Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000360
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55160/2024
LP/02583/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

24th July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HARIA

Between

DZ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Akhter of Counsel instructed by Metrolaw Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Nappey Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 28 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant and/or any member of his family, is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant and/or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Anonymity
1. The First-tier Tribunal Judge (the Judge) granted an anonymity order in this appeal and no party before me requested that it be set aside. In the circumstances, I have taken into account the starting point for consideration of anonymity orders is the principle of open justice and find that in this case because the Appellant claims a risk of persecution on return to Albania, the obligations of the United Kingdom (UK) under the Refugee Convention outweigh the principle of open justice and an anonymity order is appropriate.

Background
2. The Appellant, a national of Albania, appeals with permission against the decision of the Judge who dismissed his protection claim in a decision dated 12 October 2025.

3. The parties are aware of the details of the Appellant’s protection claim and I therefore do not set it out in detail. In summary, the Appellant claims his brother owed money to a man known as M. After the brother fled Albania, M located the Appellant and forced him to work to repay the debt. While delivering cannabis for M, the Appellant was robbed. The next day, when he went to report this, M was absent and other gang members tied him to a chair and beat him. He escaped, returned home, and then hid at his maternal aunt’s house for 10 days. He left Albania by plane with his father. He fears that if returned, M’s gang will find and harm him, requiring him to remain in hiding for a long time.

4. The Respondent accepted the Appellant’s nationality and identity. The Respondent did not accept the Appellant was forced to work to pay off his brother’s debt and that he was kidnapped by a criminal gang.

5. The Respondent noted that a referral was made to the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) for the Competent Authority to make a decision as to whether the Appellant is a victim of modern slavery.

6. The Respondent accepted that the Appellant as a person under the age of 18 is a member of a particular social group as an unaccompanied asylum-seeking child. Although persons who fear criminal gangs in Albania do not share an innate or immutable characteristic and do not have a distinct identity which is perceived as different in society. The Respondent accepted the treatment the Appellant fears would be persecution because being forced to work under threat of violence amounts to persecution.

7. The Respondent did not accept the material facts of the Appellant’s claim as the Respondent considered the Appellant’s evidence was not credible due to it being inconsistent without reasonable explanation, lacking in detail and some elements considered implausible.

8. The Respondent considered the Appellant’s failure to claim asylum in France before arriving to the UK damaged his credibility under S.8(4) of the Asylum & Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004. The Respondent does not accept the Appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution. The Respondent considered that there is sufficiency of protection in Albania and internal relocation is a reasonable option. The Respondent rejected the Appellant’s claim for humanitarian protection and under Article 8.

9. The Judge having heard the appeal dismissed the appeal.

The application for permission to appeal

10. Permission to appeal was refused by a First-tier Tribunal Judge on 9 January 2026. The Appellant renewed the application for permission on two grounds.

11. Ground 1 asserts the Judge’s adverse credibility findings were flawed because insufficient weight was given to the positive NRM decision recognising the Appellant as a victim of modern slavery. It is said the Judge misunderstood the claim by treating the case as involving a debt owed by the father, when the Appellant’s case was that he was forced to work for M because of his brother’s problems. The grounds also contend that the Judge failed properly to account for the Appellant’s age, trauma and vulnerability when assessing his evidence.

12. Ground 2 argues that the Judge failed to assess risk on return to Albania, including the risk from M, sufficiency of protection, and the possibility of re-trafficking. The grounds submit that, given the Appellant’s accepted trafficking history, youth and vulnerability, cogent reasons were required before departing from the positive NRM decision.

Permission to appeal

13. Permission was granted on both grounds by Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Lewis (DUTJ Lewis) on 22 February 2026.

14. In relation to Ground 1, although DUTJ Lewis considered the grounds to be largely generalised, unfocused and in substance an attempt to reargue the merits, it was considered arguable that the Judge had erred in law by failing to have regard to the Appellant’s position as a vulnerable witness. In particular, the Appellant had been recognised under the NRM as a victim of modern slavery and had been a minor at the time of many of the relevant events, having arrived in the UK before reaching 18. It was arguable that the Judge failed to consider the applicable guidance concerning children, vulnerable adults and sensitive witnesses. It was also considered arguable that the Judge’s reasoning lacked clarity, particularly in relation to the issue of debt.

15. The grant of permission also noted, however, that there appeared to be cogency in aspects of the Judge’s adverse credibility reasoning, including the treatment of the late account concerning “M” visiting the Appellant’s parents and the apparent discrepancy between the Appellant’s protection claim and the account recorded in the NRM process. Accordingly, any error of law would require consideration of materiality.

16. In relation to Ground 2, concerning risk on return, DUTJ Lewis considered this did not have freestanding merit because it depended on acceptance of the Appellant’s factual account, but permission was granted on that ground because permission had been granted on Ground 1.

Rule 24 Response

17. The Respondent filed and served a Rule 24 response opposing the Appellant’s appeal. In brief, the Respondent submits that Ground 1 is the primary ground upon which Ground 2 is founded and that there is no merit in Ground 1. The Respondent submits the Judge was aware of the conclusive NRM decision but was entitled to give it limited weight, as it concerned events in 2018, whereas the asylum claim centred on contact by M in 2021. In light of the inconsistencies in the Appellant’s and his brother’s evidence, the Judge was entitled to find that the NRM decision did not materially support the asylum claim.

18. The Respondent further submits that the Judge was not required expressly to refer to the vulnerability guidance, particularly as the Appellant was nearly 21 and no application was made for him to be treated as vulnerable. Any lack of clarity about whose debt was being repaid was not material, given the Judge’s otherwise cogent adverse credibility findings.

The Hearing

19. The Appellant was represented by Ms Akhter of Counsel who had also appeared before the Judge in the First-tier Tribunal.

20. The Respondent was represented by Mr Nappey a senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

21. Ms Akhter fairly agreed at the start of the hearing that Ground 2 is not a freestanding ground.

22. Both representatives agreed that if I find there to be an error of law the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing.

23. Having heard the submissions from both representatives, I reserved my decision. I now set out my decisions and reasons and deal with the issue of the disposal of the appeal.

Findings and reasons

24. I remind myself of the many authorities including Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2-4] on the approach an appellate court or tribunal should take when considering findings of fact reached by a first instance judge.

25. I have exercised that restraint and considered the Judge’s decision holistically.

26. Ground 1: Ms Akhter accepted that Ground 1 has three strands. First, it is said that the Judge failed to give proper weight to the positive conclusive grounds NRM decision. Secondly, it is said that the Judge failed to treat the Appellant as a vulnerable witness. Thirdly, it is said that the Judge misunderstood or confused the evidence concerning whose debt was owed to M.

27. The Judge correctly sets out the legal framework in the decision and begins the findings at [11] noting the conclusive NRM decision which concluded the Appellant was a victim of forced criminality in approximately 2018 and as such is a victim of modern slavery.

28. In relation to the NRM decision, Ms Akhter in her oral submissions submitted that the 2018 date referred to in the NRM may have been an error by the Competent Authority (CA) as various information was provided to the CA. Ms Akhter who represented the Appellant at the hearing before the Judge did not submit or suggest that this explanation for the difference in dates between the NRM decision and the Appellant’s account was put to the Judge and the Judge failed to take it into account.

29. I find, there is no merit to the assertion that the Judge failed to give proper weight to the NRM decision. The Judge having expressly noted the NRM decision at [11] was entitled at [13] to note that it identified forced criminality in approximately 2018 whereas the Appellant’s asylum account was that he was first approached by M in 2021. The NRM decision is not determinative of the Appellant’s asylum claim. However, the existence of a positive conclusive grounds decision was plainly relevant to the assessment of whether the Appellant was a vulnerable witness and to the manner in which any discrepancies in his evidence were evaluated.

30. The Judge proceeds at [13] to [22] to consider the evidence and finds numerous inconsistencies in the Appellant’s and his brother’s accounts.

31. The grounds as pleaded submit that the fact the Appellant is a victim of trauma, underpins his whole experience, and he should have been viewed as a vulnerable witness. Ms Akhter expanded on the grounds in her oral submissions stating that the Appellant was only 17 years of age when he claimed asylum and the Judge did not take this into account and did not give any latitude to the Appellant recollecting traumatic events that occurred in Albania when he was a minor.

32. There is of course no need for the Judge to explicitly mention the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010: Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance (the Vulnerability Guidance). I keep in mind the reminder given by Court of Appeal in AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 at [34] regarding the First-tier Tribunal that “…judges in this specialised tribunal are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically, unless it is clear from their language that they have failed to do so.”.

33. The failure to follow the Vulnerability Guidance will most likely be a material error of law although this will not always be the case, per AM (Afghanistan) and Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 1123 at [30]. The Court of Appeal considered the Vulnerability Guidance in detail more recently in Khan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 148 and reiterated that the Vulnerability Guidance was designed to promote fair hearings in tribunal proceedings and ensure that parties were able to effectively participate and have their evidence properly and fairly considered, but it did not impose free-standing legal requirements. A Tribunal's failure to follow the guidance did not automatically mean that its decision was legally flawed. The question was whether there had been actual procedural unfairness or an improper assessment of evidence that materially affected the Tribunal's decision.

34. Ms Akhter did not submit that there had been any request by her or the Appellant’s representatives to treat the Appellant as a vulnerable witness or for any particular adjustments to be made. The Vulnerability Guidance indicates that it is for the parties to draw an appellant’s vulnerability to the attention of the Tribunal. Nevertheless, this does not remove the judge’s responsibility to ensure the fairness of the proceedings, including, where appropriate, considering whether reasonable adjustments are necessary for a vulnerable witness. The Vulnerability Guidance also makes clear that it is for the judicial fact-finder to determine the relationship between the vulnerability and the evidence that is adduced.

35. It is conceded by the Respondent that there is no explicit reference in the decision to the Vulnerability Guidance and no finding that the Appellant was a vulnerable witness. The Appellant’s recognition as a victim of modern slavery, together with the fact that he had entered the UK as a minor and was recounting events said to have occurred when he was a child, at least gave rise to an obvious need to consider whether he should be treated as a vulnerable witness and whether that vulnerability bore upon the assessment of his evidence.

36. I accept the Judge was not required to refer expressly to the Vulnerability Guidance and that every failure to refer to that guidance amount to an error of law. I also accept that no application was made for special measures and that the Appellant was an adult by the date of the First-tier Tribunal hearing. Those matters are relevant, but not determinative. The issue in this appeal is whether the Judge properly assessed the evidence of a person who had entered the UK as a minor, was recounting events said to have occurred when he was a child and had been recognised by the CA as a victim of modern slavery.

37. The Judge was aware that the Appellant entered the UK as a minor, as the Judge makes specific reference to this at [26], [28] and [29] when considering Article 8. The Judge should therefore have been aware when assessing the Appellant’s credibility that he was recounting events that occurred when he was a minor. The Judge makes various findings of fact drawing on the evidence and contrasting the Appellant’s brother’s account with the Appellant’s account at [13] to [15] and [18] to [23]. The credibility assessment turned substantially on perceived inconsistencies, omissions and implausibility. However, there is no indication that the Judge considered whether the Appellant’s age at the material time, his childhood experiences, or his recognised modern slavery status had any bearing on the discrepancies, omissions or lack of clarity relied upon in the credibility assessment. That omission was material because the adverse credibility findings turned substantially on those matters. I am therefore satisfied that the assessment of the Appellant’s evidence was materially flawed.

38. I proceed to consider the third part of Ground 1, the assertion that the Judge was confused about who owed the debt to M. The Appellant’s brother in his witness statement at [6] referred to his father borrowing money from different people to support the family however there was no suggestion in either the Appellant’s brother’s witness statement or in the Appellant’s witness statement that either of them had to work for M to pay off their father’s debt.

39. At [16] the Judge refers to the father’s debt and notes the Appellant confirmed it was his brother who had the debt not the father. However, at [17] the Judge refers to the father having an outstanding debt with M and states the Appellant could not explain why the father would return to Albania having left Albania with the brother and the Appellant.

40. At [20] the Judge refers again to the father’s debt and concludes that this undermines the father’s ability to fund the flights for himself and the Appellant to France after funding the brother’s travel to Belgium in 2018.

41. Mr Nappey on behalf of the Respondent submitted that even if there was some confusion as to the issue of who owed the debt to M there are other findings in the credibility assessment contrasting the evidence of the brother with that of the Appellant at [13] to [15] and [18] to [23].

42. I find that the Judge’s reasoning on the issue of debt was materially unclear. At [16] the Judge recorded the Appellant’s evidence that the debt was his brother’s debt, not his father’s. However, at [17] the Judge reasoned on the premise that the father had an outstanding debt with M, and at [20] again referred to the father’s debt when assessing the father’s ability to fund travel. The Appellant’s case was not that he had been forced to work because of a debt owed by his father. It was that he was targeted because of his brother’s debt or problems with M. This was not peripheral. It went to the factual core of why M was said to have targeted the appellant.

43. Standing alone, the confusion over debt would have required close consideration of materiality. However, when that error is considered together with the absence of any discernible assessment of the Appellant’s evidence through the lens of his age, childhood experiences and recognised vulnerability, I am not satisfied that the adverse credibility findings can safely stand.

44. Ground 2 is not freestanding, as Ms Akhter properly accepted. It depends on the factual account rejected by the Judge. However, because the credibility assessment is materially flawed and the factual findings cannot safely be preserved, the issues of risk on return, sufficiency of protection, internal relocation and any risk of re-trafficking will need to be considered afresh.

Disposal

45. I am satisfied that the error identified means that the whole decision has been infected and needs to be set aside. I am satisfied that no findings of fact can be preserved.

46. Having regard to paragraph 7.2 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement, and given the extent of the fact-finding required, I am satisfied that the appropriate course is remittal to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains an error of law, and accordingly the decision is set aside in its entirety with no findings of fact preserved.

This appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal at Taylor House for a fresh hearing to be heard by a different judge.

N Haria
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Haria
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16 July 2026