Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000346
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57654/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 6th of May 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

A F
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr T. Hussain, Counsel instructed on behalf of the Appellant
For the Respondent: Mr N. Wain, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 27 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Caskie K.C) promulgated on 25 November 2025. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 20 September 2023 to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that his rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
Background:
3. The factual background can be briefly summarised as follows. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq. He sought protection on the grounds that he faced a real risk of serious harm and/or persecution for reasons of a threat made against him by his father’s cousin who was a major general of the KDP who had issued an arrest warrant against him. He arrived in the UK on 28 June 2021 and claimed asylum on the same day.
4. The respondent considered his application and, in her decision letter dated 20 September 2023 refused the claim. Beyond accepting his nationality and identity the respondent rejected the factual account given by him concerning the events in Iraq. The respondent in the decision letter and the review set out the issues raised as to the credibility and consistency of his claim which included the document he claimed had been issued against him. The respondent also addressed (briefly) the issues relating to documentation taking into account the country guidance decision of SMO, KSP(civil status documentation – Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 110.
5. The appeal came before the FtTJ. In a decision promulgated on 25November 2025, the FtTJ set out his findings of fact and analysis of the evidence between paragraphs 16-21 ( including the Article 8 assessment). The FtTJ dismissed the appeal having rejected his account that he had been credible in his claim to have been at risk in Iraq on the factual basis as claimed.
6. The appellant sought permission to appeal on one ground only. They are as follows:
(1) The FTJ states that the Appellant’s account is neither credible nor reliable from the outset [16]. However, despite a lengthy determination, the only reason that the FTJ is that no arrest warrant was ever produced for him and therefore he does not accept that it exists [17]. He goes on to say that no evidence was ever provided as to why the arrest warrant was not produced and that this failure to produce such a document fundamentally undermines the Appellant’s reliability. The FTJ returns to this issue in stating ‘I reiterate no explanation has been provided as to why the arrest warrant has not been produced for this hearing and in combination with the other matters above I do not accept that any arrest warrant has been issued in respect of the Appellant’ [18].
(2) It is submitted that the problem is twofold. Firstly, the FTJ does not give any reasons to be considered in combination with the failure to produce an arrest warrant. There is therefore a general paucity of reasoning. Second, it is not even clear whether the question was ever even put to the Appellant to give him an opportunity to explain why it was not available.
T
7. Permission to appeal was granted by a FtTJ on 26 January 2026 who stated : “The grounds are arguable for the reasons set out therein. It should be noted that there is an erroneous reference to Judge Shiner in the grounds.”
8. The hearing took place on 27 April 2026 at the Tribunal. The appellant was present at the hearing and was represented by Mr Hussain, of Counsel who appeared by remote means. The respondent was represented at the hearing centre in person by Mr Wain, Senior Presenting Officer.
9. Mr Hussain submitted that he relied upon the grounds of challenge. In essence he submitted that there were inadequate reasons provided for dismissing the appeal. The only relevant paragraph was paragraph 17 where the judge dismissed the appeal on the basis that no arrest warrant had been produced and this undermined his reliability. Mr Hussain submitted that this approach was in error as it required corroboration. Also, the FtTJ did not deal with why the arrest warrant had not been produced and as set out in the grounds it was not clear if it had ever been put to the appellant. He submitted that there was a paucity of reasoning and it is not possible to understand the reasons why the FtTJ had found the appellant to have given an incredible account. Therefore, the decision was flawed and should be set aside.
10. Mr Wain on behalf of the respondent had indicated at the outset that the appeal was opposed by the Secretary of State. He submitted that the difficulty with the grounds that the context of the appellant’s claim was missing. He referred to paragraph 6 and where the FtTJ had set out he appellant’s claim and that that the only issue the appellant had that related to the arrest warrant that had been issued for him in Iraq. At paragraph 16 the FtTJ noted that the only claimed fear was his arrest following the issue of the arrest warrant from his father’s cousin. Thus, the appellant’s account had been based on the fear of the consequences from the arrest warrant and this is the basis of the credibility issue which led to the FtTJ’s findings of fact between paragraphs 16 – 18. The FtTJ assessed that core issue as whether the appellant’s account about the arrest warrant was reliable.
11. Mr Wain further submitted that the assessment paragraph 17 was consistent with the decision in MAH (Egypt) and the FtTJ was entitled to attach weight to the absence of a document that could reasonably be expected to have been made available and in the context of the findings made that he was in contact with family members including his brother and his father.
12. As to the second limb of the grounds (as set out at paragraph 3), Mr Wain submitted that it was incorrect that the point was never put to the appellant. He referred to the decision letter which raised the consistency of the account and that the appellant had never seen the arrest warrant and disputed that it existed (page 6-7 Home Office bundle). He also referred to the respondent’s review at paragraph 15 (p601) were it was clearly set out that the arrest warrant was not accepted.
13. Mr Wain submitted that taking those matters into account it was clear that the existence of the arrest warrant was in dispute and the appellant was on notice of that both from the decision and from the respondent’s review. Thus, there was no procedural unfairness as the grounds appeared to state and the appellant had an opportunity to deal with that issue. The discussion of the arrest warrant was set out in the appellant’s witness statement ((10/11/23) at page 287. Therefore, the assessment made paragraph 18 formed the basis rejecting the core of the appellant’s account.
14. Mr Wain further submitted that the FtTJ made alternative findings at paragraph 20 which had not been challenged in the grounds. Those findings were as follows; that the appellant had been living in the UK since 2021 which is the point at which his relationship with his uncle broke down and that four years had elapsed since then, and that the judge did not find that after such a lengthy absence the appellant’s father’s cousin would still bear animus to him. The FtTJ found that the appellant was a young man who had a single verbal dispute with his father’s cousin and then immediately left Iraq for a period of four years. He reached the conclusion that he did not consider that there was any real possibility that the appellant’s father’s cousin would continue to seek to harm him after what was a single altercation and then a brief insult to his standing so long ago. He did not accept that the appellant’s father’s cousin would now wish harm upon him. He addressed the arrest warrant and that if it did exist it was now old and may have lapsed and that there was no evidence that the authorities had, apart from delivering the warrant to his father, taken any steps to enforce the warrant and it may simply have been a requirement to appear at a police station or court on a specific date, a date which now will have passed. Mr Wain therefore submitted that those alternative findings were not challenged and went to the materiality of any error if so found.
15. Mr Hussain by way of reply submitted that those points referred to by Mr Wain at paragraph 20 were not put to the appellant at the hearing.
16. He further submitted that the appellant had explained in the witness statement of his father informing him of the existence of the warrant. That was not a point against him and the only point that the FtTJ found against him was on the basis of his failure to produce the arrest warrant
17. In respect of the decision letter (p548) he submitted that the respondent had referred to the appellant being internally consistent concerning the arrest warrant, however in the witness statement at paragraph 5, there was no inconsistency as the document was issued when he was in Iraq. He submitted that this supported Judge Caskie’s observation that the decision letter was badly drafted . He further submitted that the only reason given by the FtTJ related to the failure to produce the arrest warrant. He submitted that this point was either not put the appellant or was not relevant to his case ( re-iterating paragraph 3 of the grounds).
18. He submitted that whilst it was argued that the arrest warrant was put issue during the decision letter, the analysis was not a logical one and did not fall within paragraph 86 of MAH (Egypt) or by reference to the decision in Kasolo. He submitted that the matters set out in the respondent’s review at paragraph 9 were irrelevant and the allegation was based on a slight against his cousin not as described by the respondent. He therefore submitted that the decision was not properly reasoned and should be set aside.
19. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision which I now give.
Discussion:
20. I am grateful for the helpful submissions given by both of the advocates during the appeal and have considered them in the context of the factual appeal and the assessment of the evidence by the FtTJ.
21. There is one ground of challenge which is based on the inadequacy of the reasoning of the FtTJ. It is also important to have in mind the role of a judgment given after trial. The primary function of a first instance judge is to find facts and identify the crucial legal points and to advance reasons for deciding them in a particular way. He should give his reasons in sufficient detail to show the parties the principles on which he has acted and the reasons that have led him to his decision. They need not be elaborate. There is no duty on a judge, in giving his reasons, to deal with every argument presented by counsel in support of his case. His function is to reach conclusions and give reasons to support his view. These are not controversial observations: see Customs and Excise Commissioners v A [2002] EWCA Civ 1039; [2003] 2 WLR 210; Bekoe v Broomes [2005] UKPC 39; Argos Ltd v Office of Fair Trading [2006] EWCA Civ 1318; [2006] UKCLR 1135".
22. The scope of the duty to give reasons was set out MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 641 (IAC) and reiterated in Joseph (permission to appeal requirements) [2022] UKUT 00218 (IAC) at [43]:
“[The duty to give reasons] does not mean that every factor which weighed with the Judge in his appraisal of the evidence has to be identified and explained. But the issues the resolution of which were vital to the Judge’s conclusion should be identified and the manner in which he resolved them explained. […] It need not involve a lengthy judgment. It does require the Judge to identify and record those matters which were critical to his decision.” (citing English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd. (Practice Note) [2002] EWCA Civ 605)
23. The SPT’s Practice Direction of June 2024 on Written Reasons is also of relevance, particularly paragraph 6 which sets out the following
“6. Providing adequate reasons does not usually require the First-tier Tribunal to identify all of the evidence relied upon in reaching its findings of fact, to elaborate at length its conclusions on any issue of law, or to express every step of its reasoning. The reasons provided for any decision should be proportionate, not only to the resources of the Tribunal, but to the significance and complexity of the issues that have to be decided. Reasons need refer only to the main issues and evidence in dispute and explain how those issues essential to the Tribunal’s conclusion have been resolved.”
24. There is no dispute that there is a requirement for the appellant’s fear of persecution to be well founded which means that there has to be a “reasonable degree of likelihood” that he will be persecuted for a Convention reason if returned to his home country ( see MAH (Egypt) at paragraph 49. In the present case the core issue was whether the evidence demonstrated a reasonable degree of likelihood or a real risk that there was an arrest warrant issued by someone the appellant referred to as his father’s cousin, a major general in the KDP. The FtTJ was therefore entitled to address the evidence which related to that core aspect of his appeal. This is because the appellant’s evidence had stated that the only issue that he had was the arrest warrant that had been issued in his country. He identified the person as his father’s cousin ( see paragraph 6 of the FtTJ’s decision). The account given by the appellant was that he had a verbal argument with this man on the telephone after he had attended a demonstration. The appellant had never seen the arrest warrant and it had been given to his father.
25. In his analysis of the evidence the FtTJ set out the relevance of the arrest warrant to the factual claim and to be in fear on return and that, “it is correct that he did not receive any direct oral threats against him but on the appellant’s account the reason for that is that his father’s cousin did not need to make any threats, he simply carried out an action of arranging for arrest warrant to be issued against the appellant”. The FtTJ identified the issue as follows; “if the appellant’s account is true then his fear is not based on speculation but is based on the consequences of arrest following the issuing of arrest warrant” ( see paragraph 16). Therefore, the FtTJ identified from the appellant’s evidence that the basis of the claim and that the core facts which gave rise to the fear was the consequence of arrest following the issuing of the arrest warrant.
26. The FtTJ was therefore entitled to consider whether the appellant demonstrated the basis upon which the arrest warrant had been issued. The FtTJ found as a fact against the appellant that there was a lack of reliable evidence as to why the arrest warrant was issued. He stated “that there was a lack of reliable evidence as to whether the arrest warrant was issued at the behest of his father’s cousin or because the authorities are to establish the appellant’s attendance at the demonstration”.
27. The FtTJ then went on to find that he was not satisfied that the arrest warrant, which was central to the appellant’s claim, in fact existed and gave reasons for that finding. He recognised that whilst the appellant was not required to corroborate his account, the appellant had been in the UK since 2021 and no evidence had been produced as to why the arrest warrant that was said to have been issued and given to his father had not been produced for the appeal. The FtTJ further found that if such arrest warrant had been issued, that the appellant would reasonably likely have produced it. That was a finding open to the FtTJ to make on the evidence because the appellant had been able to obtain photographs from family members in Iraq and therefore it could not be said that he was unable to contact his family. The FtTJ found as a fact that the appellant had maintained contact with his family in Iraq.
28. Additionally, the FtTJ had also set out earlier at paragraph 17 the lack of reliable evidence as to the basis of the arrest warrant- whether it was issued at the father’s cousin’s behest or because the authorities had established the appellant’s attendance at a demonstration. In this regard the FtTJ was entitled to find that the warrant would have set out what the allegation was ( see later at paragraph 17).
29. I turn to the oral submission made by Mr Hussain and that the FtTJ’s assessment of the evidence disclosed an error of law by requiring the appellant to produce the arrest warrant.
30. It was not raised in the grounds that the FtTJ’s decision on the arrest warrant was contrary to the decision in MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216 nor was it asserted that it was an error of law to require corroboration. Nonetheless I have considered the submission made by Mr Hussain.
31. The court dealt with the issue corroboration as follows :
“86. It was common ground before this Court that there is no requirement that the applicant must adduce corroborative evidence: see Kasolo v Secretary of State for the Home Department (13190, a decision of the then Immigration Appeal Tribunal, 1 April 1996). On the other hand, the absence of corroborative evidence can, depending on the circumstances, be of some evidential value: if, for example, it could reasonably have been obtained and there is no good reason for not obtaining it, that may be a matter to which the tribunal can give appropriate weight. This is what was meant by Green LJ in SB (Sri Lanka) at para. 46(iv)”.
32. Mr Hussain referred to the decision in Kasolo. In ST (Corroboration, Kasolo) Ethiopia [2004] UKIAT 00119 the AIT held that the fact that corroboration is not required does not mean that an Adjudicator is required to leave out of account the absence of documentary evidence which might reasonably be expected. An appeal must be determined on the basis of the evidence produced but the weight to be attached to oral evidence may be affected by a failure to produce other evidence in support.
33. The FtTJ’s self- direction at paragraph 17, that it was not a requirement that the appellant provide corroboration of his account is consistent with the general principles. However, the FtTJ explained the relevance of that evidence to the core of his protection claim and being at risk on return to Iraq and was entitled take into account that the absence of documents which could reasonably be expected to have been produced fundamentally undermined his claim. In this context the FtTJ identified that the appellant has maintained contact with his family in Iraq and that he had been in the UK since June 2021. He recorded that, “no evidence has been produced to me as to why the arrest warrant that is said to have been issued and given to his father has not been produced in respect of this appeal.” The FtTJ was entitled to take into account that the appellant had been able to obtain photographs from his family in Iraq, and as such the family members had the means of communicating documents to the appellant, and that the failure to produce the document in those circumstances fundamentally undermined the appellant’s credibility.
34. The approach taken by the FtTJ was therefore open to him and was consistent with the decision of in MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216 as set out at paragraph 86 and cited above. The FtTJ explained the relevance of that evidence to the core of his protection claim and being at risk on return to Iraq and was entitled take into account that the absence of documents which could reasonably be expected to have been produced fundamentally undermined his claim.
35. In his submissions Mr Hussain relied upon the second part of paragraph 3 of the grounds where it is stated that it was not even clear whether it had been put to the appellant that he had failed to produce the arrest warrant and therefore was an issue of procedural fairness.
36. When considering that submission and in that context, the grounds of challenge do not prove themselves. There is no copy of counsel’s note or any reference to the evidence in support of that. In any event, the material that was before the FtTJ demonstrates that the issue pertaining to the arrest warrant was properly raised. In this respect Mr Wain referred to the decision letter which set out the basis of the appellant’s claim. It stated, “ you spoke on the phone with A (father’s cousin) and insulted him and his family and the arrest warrant was issued for you via being handed to your father.” The respondent set out that the material fact that was not accepted was that the appellant was not of any adverse interest to the Major General. Whilst Mr Hussain submitted that the decision letter referred to an inconsistency as to the arrest warrant when there was none, in my judgement what was relevant was the core element of an arrest warrant and its existence and that was plainly in issue. This is supported by the decision reached which referred to whether the arrest warrant was in existence. Similarly, the respondent’s review plainly put the arrest warrant in issue. Whilst Mr Hussain referred to the first paragraph of paragraph 9 which dealt with identity documents, paragraph 15 stated that the alleged arrest warrant was not accepted. In my judgement it could not be realistically said that the arrest warrant had not been put in issue by the respondent given that it formed the core of his account.
37. Returning to the decision reached by the FtTJ, when referring to the “combination of matters” the FtTJ was referring to the assessment made as to the core element of this claim as explained at paragraph 6, 16 and assess between paragraphs 16 – 18.
38. Furthermore, as regards the FtTJ’s reasoning, I accept the submission made by Mr Wain that the FtTJ provided further reasons and under took a further assessment of risk as set out at paragraph 20. In this regard the FtTJ took into account that the appellant had been living in the UK since 2021 and identified that that was the point at which the appellant had said his relationship with his uncle broken down. The FtTJ took into account four years had elapsed since then and reached the finding that he did not consider that after such a lengthy absence the appellant’s father’s cousin would still bear animus to him. He reasoned this by referring to the core element of the appellant’s claim namely that the appellant was a young man who had a single verbal dispute with his father’s cousin. He immediately then left Iraq for a period of four years. Based on that core factual account the FtTJ found that, “I do not consider there is any real possibility that the appellant’s father’s cousin would continue to seek to harm him after what was a single altercation and then a brief insult to his standing so long ago. I do not accept that his father’s cousin will now wish harm upon the appellant. The arrest warrant (if it exists) is now old and may have lapsed.” The FtTJ concluded that “there is no evidence that the authorities have, apart from delivering the warrant to his father, taken any steps to enforce the warrant and it may simply have been a requirement to appear at a police station or court on a specific date, a date which will now have passed.”
39. Mr Hussain in his oral submissions submitted that those matters had not been put to the appellant. However, there is no evidential support for that submission. Firstly, those were reasons given by the FtTJ in his decision at paragraph 20 which led to his overall conclusion that there was no reasonable likelihood that the appellant would be at risk on return to Iraq and thus the dismissal of his claim. They were plainly set out at paragraph 20 and they are not challenged in the grounds. Had it been the position that it was not accepted that those matters had been put to the appellant, that would have been set out in the grounds along with the assertion made at paragraph 3. Secondly, the judge recorded one of the submissions made at paragraph 14 and that it was argued that since the appellant had arrived in the UK in 2021 there had been no further threats from his uncle (the person who it was who the appellant claimed to be at risk from) therefore that provides support that the issues as to future risk had been raised.
40. Therefore, the FtTJ also gave further reasons in the alternative for reaching his overall conclusion relating to risk on return to Iraq. For those reasons and having considered the decision of FtTJ Caskie K.C in light of the evidence and factual findings made I am satisfied that there is no error of law in the decision based on the grounds as advanced. Consequently, the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, therefore the decision shall stand.
Notice of Decision:
The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of an error of law and the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.
30 April 2026
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds