Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000286
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01473/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 21st of April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREER

Between

TT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Nathan, of Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 27 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is an Afghan national, born on 1 August 1998, of Pashtun ethnicity. He appeals, with permission, against the decision of a Judge of the First-Tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’) dismissing his protection and human rights appeals, promulgated on 4 December 2025 following a hearing at Bradford on 2 December 2025.
Anonymity
2. The Appellant has the benefit of an anonymity order, given the nature of his claim. Although there is a presumption in favour of open justice, the publication of the Appellant’s name in connection with an application for international protection, concerning a country that was the subject of an international military operation between 2001 and 2021, may place him at risk should he return to Afghanistan. In those circumstances, the presumption in favour of open justice is outweighed and the Appellant should continue to benefit from an anonymity order.
The Background
2. It is the Appellant’s case that he is at risk of suffering serious harm at the hands of the Taliban upon return to Afghanistan because of his family’s association with the previous regime. He says that he and his father worked for the previous government as informants. The Taliban discovered this and the Taliban killed the Appellant’s father. The Appellant fled Afghanistan, fearing that he, too, would be harmed by the Taliban.
3. The Respondent did not believe the Appellant’s claims about his reasons for leaving Afghanistan and refused the Appellant’s application for asylum. The First-tier Tribunal agreed with the Respondent and dismissed the Appellant’s Appeal.
4. The Appellant sought permission on 3 grounds. First, the Tribunal attached weight to immaterial considerations when rejecting expert evidence. Second, the Tribunal gave inadequate reasons for its conclusions in respect of the credibility of the Appellant’s claims. Third, the Tribunal erred in law in respect of its conclusions in respect of the risk facing the Appellant upon return to his home area.
5. At the hearing before me, Mr McVeety indicated that the Secretary of State did not oppose the Appellant’s Appeal. Although he initially resisted the appeal on all grounds, he changed his view after Mr Nathan filed with the Tribunal the Appellant’s First-tier Tribunal Skeleton Argument. This, Mr McVeety recognised, contained submissions relating to the purported inconsistencies in the Appellant’s evidence which were taken against the Appellant by the Judge. He told me that he agreed with the submission that the Judge conducted no reasoned analysis of these points and this left the informed reader unable to understand why the Judge rejected the Appellant’s evidence. He invited me to set aside the decision and remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh.
Grounds of Appeal: Discussion and Findings
6. In light of Mr McVeety’s concession, it is unnecessary for me to say much more.
7. Although a decision of the First-tier Tribunal is not required to address every point advanced before it, it must contain adequate reasons to enable the losing party to understand why they have lost. In the present case, it is clear from the Appellant’s skeleton argument that detailed submissions were made in response to each of the alleged inconsistencies said to arise from the answers given by the Appellant during his asylum interviews. The Tribunal refers to those purported inconsistencies only in general terms at paragraph 22 of its decision and concludes that they undermine the Appellant’s credibility. While it is apparent that the Tribunal rejected the Appellant’s explanations, it provides no reasons for doing so. In the absence of any engagement with those explanations, the Appellant is left unable to understand why his evidence was not accepted.
8. This deficiency assumes particular significance in the circumstances of this appeal. The alleged inconsistencies are derived from a comparison between the record of the Appellant’s initial screening interview and the account that he gave at a later stage of the examination of his claim. That Screening Interview took place at Manston Immigration Centre between 11.32pm in the evening and 1.10am the following morning. This was shortly after the Appellant’s arrival in the United Kingdom by small boat. The questions and answers were communicated via a telephone interpreter. During the Interview, the Appellant complained of being in pain and described problems with his mental health. The interview was not tape recorded and does not, in any event, purport to be a verbatim account of what was said. In those circumstances, it is difficult to see how a great deal of weight could safely be attached to the transcript without careful consideration of the issues identified in JA (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 450 and YL (Rely on SEF) China [2004] UKIAT 00145. Where, as here, the Tribunal’s credibility findings appear to depart from what might ordinarily be expected on the evidence, the obligation to give clear and adequate reasons is correspondingly heightened.
Disposal
9. I have considered the appropriate disposal having regard to paragraph 7.2 of the Senior President’s Practice Statements and the guidance in AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC). The error identified goes to the procedural fairness of the hearing and infected the entirety of the credibility assessment. The Appellant was deprived of a fair determination of his appeal. In those circumstances, none of the findings of fact can safely be preserved. Extensive fact finding will be required. Having regard to the overriding objective, I am satisfied that the appropriate course is to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing before a judge other than Judge Saffer.
Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error on a point of law. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.
2. The matter is to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be determined de novo by a judge other than Judge of the First-Tier Tribunal Saffer.

J. GREER

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15 April 2026