is no fixed income threshold (unlike spouse visas), but the sponsor must show that after housing costs, their income is sufficient to maintain themselves, their dependants, and the applicant at a level not below the income support threshold.”
• At [16] – [18] the FTIJ notes that if the immigration rules are not met, when considering Article 8(2), the public interest normally requires removal unless removal would engender unjustifiably harsh consequences.
• At paragraphs [19] – [31] the FTIJ then makes the following findings of fact:
◦ [19] – [20] the FTIJ confirms that he has considered the totality of the evidence when reaching his findings.
◦ [21] the FTIJ notes that accommodation and finances are not in issue.
◦ [22] the FTIJ summarises 3 reports from: Psychologist Dr Saima Latif dated 18 November 2023 (at SB [122]); Independent Social Worker Charles Musendo dated 21 November 2023 (at SB [97]); and Neuro Linguistic Programming Practitioner Dr Shehla, dated 19 November 2023, as follows:
(a) 21 Appeal Number: HU/00805/2025 There was an expert medical report dated 18 November 2023. The expert medical report confirmed that the Appellant suffered from multiple chronic conditions, including advanced dementia, diabetes, hypertension, and severe mobility limitations, compounded by depression and anxiety. The report concluded that her health was fragile and likely to deteriorate further without consistent care and supervision. It highlighted that while medication may be obtainable in Bangladesh, the absence of structured support and specialist care would place her at significant risk of neglect and rapid decline. The expert stressed that her dependency on family members for daily living tasks is absolute, and that relocation would severely compromise her physical and mental well-being, given the lack of equivalent care arrangements in her country of origin.
(b) There was also a social worker’s assessment dated 21 November 2023. The social work assessment confirmed that the Appellant was highly dependent on her adult children in the United Kingdom for all aspects of daily living, including personal care, mobility assistance, and emotional support. She suffered from dementia, diabetes, hypertension, and poor mobility, and required continuous supervision. The report concluded that there was no family or social network in Bangladesh able or willing to provide such care. While the Respondent relies on the Country Policy and Information Note to assert that medical treatment for conditions such as diabetes and hypertension is available in Bangladesh, it was argued this Note did not address the practical reality of the Appellant’s circumstances. It was submitted that her needs extended beyond access to medication and included constant physical assistance and safeguarding, which cannot be met by clinical facilities alone.
(c) The medical letter from Neurophoria NLP Surgery confirmed that the Appellant suffered from multiple chronic conditions, including dementia, diabetes, hypertension, and severe mobility impairment. It stated that she required ongoing supervision and assistance with daily living tasks and was not fit to travel due to her frailty and risk of deterioration. The report emphasised that her health needs were complex and continuous, and that removal from her current care environment would significantly compromise her well-being.
◦ [23] The FTIJ sets out the availability of treatment in the CPIN, as relied upon by the SSHD.
◦ [24] The FTIJ finds in relation to the report of Dr Latif,
▪ That the report is based wholly upon conversations with the Appellant’s family members.
▪ That the expert states that the Appellant was unable to engage with her due to dementia.
▪ That the only medical evidence before the expert were prescriptions that are not before the Tribunal.
▪ That the report does not identify what medication the Appellant takes.
▪ That the report does not consider the availability of facilities on return.
▪ That the report is 2 years old
◦ [25] The FTIJ finds in relation to the report of Dr Shehla,
▪ That the report was based upon what the Appellant told the expert not what her family said.
▪ That the report records the Appellant claiming to have lived alone in Bangladesh with no one to help, which is inconsistent with the Sponsor’s oral evidence.
▪ That the expert records the Appellant as presenting as confused and anxious whilst also being able to provide details of her life in Bangladesh and her issues.
▪ That the report finds what help the Appellant needs, but the RFRL accepts that the Appellant has health issues.
▪ That the report is 2 years old.
◦ [26] The FTIJ finds in relation to the report of Mr Musendo,
▪ That the report is based upon a singular visit to the family home.
▪ That the report refers to a medical report by Dr Islam, the Appellant’s doctor in Bangladesh, which is not before the Tribunal, “albeit there is a summary of the medication she was on in Bangladesh”.
▪ That the report found that the Appellant has care and support needs and would lose her family support if she was removed.
▪ That the report found that the Appellant would need support wherever she lived.
▪ That the SW appeared to have no knowledge of the circumstances available in Bangladesh.
▪ That the report is 2 years old.
◦ [27] The FTIJ records the SSHD arguing that the Appellant could reintegrate on return; that she had assistance in Bangladesh before entering the UK, albeit that the Sponsor claimed in oral evidence that such support was no longer available; and that the Appellant had failed to provide any statements from Bangladesh, setting out what support was previously provided and whether such support was still available.
◦ [28] The FTIJ records,
“The Sponsor argued the Respondent has overlooked what is said to have been a significant deterioration in her health since her arrival in the UK, but the evidence available is mixed with one doctor saying she was unable to provide instructions and the other stating she was able to give instructions. There is also the social worker’s report which sets out his assessment of the Appellant’s capabilities. I reiterate the Respondent accepts the Appellant has health issues but submitted there were other options available other than the Appellant and Sponsor’s preferred option.”
◦ At [29] – [31] the FTIJ then finds,
29. Prior to coming here, the Appellant managed with informal arrangements and her own resilience, but now it is argued her condition has progressed to the point where she can no longer live like that. It is argued she now requires daily hands-on care, which is currently provided by her daughter and son in the UK. The Respondent does not dispute the Appellant will need support but the difference between the Respondent’s position and that of the Appellant is that the Respondent argued there is treatment and support available in Bangladesh.
30. The Sponsor told me today her mother cannot go anywhere alone and would be unable travel back. I note when she came here, she was also accompanied so little appears to have changed.
31. I was not provided with a medical report about her condition prior to coming to this country in 2023. That report may have assisted me in deciding what, if anything, had changed health wise between how she was in Bangladesh to how she was in this country. I was also not provided with any appointment letters or reports from consultants which again would have told me about her current situation. There was no evidence that care was either unavailable or unaffordable in Bangladesh. All the reports were two years old.
• At [32] the FTIJ finds in the light of the above that the immigration rules are not met.
• At [33] – [34] the AFTIJ considers the appeal outside the immigration and finds, that there is family life between the Appellant and the Sponsor such that Article 8(1) is engaged.
• At [35] – [36] conducts the following balancing exercise,
35. The public interest lies in the maintenance of effective immigration controls. To strike a fair balance between the competing public and individual interests involved, I adopt a balance-sheet approach:
(a) The Appellant did not meet the Immigration Rules.
(b) If this application had been considered or would have been under Appendix ADR, I would have to consider (a) whether the Appellant needs long-term personal care to perform everyday tasks due to age, illness, or disability; (b) whether that care is unavailable or unaffordable in Bangladesh and (c) whether the UK-based sponsor must be able to provide adequate maintenance, accommodation, and care without recourse to public funds. It seems to me that the only issue in this case was whether that care is unavailable or unaffordable in Bangladesh. No report or evidence was provided about circumstances in Bangladesh. I have an assessment of her condition here but no assessment of options in Bangladesh.
(c) There is nothing to add to the public interest in the maintenance of effective immigration controls.
(d) This is not an appeal in which the application was bound to succeed on the evidence currently before me.
(e) The Appellant family do provide emotional, physical and financial support to the Appellant.
36. It is a balancing act, and the issue is whether a refusal would be a breach of Article 8 because it would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the Appellant. The threshold test is high and applications of this nature cannot be granted solely based on what best suits the Appellant’s family. The reports are all over two years old and there was neither an assessment about support available in Bangladesh nor any evidence about what could be provided by her previous carers or anyone else for that matter. Where there is a Rule for applications such as this it is often argued that if the Rule is met then the appeal should be allowed under article 8 ECHR. Similarly, if the Rule is not met then that is a weighty factor to have regard to when considering whether to allow or refuse an appeal.
• At [37] The FTIJ finds that removal would not engender unjustifiably harsh consequences and notes that “my conclusion may have been different if better evidence had been provided.”
Grant of PTA and Grounds of Appeal
8. On 7 January 2026 First-tier Tribunal Judge T Lawrence granted the Appellant permission to appeal the Decision of Judge Alis to the Upper Tribunal without restriction.
9. In grounds of appeal settled by Maya Law on 23 December 2025, the Appellant advanced one ground of appeal, as follows:
“The Appellant provided substantive medical reports confirming the Appellant’s ill health. The First−Tier Tribunal Judge, in paragraph 24, states that he rejected Dr. Latif’s report because it is based wholly on conversations with the Applicant’s family. It is not disputed that she has not been to the GP. Dr Latif’s report should not be assessed in isolation but as an overall picture with the GP’s letter. There were several reports from social workers, the GP and also Dr. Latif. All medical practitioners came to the same conclusion that the Applicant was ill and would not be able to survive in Bangladesh. The First−Tier Tribunal Judge was also privy that the Applicant is too unwell to travel and yet the First−Tier Tribunal Judge, in paragraph 29, concludes that the Respondent has argued that treatment and support is available in Bangladesh. Without taking into consideration the context of her ill health and inability to travel. It is submitted that the First−Tier Tribunal Judge erred in the law in the assessments of the documentary evidence and without taking a holistic approach of all the evidential which was unchallenged and not disputed that the medical evidence was not a transparent account of her ill health, her inability to travel and inability to look after herself due to her age, illness and disability. It is submitted that the Judge erred in law.”
10. In a Rule 24 reply dated 3 February 2026, the SSHD argued that Judge Alis properly directed himself and “made his treatment of the expert and other medical evidence unmistakeably clear in his treatment of it at paragraphs 24, 25, 26, and 31 of his decision. The justifiable criticisms of the age and shortcomings of the evidence is clear.”
11. The matter now comes before me to determine whether there is an error of law in the Decision of the Judge pursuant to s.12(1) of the Tribunal Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. If I find an error, I must then determine whether the error is material, such that the Decision should be set aside. If the Decision is set aside, I must decide whether to remake the Decision in the Upper Tribunal or remit the appeal to the First-Tier Tribunal, pursuant to s.12(2) of the 2007 Act.
ERROR OF LAW HEARING
Preliminary Matters
12. At the outset of the hearing, I explained to the unrepresented Appellant’s sponsor daughter Ms Akhtar, and her grandson Mr Ahmed, how the proceedings would work and the nature of an error of law hearing. Mr Ahmed confirmed that he would speak on behalf of the Appellant at the hearing.
13. Upon discussion with the parties, it became apparent that the Appellant’s family had not brought any papers with them. Accordingly, I ensured that the key documentation was photocopied, so that the Appellant’s family could follow the submissions by reference to the documents. In this regard, whilst this was an appeal brought by the Appellant at first instance, I asked Mr Ojo to make his submissions first. I then invited Mr Ahmed to address me on the key points advanced by Mr Ojo.
DISCUSSION
14. When considering the grounds and the Appellant’s invitation for me to interfere with the Decision of Judge Alis, I am mindful of Lord Hamblen’s guidance at [72] of HA Iraq SC [2022] UKSC 22, that “it is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal” and that the following principles to be applied,
(i)   They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently - see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii)  Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account - see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii)  When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out - see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope.
15. The first point taken in the grounds is that the FTIJ erroneously rejected the report of Dr Latif, without holistically assessing it in the round with the other medical evidence. In this regard the ground argues that the medical evidence was not challenged, and that all the experts were unanimous in finding that the Appellant was ill and would be unable to survive in Bangladesh.
16. I do not find this argument to have any merit.
17. At paragraph [19] the FTIJ confirms that he has had regard to the totality of the evidence when reaching his findings. I find that this is not any mere recitation of the FTIJ’s duty to do so.
18. At paragraph [22] the FTIJ summarises the 3 reports of Psychologist Dr Saima Latif dated 18 November 2023 (at SB [122]); Independent Social Worker Charles Musendo dated 21 November 2023 (at SB [97]); and Neuro Linguistic Programming Practitioner Dr Shehla, dated 19 November 2023 (at SB [140]). At paragraphs [24] – [26] the FTIJ then makes findings in relation to each report in turn. The fact that the FTIJ considered each in turn is nothing to the point, as made clear by President Lane in the guidance to QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) China [2021] UKUT 00033 (IAC),
“What the case law reveals is that the judicial fact-finder has a duty to make his or her decision by reference to all the relevant evidence and needs to show in their decision that they have done so. The actual way in which the fact-finder goes about this task is a matter for them. As has been pointed out, one has to start somewhere. At the end of the day, what matters is whether the decision contains legally adequate reasons for the outcome […..]”
19. In this regard, it is to be noted that the key findings in relation to all 3 reports are their 2 year vintage; the difference in Dr Latif’s and Dr Shelha’s finding of whether the Appellant was capable of being interviewed; the absence of medical records before both Dr Latif and Dr Shelha; the failure to produce the prescriptions referred to by Dr Latif or identify what they were; the failure to produce the report of Dr Islam from Bangladesh, as referred to by the social worker; Dr Latif’s failure to consider the availability of facilities upon return; Dr Shehla’s recording of the Appellant being alone before entering the UK, contrary to the Sponsor’s evidence at [10]; and the social worker’s lack of knowledge regarding facilities in Bangladesh.
20. At [27] the FTIJ then summarises the SSHD’s argument - in the light of the Sponsor’s evidence at [10] that “prior to her mother coming to this country in 2023 the Appellant lived in a house with people who she sent money to and provided for her daily needs” - that the Appellant would have any necessary support on return in the absence of any witness statements from Bangladesh to confirm that support was no longer available.
21. At [28] the FTIJ then records the Sponsor’s argument that the Appellant’s health has deteriorated since entering the UK but finds the medical evidence mixed because Dr Latif said she was unable to interview the Appellant due to her dementia, whilst Dr Shehla did interview the Appellant; during which the Appellant provided details of her life in Bangladesh (which was inconsistent with the Sponsor’s oral evidence) and her issues.
22. The FTIJ then confirms that the SSHD accepts that the Appellant has health issues “but submitted there were other options available other than the Appellant and Sponsor’s preferred option.”
23. It is in the context of this assessment of the evidence and the parties’ competing submissions that the FTIJ concludes at [31] that,
“I was not provided with a medical report about her condition prior to coming to this country in 2023. That report may have assisted me in deciding what, if anything, had changed health wise between how she was in Bangladesh to how she was in this country. I was also not provided with any appointment letters or reports from consultants which again would have told me about her current situation. There was no evidence that care was either unavailable or unaffordable in Bangladesh. All the reports were two years old.”
24. I therefore find it clear that the FTIJ was not satisfied on the medical evidence before him that: the Appellant’s health had deteriorated as claimed, in the absence of medical evidence from before the Appellant entered the UK; was not satisfied on the evidence before him that he had a clear picture the Appellant’s current health needs, in the light of the vintage of the reports; and was not satisfied that the Appellant had produced any evidence that care was unavailable or unaffordable.
25. At [35] - [37] the FTIJ then incorporates these findings into a proportionality assessment and finds,
“It seems to me that the only issue in this case was whether that care is unavailable or unaffordable in Bangladesh. No report or evidence was provided about circumstances in Bangladesh. I have an assessment of her condition here but no assessment of options in Bangladesh.”
[…..]
“[…..] The reports are all over two years old and there was neither an assessment about support available in Bangladesh nor any evidence about what could be provided by her previous carers or anyone else for that matter […..]”
[…..] I make it clear I have reached this conclusion based on the available evidence before me and my conclusion may have been different if better evidence had been provided.”
26. The burden of proof was clearly upon the Appellant to demonstrate on balance that support and care in Bangladesh would be so inadequate, unavailable or inaccessible, such that removal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences. All that the FTIJ has done is find that the evidence produced did not discharge that burden of proof.
27. I find this analysis and conclusion to be within the FTIJ’s reasonable range of responses.
28. In terms of the suggestion in the grounds that the FTIJ erred at [24] by rejecting Dr Latif’s report because it was based wholly on conversations with the Appellant’s family, I find this complaint misconceived. Whilst the FTIJ did find that the report was based wholly on conversations with the Appellant’s family, the FTIJ also found an inconsistency in Dr Latif not interviewing the Appellant due to her dementia on the one hand, and Dr Shehla’s ability to interview the Appellant. The FTIJ further took into account the absence of any medical evidence before Dr Latif, other than prescriptions which are neither identified by Dr Latif, nor were they produced before the Tribunal.
29. In HA (expert evidence; mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 00111 (IAC), the Presidential panel confirmed the relevance of GP records to both the Tribunal’s and an expert’s assessment of an Appellant’s health,
(4) Notwithstanding their limitations, the GP records concerning the individual detail a specific record of presentation and may paint a broader picture of his or her mental health than is available to the expert psychiatrist, particularly where the individual and the GP (and any associated health care professionals) have interacted over a significant period of time, during some of which the individual may not have perceived themselves as being at risk of removal.
(5) Accordingly, as a general matter, GP records are likely to be regarded by the Tribunal as directly relevant to the assessment of the individual's mental health and should be engaged with by the expert in their report. Where the expert's opinion differs from (or might appear, to a layperson, to differ from) the GP records, the expert will be expected to say so in the report, as part of their obligations as an expert witness. The Tribunal is unlikely to be satisfied by a report which merely attempts to brush aside the GP records.
30. In JL (medical reports-credibility) China [2013] UKUT 00145 (IAC), the UT further found that
“The more a diagnosis is dependent on assuming that the account given by the appellant was to be believed, the less likely it is that significant weight will be attached to it (HH (Ethiopia) [2007] EWCA Civ 306 [23]).”
31. Accordingly, I find that the FTIJ’s criticism of Dr Latif’s report on the basis that it was predicated upon conversations with the Appellant’s family in the absence of any medical records, well-reasoned and based upon legal precedent.
32. The second point taken in the grounds, is that despite the FTIJ having evidence before him of the Appellant being too unwell to travel, at [29] the FTIJ simply notes that the Respondent argued that treatment was available, without considering the SSHD’s argument in the context of the Appellant’s ill health and inability to travel.
33. Contrary to the complaint in the grounds, I find it clear that the FTIJ does consider the Appellant’s ability to travel at [30] – [31].
34. At [30] the FTIJ notes the Sponsor’s evidence in this regard and notes that the Appellant was accompanied to the UK. Critically, at [31] the FTIJ then finds that,
“I was not provided with a medical report about her condition prior to coming to this country in 2023. That report may have assisted me in deciding what, if anything, had changed health wise between how she was in Bangladesh to how she was in this country. I was also not provided with any appointment letters or reports from consultants which again would have told me about her current situation. There was no evidence that care was either unavailable or unaffordable in Bangladesh. All the reports were two years old.”
35. Accordingly, the FTIJ was not satisfied that the Appellant’s health had deteriorated since before her entry to the UK, in the absence of medical evidence from Bangladesh, and was not satisfied as to the current state of the Appellant’s health in the absence of contemporaneous evidence from her current medical care providers in the UK. In short, as found at [30] “when she came here, she was also accompanied so little appears to have changed.”
36. In circumstances where the Appellant bears the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities, I find this to be within the FTIJ’s reasonable range of responses.
37. I find that the ground of appeal is nothing more than a disagreement with the FTIJ’s well-reasoned Decision. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the ground of appeal discloses any material errors of law in Judge Alis’s Decision.
Grant of Permission
38. I note that Judge Lawrence’s grant of permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal dated 7 January 2026, further suggests that the FTIJ erred by failing to make findings as to the extent to which the evidence was accepted.
39. I find no merit in this suggestion. As considered above, I find it plain that the FTIJ was simply not satisfied that the Appellant had established on balance that her health was any different to before her entry to the UK; because there was no evidence before him of the Appellant’s health requirements whilst in Bangladesh; there was no evidence before him from those that had previously cared for the Appellant before her entry to the UK, to suggest that care was no longer available; the 3 reports were 2 years old and vitiated by the issues I have outlined above; and there was no contemporaneous medical evidence of the Appellant’s health issues and needs. In short, the FTIJ found that the evidence before him was insufficient to discharge the burden of proof in demonstrating that removal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences. As reasoned by the FTIJ at [37],
“I make it clear I have reached this conclusion based on the available evidence before me and my conclusion may have been different if better evidence had been provided.”
CONCLUSION ON ERROR OF LAW
40. For the reasons above, I find that Decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Alis does not disclose any material errors of law.
NOTICE OF DECISION
1. The Decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Alis does not contain any material errors of law and therefore stands.
2. The Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

D. Clarke
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
21 June 2026