Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000266,
UI-2026-000267 & UI-2026-000269
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/66232/2024,
HU/66230/2024, HU/66237/2024
LH/02113/2025,
LH/02114/2025, LH/02119/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 17th of April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BARTLETT

Between

SSHD
Appellant
and

HH
BH
ABH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Grubb
For the Respondent: Ms Knorr

Heard at Field House on 24 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Procedural Background
1. I will use the names for the parties adopted in the First-tier Tribunal to avoid confusion and so in this judgment the Appellants refer to HH, BH and ABH and the respondent refers to the Secretary of State for the Home Department.
2. The appellants are Palestinian nationals who applied for entry clearance under Appendix Family Reunion (Protection) route on 23 November 2023 on the basis of their relationship with the sponsor who had leave to remain as a graduate in the United Kingdom and has since been granted Refugee status. These applications were refused on 11 November 2024. The appeal against those refusals in the First-tier Tribunal was originally brought in respect of 8 appellants.
3. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision dated 23 October 2025 (the “Determination”) allowed the appeal in respect of the three appellants (HH, BH and ABH) and refused it in respect of the five other appellants. This appeal to the Upper Tribunal only concerns HH, BH (the sponsor’s) parents and ABH (the sponsor’s brother who was a minor but is now an adult). The five appellants who have not cross-appealed the First-tier Tribunal’s decision to dismiss their claims are the sponsor’s sister’s, brother in law, their twin daughters and the sponsor’s adult brother who left Egypt and has obtained Refugee status in Greece.
4. The First-tier Tribunal Judge who heard the case granted permission to appeal on 29 January 2026 in a grant of permission that included the following:
“Contrary to ground 1, which asserts that disproportionate weight was placed on the interests of the sponsor’s family members in Egypt, the primary focus as per the decision at [52]-[53] (see also [58]) was the circumstances of the sponsor in the United Kingdom. The evidence demonstrated that the sponsor remained an integral part of the family unit prior to her departure for her studies.
However, as IA v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 has now been determined it is arguable that an assessment of the nature and quality of the family life said to exist, is required in accordance with the guidance set out by the Court of Appeal.”
5. The grant also noted that an error in ground 1 may impact all the other matters raised in the grounds.
Factual Background
6. In terms of the factual background to the Determination it was agreed that the appellants could not meet the immigration rules (and did not at the time of application) and therefore the issues in the case were solely based on family and private life under Article 8 ECHR outside the immigration rules. It was accepted by the appellants that because the sponsor did not have leave as a refugee when the applications for leave under the family reunion route were made they could not succeed under the rules.
7. [30] of the Determination sets out the sponsor’s circumstances, in summary between August 2019 and May 2020 she studied on a scholarship in Indiana returning to Gaza and her family on completion of the course. In October 2022, she travelled to the UK to study an LLM in international law and global justice at the University of Sheffield via a scholarship. It was her undisputed evidence that on occasion she was financially supported by her parents and siblings. Her student visa was valid until 24 January 2024 and she intended to return to Gaza and her family after graduating. However, as a result of the war she was unable to return to Gaza and extended her visa until in July 2025 she claimed asylum and by the time of this appeal she had been granted asylum.
8. [31] of the Determination sets out the appellants’ family’s circumstances. Namely that they entered Egypt on 27 February 2024 and were granted a visa for 45 days that was not renewable. They remain living in Cairo with the original appellants who did not appeal to the Upper Tribunal and the others living separately but close by. The sponsor has visited her family in Egypt and remains able to do so.
The Grounds of Appeal
9. The grounds of appeal rely on 4 grounds:
a. Ground 1: the judge placed disproportionate weight on the interests of the Appellants in Egypt.
b. Ground 2: the judge failed to adequately consider relevant evidence when making a finding that R1 – R3 would be in a position to support themselves such that they would not be a burden on the public purse.
c. Ground 3: the judge failed to carry out an appropriately fact sensitive exercise when assessing proportionality.
d. Ground 4: the judge failed to place appropriate weight on the public interest weighing in favour of refusal
Submissions
10. Ms Grubb and Ms Knorr relied on written skeleton arguments and made oral submissions. These are recorded in the record of proceedings.
Decision
11. The Determination is careful and detailed. However, as the grant of permission notes since the Determination was made, the Court of Appeal made the decision in IA v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 and this is of relevance to this case.
12. IA v SSHD provides its own useful summary at [10-12] of the principles that are relevant in cases like this involving adult overseas relatives seeking entry under article 8 ECHR outside the immigration rules. These principles are set out in more detail later in IA v SSHD but I set out the summary sections below:
“[10] First, the consistent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR) has been that “family life for the purpose of Article 8 … is normally limited to the core family and that there will be no family life between parents and adult children or adult siblings unless they can demonstrate “additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties”” (see Kumari v. The Netherlands 44051/20, 10 December 2024 (Kumari) at [35], and Beoku-Betts v. SSHD [2008] UKHL 39, [2009] 1 AC 115 (Beoku-Betts) at [39]). The FTT did not apply that test, but instead asked itself whether the sponsor had provided “real, effective or committed support” to his brother and the family (see [18] and [25] of the FTT decision). The real, effective or committed support test is lower than the additional elements of dependence test. Applying the proper test, neither the brother nor his family had shown that they had family life with the sponsor for the purposes of article 8(1).
[11] Secondly, if there had been family life between the sponsor and his family (as found by the FTT), it would have been appropriate to have regard to the unitary nature of that family life (see Beoku-Betts at [4], [20] and [41]-[43]). We accept, however, that, in undertaking the proportionality balance under article 8(2), the court is looking primarily at the article 8 rights of those persons within the jurisdiction of article 1 of the ECtHR (in this case, the sponsor).
[12] Thirdly, we have concluded that the UT made several errors in undertaking the proportionality balance under article 8(2). Even if, contrary to what we have decided, family life had existed between the sponsor and the family, the balance should not have been determined in favour of granting the family entry clearance. Very exceptional or compelling circumstances had not been shown. The UT was wrong to pay so little regard to the immigration control policies of the SSHD and the UK Government, as reflected in the Rules, as expressing what was necessary in the interests of the economic well-being of the UK and for the protection of the rights of the citizens of the UK. The UT wrongly over-stated the importance of the family’s short-lived family life with the sponsor (had it existed at all), the best interests of the children of the family and the admittedly serious risks faced by the family in Gaza.”
13. Ms Grubb relied on Ground 4 as her strongest ground and I will address this first.
14. I find that the judge fell into the error identified in [12] of IA v SSHD which is that she paid “so little regard to the immigration control policies of the SSHD and the UK Government, as reflected in the Rules, as expressing what was necessary in the interests of the economic well-being of the UK and for the protection of the rights of the citizens of the UK”.
15. This is because the only references to any of those issues in the proportionality assessment is at [55] and [57]. [55] is a statement of part of the respondent’s submission which the judge says she has taken into consideration:
“The Respondent relyiesthe statement of David Ramsbotham, a civil servant deployed as Deputy Director of Human Rights and Family Policy Unit and the concerns that immigration control/services would be undermined if entry clearance was granted to all family members from conflict zones who have a relative in the UK, providing emotional/financial support. As once they are admitted to the UK they could be dependent on public services and benefits.”
16. [57] sets out:
“The Respondent has raised valid concerns in relation to whether they would be a burden on the taxpayer, when not all the Appellants speak English. However, the sponsor’s evidence was that she was currently employed and supporting her family. Whilst the level of support she is able to provide is limited in nature, I have considered her evidence that given her mother’s background, as she had a number of contacts, she would be in a position to connect with NGOs to secure employment, especially as there was always a need for Arabic speakers in the mental health field. Further that whilst her brother would likely study, he could also contribute through part-time work and that her father could also find some form of employment. All of this whilst speculative when considered against the fact that her mother in particular has been economically active (as evidenced by letter from UNRWA), then I am satisfied on balance they are in a position to financially support themselves such that they do not become a burden on the public purse.”
17. At [58] the judge weighs up the factors in the balancing exercise and states:
“I note the policy concerns of the Respondent outlined in the statement of David Ramsbottom, the potential burden on the public purse, as well as the fact that they could make a reunification applications to Greece to join AH.”
18. There is no mention of the factors set out in [12] of IA v SSHD. I find that this is a material error of law. Ground 4 is made out.
19. In relation to Ground 1, IA v SSHD provides further guidance on applying article 8 ECHR:
“[142] Moreover, even if family life had existed between the sponsor and the brother or between the sponsor and the family, that would not have meant that the article 8 rights of the brother or the family outside the UK were the main focus of the proportionality exercise under article 8(2). The main focus of that exercise would have been the family life of the person within the jurisdiction of article 1 (here, the sponsor), but that family life had to be considered as being a unitary family life with his brother or the family outside the UK. The unitary family life of the brother with his own family outside the UK is also not the focus of the proportionality exercise.
[143] This is not, as the family submitted, a distinction without a difference. As we have explained at [100] above, the UK as an ECHR state is not under a positive obligation to admit every member of the wider family of the person within the territory of the UK. The positive obligation could only extend, even if such family life existed, to those who have family life (for the purposes of article 8(1)) with that person, in this case the brother (or, as the family argued, the family). Moreover, the person who has “the right to respect for his … family life” under article 8(1) is the sponsor, who is within the jurisdiction of article 8, and the requirement that “[t]here shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of [the sponsor’s right to family life]” under article 8(2) encompasses the brother or the family (as the persons outside the UK) because interference with the family life of the sponsor (which he shares with the brother or with the family) necessarily interferes with the sponsor’s family life with him.”
20. [143] makes clear that the focus must be on the sponsor and that is the how the appellants’ article 8 rights must be assessed, through the lens of the sponsor.
21. [58] of the Determination sets out the balancing exercise and considers the family relationship:
“[58] Having considered the totality of the circumstances outlined above, I find this is a finely balanced case on the facts specific to these three Appellants. The Appellant’s circumstances appear to be precarious in Egypt and I note the policy concerns of the Respondent outlined in the statement of David Ramsbottom, the potential burden on the public purse, as well as the fact that they could make a reunification applications to Greece to join AH. However, what tips the balance in favour of the Appellant’s is the close relationship they share with the sponsor and the fact they were part of the same family unit before they were more permanently separated as a result of the war. They all suffer with mental health issues as a result of the war and the ongoing separation from each other is exacerbating their conditions as well as in the sponsor’s case, preventing her from seeking effective treatment.”
22. Ms Grubb submitted that the Judge erred by not carrying out the exercise through the lens of the sponsor as required by IA v SSHD. I find that the Judge did not carry out the assessment through the lens of the sponsor and so the proportionality assessment was flawed. For example, the Judge did not consider the ability of the family to continue family life through visits and communication methods (the sponsor had visited the appellants twice in Egypt already) instead focusing on the effect of the precarious status the appellants had in Egypt on the appellants such as difficulties accessing work and education.
23. I find that this is a material error and Ground 1 is made out.
24. As I have found material errors of law in relation to ground 1 and 4, I consider that ground 3 is also made out as the proportionality exercise is flawed. I do not consider that it is necessary to consider ground 2 in these circumstances.
25. I find that as a result of these errors the decision must be set aside in its entirety. Due to the fact finding required in this case, I have decided to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal with no preserved findings of fact.
Notice of Decision
The Determination of the First-tier Tribunal dated 23 October 2025 contains material errors of law and is set aside in its entirety. The appeals are remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for de novo hearings with no preserved findings.

Judge Bartlett

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10 April 2026