Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000362
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/57858/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 12th of May 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

SHAHZAD ALI
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE NOT made)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Jagadesham, Counsel instructed on behalf of the appellant
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at (IAC) on 29 April 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Forster) promulgated on 10 December 2025. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 20 June 2024 to refuse his human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ not did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be made. Anonymity is not granted because the facts of the appeal do not demonstrate that his rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR.

The background:
3. The factual background can be briefly summarised as follows. The appellant is a national of Pakistan. He entered the United Kingdom on 29 November 2019 on a visitor visa valid until 29 May 2020. He applied for leave to remain on family/private life grounds but this was refused on 29 September 2021 and his subsequent appeal was dismissed on 26 May 2022 by FtTJ Hands ( see decision at p139CB). The basis of his claim before the FtTJ is recorded at paragraph 3 of the decision. He provided essential emotional support to assist his sister and her children and that the decision to refuse him leave was a disproportionate interference in his family and private life and would have a detrimental effect on the mental health and moral well-being of his sister, nieces and nephew. It was also claimed that there would be significant obstacles to his integration into Pakistani culture because of the threats made to him by his brother, he would have no income and there would be unjustifiably harsh consequences for him. The FtTJ found on the evidence that the appellant would have an income from the business that he owned. The judge also found that he had family and friends to whom he could turn to for support and would not face homelessness or destitution (paragraph 22: page 222CB). As regards his relationship with his sister, the FtTJ did not accept that his sister and her children needed him to support them nor that they relied on him for financial support. In respect of the evidence provided in relation to the circumstances, the FtTJ did not accept his claim that his sister’s health and well-being would deteriorate if the appellant were to return to Pakistan.
4. Following the dismissal of his claim his appeal rights expired on 10 June 2022. The decision letter records that the appellant applied for a fee waiver for an application based on human rights grounds on 20 June 2022 which was rejected on 27 September 2022. A second fee waiver application was made on 5 December 2022 but was rejected on 3 February 2023.
5. The date of the current application for leave to remain on the basis of his family and private life with a British citizen was made on 12 February 2024. It is recorded by the FtTJ that he had no valid leave in the UK since 29 May 2020.
6. The application was based on being in a relationship with a British citizen who has British children. He applied on the basis that she was his partner and that he had entered into a religious Islamic Nikkhah ceremony with her on 5 April 2023 and had been living with her in a relationship since June 2022”. He stated that he first met his partner in September 2020 and the relationship began in June 2022. He had met her at his sister’s house. He set out that he had not lived with his partner continuously for two years.
7. The respondent refused the claim in a decision taken on 20 June 2024. The respondent assessed the application under the requirements of Appendix FM and based on his application for leave to remain as an unmarried partner. He could not meet the eligibility relationship requirement because he could not meet the definition of a partner set out under GEN 1.2 and E-LTRP 1.9 based on the evidence provided that he had only been in a relationship with his partner since June 2022 meaning that at the date of the application had not been in a relationship similar to marriage or civil partnership with her for at least two years. Further she was still legally married to her former partner. He could not meet the eligibility financial requirement because he relied upon his partner’s employment income but she did not meet the definition of a partner. The appellant did not have valid leave to remain in the UK and was in breach of immigration laws. The respondent concluded that EX1 did not apply as it had not been established that there were insurmountable obstacles to prevent family life continuing outside the United Kingdom. The decision also considered his private life, but on his length of residence he failed to meet the requirements of Paragraph PL4.1 and PL 5.1 (a) and as regards Paragraph PL 5.1 (b) it was concluded that there were no very significant obstacles to his integration if required to leave the UK. The respondent addressed the issue of whether there were “exceptional circumstances” but found that there were no exceptional circumstances such as paragraph GEN.3.2 of Appendix FM applied. The application was therefore refused.
The FtTJ’s decision:
8. The appellant appealed that decision which brought the matter before the FtTJ. At the hearing the FtTJ heard evidence from the appellant and his partner. In his decision which was promulgated on 12 December 2025 he dismissed the appeal having concluded that there were no insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing outside the United Kingdom and that it was reasonable and proportionate for the appellant to leave the United Kingdom.
9. In his decision the FtTJ applied the relevant Immigration Rules. He recorded that whilst it was accepted that the parties had undergone an Islamic marriage ceremony in April 2023 he found from the evidence that the appellant moved in with her in June 2022 which was less than two years before he had made his application therefore he could not satisfy the definition of a “partner” under Appendix FM. He could not meet the eligibility immigration status requirement having been in the UK illegally since 29 May 2020. He could not meet the eligibility financial requirements of Appendix FM based on his evidence that he received financial support from his partner and from his relatives in the UK. She currently received universal credit.
10. As to the issue of insurmountable obstacles the FtTJ found that EX1(a) did not apply because his partner’s three children were all adults. As regards EX. 1(b) the FtTJ directed himself to the applicable threshold and the decision of Agyarko alongside Paragraph EX2, expressed as “the very significant difficulties it should be faced by the applicant or their partner… Which could not be overcome would entail very serious hardship of the applicant or their partner.” At paragraph 21 the FtTJ addressed that by reference to the appeal reasons which stated that the would-be insurmountable obstacles due to several reasons including his partners stress and anxiety, that the children’s best interest will be disrupted as would her employment in the UK and there are safety concerns in Pakistan due to the lack of legal recognition of their relationship. At paragraph 22, the FtTJ addressed his partner’s medical health but noted there was no medical evidence to support the claim. The FtTJ recorded that while he accepted she suffered from low mood and she was anxious about the current situation, neither she nor the appellant had told him about any medication she took or treatment received. He concluded that there was nothing to suggest that his partner would be unable to obtain medical care she may require in Pakistan. At paragraph 23, he addressed the claim relating to her children but found that all three were adults. Whilst he had been told that she cared for one of her sons who had an endocrine disorder he recorded that no details were given about her son’s state of health; that it was not usually life-threatening as suggested by the appellant’s partner and that all three children were likely to remain in the UK. As to the claim made in relation to her employment, he recorded that the appellant’s partner was no longer working. At paragraph 25, the FtTJ recorded the evidence given by the appellant’s partner who had said that her divorce was likely to be finalised in December this year. The FtTJ stated “she and the appellant have been married in the Islamic faith and no evidence has been produced to support the assertion that Ms Kauser would face difficulties in Pakistan because she is has divorced her previous partner. Her marriage to the appellant would be legally recognised.“ He concluded that the appellant had not provided evidence that there were insurmountable obstacles that would be faced by him or his partner in continuing their family life outside the UK and Pakistan.
11. At paragraph 28 the FtTJ set out his analysis of the evidence relating to the issue of whether there were “very significant obstacles” to his integration. The FtTJ recorded that his starting point was the previous decision of FtTJ Hands in May 2022 applying the principles in Devaseelan. He recorded that the previous Tribunal had found that the appellant had failed to establish that he would suffer undue hardship should he be returned to Pakistan. He helped run a shop before he left Pakistan and there was insufficient evidence to establish that he could not do that again. It was found that he would be able to seek appropriate employment if work in the family business was not available. His family members in Pakistan would also be able to support him until he settled. The previous Immigration Judge found that the appellant had failed to establish that he would find himself destitute because he had family who could assist him to reintegrate into life in Pakistan. It was said that any suffering would be temporary. “The appellant spent 38 years in Pakistan before he came to the UK in 2019. He obviously speaks Urdu and he knows the culture. He is part of the Pakistani community in the UK. His partner was born in Pakistan and she has returned there at least twice since she came to the UK in 2003. She has family in Pakistan”.
12. The FtTJ concluded that he did not accept that the new evidence provided him with very good reasons to depart from the previous Tribunal’s findings and that it had not been established that there were very significant obstacles to integration (paragraph 28 – 31).
13. The FTJ addressed the issue of whether there were “exceptional circumstances” and whether the refusal of leave would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences such that there would be a disproportionate interference of article 8, but concluded that the appellant’s inability to satisfy the Immigration Rules was a weighty factor in the assessment, that there were no “exceptional circumstances” on the facts of the case and applying the public interest considerations under section 117B, the FtTJ gave little weight to his private life or his relationship with his partner having been established when his immigration status was at best precarious. The FtTJ found that the appellant was in the UK illegally and had remained after his previous application and subsequent appeal was dismissed in 2022. The FtTJ found that “his conduct undermined the immigration process”. The FtTJ also found that he was unable to support himself financially in the UK and that his partner lacked the means to assist him and that the appellant was likely to be a burden on UK taxpayers. The FtTJ therefore concluded that the decision to refuse the application was not disproportionate or in breach of Article 8 of the ECHR.
The hearing before the Upper Tribunal:
14. The appellant applied for permission to appeal, based on two grounds which challenged the decision of the FtTJ promulgated on 12 December 2025. A Judge of the FtT granted permission to appeal on 28 January 2026.
15. Mr Jagadesham, Counsel instructed on behalf of the appellant relied upon the grounds of challenge and the Rule 25 reply set in the consolidated bundle. Mr McVeety, Senior Presenting Officer confirmed he relied upon the Rule 24 response under the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. Both provided their oral submissions.
16. I am grateful for the submissions made by the advocates and the assistance they have given during the hearing. It is not necessary to set out those submissions in full as they are a matter of record and I will consider those submissions when assessing whether the decision of the FtTJ discloses the making of a material error of law.
17. Before undertaking an assessment of the grounds, I take into account the following matters. First, I must read the decision of the FtTJ sensibly and holistically and exercise appropriate restraint before interfering with it. Secondly, a brief decision does not mean necessarily that it is erroneous in law. Thirdly, what is required in a decision will be case specific and will depend on the nature of the issue (s) in play.
18. There are two grounds of challenge advanced in the written application submitted on 24 December 2025. It is necessary to set out the basis upon which the grounds were submitted.
19. Ground 1: Failure to Consider a Material Factor (Risk of Persecution/Imprisonment)
The Judge erred in law by failing to consider a material factor specifically raised: the risk that the Appellant faces imprisonment in their home country.
The Error: The Judge failed to assess the risk of prosecution or persecution arising from the Appellant's marriage in circumstances where the Sponsor remains legally married to a first husband.
Materiality: In many jurisdictions, such a marriage is considered bigamous or otherwise unlawful, carrying significant criminal penalties including jail time. By ignoring this risk, the Judge failed to properly assess the Appellant’s protection or Human Rights claim (e.g., under Article 3 of the ECHR regarding inhuman or degrading treatment).
Case Law: Under principles established in R (Iran) & Ors v SSHD [2005] and MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013], a judge must resolve conflicts of fact on material matters and provide adequate reasons for rejecting or accepting a risk.

Ground 2: Inadequacy of Reasoning the Judge failed to provide any, or any adequate, reasons for why the risk of imprisonment was not a barrier to the Appellant’s return. The determination is silent on this specific risk, making it impossible to understand if the Judge rejected the risk on its merits or overlooked it entirely.

Judicial Duties: Applying Law to Facts A Judge has several strict legal duties when deciding an appeal: Duty to Consider All Material Evidence: A judge must take into account all evidence and arguments placed before them that are relevant to the outcome.

Duty to Give Reasons: A judge must explain why they reached a decision, particularly when rejecting evidence of a risk of harm. Duty of Fact-Finding: The judge must resolve disputes of fact (e.g., whether the marriage is unlawful in the home country) based on the evidence provided. Duty to Apply the Correct Legal Test: In protection cases, the judge must apply the "reasonable degree of likelihood" test (from Sivakumaran [1988]) to assess the risk of future harm.
20. In his submissions, Mr McVeety drew attention to the basis upon which the grant of permission was made. He submitted that the FtTJ had granted permission on an incorrect factual basis as indicated by the reference to “the evidence of the appellant and the sponsor that they believe that the previous husband would allege that they were not, in fact, divorced in Islamic law prior to the Islamic marriage of the appellant and the sponsor and that it was this that would put them at risk.” Having considered the witness statements provided by both the appellant and his partner, and also the “appeal reasons”, none of those documents made any reference to the appellant’s partner’s ex-husband making any allegations to the authorities in any attempt to put either party at risk. The FtTJ recorded the evidence from the appellant’s partner and that there had been a dispute about the financial settlement which was what she had referred to in her witness statement (see paragraph 6) and the appellant at paragraph 9 of his witness statement. Thus, that part of the reasoning of the FtTJ when granting permission did not reflect the evidence as it was before the FtTJ. Nonetheless, permission has been granted and it is this procedure which brings the appeal before the Upper Tribunal and thus the consideration of the grounds.
21. Mr Jagadesham, in his oral submissions, submitted that the FtTJ erred in law by failing to address the consequences for the appellant and his partner having committed the offence of bigamy as the appellant’s partner was legally married at the time she married the appellant in the UK. He submitted that this was reflected in the “appeal reasons” document (p63) and the 2 witness statements filed by the appellant and his partner. He submitted that the FtTJ failed to address this in his decision and that paragraph 25 and his reference to “she and the appellant have been married in the Islamic faith no evidence has been produced to support the assertion that Ms Kauser would face difficulties in Pakistan because she is has divorced her previous partner” did not address the position that the appellant had entered into a marriage when legally married to her husband. He submitted that this was a material error of law.
22. Mr Jagadesham referred to the Rule 25 response submitted by the appellant’s solicitors at paragraphs 9 and 10 where it was stated that the Islamic marriage between the appellant and the sponsor is “potentially bigamous under Pakistani law” and by reference to Sections 494 and 495 of the Pakistan Penal Code, bigamy carries a term of imprisonment of up to 7 years.” Mr Jagadesham was not able to identify where that evidence was in the material before the FTT or in what circumstances that evidence had been placed before the FtTJ. He submitted that there was evidence from the appellant and the sponsor which the FtTJ had not engaged with.
23. Dealing with ground 1, it was submitted on behalf of the respondent in oral submissions that it had not been established that the FtTJ had been made aware of the argument on the basis it was now raised or in fact how much of that argument had been raised at the hearing. Secondly, the matters raised in the Rule 25 response relating to Pakistani law had not been put before the FtTJ nor was there any objective evidence relating to Pakistan and its legal system. The FtTJ was required to consider the issue on the balance of probabilities and it had not been demonstrated that on the basis of the evidence available that the FtTJ could have made any such assessment.
24. Mr McVeety submitted that the marriage undertaken in the UK between the parties was not a bigamous marriage because it was not recognised in the UK. He submitted that if the parties were seeking to advance arguments as to Pakistani law then the decision in Hussein and Anor (Status of passports; foreign law) [2020] UKUT 00250 applied and that expert evidence directed to the point at issue should have been provided before the FtTJ. The claim was wholly unsupported.
25. I have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties and have done so in the context of the evidence that was made available to the FtTJ. The basis upon which the written grounds of challenge were advanced were that the FtTJ failed to assess “the risk that the Appellant faces imprisonment in their home country” and “In many jurisdictions, such a marriage is considered bigamous or otherwise unlawful, carrying significant criminal penalties including jail time. By ignoring this risk, the Judge failed to properly assess the Appellant’s protection or Human Rights claim (e.g., under Article 3 of the ECHR regarding inhuman or degrading treatment)”.
26. At paragraph 6 of his decision the FtTJ set out the “ principal controversial issues”:
• Does the Appellant meet the eligibility requirements of Appendix FM?
• Does the Appellant meet the eligibility immigration status requirements of Appendix FM?
• Does the Appellant meet the eligibility financial requirements of Appendix FM?
• Is EX.1. met?
• Does the Appellant meet the requirements of paragraph PL 5.1. and would there be very significant obstacles to his re-integration to Pakistan?
• Are there any exceptional circumstances which would render the refusal a breach of Article 8 ECHR?
27. Contrary to those written grounds and as recorded above, it had not been raised before the FtTJ that the appellant would be at risk of imprisonment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR. Article 3 would be a separate claim made under the Human Rights Convention and I am satisfied that if that claim had been made and on that basis as the grounds assert that it would have formed part of the “principal controversial issues” identified at paragraph 6 of the decision. Thus, the respondent was correct in the Rule 24 response to raise that issue as it directly flows from the grounds that were submitted on behalf of the appellant by his former solicitors. I note that the Rule 25 response provided by the solicitors now instructed sets out at paragraph 7 : “The Appellant was not raising a freestanding Article 3 claim; rather, the risk of prosecution or persecution on return to Pakistan is a factual matter directly relevant to whether there are insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing outside the United Kingdom”. Whilst that now seeks to explain the basis upon which it is argued does not detract from the way it was originally advanced when the grounds were issued.
28. Mr Jagadesham argues that the issue was raised and identifies the following matters. Firstly, the “Appeal reasons” (p63) which set out the following “Health conditions of my wife for stress and anxiety as a result of her divorce case and financial matters from her divorce The presence of children in the UK whose best interests would be significantly disrupted by relocation; My wife’s inability to relocate due to strong and long-standing ties in the UK her divorce case her employment and caregiving responsibilities; Safety or human rights concerns in the Pakistan including discrimination or lack of legal recognition of the relationship. My wife’s estranged partner hasn’t divorced her and Imran Khan and his wife were jailed for getting married”.
29. He also identifies the witness from the appellant at paragraph 20 which reads as follows, “however if she is not divorced then this causes both religious and legal consequences to us not including the threat of being imprisoned in Pakistan since Imran Khan’s imprisonment in Pakistan and his wife’s it is considered a problem if a woman hasn’t divorced and she marry somebody else. We would both face imprisonment in Pakistan” . He also relied on the witness statement from the appellant’s partner at paragraph 10, stating,” we are living in temporary accommodation and I fear that if we go back to Pakistan that we will be mistreated by the authorities and be persecuted for having relations with Shahzad. Pakistan is a very complicated place and I’m conscious that Imran Khan and his wife were also recently imprisoned when Imran Khan’s wife’s ex-husband made allegations in court in Pakistan to dispute that they were not properly divorced.”
30. Whilst there were assertions made in the evidence , it is not been demonstrated on what basis this was expressly identified to the FtTJ. It is not sufficient in my view to refer to isolated paragraphs in the witness statement to demonstrate that this was an issue that was properly advanced. The evidence that has been identified consists of a short paragraph in each of the witness statements which sets out nothing more than a bare assertion. Whilst Mr Jagadesham referred to the Rule 25 reply and the material set out there relating to the risks of imprisonment in the context of the Pakistan Penal Code and consequences of bigamy, he accepted that none of that evidence had been put before the FtTJ. I am satisfied that there was no evidence before the FtTJ to support those bare assertions made in the two witness statements.
31. Mr McVeety makes the point that if the appellant was seeking to rely on evidence relating to the law in Pakistan that the burden was upon the appellant to produce that material for the FtTJ to consider, assess and analyse ( see the decision in Hussein (as previously cited)). That decision sets out that foreign law ( including nationality law) is a matter of evidence, to be proved by expert evidence directed specifically to the point in issue. When applied to this appeal it required the provision of any relevant legal provisions under Pakistani law and the any country objective material as relevant.
32. Mr Jagadesham in his reply sought to rely on the decision of R (on the application of KV v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018[ EWCA Civ 2483 and specifically paragraph 31 of that decision. His submission was that the case demonstrated that expert evidence was not required.
33. Having considered KV I reject the submission made for the following reasons. Paragraph 31 of the decision of KV (as cited) expressly set out that “in English proceedings, matters of foreign law are treated as matters of fact which must be proved to the satisfaction of the court or tribunal”. But that paragraph goes on to read, “traditionally, the general rule in court proceedings has been that this cannot be done simply by putting the text of a foreign enactment before the court or by citing foreign decisions or books of authority, that can only be done by juicing evidence from expert witness. The reason generally for this requirement is that, without the existence of an expert witness, the court is not competent to interpret such materials”. The court went on to refer to that being, “sometimes undoubtedly true” and gave the example where the foreign law in question derives from a system which does not share a common heritage with our own and is contained in sources written in a foreign language whose meaning and/or relationship to each other is not easy to understand. In those circumstances it would be plainly unsafe for an English judge to reach conclusions about the effect of the foreign law without expert assistance. However, “an English judge does not generally need expert assistance in order to understand and interpret an enactment or decision of the court of another English-speaking country whose law forms part of the common law.” The court identified as a second reason for requiring expert evidence in order to prove foreign law is that without it the parties or the court are not competent to research the relevant foreign law and ensure that they have identified the most relevant and up-to-date materials (see paragraph 33). Furthermore, whilst the court referred to the technological advances and expansions of the Internet and the ability to provide such material, the Court considered that it was a matter for the judgement of the tribunal to decide what material to accept in any particular case as evidence of foreign law.
34. When considering that decision it is not been demonstrated that the law in Pakistan or such enactments are from another English-speaking country whose law forms part of the common law. More importantly and when applied to this current appeal, there was no evidence provided from any source to support what was no more than a bare assertion that had been made.
35. I observe that the Rule 25 reply at paragraph 13 sets out “The risk of criminal prosecution under Pakistani law for bigamy is not a peripheral matter; it goes directly to the question of whether there are insurmountable obstacles to the Appellant’s return. Even if the Appellant did not produce country background evidence on Pakistani criminal law, the existence of bigamy offences in Pakistan is a matter of law of which the FtTJ could and should have taken judicial notice or, at the very least, engaged with as an issue raised by the Appellant.”
36. I do not accept that submission. As identified in KV matters of foreign law are treated as matters of fact which must be proved to the satisfaction of the court or tribunal. In this context, the burden was upon the appellant to demonstrate the factual circumstances on the balance of probabilities and provide evidence upon which the FtTJ could make a reasoned analysis, if indeed it was raised on the basis set out in the grounds. The reformed appeal procedures are specifically designed to ensure that the parties identify the issues and that they are comprehensively addressed before the FTT not that the proceedings before the IAC are some form of rolling consideration by either party of its position (see the dicta in Lata). It is not for a FtTJ to try and find evidence or do his own research; proceedings before the FtT have been described by the Court of Appeal as the “first night of the show”, in other words the onus was upon the appellant to demonstrate the factual circumstances of his case before the FtT.
37. It is also relevant that in relation to insurmountable obstacles relied upon, any subjective fear claimed as here would require the fear to be objectively founded. In other words, there was no objective evidence in support of the subjective fear provided in the witness statement either in the form of Pakistani law as applicable but also by reference to the country conditions in Pakistan and set in the context of any factual circumstances.
38. Ground 2 is to be considered in the light of the matters set out above. I can see no basis upon which it can be properly advanced that the FtTJ failed to give adequate reasons as to why the appellant was not subject to the risk of imprisonment when there was no evidential foundation upon which the FtTJ could make any such reasoned assessment.
39. In conclusion and when properly analysed, the grounds of challenge are not made out. Consequently, for those reasons the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, therefore the decision shall stand.
Notice of Decision:
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law; the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

5 May 2026

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds