Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000265
First-tier Tribunal No: EU/55005/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

3rd of September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HARRIS

Between

MANJU OLI
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Mr Jesurum of Counsel
For the respondent: Ms Mckenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 August 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is my remaking of the decision in this appeal. For ease of reference, I will refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal.
Background
2. The appellant is a citizen of Nepal. She applied on 25 March 2024, while she was resident in Norway, to the respondent for a family permit under the European Union Settlement Scheme (“EUSS”) as contained in Appendix EU (Family Permit) to the Immigration Rules.
3. It was her claim that she was the dependent mother of the sponsor, Mr Sunil Oli, and thus a family member of a relevant EEA citizen entitled to an EUSS family permit under Appendix EU (Family Permit) to the Immigration Rules.
4. The respondent refused the application in a decision dated 22 May 2024 and the appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal.
5. First-tier Tribunal Judge J G Richards (the “FTTJ”) allowed the appellant’s appeal in a decision dated 25 November 2025 on the ground the decision was not in accordance with residence scheme Immigration Rules.
6. The respondent appealed with permission to this Tribunal and came before me at a hearing on 24 April 2026. In an error of law decision dated 6 May 2026 (which is annexed to this decision) I found that the decision of the FTTJ did contain a material error of law concerning the assessment of dependency and should be set aside. I decided that, as requested by the respondent and as not objected to by the appellant, it was appropriate for this Tribunal to remake the decision in this appeal.
The remaking hearing on 13 August 2026
7. At the remaking hearing before me the appellant relied on the bundle of documents she produced for her First-tier Tribunal appeal hearing (contained in the error of law consolidated bundle) as well as a supplementary bundle produced for this hearing. The respondent relied on the bundle of documents she produced for the First-tier Tribunal hearing (contained in the error of law consolidated bundle).
8. With the help of an interpreter in Nepali I heard oral evidence in turn from Mr Sunil Oli, the sponsor and son of the appellant, and Mrs Deepa Oli, the daughter-in-law of the appellant and wife of the sponsor. Each relied on their witness statements and each was cross-examined by the respondent. Then I heard the submissions of the parties. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision.
Primary Issues
9. Firstly, it is disputed between the parties before me regarding as of which date I should assess the case of the appellant. The respondent submitted it should be the date of the hearing while the appellant submitted it was the date of application.
10. Secondly, the claimed dependency of the appellant on the sponsor is in dispute.
11. It is for the appellant to prove her case on the balance of probabilities.
My Findings
The first issue
12. Here Ms Mckenzie for the respondent relied upon dicta in Reyes (EEA Regs: dependency) [2013] UKUT 00314 (IAC) at paragraphs 32 to 34:
[32.] We are unable to accept that a person is entitled to succeed under regulation 7 if able to show dependency at the date of application but not at the date of decision.
[33.] As already noted, the test of dependency as found in regulation 7 [of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006] (and also in regulation 8) is expressed in the present tense: see [19] above. As a result the appellant would only have been entitled to succeed in his application to the respondent if he had been able to show on the basis of evidence produced to the respondent that he was dependent as at the date of decision.
[34.] How is the position affected once a person has been refused by the respondent and lodges an appeal? In our view, the relevant date for deciding whether he met the requirements must then become the date of hearing. As a result of our finding that the First-tier Tribunal judge’s decision was set aside and our giving directions making clear that the appellant was required to produce further evidence of his situation once he had got a job in Kent, the relevant date for deciding whether the requirements of regulation 7 are met becomes the date of hearing before us. The 2006 Regulations expressly apply to EEA appeals the provisions of s.85(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002: see paragraph 1 of Schedule 1.
13. Mr Jesurum submitted that the Rules specifically referred to the appellant having to meet requirements as of the date of application.
14. I find the position of the appellant is correct in law.
15. It is not disputed that this appeal, as was the case for the appeal in Reyes, is made under s.82(1) Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and that s.85(4) of the 2002 Act applies. It can be noted that s.85(4) Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 currently reads in a similar way to how it did before the Tribunal in Reyes:
On an appeal under section 82(1) ... against a decision [the Tribunal] may consider ... any matter which [it] thinks relevant to the substance of the decision, including ... a matter arising after the date of the decision.
16. In Reyes the Tribunal were considering matters relating to the issue of dependency under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006 then in force.
17. I accept that in the 2006 Regulations, and indeed in the subsequent Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016, the requirement for an EEA family permit under Regulation 12 was worded in the present. I consider this was the context for the Tribunal deciding in Reyes how to apply s.85(4) of the 2002 Act and for determining an appellant’s case in an appeal regarding the refusal of the respondent to issue EEA documentation had to be assessed as of the date of the hearing.
18. In contrast, I accept that the relevant eligibility provision for this appeal under Appendix EU (Family Permit) to the Immigration Rules at paragraph FP6(1) specifies the date for when a case involving an application for an EUSS family permit should be assessed:
The applicant meets the eligibility requirements for an entry clearance to be granted under this Appendix in the form of an EU Settlement Scheme Family Permit, where the entry clearance officer is satisfied that at the date of application (my emphasis):
(a) ….
(b) The applicant is a family member of a relevant EEA citizen;
19. I am satisfied that the date for demonstrating a claimed dependency, in order to be treated as a family member for the purposes of Appendix EU (Family Permit), is expressly identified in the Rules as at the date of application.
20. Thus, for the purposes of s.84(4) of the 2002 Act, where an appeal is about whether someone is a family member entitled to an EUSS family permit, the substance of the appealed decision concerns circumstances as at the date of application made by the appellant.
21. That said, s.84(4) of the 2002 Act does allow me to consider matters of evidence that may date from after the date of application so far as it may relate to the situation at the date of application.
22. Thus in this appeal, I bear in mind that the date of application was 25 March 2024. This is the date as of which the appellant needs to demonstrate the claimed dependency making her a family member of a relevant EEA citizen entitled to a family permit.
Second Issue: Dependency
23. Here I have considered the provisions of Appendix EU (Family Permit) to the Immigration Rules including definitions set out in Annex 1.
24. In particular, I note that “Dependent” means here that:
(a) having regard to their financial and social conditions, or health, the [appellant] cannot meet their essential living needs (in whole or in part) without the financial or other material support of the relevant EEA citizen (or, as the case may be, of the qualifying British citizen) or of their spouse or civil partner; and
(b) such support is being provided to the [appellant] by the relevant EEA citizen (or, as the case may be, by the qualifying British citizen) or by their spouse or civil partner; and
(c) there is no need to determine the reasons for that dependence or for the recourse to that support
25. I remind myself that under Appendix EU (FP) there is no requirement for any specified documentation to be produced in order to demonstrate a claim of dependence.
26. The appellant relies on witness statement and documentary evidence included in the bundle of documents put before the First-tier Tribunal as well as witness statement and documentary evidence include in the supplementary bundle.
27. The respondent disputes that there is sufficient evidence to demonstrates the claimed dependency of the appellant.
28. It is not disputed that she appellant has been a widow since 2012.
29. The appellant claims that she has never owned any property of her own whether in Nepal or elsewhere. She says that when she married, she initially lived with her husband at her father-in-law’s home. Subsequently, she and her husband moved into rental accommodation and never bought any property of their own; the home of the appellant’s father in law has passed into the ownership of one of the brothers of the appellant’s deceased husband.
30. There is no supporting evidence produced for this part of the appellant’s case but taking into account the passage of time, I find this does not necessarily damage the credibility of the claim.
31. I note there was no cross-examination of the witnesses, including the sponsor, about claims made about the appellant’s circumstances in Nepal before she went to Norway. Further, I accept that the evidence of the sponsor, in particular, is capable of supporting the claim of the appellant to have no resources of her own.
32. Having had the benefit of the sponsor giving oral evidence before me and be tested in cross examination, I have found him to be a generally coherent and consistent witness. I considered that his only unclear answers under cross-examination concerned whether the claimed current rental agreement for the appellant in Nepal was only written in the English version produced in the supplementary bundle or whether there was also another version (possibly original version) in Nepali. Ultimately, I was satisfied with the appellant’s answer that there was just the one document, specifically prepared in English because of the ongoing appeal proceedings, and found I was prepared to accept that much of the previous lack of clarity on the matter from the sponsor was the result of him not fully understanding the distinction between translating an original Nepali document into English and producing an original document deliberately written in English.
33. On the evidence before me I found that I was able to treat the sponsor as a reliable witness. I find I am able to place weight on his evidence about the lack of funds and assets owned by the appellant in Nepal including her ownership of any property in that country.
34. I find I am also able to place weight on the sponsor’s evidence that the appellant continued to lack any financial resources of her own while living in Norway (and indeed on return to Nepal after the date of application).
35. For the sake of thoroughness, I will also comment that, having had the benefit of Mrs Oli giving oral evidence and be cross-examined before me, I find I am also able to treat her as a reliable witness as well. I place weight on her evidence about the appellant lacking financial resources of her own.
36. It is the appellant’s case that at the date of application she was living in Norway and reliant upon the sponsor for accommodation and financial support because she is without any funds or assets of her own.
37. The appellant claims that she joined the sponsor and his family in Norway in 2019 and remained living in the home of the sponsor there when first the sponsor came to the UK in 2021 and then Mrs Oli also. It is said that, after he left Norway, the sponsor supported the appellant’s living and other expenses from income earned from renting out a room at his property as well as transferring funds on occasion. One of the sponsor’s daughter was still at the time studying in Norway and helped her grandmother, the appellant, by using funds from the rental money to shop and cover expenses
38. I have placed little weight on documentary evidence produced untranslated from the original Norwegian, such as the bank statements said to show receipt of the claimed rental money, the transfer of funds and the paying of expenses while the sponsor was in the UK and the appellant in Norway, even where the sponsor has attempted to explain what can be read. The sponsor is not an independent expert translator of Norwegian into English.
39. On the other hand, the appellant has produced documentary evidence with English translation about:
• money transfers between the sponsor and the appellant between 2016 and 2019
• the issuing of an EEA family permit to the appellant by the Norwegian authorities
• registration documentation for the appellant with the Norwegian National Population register
• a home the sponsor bought in Oslo
No specific challenge about any reliability issues for this documentary evidence has been raised by the respondent before me. Considering matters in the round, I find I am able to treat this evidence as reliable.
40. I accept that the money transfer evidence is consistent with the appellant receiving financial support from the sponsor while in Nepal, indicating a past dependency.
41. I accept that the issuing of the EEA family permit by the Norwegian authorities is consistent with the appellant demonstrating in 2019 that she was dependent upon the sponsor. I do not treat this as automatically demonstrating that the appellant was similarly dependent in 2024 but I accept it does show a past dependency on arrival in Norway that would be consistent with that dependency continuing.
42. I accept that the registration and property documentation is consistent with the sponsor’s account of accommodating the appellant while she was in Norway.
43. I find I can also give weight to the account of the sponsor and Mrs Olis about providing emotional support to the appellant while she was in Norway.
44. On the oral and documentary evidence before me, I am satisfied that at the date of the application the appellant did not have any assets or funds of her own to meet her essential living needs.
45. There are two types of material support which it is said the appellant was receiving from the sponsor at this time: the provision of accommodation and the giving of financial support to cover living expenses. Even where one aspect of a claim is poorly presented in terms of supporting evidence, for example the bank statement evidence that is untranslated from Norwegian but said to show the claimed financial support, I bear in mind that, in order to demonstrate dependence, the appellant need only demonstrate that at the date of application she could not meet her essential living needs in part without the financial or other material support of the sponsor.
46. I am satisfied on the oral and documentary evidence before me that at the date of application the appellant was receiving from the sponsor the material support of being accommodated in Norway. Moreover, I accept this accommodation was an essential living need of the appellant. Given I have found she had no assets or funds of her own at the time, I am satisfied that, at the least, the appellant demonstrates that at the date of application she could not meet her essential living needs in part without this material support from the sponsor.
47. Applying the definition contained in Annex 1 of Appendix EU (FP), I find this is sufficient to demonstrate that at the date of application the appellant was dependent upon the sponsor and therefore a family member entitled to be issued with an EUSS family permit.
48. For the sake of thoroughness, I will also make a finding about the claimed financial support said to be provided at the date of application. As mentioned, the respondent is able to point to there being a lack of supporting evidence for this in English as opposed to the untranslated Norwegian documentary evidence to which I can attach little or no weight. However, I consider there is reliable evidence of financial support being provided by the sponsor prior to the appellant coming to Norway. I consider there is also reliable documentary evidence in the supplementary bundle of the sponsor providing financial support through clearly named and dated money transfers to the appellant since she has returned to Nepal.
49. I am satisfied that throughout the appellant has been without any financial resources of her own and therefore unable to meet her essential living needs by herself. In the circumstances, I find I am able to give the appellant the benefit of the doubt, place weight upon the oral evidence of the sponsor and Mrs Oli and accept that in the period when the appellant was in Norway, she was receiving the claimed financial support from the sponsor in order to meet her essential living needs.
50. Accordingly, I am satisfied on the oral and documentary evidence before me that, at the date of application, having regard to her financial and social conditions, or health, the appellant could not meet her essential living needs (in whole or in part) without the financial or other material support of the relevant EEA citizen, her sponsor.
51. I am satisfied that the appellant demonstrates she was the dependent family member of the sponsor at the date of application as claimed. The decision of the respondent is not in accordance with residence scheme Immigration Rules.

Notice of Decision
I allow the appeal of the appellant

To the respondent – Fee award
As I have allowed the appeal and because a fee has been paid or is payable, I have considered making a fee award. I have decided to make no fee award as the appellant needed the opportunity provided by the appeal hearing to produce evidence upon which she has relied to win her case.

M Harris

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

25 August 2026

Annex: The Error of Law Decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000265
First-tier Tribunal No: EU/55005/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HARRIS

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

MANJU OLI
Respondent

Representation:
For Mrs Oli: Mr Jesurum of Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Esherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 24 April 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Secretary of State appeals with permission against the decision dated 25 November 2025 of First-tier Tribunal Judge J G Richards (“the FTTJ”) to allow the appeal of Mrs Oli on human rights grounds.
2. The appellant, currently residing in Norway, is a citizen of Nepal. She applied to the respondent for a family permit under Appendix EU (FP) of the Immigration Rules on the basis she was the dependent mother of the EEA national sponsor, Mr Sunil Oli.
3. The respondent disputes that the appellant is dependent upon the sponsor.
4. The FFTJ in his decision found he was satisfied that the appellant was dependent, particularly because of accommodation provided to the appellant in Norway by the sponsor.
The Grounds of Appeal
5. The respondent raises one ground. This is that the FTTJ erred by failing to make a proper finding about the financial circumstances of the appellant including as regards her claim she had no income or other financial resources of her own.
Is there a material error of law requiring me to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal?
6. There is no dispute between the parties that the following legal test is given in the annex to Appendix EU (FP) for determining dependence: being dependent means-
(a) having regard to their financial and social conditions, or health, the [appellant] cannot meet their essential living needs (in whole or in part) without the financial or other material support of the relevant EEA citizen (or, as the case may be, of the qualifying British citizen) or of their spouse or civil partner; and
(b) such support is being provided to the appellant by the relevant EEA citizen (or, as the case may be, by the qualifying British citizen) or by their spouse or civil partner; and
(c) there is no need to determine the reasons for that dependence or for the recourse to that support
7. In her witness statement the appellant, as well as describing the support of accommodation provided to her by the sponsor, states that “she does not have any money of her own”. The sponsor provides a similar account about the support he provides. Thus I can see that the appellant’s case clearly advanced before the FTTJ was that she has no financial resources of her own and thus cannot meet her essential living needs, particularly in terms of accommodation, without the financial or other material support of the sponsor.
8. It can be seen that the FTTJ at paragraph 16 of the decision accepts that the sponsor was providing financial or other material support. Thus the component of support from the sponsor is accepted as demonstrated. That finding has not been challenged by the respondent.
9. At the start of paragraph 17 of the decision the FTTJ identifies that the “only other question” is whether the appellant could not meet her essential living needs without the sponsor’s support. The FTTJ focuses on it being culturally the responsibility of the sponsor to support the appellant before making the finding accepting dependence.
10. Central to the argument of the respondent is that the FTTJ, whether in the reasoning for finding dependence given in paragraph 17 or elsewhere, makes no finding accepting the claim of the appellant to have no financial resources of her own. Without such a finding, it is contended there is no lawful finding that the appellant cannot meet her essential living needs without the sponsor’s support.
11. In submissions before me Mr Jesurum for the appellant accepted that the FTTJ made no express finding in the decision as regards the claim of the appellant to have no financial resources of her own. I consider Mr Jesurum right about this – there is no such finding. I am not satisfied the mere existence of a cultural responsibility of son for mother establishes, without more, that the appellant in her particular circumstances has no resources of her own.
12. Nevertheless, Mr Jesurum made a number of submissions that no material error of law arose in the decision.
13. One submission of Mr Jesurum, as set out in his skeleton argument, is that the respondent is relying before this Tribunal on points not pursued or challenged before the FTTJ. I accept that it does not appear from the reasons for refusal, review or the decision of the FTTJ that the respondent advanced the matter mentioned in the grounds of appeal to this Tribunal as regards the appellant having accommodation of her own in Nepal. The FTTJ cannot be faulted for failing to consider this matter when it was not argued at the hearing.
14. Nevertheless, I am satisfied from what is said in the reasons for refusal, paragraphs 7 to 11 of the review and paragraph 13 of the FTTJ’s decision, that in this appeal the respondent was putting the appellant to proof on the claim she had no financial resources of her own. These are clearly points raised by the respondent for the hearing which dispute the financial circumstances of the appellant are as claimed. Accordingly, I am not persuaded by this submission of Mr Jesurum.
15. Another submission of Mr Jesurum is that the FTTJ implicitly accepted the claim of the appellant to have no resources of her own. Considering the nature of the findings made by the FTTJ individually or as a whole, I am not satisfied there is any implicit acceptance of the claim. I am not satisfied that silence equates to implicit acceptance when the matter is so central to the issue of dependence being considered. Moreover, I take the view that the respondent as a party to the appeal is entitled to be given an express finding with reasons on so significant a matter. Accordingly, I am not persuaded by this submission of the appellant.
16. Mr Jesurum drew attention to the appellant being previously issued a permit under EU law by the Norwegian authorities in 2020 as a family member of the sponsor. I accept this has the potential to be a relevant piece of evidence when the FTTJ was considering dependence for the purposes of this appeal but I note Mr Jesurum acknowledged the issuing of such a card was not by itself sufficient to demonstrate dependence at the time and in the distinct context of the family permit sought by the appellant under Appendix EU (FP) of the Rules.
17. In any event, at paragraph 18 of the decision the FTTJ expressly states he has not considered the point and so does not rely upon the Norwegian document for the finding that the appellant is dependent upon the sponsor. In the circumstances, I am not persuaded the existence of the Norwegian document can be treated as rectifying any error made elsewhere in the decision by the FTTJ.
Conclusion
18. Having considered the submissions of the parties and the content of the decision, my conclusion is that, taking into account what was in dispute between the parties and applying the correct test under Appendix EU (FP), the failure of the FTTJ to make a finding about the claim of the appellant to have no resources of her own does amount to an error of law.
19. Such a finding is central to determining whether the appellant is not able to meet her essential living needs without the support of the sponsor. In its absence there has not been a lawfully complete assessment of the primary issue in this appeal. I am satisfied the error of law is a material one.
20. I am satisfied that, as submitted in the respondent’s ground of appeal, the decision of the FTTJ contains a material error of law and should be set aside.
Remaking
21. The normal course of action is for this Tribunal to remake the decision even if it requires further findings of fact to be made on the evidence. Ms Esherwood suggested the Tribunal retain the appeal on the basis that, given current listing in the First-tier Tribunal, it was likely that a rehearing and resolution of this appeal would take place sooner if this Tribunal carried out the remaking. When asked, Mr Jesurum said he had no particular view on where the appeal should be reheard.
22. In the circumstances, I consider it is appropriate for this Tribunal to remake the decision. This Tribunal will hear the appeal afresh at an oral hearing on a date to be notified to the parties.
Notice of Decision
The decision dated 25 November 2025 by First-tier Tribunal Judge J G Richards contains a material error of law and is set aside.
Directions
(1) This Tribunal will consider the appeal afresh and remake the decision at a face to face oral hearing on the first available date, listed for 2 hours with a Nepali interpreter.
(2) Any party wishing to rely on further evidence will file it with the Tribunal and serve it on the other party by 5 working days before the date of the rehearing.

M Harris

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 May 2026