Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000366
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/00261/2025
EA/02271/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 10th of June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

MATEUSZ RAFAL DURA
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Reiss, Latitude Law Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr N Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 20 May 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a 27 year old Polish national, who has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom since he was nine years old. He appeals, with permission, against the decision of a First-tier Tribunal Judge (FTTJ) to dismiss his human rights appeal, which followed the respondent’s decision to refuse his human rights claim to remain in the United Kingdom. At the same time as making that decision the respondent issued a deportation order against the appellant. That order was made because the appellant is a foreign criminal having been sentenced to serve one years imprisonment for attempting to engage in sexual communication with a child and breaching a sexual harm prevention order (SHPO).
2. The appellant’s human rights appeal was based on his right under Article 8(1) of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention) to respect for his private and family life. The FTTJ found however that interference with that right was justified in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Convention because of the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals.

3. The appellant brings his appeal because he says that the FTTJ’s decision involved errors of law. Having considered the evidence and heard the detailed submissions of the parties, I have decided that the decision of the FTTJ did not contain an error of law and shall stand. My reasons for that conclusion are explained in the following paragraphs.
Relevant Background
4. The appellant was born in Poland, where he lived with his mother, father and three sisters until 2008 when, in accordance with the right of Free Movement within the European Union, the family moved to the United Kingdom. The appellant attended school and College before undertaking an apprenticeship with Ford. He is an IMI certified technician and worked in garages and then as a traffic management operative. The appellant’s older sister moved out of the family home but the appellant and his two younger sisters continued to live with their parents. When the United Kingdom left the European Union the appellant applied for and was granted indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom.
5. On 10 October 2020 the appellant committed three offences of making or possessing indecent images of children, which included him having 26 of the most serious “Category A” images on his mobile phone. The offences were discovered when the police had cause to seize and examine his phone during an investigation into contact the appellant had with a vulnerable child. The appellant was not sentenced for those offences until 8 December 2023 when he was made subject to a 12 month Community Order. At the same time he was also made subject to an SHPO, which amongst other requirements, prohibited him from using social media sites. Three months later on 10 March 2024 the appellant was convicted of the offence of failing to comply with the SHPO and fined £500.
6. On 1 July 2024 the applicant was using Instagram in contravention of the SHPO when he was contacted by what he thought was a 13 year old girl but was in fact an undercover police officer. The conversation quickly degenerated into sexual messages and chats, with the appellant sending pictures of himself. The appellant was arrested and admitted offences of attempting to engage in sexual communication with a child and breaching the SHPO. He pleaded guilty to those offences and on 19 September 2024 was sentenced to twelve months immediate imprisonment.
7. In light of the sentence passed the respondent informed the appellant she was intending to deport him and invited him to submit reasons why she should not do so. The appellant replied raising a claim that deportation would be a disproportionate interference with his private and family life in the United Kingdom. The respondent refused that claim in a decision dated 21 January 2025 and on the same day issued a deportation order. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal against the decision to refuse his human rights claim. There is no right of appeal against the deportation order.
The Legal Framework
8. Article 8(1) to the Convention provides that a person has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence and Article 8(2) provides that “there shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”
9. Part 5A of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the 2002 Act) provides the Tribunal with a complete code for answering the “public interest question” of whether an interference with a person's Article 8(1) right to respect for private and family life is justified under Article 8(2). Section 117C of the 2002 Act concerns relevant considerations in cases involving foreign criminals.
10. Section 117C(1) states that the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest and section 117C(2) says that the more serious the offence the greater the public interest in deportation. Section 117C(3) states that the public interest requires the deportation of a foreign criminal who has not been sentenced to a period of four years imprisonment or more, unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies. Exception 1 is defined in section 117C(4) as applying where:
a) [the foreign criminal] has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life
b) [the foreign criminal] is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
c) There would be very significant obstacles to [the foreign criminal’s] integration into the country to which [the foreign criminal] is proposed to be deported
11. Exception 2 is defined in s117C(5) but is not relevant to the appellant’s case.
12. Section 117C(6) has been interpreted (see most recently in Lady Justice Andrews judgment in Nguyen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1452) as meaning that, where a foreign criminal sentenced to less than four years imprisonment does not meet the requirements of the two Exceptions, the public interest requires their deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in the two Exceptions. The assessment of whether there are very compelling circumstances over and above the two Exceptions that outweigh the public interest in deportation, involves a proportionality assessment weighing the interference with the article 8 rights of the foreign criminal against the public interest in his deportation, and a very strong claim indeed will be required to outweigh the great weight that is to be given to the public interest in the deportation of qualifying offenders (see [46] – [51] of the judgment of Lord Hamblen in HA (Iraq) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22.
The FTTJ’s Decision
13. Having set out the law, the evidence and the issues in the appeal before him, the FTTJ applied Part 5A of the 2002 Act to answer the public interest question.
14. The FTTJ identified that the appellant is a foreign criminal who had been sentenced to less than four years imprisonment and so began his analysis by considering whether the appellant met the requirements of Exception 1. The Judge found that the appellant (a) had lived in the United Kingdom lawfully for more than half his life [30], (b) was socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom [31] – [33], but (c) would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Poland [34] – [48]. The FTTJ concluded therefore that the appellant did not meet all the requirements of Exception 1 to deportation.
15. There being no suggestion that the appellant met the requirements of Exception 2, the FTTJ found the appellant did not meet the requirements of the two Exceptions and proceeded to consider whether there were very compelling over and above the two Exceptions which outweighed the public interest in the appellant deportation at [49] – [86]. The FTTJ concluded that there were no such very compelling circumstances and that the public interest in the appellant’s deportation outweighed the appellant Article 8(1) rights.
The appeal to this Tribunal
16. The appellant was granted permission to appeal to this tribunal by Upper Tribunal Judge O’Callaghan on two grounds. The first ground avers that the FTTJ erred by failing to consider the abhorrent nature of the appellant’s offending when assessing whether the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration in Poland. The second ground avers that the FTTJ erred by giving inadequate reasons for his conclusion that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Poland in circumstances where the FTTJ said the appellant’s offending meant he had “some hesitation” about finding the appellant to be integrated in the United Kingdom.
17. The appellant further argues in his grounds of appeal that the Judge made two other errors of law which, though they were not material to the Judge’s decision, indicate that the Judge did not apply the legal test correctly when considering whether the appellant met the requirements of Exception 1. Those asserted errors are a flawed assessment of whether the appellant shares a family life engaging Article 8(1) of the Convention with his parents and sisters (“error 3”) and that the FTTJ made a finding that the appellant’s parents and sisters could support him financially in Poland in the face of contrary evidence which was unchallenged (“error 4”).
18. The respondent did not serve a written response to the appellant’s grounds of appeal but Mr Wain confirmed that they were opposed. During the hearing I heard helpful submissions about the asserted errors of law from Mr Reiss and Mr Wain. I will not summarise those submissions here but will refer to them in my analysis below.
Analysis
19. Although there were two grounds of appeal, it is convenient to address each of the four errors it is asserted the FTTJ made in turn.
Did the FTTJ Fail to consider the abhorrent nature of the offending when assessing very significant obstacles to integration?
20. The categorisation of the appellant’s offending as “abhorrent” came in the respondent’s decision to refuse his human rights claim but has been justifiably adopted by Mr Reiss in his submissions. Mr Reiss submits that the abhorrent nature of the offending will makes it harder for the appellant to integrate in Poland. He submits that this was an argument raised by the appellant in the appeal before the FTTJ and that the FTTJ’s failure to deal with the argument amounts to a material error of law. Mr Wain argued that the nature of the offending is not one of the generic factors to be considered when assessing whether there will be very significant obstacles to integration, but in any event it is clear that the abhorrence of the appellant’s offending was in the mind of the FTTJ throughout the decision and that it formed part and parcel of his assessment.
21. The appellant’s offending was unquestionably abhorrent. His first set of offences involved the worst category of indecent images of children and was exposed when the appellant was found to have been in contact with a vulnerable child. Just three months after being made subject to a SPOH order the appellant had breached it, and just four months after that offence, the appellant breached it again, this time attempting to engage in sexual communication with a child. As Mr Reiss accepted the submission that such abhorrent offending means it is more likely that the appellants private life interests outweighs the public interest in his deportation, is an unattractive one which flies in the face of the strong public interest in the deportation of those who commit abhorrent offences.
22. I agree with Mr Reiss that the assessment of whether the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration required a broad evaluative assessment to be undertaken on the particular facts of the case presented. That evaluative assessment was not to be restricted to consideration of generic factors and it could include the particulars of the appellant’s offending. I am satisfied however, that the FTTJ undertook exactly such a broad evaluative assessment in the appellant's case.
23. In particular, I agree with Mr Wain that the FTTJ unquestionably had the abhorrence of the appellant’s offending in mind throughout his assessment of the appeal. At [25] the FTTJ says this in terms stating “I have kept the Judge’s sentencing remarks to the forefront of my mind when assessing the evidence and deciding this appeal” before then quoting the sentencing Judge’s description of the appellant’s most recent offending. The FTTJ specifically addresses the nature and seriousness of the offences committed at [50] – [54] of the decision, again by reference to the judge’s sentencing remarks, and also the terms of the community order that was imposed for the first offence. The FTTJ considers the appellant’s conduct after committing the offences and the high risk he poses to children at [56] – [64] of the decision, making further reference in that section to particularly abhorrent features of the offending at [64]. When the decision is read as a whole there can be no sensible doubt that the FTTJ was fully cognisant of the abhorrent nature of the appellant’s offending.
24. Further, the Judge’s specific assessment of whether the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration in Poland itself confirms that the Judge did have the nature of the appellant’s offending in mind when he undertook that assessment. Within that assessment, at [36] the Judge specifically references the nature of the appellant’s offending when accepting that it meant that the appellant has not told his extended family about the offences.
25. It is clear therefore from a careful reading of the FTTJ’s decision that the abhorrent nature of the appellant’s offending was something the Judge kept in mind throughout his consideration of the appellant’s case and specifically when considering whether the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration in Poland. It is entirely unrealistic to suggest that despite his obvious awareness of the abhorrent nature of the offending, and despite his reference to the nature of the appellant’s offending in the part of the decision specifically considering obstacles to integration in Poland, the Judge somehow failed to take the nature of the offending into account when concluding that there were not very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration in Poland.
26. Mr Reiss is correct when he says that the Judge did not address in his decision the specific suggestions made in the appellant’s skeleton argument about the effect the abhorrent offending would have on the appellant’s ability to integrate in Poland. I pause to note that some of those submissions, such as the suggestion that the appellant “will need to disclose his offending whenever he applies for work or tries to engage in any social group” do not appear to have had any foundation in the evidence that was before the Judge. Be that as it may, the fact that the FTTJ did not refer in his decision to these specific assertions made in the skeleton argument, does not, contrary to the grounds of appeal, indicate that the Judge has failed to consider those arguments. In Kamara v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 813 Sales LJ rejected a similar argument that, because no express mention was made of the fact the appellant was a young man in good health, the Judge had failed to have proper regard to all those matters in an assessment of whether there were very significant obstacles to integration. Sales LJ said at [18] “The UT’s decision is to be read looking at the substance of its reasoning and not with a fine tooth-comb or like a statute in an effort to identify errors.” Equally, Lord Hamblen made clear at [72 (ii)] of HA (Iraq) that “Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account.”
27. It is quite clear in my judgment that the FTTJ had the abhorrent nature of the appellant’s offending in mind when undertaking his assessment of whether the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration in Poland and had regard to the abhorrent nature of the offending when undertaking his broad evaluation of that question.
Did the FTTJ fail to give adequate reasons for conclusion the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Poland
28. Mr Reiss submitted that in the context of the FTTJ’s statement that he had “some hesitation in finding that the Appellant is integrated into life in the United Kingdom given the nature of his offending” the Judge’s conclusion that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Poland was inadequately reasoned. Mr Reiss argued that the appellant was left unaware of why the Judge would hesitate to find him to be integrated in the United Kingdom but not hesitate to find the appellant could integrate in Poland.
29. I did not find the emphasis on the FTTJ’s hesitation or otherwise when making findings to be helpful. There is no requirement on the Judge to make findings unhesitatingly and in reality whether the Judge hesitated or not before making a relevant finding is of no consequence. As Mr Wain pointed out, irrespective of whether he did so hesitatingly or not, the finding of fact made by the Judge was that despite the appellant’s offending, the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom. There is nothing about that finding of fact which is inconsistent with the Judge additionally finding that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Poland.
30. Further, the question of whether the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom and whether the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration in Poland involve different considerations. When considering the former the FTTJ was considering whether the appellant’s offending had broken the integrative links he had formed having grown up in the United Kingdom. When considering the latter the Judge was considering whether the appellant’s past offending would pose very significant obstacles to his future integration in Poland.
31. In my judgment the FTTJ’s evaluation of whether the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration in Poland at [34] – [48] was entirely orthodox and appropriate and the reasons the Judge gave for his conclusion that the appellant would not face such obstacles were adequate to enable the appellant and this tribunal to understand how the Judge came to his conclusion. Those reasons included the appellant’s significant number of visits to Poland [37], his experience from working with cars in the United Kingdom and the fact that is a skill that can transfer to Poland [38] – [39], his ability to communicate in Polish [40], his early education in Poland [42], the financial and emotional support he will receive from his parents and sisters [43] – [44]. The Judge also appropriately referred to the fact the very significant obstacles to integration test involved a high threshold. These were all reasons, clearly articulated, which enable the reader to understand why the Judge reached the conclusion he did.
32. I reject the assertion made by Mr Reiss that the Judge focused only on the ability to sustain life and did not properly consider how one becomes an insider in a community. In fact the Judge explicitly considered the extent to which the appellant already is an insider in the community by referring to the large number of visits the appellant has made to the country, and the links and connections that had been maintained with Poland. At [46] the Judge explicitly found that “he is enough of an insider to operate on a day to day basis”.
33. As before, I acknowledge that the Judge did not specifically address the claim that the nature of the offending would present an obstacle to integration when giving his reasons. However as Singh LJ pointed out at [26] of MD (Turkey) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 1958 when discussing the duty to give adequate reasons: “It is important to appreciate that adequacy in this context is precisely that, no more and no less. It is not a counsel of perfection. Still less should it provide an opportunity to undertake a qualitative assessment of the reasons to see if they are wanting, perhaps even surprising, on their merits”
34. Overall, the FTTJ’s reasons for his conclusion that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Poland was adequate. They demonstrated that he had applied the appropriate law, had considered the relevant facts and reached a conclusion which was reasonably open to him on those facts applying the law.
Was there a flawed assessment of Article 8(1) Family life
35. At [26] – [29] the FTTJ made the finding that the appellant has a private life but not a family life that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention. He explains that conclusion noting that the appellant is single and not a parent, that he lived 2 hours’ drive away from his parents and adult sisters, that he sees them every other weekend and that his father said that while he used to see the appellant more regularly whenever the appellant was living in London, he doesn’t see him very much now. The Judge concluded that there was nothing to suggest that there is anything more than normal emotional ties between the appellant and his family.
36. Mr Reiss submitted that this conclusion was flawed and that there are additional elements of dependency which mean there is family life that engages Article 8(1) between the appellant his parents and sisters. Mr Reiss argues that the Judge treated the fact the appellant was living two hours away from his parents and sisters as a conclusive factor, that the Judge failed to consider the appellant's history in the United Kingdom including the fact that until his incarceration he had always lived in the family home, that there was evidence of emotional and social dependence and that he only went to London because he was imprisoned there and only went to Norwich because he was required to live in approved premises following his release.
37. I note that the brevity of the Judge’s assessment of the existence of family life reflects the fact that the existence or otherwise of such a family life was not one of the principle controversial issues in the appeal. Despite its brevity however it is clear to me from the FTTJ’s reasoning that his analysis of whether there is an Article 8(1) family life between the appellant and his parents and sisters was not flawed and in reality the complaints of Mr Reiss are disagreements with the Judge’s evaluative assessment.
38. Whilst it may well have been the result of the Probation Service’s insistence that the appellant live in Approved Premises following his release from prison, the Judge was unquestionably right when saying that at the time of the hearing the appellant was living two hours away from his family and did not see his father very often. Likewise it may well have been enforced imprisonment that kept the appellant separated from his family for part of the time, but the Judge was entitled to recognise that by the time of the hearing the appellant had being living separately from his parents and siblings for more than eight months. These were unquestionably matters the Judge was entitled to consider when assessing whether there was Article 8(1) family life.
39. Contrary to Mr Reiss’ submissions the Judge did not treat separation of the appellant from his parents and sisters at the time of the hearing as the conclusive factor in his assessment. This is apparent from the Judge’s reference at [28] to emotional ties between them. The FTTJ returned to the issue of emotional support between the appellant and his parents and sisters at [43] and [44] of the decision noting that the family are clearly supportive of the appellant, willing to support him financially and maintain contact with him by telephone. The Judge also notes in that analysis however that the appellant only sees his family every other weekend. The Judge again returns to the theme at [80] – [84] noting again the contact and support between the appellant and his parents and sisters. It is clear in these circumstances that the finding there was not a family life that engages Article 8(1) of the Convention was not conclusively made because the appellant was not living with his parents and siblings at the time of the hearing, but as a result of a much broader assessment which included an assessment of the emotional attachments between them.
40. In reality the evidence that was before the Judge came a long way short of establishing the “additional elements of dependence, involving more than the normal emotional ties” which, as the Master of the Rolls stated in IA and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516, is the appropriate test for deciding when there is family life for the purpose of Article 8(1) of the Convention. The evidence in the OASys report was that prior to his incarceration the appellant was residing away from his parents as he was working all over the country with his employment and following his release although he was required to live a distance away from his parents and sisters there was nothing to suggest dependency between them.
Was the finding that the appellant’s parents and sisters could support him financially in Poland in the face of contrary evidence which was unchallenged?
41. The Judge’s finding at [46] was that the appellant’s family in the United Kingdom “could provide him with some financial support to provide enough money for accommodation and the basic necessities of life until such times he establishes himself and is self-sufficient”. I do not consider this finding to be inconsistent with the family saying they would only be able to provide a few hundred pounds per month, which is what Mr Reiss says was the unchallenged evidence before the FTTJ. There was certainly no evidence to show that a few hundred pounds per month would not be sufficient to provide the appellant with the basic necessities of life for a short period of time in Poland.
Conclusion
42. Contrary to the capable submissions of Mr Reiss I am not persuaded that the decision of the Judge contained any errors of law. Instead, in my judgment, it is apparent that the Judge applied the relevant law, considered all the relevant evidence and arguments and reached findings on the facts which led him to the conclusion that the public interest in the appellant’s deportation outweighed his rights under Article 8(1) of the Convention.

Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Clarke did not contain an error of law and shall stand

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

26 May 2026