Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000335
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55429/2024
LP/13826/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17th April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PAUL LEWIS

Between

MK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr. Bazini, counsel instructed by Kidd Rapinet LLP Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr. Sheik, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 26 March 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Order Regarding Anonymity

Anonymity was ordered by the Upper Tribunal. No application to discharge was made. It remains in force in the terms below.
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

Background
1. The appellant is a citizen of Lebanon who claimed asylum based on his political opinion. His claim was refused by the respondent and his subsequent appeal dismissed by a judge of the First-Tier Tribunal [the ‘judge’] in a decision promulgated on 9th July 2025.
2. Permission to appeal against the judge’s decision was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Mills on 24th January 2026. There are three grounds:
(i) Procedural unfairness due to entering the arena by questioning the appellant in a manner that went beyond clarification and amounted to cross-examination.
(ii) Reaching findings on credibility that are ‘unreasonable and flawed’ due to being based on a misapprehension of the evidence or alternatively based on points not put to the appellant.
(iii) Declining to place weight on any of the corroborative documentary evidence on an unsound basis, due to limited errors of translation in only some of the documents.
The hearing
3. The respondent provided a note of the hearing which records the questions asked by the respondent and judge together with the appellant’s responses. The appellant agrees the note fairly reflects what occurred at the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal such that it was unnecessary to listen to the recording of the hearing.
4. Mr. Bazini who also appeared on behalf of the appellant at the First-tier Tribunal has not provided a witness statement setting out what occurred before the Judge. The parties also agreed that I could proceed without a witness statement. The details of Mr. Bazini’s actions, and the reason(s) underpinning that decision are unchallenged and set out below.
Proceedings in the First-tier Tribunal
5. Given the nature of the challenges to the judge’s decision, it is necessary to set out in a little detail the issues in the case and what occurred at the hearing before the judge.
6. The appellant claimed to be at risk on return to Lebanon. He says that in January 2022 he was in the Lebanese Army. He says that he met a woman via the Telegram platform. They began exchanging messages. The woman was based in the USA and told the appellant she was an Israeli national. The appellant and the woman continued to exchange messages until he was discovered by a Major in the army. Fearing that he would be tried for treason the appellant fled the army.
7. A warrant was later issued for his arrest. In his witness statement the appellant said that the original of the warrant was with his family in Lebanon, but they could not post the original to him. A copy of the warrant had been provided to the appellant via WhatsApp by a lawyer in Lebanon instructed to act on the appellant’s behalf.
8. The respondent does not accept that the appellant was in the Lebanese army; that he was messaging an Israeli woman; was discovered by his military bosses, or that he is wanted by the Lebanese authorities on the ground of treason. The respondent submitted that the appellant’s documents, including the arrest warrant were not reliable because the original of the documents had not been provided and the translation upon which the appellant relied was not from a certified UK translation service
9. As a core function, it fell to the judge to assess what was termed the credibility of the appellant’s account.
10. As his evidence-in-chief the appellant adopted the contents of his witness statements. He was asked more than 40 questions in cross-examination which covered seven broad topics including the core account of appellant’s asylum claim, his journey to the UK and his claim pursuant to article 8 ECHR. The cross-examination lasted 30 minutes.
11. After 12 questions in cross-examination, the judge asked the appellant about where he was keeping the phone with which he communicated with the woman. There is no criticism, nor could there be, of this single question either in form or timing made by the appellant then or now.
12. After the respondent concluded cross-examination, the judge asked the appellant more that 40 questions over a 23-minute period. The questions and responses as recorded in the note are set out below with one redaction by me to remove the name, through whom the appellant could be potentially identified.
Q: In 2022 – he spoke English a little bit.
A: Yes

Q: In terms of this conversation with this girl, the girl was located in USA?
A: Yes

Q: How did you know that?
A: Because I asked her

Q: Where in the US?
A: I don’t know

Q: So, she was communicated with you on telegram?
A: Yes, in Hebrew

Q: What made you think it was Hebrew.
A: Because I was translated her text messages.

Q: So, was this text messaging or phone call?
A: Text messages

Q: Who started texting who?
A: She

Q: This was in January 2022?
A: Yes

Q: On telegram in Hebrew?
A: Yes

Q: You get something in Hebrew – why didn’t you immediately delete it because obviously you are Lebanon?
A: I really liked her picture, and I don’t have any problem with that

Q: You translated the messages on google translated? what did the message say?
A: How are you what are you doing

Q: She spotted your photo too?
A: Yes

Q: Did you rely in English, Arabic or Hebrew?
A: Arabic

Q : You did not translate in English?
A: No, she did.

Q: What did you say?
A: Just replied to her

Q: What happened then?
A: I cannot recall

Q: Apart from that?
A: What do you work.

Q: Where does she work?
A: Hairdressers,

Q: Whether you knew the risk in terms of someone with
A: No

Q: Why
A: Treason

Q: You told her you worked in military, sent her photos in uniform
A: Yes, I sent her some photos,

Q: So, she knew you were in the military?
A: Yes

Q: In that time how many messages did you exchange?
A: I cannot recall

Q More than 100?
A: Yes

Q: More than 500?
A: Yes

Q: When you got these messages in Hebrew did you delete them?
A: No

Q: When though you knew if somebody find them you will be in problem?
A: They were in telegram I could not delete them

Q: When did you last got into the app?
A: 2022 before my phone was confiscated

Q: You haven’t tried to get back in telegram?
A: No

Q: You didn’t do that even for the preparation for this hearing?
A: No

Q: Why not?
A: Cause my friend created the account for me and the phone is gone.

Q: I asked why hadn’t you tried?
A: I cannot recall the login details

Q: But you haven’t tried?
A: No, I haven’t

Q: In the arrest warrant – it said AMARO Raid what is Amro?
A: Interpreter – English one – mother is not mentioned correct [Redaction of name].

Q: Is the name is same?
A: The English is wrong, but Arabic is correct

Q: Your sister is here, are your parents still in Lebanon and your brother?
A: Yes

Q: Immediate family?
A: Yes, my second sister

Q: In your Asylum questionnaire- you went from Lebanon turkey and travelled through different country, why didn’t you claim asylum?
A: My sister lives here

Q: You speak French?
A: Not that much

Q: They don’t teach French?
A: Only who attend school

Q: You say you have English background, how much English do you speak?
A: I attended school just about that.

Q: Your father works for the council, what does that mean?
A: Yes, that’s correct

Q: In your interview, your mother, father, your aunt is in Lebanon?
A: Yes, but my second sister travelled

Q: When did you sister arrived in the UK?
A: 6 years ago.

Q: Are there any sisters in Lebanon?
A: Only 1 and 1 brother.
13. The judge heard submissions from the parties. At no point during or after the judge’s questions did Mr. Bazini raise an objection to the substance, number or nature of the questions. The judge reserved her decision, providing written reasons which are now the subject of this appeal.
Discussion
Ground one
14. Mr. Bazini’s first ground of appeal is sub-divided into three separate, but linked, complaints:
(i) By her own admission the Judge cross-examined the Appellant.
(ii) The Judge cross examined on matters that had not been raised by the Respondent - this was not mere clarification.
(iii) The Judge’s questioning was excessive lasting some 23 minutes, almost as long as the Respondent’s cross-examination.
15. Mr. Bazini accepts that he did not challenge the judge’s questions at the time. On my enquiry he explained that judges do sometimes ask questions and counsel ‘take a view’ as to whether the judge’s question in substance, number and form were appropriate. At the time Mr. Bazini considered the judge’s questions ‘were capable’ of amounting to matters of ‘clarification’.
16. Mr. Bazini does not resile from that starting point in this appeal. Mr. Bazini refers to [19] of the judge’s decision in which the judge sets out the appellant’s responses to questions ‘in cross-examination’. The appellant’s responses, in so far as they are recorded at [19] are, for the most part, responses to the judge’s questions, not those from the respondent. This, Mr. Bazini submits, reveals the judge’s intention in asking the appellant questions was to cross-examine him.
17. I am not persuaded there is merit in focussing only on the description given by the judge to the evidence of the appellant. The judge set out in one section of her judgement the answers given by the appellant to questions from the respondent and the judge. Whilst more care may have been taken by the judge to delineate from whom the questions came, this is, on my view no more than a stylistic or typographical error from the judge.
18. The second and third parts of ground one relates to the nature and number of questions asked by the judge.
19. In Hossain v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ. 608 a decision of the Court of Appeal dated 5th June 2024, the appellant argued that proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal were procedurally unfair because the judge had departed from her supervisory role and ‘descended into the arena’. At [69], the question of whether the hearing was unfair is an objective assessment. This is essentially an intuitive judgment. The ultimate question is whether the Judge's interventions made the trial unfair.
20. It is permissible for a judge to ask questions. At [74]
The judge's questioning which is being challenged occurred after the examination of each witness by counsel had concluded. She also expressly gave counsel an opportunity to ask further questions. It is clear that the FTTJ asked a significant amount of questions and also that, on occasion, her questioning was persistent (for example, when she said, "I do need to have an answer to this."). However, although the number of questions might well be unusual, it is necessary to look at what happened qualitatively as well as a quantitatively. There is nothing to suggest that her questioning could be described overall as hostile. Further, I agree with Mr Tabori's submission that the FTTJ was not pursuing her own line or lines of inquiry but was asking questions about matters that fell within the areas previously covered by the evidence including the SSHD's cross-examination and, indeed, were questions directed to the central issue of whether the Appellant had undertaken the language test.
21. At Hossain [77] the judge
‘was clearly asking questions about matters that troubled her and which went to the central factual issue she had to decide…... It was, in my view, fairer that she asked questions about these matters rather than leave her concerns unaddressed and without having given the Appellant and his witnesses an opportunity to deal with them’.
22. At [79], the Court considered the duties of counsel during the hearing. As was said in PA (Bangladesh), counsel in general have a duty to raise concerns about the fairness of a hearing during the course of the hearing. The absence of any such concern being raised might well be a material factor if it is subsequently asserted that the judge's conduct was inappropriate. The relevance of this will depend on the circumstances: the absence of complaint cannot make an unfair trial fair.
23. PA (protection claim: respondent's enquiries; bias) Bangladesh [2018] UKUT 0337 (IAC), was a decision of this Tribunal. At [81] and [82].
Members of the Bar are expected to put their clients’ cases fearlessly. As a general matter, if Counsel concludes during a hearing that the judge is behaving in an inappropriate manner, Counsel has a duty to raise that matter with the judge, there and then. In this way, the issue will, at the very least, be recorded in the judge’s record of proceedings and, ideally, in the record of Counsel and/or his or her instructing solicitor.
The fact that an allegation of bias is not made until an application is filed for permission to appeal is not, of course, determinative of the issue. Each case must turn on its own facts and circumstances. The appellate court of tribunal may, nevertheless, be entitled to have regard to the absence of any challenge at the hearing, or at least before receipt of the decision, in determining the allegation.
24. Shortly after the decision in Hossain, on 6th June 2024 the Court of Appeal again considered the issue of judicial interventions in Hima v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 680.
25. The core complaints subject to appeal in Hima were wider than Hossain including that the judge's response to the appellant's representative's objection to the cross-examination was inappropriate and that the judge accused the representative of making an improper submission when no such submission had been made and that the judge had made a finding adverse to the appellant without giving the appellant an opportunity to deal with the point.
26. The decision is Hima does not refer to Hossain and does not set out a different approach to the test of fairness each decision will be fact specific, per Willam Davis, LJ at [11] and [12]:
Determining whether a hearing was unfair requires an objective assessment by the court of the conduct of the hearing. Fairness in judicial proceedings requires consideration inter alia of whether the judge was open-minded in the course of the hearing, whether the parties to the proceedings were treated in an even-handed manner and whether the judge demonstrated partiality during the hearing. In the context of judicial interruptions or interventions during oral evidence one issue will be whether that generated a risk of a descent into the arena. All of these matters are to be assessed not by whether it gave rise to an appearance of bias in the eyes of the fair-minded observer but by whether objectively it rendered the trial unfair.
Whether judicial unfairness in the course of a hearing vitiates the eventual decision will be part of the objective assessment. There will be cases where a judge acts unfairly in a hearing but the effect of the unfairness is not sufficient to affect the outcome of the proceedings.
27. In Hima Underhill LJ at [61] added:
‘.. as he says at para. 41, deciding whether the conduct of a judge has been such as to render a hearing unfair is a highly fact- and context-specific exercise. For that reason, I would not want our decision to be understood as discouraging FTT judges from asking their own questions of witnesses where that is necessary in order to enable them fully to understand the facts and the issues. While I do not accept Ms Anderson's submission that the role of a judge hearing immigration and asylum appeals in the FTT is quasi-inquisitorial, I recognise that the characteristics of such cases may mean that it may more often be appropriate for judges to intervene during the evidence than it is in typical High Court litigation. But what is appropriate depends on the circumstances of the case, and the judge should in any event do nothing that compromises the fairness of the proceedings or gives an impression of partiality.
28. Mr. Bazini did not challenge the relevance of the questions at the hearing. The absence of complaint by counsel does not determine the fairness of the proceedings but remains one of the matters to which I must have proper regard. The respondent relies on Hossian at [74], submitting that the judge was clearly asking about matters which troubled her and went to the central factual issues for her to determine.
29. In reaching my determination I have considered the judge’s questions individually and their cumulative effect. The judge’s questions were, for the most part, open questions. There is no criticism of their tone. The judge was exploring albeit in some detail, those matters which it was necessary for her to explore to reach her determination. In the context of the issues to be determined the judge was entitled to seek to better understand the appellant’s case. There are no bright lines. A decision to seek clarification or further explore any issue should always be undertaken with caution. In this matter, I am not persuaded the effect of the judge’s enquiry was to vitiate the fairness of the proceedings, applying Hima at [12]
Grounds 2 and 3
30. Grounds two and three identify errors in the judge’s reasoning.
31. At [37] the judge found the appellant to be a ‘wholly incredible witness’. The reasons are set out in nine subsequent bullet points [‘BP’]. Mr. Bazini made detailed written and oral submissions as to each of the judge’s findings. In reply, the respondent submits the criticisms are no more than disagreements with the findings of the judge which the judge was otherwise entitled to make.
32. In assessing the judge’s reasoning, I bear in mind the observations of Lord Brown in South Bucks County Council -v- Porter [2004] UKHL 33; 2004 1 WLR 1953 at para [36]. His guidance is cited with approval by the Presidential Panel in TC (PS compliance - “Issues-based reasoning”) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 00164 (IAC). Lord Brown’s observations were as follows:
“The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in dispute, not to every material consideration…”
33. In Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ. 464, at [2], the Court of Appeal reiterated the caution with which an appellate tribunal must approach findings of fact.
34. At BP[2] Mr. Bazini says that the judge made an adverse finding against the Appellant: that it was implausible that he would maintain communication with a woman who contacted him in Hebrew given the risk to Lebanese citizens. Mr Bazini says this finding not founded on objective evidence as to the communication between citizens of Lebanon and Israel or a point taken by the respondent in her refusal letter. The respondent submits that the risk of such communication would have been well known to the appellant as a serving soldier in the Lebanese army.
35. I find the judge had regard to the appellant’s position in the army and that the judge made and assessment of the evidence before providing adequate reasons.
36. At BP [3] and [4], the judge found that despite the number of conversations between the appellant and the woman he met online, the appellant ‘knew little about her’. Mr. Bazini submits that the full extent of the appellant’s knowledge was not properly tested in cross-examination and as such this was not a finding properly open to the judge. Having regard to the evidence before her, the judge was entitled to find the appellant’s knowledge of the personal life of the woman with whom he was conversing was inconsistent with the nature and number of contacts he claimed to have with her. This ground is a complaint about the weight attached to the judge’s findings which were a matter for her judgement having heard the evidence.
37. At BP [5] The judge found that the appellant had not attempted to log into his Telegram App or account to retrieve the messages. Mr Bazini submits that this ignores the appellant’s witness statement in which he stated that he could not recall the login details. Here the judge’s short reasoning reflects the appellant’s oral evidence that the appellant had not subsequently logged into the App. The fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that she overlooked it. The weight attached to the steps taken by the appellant to recover his log in details is essentially a matter for the judge.
38. At BP [6] and [7], Mr. Bazini submits that the judge misunderstood the evidence given by the appellant as to the attendance of the Lebanese authorities at his home after he had left the army either without leave or having been suspected of treason. At BP [8] and [9] Mr. Bazini submits that the judge ‘appears to draw adverse inferences from the Appellant not producing the original documentation’ - the arrest warrant when there is a complete failure to put the point to the Appellant and give him an opportunity to explain why the original documents remain in Lebanon. Mr. Bazini submits that the appellant was not asked about a failure to produce the documents. The judge’s decision fails to recognise the evidence from the Lebanese lawyer producing the documents.
39. It is important to read the judge’s decision as a whole. The judge made a broad evaluative judgement as to the reliability of the arrest warrant. The judge’s view was that the copies relied upon by the appellant were unreliable. The judge concluded that ‘The translations are not safe to be relied upon and fail the Tanveer Ahmed test.’ The appellant instructed a lawyer in Lebanon who he says sent him a copy of the warrant via WhatsApp. The absence of the original in those circumstances was a matter which the judge was entitled to give weight to.
40. Having reached such findings, the judge was entitled to consider the appellant’s account of being visited by the Lebanese authorities and how their interest in the appellant, on one view of the evidence, faded over time. The complaint(s) by Mr. Bazini in this regard amount to a disagreement with the findings of the judge and to not reveal an error
41. As to BP [2] to [9] inclusive, applying Volpi, I do not find there to be an error in the judge’s reasoning on the matters set out above. The judge’s reasons were capable of being expressed more clearly, but they remain based on the evidence. An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
42. I turn to BP [1]. Here, the judge found ‘It is not plausible that a Jewish woman living in the US would communicate with the Appellant in Hebrew, and he respond in Arabic, where they both speak at least some English’ Mr Bazini submits that this was not a point taken by the Respondent; there was evidence that the appellant could communicate in (limited) English at 22 years old and the judge failed to fully grasp the evidence from the appellant that he used a translation app to communicate. The respondent submits these were findings open to the judge on the evidence.
43. Plausibility findings should be approached with care. I find that that the judge did not consider this aspect of the evidence fully and in doing so reached a finding that such events were ‘not plausible’ without addressing the appellant’s explanation of using a translation App.
44. I have considered carefully whether this error was material to the judge’s decision and conclude, with reference to the decision as a whole that it is not.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the Judge does not contain an error of law. The appeal is dismissed.

Paul Lewis

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7th April 2026