Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000372
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00809/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

29th June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DEAKIN

Between

NM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Sadiq, counsel, for Kalsi Legal Limited
For the Respondent: Ms Khan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 20 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The Appellant [‘NM’] brings this appeal, with permission, against FTJ Alis’s decision of 28 November 2025 to refuse his appeal on refugee, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.
Material Background
2. NM is an Afghan national.
3. NM claims that he worked for the former government of Afghanistan as an IT manager and CCTV controller between 2018 and 2021. He claims that he and his family were threatened and that he was forced to relocate to Kabul in 2020.
4. NM left Afghanistan after the fall of the Government and travelled, via a number of third countries, to the United Kingdom. He maintains that the Taliban have continued to have an interest in him, and that the Taliban have continued to visit his family home and ask for details of the Appellant’s whereabouts (see NM’s 30 October 2025 witness statement at para. 4).
5. NM arrived in the United Kingdom on 3 October 2025 and claimed asylum.
6. NM’s application for asylum was refused by the Secretary of State in a decision dated 20 February 2025.
7. NM appealed this decision to the First-tier Tribunal. FTJ Alis dismissed NM’s appeal dismissed on refugee, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds in a decision promulgated on 28 November 2025.
Permission to Appeal
8. On 12 December 2025, NM applied to the First-tier Tribunal for permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision. He advanced four grounds of appeal. Permission to appeal was refused by FTJ Safer by order of 1 January 2026.
9. NM renewed his application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. His application was supported by undated “Renewed Grounds for Permission to Appeal to Upper Tribunal”. Counsel for NM informed me that the Grounds of Appeal relied on to support the application for permission to appeal as made to the First-tier Tribunal were also included but that the Upper Tribunal Judge considering permission was not explicitly asked to address them.
10. Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Jervis granted permission to appeal by order of 5 March 2026. At the start of the hearing before me there was some confusion as to whether the grant of permission related to the grounds relied on in support of the application to the First-tier Tribunal, the grounds relied on in support of the application to the Upper Tribunal, or both. I indicated at the hearing that (i) it was clear from the heading and case number on the order the Deputy Judge had granted permission to appeal in this case; (ii) the Judge had not been invited to consider the grounds before the First-tier Tribunal and would have had no reason to do so; and (iii) the grant of permission could properly be taken to relate to the grounds relied on in the application for permission to the Upper Tribunal. This approach was not challenged by the parties, and the appeal proceeded on this basis.
11. I note further that the grant of appeal was expressed in unqualified terms (“The application for permission to appeal is GRANTED”) and so, following Safi and others (permission to appeal decisions) [2018] UKUT 388 (IAC), it was appropriate to proceed on the basis that permission to appeal had been granted on all grounds relied on in “Renewed Grounds for Permission to Appeal to Upper Tribunal” despite it’s not being clear how the reasons provided for the grant of permission relate to the pleaded grounds.
The Grounds of Appeal
12. Against that background, NM relied on four grounds of appeal before me:
a. Error in the Assessment of Credibility: failure to Holistically Consider Explanations for Inconsistencies and Contextual Factors
b. Error in the Evaluation of Documentary Evidence – Misapplication of Tanveer Ahmed Principles
c. Error in assessing risk on return, internal relocation, and sufficiency of protection, failure to engage with objective evidence and country guidance
d. Procedural unfairness, inadequate reasons and failure to address key submissions
13. I will address each ground below.
Ground (i): Assessment of Credibility
14. NM advanced three sub-grounds under this heading:
15. First NM argued that the Judge erred in law when assessing credibility by failing to properly consider NM’s explanations for the inconsistencies found in NM’s various accounts. NM points, in particular, to NM’s “lack of legal representation, language barriers, misunderstanding of questions, and the traumatic context of the interviews” (Grounds, 3rd para.).
16. Counsel for NM expanded on this sub-ground in oral submissions. He pointed in particular to: (i) para. 37 of the Judge’s decision, in which the Judge drew negative inferences from the fact that NM was unable to describe in his interview what equipment he worked with; (ii) para. 38, in which the Judge drew negative inferences from NM’s failure to mention in his screening interview that his father had been abducted; and (iii) para. 43, in which the Judge noted and relied on the Appellant’s statements that he only wanted to come to the United Kingdom and that he wanted to continue his education here. Counsel for NM submitted that the Judge erred in failing to consider these points in the context of para. 3 of NM’s witness statement of 30 October 2025, in which he stated that he was not legally represented when answering his interview questions, that he was unaware of the content of his asylum interviews as he did not understand English, and that the Secretary of State misunderstood some aspects of his claim/he could not understand some of the questions put.
17. I do not accept that the Judge erred as claimed by NM:
18. The Judge was plainly aware of NM’s explanations for the inconsistencies in his account. The Judge expressly stated at para. 11 of the Decision: “The Appellant clarified in his witness statement inconsistencies noted by the Respondent, attributing them to lack of legal representation, language barriers, and misunderstanding during interviews.”
19. At para. 37 of the Decision the Judge addressed both NM’s explanation for why he was unable to give an account of the equipment used and the Secretary of State’s submission that it would have been reasonable for NM to have known this information. It is plain from the context that the Judge rejected NM’s account. He was entitled to do so. In any event, even if the Judge had erred as alleged, this error would be rendered immaterial by the Judge’s unchallenged finding at para. 42 that, even if NM had been employed as claimed, “the country evidence points to the fact neither he nor his family would be targeted.”
20. As to para. 38 of the Decision, the Judge explained why he concluded that NM could have been expected to state that his father had been abducted in his interview. In my judgment the Judge’s reasons were sufficiently clear to enable the parties to understand the basis for this conclusion. The Judge was not required to make further reference to NM’s reasons for inconsistencies in his account.
21. As to para. 43 of the Decision, the Judge found that “the fact he stressed he only wanted to come to the United Kingdom and he wanted to continue his education here” weighed against NM’s credibility. The Judge had previously quoted at length from NM’s screening interview at para. 32 of the Decision, noting NM’s answer “I am here because I want to pursue my education here and go for a masters and I speak a little English and I don’t want to go to any other countries I just want to stay in the UK to get my master’s degree”. NM does not seek to correct this statement at para. 3 of his witness statement and, in any event as set out above, the Judge was plainly aware of NM’s submissions as to reasons for inconsistencies in his position. In my view the Judge was entitled to draw inferences as to credibility from this statement as he did.
22. In my judgment the Judge took NM’s explanations for the inconsistencies in his evidence into account and the Judge’s credibility findings at paras. 37, 38 and 43 were properly open to him and adequately reasoned.
23. Second NM argued, in reliance on HK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 at [8]-[10] that the Judge erred in his approach by failing to assess credibility “holistically”.
24. I do not accept that HK stands for the proposition of law cited. The paragraphs expressly relied on by NM (paras. [8]-[10]) concern matters of fact relevant to HK and have no bearing on issues in the present appeal. In any event, I consider that the Judge did approach the issue of credibility holistically and that the approach he adopted was one that was properly open to him.
25. Third NM argued that the Judge “…misapplied the structured credibility approach in KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491 (IAC), which requires consideration of sufficiency of detail, internal/external consistency, and plausibility within a framework that avoids over-reliance on minor discrepancies…” (Grounds, 4th para.).
26. KB & AH does not impose a mandatory framework for the assessment of credibility. For the reasons set out above, I consider the Judge’s approach to credibility to have been adequately reasoned and properly open to him.
27. Fourth NM argued that the Judge did not engage with his reasons why he did not claim asylum earlier than he did when applying section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004.
28. The Judge was took into account NM’s explanation as to why he did not claim asylum in countries through which he passed before arriving in the United Kingdom, expressly recording at para. 12 of his Decision: “…He also addressed the Section 8 issue, explaining that failure to claim asylum in transit countries was due to lack of knowledge and language barriers, not bad faith.” See also the Judge’s recording of the Secretary of State’s submission at para. 24 that NM’s explanation for failing to claim asylum in the countries through which he passed before entering the United Kingdom was “not considered reasonable”. The Judge then reached his conclusions on this issue at para. 43 of the Decision, finding that the fact that NM had failed to claim asylum in safe countries through which he passed adversely affected his credibility. It is clear from the decision that he preferred the Secretary of State’s submissions on this point and rejected NM’s explanation. In my view he was entitled to do so.
29. In conclusion, while the Judge’s reasoning is brief, I find that he took relevant matters into account and that his reasons are sufficient to explain the basis for his credibility findings. Ground (i) discloses no error of law and I dismiss the appeal on this ground.
Ground (ii): Evaluation of Documentary Evidence
30. NM argues that the Judge failed to properly apply the principles set out in Tanveer Ahmed v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKIAT 00439 when assessing the veracity of NM’s supporting documents. In oral submissions, Counsel for NM submitted that it was not clear why the Judge had concluded that the documents in issue did not add weight to NM’s claim.
31. I do not accept that the Judge erred in his approach to Tanveer Ahmed or that his findings on this point were inadequately reasoned.
32. At para. 5 the Judge stated in terms: “In relation to documents it is the party who produces a document to show that it is reliable. When I come to look at the evidential value of the document, I must not view it in isolation but consider it is as part of the totality of evidence placed before me (Tanveer Ahmed (2002) UKIAT 00439).” I consider that to be an accurate self-direction.
33. The Judge then proceeded to apply that principle to the facts of the case:
a. At para. 31 the Judge identified a number of documents on which NM relied. No issue was taken with these documents.
b. At para. 32 the Judge recorded answers given by NM in his screening interview as to the nature of his employment. The Judge noted at para. 33 that “the Appellant made clear in his first substantive interview he worked for an agency connected to the government and the Americans albeit he did not work for the Americans” and went to explain why NM’s answers suggested this role was fairly low level. At para. 34 the Judge recorded that NM also stated in his substantive interview that he worked in IT as well as being a controller of CCTV cameras.
c. At para. 35 the Judge explained that the documentary evidence already referred to did not support his claim that he had been employed by the Government. The Judge then noted that NM had also produced two letters which did support his claim. I pause to note that these letters do indicate that NM had a government role. A letter dated 6 October 2023 and purporting to issue from a former member of the cabinet states in terms that NM “worked as in (sic) IT Manager and Controller of CCTV operations at the central branch of the Ministry for Parliamentary Affairs [DATE]”. A second letter, dated 28 November 2022 and purporting to issue from an Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, reports that NM “worked part-time for the Ministry of Communication and IT in the Jalalabad regional office for about two years”. Having noted these documents, the Judge properly directed himself that they fell to be “considered in the round especially as the June 2023 Country of Origin Information report made it clear that the obtaining of fraudulent documents in Afghanistan is facilitated by the fact that corruption and nepotism is widespread…”
d. As I have already set out above, at para. 37 the Judge expressly noted NM’s consistent claim to have worked for the Government and the letters in support of that claim. He then weighed this against the facts that NM had produced no evidence of threatening visits to his family, that NM’s own account suggested that he had had a junior role, and that in his interview NM had been unable to describe the equipment he worked with (something which the Judge considered he would have been expected to do be able to do if he had been employed as claimed).
e. At para. 42 the Judge concluded that he did not accept that NM was employed as claimed.
34. Against that background, it seems to me that the Judge’s approach to NM’s documentary evidence was clear and properly open to him. In relation to the documents cited at para. 31 of the Decision, the Judge concluded that these did not support NM’s claim. No issue was taken with the Judge’s approach to these documents and I do not address them further. In relation to the letters cited at para. 35, the Judge properly found that these did support NM’s account, properly took into account country evidence relevant to the weight that could be placed on those documents, evaluated NM’s case in the round, and concluded that NM did not have the job he claimed to have. It is clear from reading the Decision as a whole that the Judge did not accept he could place weight on the letters and that he thought he could not do so because (i) country evidence suggested that fraudulent documents were facilitated by widespread corruption and so documentary evidence needed to be considered in the round and (ii) having carried out this exercise, the Judge considered that information contained in the documents was not consistent with the evidence as a whole. I do not accept that the Judge erred in his approach.
35. In any event, even if the Judge had erred in law as submitted, any such error was not material to the outcome of NM’s appeal. At paras. 39-41 of his Decision the Judge made reference relevant objective evidence and, at para. 42, he concluded in light of that evidence that NM would not be at risk on return even if he had been employed as claimed. I consider this finding was properly open to the Judge (and I address NM’s challenge to this point below).
36. I accordingly dismiss Ground (ii).
Ground (iii) Error in assessing risk on return, internal relocation, and sufficiency of protection, failure to engage with objective evidence and country guidance
37. NM advanced a number of sub-grounds under this heading. I address them each in turn.
38. First NM argued that the Judge erred in law by failing to properly engage with objective evidence about the Taliban’s nationwide control and targeting of former government affiliates. In his oral submissions, Counsel for NM submitted that the Judge had approached the objective evidence with a “very broad brush”, that the objective evidence did not necessarily point to there being no risk in this case. He argued that the Judge was required to, and did not, properly marry the facts of the case to the objective evidence. He relied in particular on paras. 3.3.1, 3.1.4 and 3.2.2 of the Country Policy and Information Note Afghanistan: Fear of the Taliban (August 2025) [‘the CPIN’].
39. The Judge’s primary finding was that NM was not employed as claimed (para. 42) and, as set out above, I consider the Judge was entitled to reach this view. While not stated explicitly, it follows from the logic of the Judge’s decision that he considered it to follow that NM would not be at risk on return. This follows from para. 3.1.5 of the CPIN as quoted at para. 39 of the Decision. This is a complete answer to NM’s submission.
40. As I have set out above, the Judge’s alternative finding was that, even if NM had been employed as claimed, it followed from the objective evidence that NM would not be at risk on return. In coming to this conclusion the Judge made express reference to paras. 3.1.5, 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 of the CPIN. Taken together, these suggest that NM, as a former government official, would not be at risk on return.
41. As to NM’s submissions before me, it is correct that the Judge did not refer to CPIN para. 3.1.4 – he was not required to do so and this adds no support to NM’s appeal. It is also correct that the Judge did not explicitly have regard to CPIN 3.2.2. However, it was not necessary for the Judge to make express reference to every paragraph of the CPIN that had some relevance to NM’s case. The Judge expressly addressed the amnesty CPIN 3.3.2 and noted that the Taliban “generally adhered to enabling people to return to the country” (para. 41 of the Decision). In my judgment this was sufficient to explain his reasoning.
42. If the Judge had come to the conclusion that NM or his family had, in fact, been threatened, then this would have required him to engage further with the underlying objective evidence. I was initially troubled by the fact that the Judge did not make express findings on this point. However, in my view paras. 35-38 of the Decision make it sufficiently clear that the Judge rejected NM’s claims that his family had faced threats. In those circumstances I do not accept that there was evidence that NM was of interest to the Taliban such that the Judge was required to engage further with the facts of NM’s before reaching his conclusion that the general position as set out in the objective evidence applied.
43. Before me, Counsel for NM pointed to questions 85-87 of NM’s Asylum Interview and argued that this suggested that NM was of interest to the Taliban because of the work he was doing and, as such, that the Judge was required to engage further with the objective evidence. It is not clear that this issue was expressly raised before the Judge. In any event, and as set out above, the Judge was not required to identify all of the evidence relied when reaching findings of fact. His reasons were required to be “adequate, clear, appropriately concise, and focused upon the principal controversial issues on which the outcome of the case has turned. To be adequate, the reasons for a judicial decision must explain to the parties why they have won and lost. The reasons must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the main issues in dispute”: Practice Direction from the Senior President of Tribunals: “Reasons for decisions” (4 June 2024). In my judgment the Judge’s reasons as to why he did not consider that NM would be at risk on return even if employed as claimed, based on the objective evidence as they were, satisfied these criteria.
44. Second NM argued that the Judge “speculates on internal relocation being reasonable”, ignoring evidence of ongoing interest in NM. NM relied on AS (Safety of Kabul) Afghanistan CG [2020] UKUT 00130 to support this submission.
45. The Judge did not, and given his findings was not required to, address internal relocation in his decision. It appears this sub-ground was pleaded in error. In any event, it discloses no error of law in the Decision.
46. Third NM also argued that the Judge erred in failing to consider whether there were reasons to depart from AS in light of CPINs from August 2024 going to risks to individuals with imputed political opinions linked with the former government of Afghanistan. NM relied on Roba (OLF - MB confirmed), Ethiopia CG [2022] UKUT 1 (IAC).
47. While Country Guidance may be departed from in appropriate circumstances, the Judge did not rely on AS when reaching his conclusions in the present appeal, and NM has offered no cogent reason as to why or in what manner the Judge should have considered departing from AS. The Judge did, however, rely on a CPIN from 2025 when reaching his conclusions. In my view the Judge properly had regard to then up-to-date country information when coming to his decision and this sub-ground discloses no error of law.
48. Fourth NM argued that the Judge’s application of section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 was flawed as the Judge failed to consider NM’s explanations for failing to claim asylum earlier than he did.
49. For the reasons I have set out above, it is not correct for NM to assert that the Judge failed to have regard to NM’s reasons for failing to claim asylum in the countries to which he passed before entering the United Kingdom. The Judge expressly addressed NM’s reasons for failing to claim asylum in safe third countries at para. 12. He then went on to record the Home Office’s submissions on the point at para. 24, and he set out his conclusion at para. 43. This sub-ground discloses no error of law.

Ground (iv): Procedural unfairness, inadequate reasons and failure to address key submissions
50. NM argued that the Judge’s findings were vitiated by inadequate reasons on “key submissions, such as humanitarian concerns, extrajudicial killings, and detentions or the feasibility of return as per the appellant's skeleton” (Grounds, 7th para.) In oral submissions, Counsel for NM argued that, while the Judge was plainly concerned about the lack of evidence in support from family members, this was not put to NM. Counsel for NM also submitted that the Judge had erred in finding that NM had not been directly threatened.
51. It is not clear how the examples of “key submissions” relied on by NM are said to relate to his particular case. In any event, as set out above, I consider the Judge’s reasoning and conclusions make clear what the Judge’s conclusions were and the basis on which he reached them. I do not find the Judge erred in failing to provide adequate reasons. As to the Judge’s concerns about the lack of corroborative evidence: contrary to Counsel for NM’s submissions, the point does appear to have been live at first instance as NM is recorded as giving evidence as to why his wife had not provided a witness statement (para. 26). In any event, in my judgment the Judge was entitled to weigh the absence of corroborative evidence when assessing the credibility of NM’s account. His reasoning is clear and I do not accept the Judge erred as alleged in this sub-ground.
52. Finally, NM submits that the Judge erred at para. 36 when he stated that “it seems no direct threats were ever made to this Appellant”. I read this as the Judge’s summary of NM’s case and not a finding of fact. As a summary of NM’s position, it is not correct. NM makes reference his having been directly threatened on numerous occasions in his Asylum Interview (see for example questions 67, 75, and 76) and in his witness statement of 30 October 2025 (see para. 3). Indeed, the Judge himself quotes NM as saying “and they also threatened me personally” at para. 32.
53. While it is clear the Judge erred when making this observation, I do not consider his error to have been material to the Judge’s findings. The erroneous statement was expressed tentatively (“it seems”), it is inconsistent with the rest of the judgment; and the Judge did not rely on the absence of direct threats to NM when reaching his conclusions. I note the Judge did expressly rely on the other observations made at para. 36 (namely the lack of evidence of threatening letters/visits) when weighing the various factors relevant to NM’s case at para. 37. This supports my conclusion that the Judge did not place weight on the absence of direct threats to NM when coming to his conclusions on credibility.
54. In any event, whether the Judge understood NM’s claim to be that he was threatened both directly and indirectly or only threatened indirectly had no bearing on the Judge’s central finding that NM’s claim that he was threatened was not credible. Having concluded that NM’s account of indirect threats was not credible, I can see no way in which NM’s uncorroborated assertions that he had also been directly threatened could have led the Judge to a different conclusion.
55. I accordingly dismiss this appeal on Ground (iv) and its various sub-grounds.

Notice of Decision
1. Appeal dismissed.

ANDREW DEAKIN

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 June 2026