Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000311
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00402/2025
PA/82934/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

2nd September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BAGRAL

Between

SB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms F Iqbal, Counsel instructed by Barnes Harild & Dyer Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of First‑tier Tribunal Judge Jarvis(“the judge”), promulgated on 14 November 2025, by which his appeal against the Respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claim was dismissed.
2. Permission to appeal was refused by the First‑tier Tribunal on 8 January 2026. On renewal, permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge O’Callaghan on 27 March 2026. In granting permission to appeal Judge O’Callaghan gave the following direction:
“9. It is my preliminary view that the decision did involve the making of an error of law as to procedural fairness, and that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside without a hearing. The appropriate course of action would be to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh determination on all issues, with the expectation that the First-tier Tribunal would issue new directions requiring the parties to file relevant evidence.
10. Unless within 14 working days of the issue of these directions there is any written objection to this course of action, supported by cogent argument, the Upper Tribunal will proceed to determine the appeal without an oral hearing and will remit to the First-tier Tribunal.”
3. On 8 April 2026, the Respondent filed a Rule 24 Response opposing the appeal.
Background
4. The Appellant is a national of Iran. His asylum claim, based on his Kurdish ethnicity and claimed sur place political activity in the United Kingdom, was refused by the Respondent on 18 December 2024. He appealed to the First-tier Tribunal.
5. The appeal came before the judge on 27 October 2025. Neither the Appellant nor his representatives attended. The judge recorded that notice of hearing had been sent to the Appellant by email on 27 June 2025 and that representatives instructed thereafter had filed a bundle and skeleton argument on his behalf.
6. The judge further recorded that attempts had been made to contact both the Appellant and his solicitors on the day of the hearing without success. Satisfied that notice of hearing had been properly served the judge proceeded in the Appellant's absence and dismissed the appeal.
The Grounds of Appeal
7. The grounds allege procedural unfairness. It is asserted that the hearing notice was sent to the Appellant before he instructed solicitors and was not subsequently brought to his representatives' attention because he did not appreciate that the document was the hearing notice. The representatives thereafter came on record, complied with directions and pursued the appeal. It is contended that the Appellant's failure to attend resulted from a genuine mistake rather than deliberate non-engagement and that, in a protection appeal, he should be given the opportunity to give oral evidence and advance his case.
The Rule 24 Response
8. The Respondent submitted that the judge had directed himself appropriately. The Respondent relied upon paragraph 10 of the judge’s decision and submitted that the Tribunal clerk did make attempts to contact both the Appellant’s representatives and the Appellant on the day of hearing. The Respondent contended that it was untrue to state that no calls had been made.
9. The Respondent further submitted that it was unclear why the representatives did not answer the telephone on the day of the hearing. The Respondent also questioned, in the absence of supporting material, why, if the Appellant forwarded information received from the Tribunal, he would have omitted to send the actual hearing notice which would presumably have been attached to the email he received. The Respondent submitted that the Tribunal had made numerous attempts to contact the Appellant and his representatives, that the judge had considered the interests of justice at paragraph 12, and that the decision to proceed was one open to him.
The Hearing
10. I had before me a composite bundle which included the documents relevant to the appeal, and the Appellant’s and Respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal.
11. I heard helpful submissions from the representatives. It is not necessary to set out those submissions here. They are reflected where necessary in my findings below. I indicated that I would reserve my decision and provide that in writing which I now turn to do.
Consideration
12. I have considered the competing submissions of the parties with care. I accept that the judge recorded attempts by the Tribunal clerk to contact both the Appellant and the solicitors. I also accept that the Appellant’s grounds were too broadly expressed in stating that no calls were made, in circumstances where the judge recorded that calls had been attempted. I further accept that there was fault on the part of the Appellant in not forwarding the document containing the hearing notice to his representatives, and fault on the part of the representatives in not identifying that a hearing notice may have been included among the documents sent directly to the Appellant.
13. However, those matters do not answer the procedural fairness issue. The question is not confined to whether the judge was entitled, on the information available at the hearing, to proceed in the Appellant's absence. The ultimate question is whether, having regard to the fuller procedural history now before the Upper Tribunal, the proceedings were procedurally fair.
14. The chronology is important. The notice of hearing was sent to the Appellant directly on 27 June 2025. On 3 July 2025, the Appellant’s representatives notified the First-tier Tribunal that they were instructed, provided a signed authority, asked that Tribunal to note its interest, and requested that future correspondence be forwarded to them. The same email requested an extension of time to prepare the appeal skeleton argument and bundle.
15. Thereafter, the representatives actively engaged in the appeal. They obtained an extension of time, filed the Appellant’s bundle and skeleton argument, and complied with the Tribunal’s directions. That course of conduct was not consistent with an Appellant or representatives deliberately disengaging from the proceedings.
16. The material point is that, after the representatives came on record and requested that future correspondence be sent to them, there is no evidence that they were served with the notice of hearing. Although notice had previously been sent to the Appellant directly, the Tribunal was thereafter informed that he was represented and that future correspondence should be directed to his solicitors. In those circumstances, the absence of evidence that the hearing notice was provided to the representatives is highly material to the issue of procedural fairness.
17. I also address the point concerning the telephone call or calls on the day of the hearing. The judge recorded that the clerk had tried to telephone the solicitors but had not been able to get through. The phrase “not been able to get through” is not wholly clear. It may mean that the call was unanswered, that there was some other failure in contacting the office, or that the call did not result in any communication with a person able to assist. What matters is that it does not establish that actual contact was made with Ms Bibi (the Appellant’s assigned case worker), or with any representative who was familiar with the case and able to take instructions or attend.
18. Ms Bibi’s evidence is that she received no calls, that she was not made aware of any such calls by her office, and that no message was left for her. That evidence has not been materially contradicted by any evidence identifying the number called, the time of the call, whether the call rang out, whether voicemail was available, whether a message was left, or whether anyone at the firm answered.
19. I do not regard an unsuccessful attempt to telephone the representatives on the morning of the hearing as a substitute for proper service of the notice of hearing. A call made on the day of the hearing, which did not result in any actual communication, could not overcome the absence of evidence that the representatives had been served with the hearing notice after coming on record and requesting that future correspondence be directed to them
20. I have also considered the Respondent's submission that the Appellant was notified of the hearing by the notice sent to his email address on 27 June 2025. There is force in that submission. However, the evidence now before the Upper Tribunal is that, although the Appellant received the Tribunal's email, he did not appreciate that one of the attached documents contained the notice of hearing and therefore did not bring it to the attention of his representatives. Shortly thereafter, the Tribunal was informed that the Appellant was represented and was asked to direct future correspondence to his solicitors. The appeal was then actively pursued through those representatives. In those circumstances, the fact that notice was initially sent to the Appellant does not, by itself, answer the question whether the proceedings were procedurally fair, given the absence of evidence that the hearing notice was subsequently served upon his representatives.
21. I accept that responsibility for what occurred does not lie wholly with one party. The Appellant failed to recognise the hearing notice and his representatives could have made further enquiries as to whether a hearing date had been fixed. However, the appeal was thereafter actively pursued through those representatives, who complied with the Tribunal's directions, and there is no evidence that the hearing notice was served upon them after they came on record.
22. The consequence was material. Credibility was central to the appeal and the Appellant's oral evidence was of obvious importance to the assessment of his claim. The judge expressly treated the Appellant's absence as damaging to his credibility and damaging to the core of his case. The findings reached were therefore materially affected by his absence and the adverse inference drawn from it.
23. I make it clear that there is no criticism of the judge. On the information available to him at the hearing, the judge was entitled to consider Rule 28 and to conclude that it was appropriate to proceed in the Appellant's absence. The position appears differently, however, when the fuller procedural history is considered. That history demonstrates that the Appellant's representatives had come on record, had actively engaged with the appeal and had requested that future correspondence be directed to them, yet there is no evidence that they were served with the notice of hearing.
24. Having considered the matter in the round, I am satisfied that the proceedings were procedurally unfair and that the decision therefore involved the making of a material error of law.
25. I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal in its entirety. No findings of fact are preserved. Given the nature of the error and the extent of the fact-finding required, the appropriate course is to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing before a judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Jarvis.
Notice of Decision
26. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law.
27. The decision is set aside in its entirety.
28. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing on all issues before a judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Jarvis.

R. Bagral
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
24 August 2026