Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000390
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/50770/2022
IA/01215/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 17th April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BARTLETT

Between

MD KAMRUL HASAN
(ANONYMITY ORDER NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Swain
For the Respondent: Ms Ahmed

Heard at Field House on 1 April 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant made an application for Indefinite leave to remain on the basis of long residence and outside the immigration rules under article 8 ECHR which was refused by the respondent in a decision dated 25 January 2022. The appellant appealed that refusal to the First-tier Tribunal. The appellant’s appeal was rejected by the First-tier Tribunal in a decision promulgated on 17 October 2025 (the “Determination”).
2. The First-tier Tribunal Judge granted permission to appeal on 30 January 2026 giving the following reason:
“Ground 2, failure to address the “Mansur” submission. The Judge did not address this in the decision despite it being pleaded in the skeleton argument. It is arguable this is a error of law.”
3. The grant of appeal did not expressly limit the grant to Ground 2 only and the Grounds of appeal included 7 grounds which are as follows:
a. Ground 1 - Misdirection on historical injustice - treating Upper Tribunal judicial review decision as binding on a statutory appeal
b. ground 2 - failing to address the distinct “Mansur” submission
c. ground 3 - failing to properly assess TOEIC related historical injustice
d. ground 4 - inadequate assessment of very significant obstacles under paragraph 276 ADE.
e. ground 5 - misapplication of section 117B considerations
f. ground 6 - contradictory and unintelligible conclusions
g. ground 7 - material unreliability from cumulative factual mistakes.
Submissions
4. The respondent submitted a rule 24 response dated 10 February 2026. Mr Swain and Ms Ahmed made oral submissions.
Decision
Ground one – Misdirection on historical injustice - treating upper tribunal judicial review decision as binding on a statutory appeal
5. Mr Swain made lengthy oral submissions on this ground. I consider that his submissions largely attempted to re-argue the case rather than establish an error of law.
6. Part of Mr Swain’s submissions for ground one were that the judge should have taken evidence from the appellant about the irrationality of the respondent's 2015 decision to refuse an application made by the appellant in 2015. Ms Ahmed objected to that on the basis that it was a new ground of appeal for which permission to appeal had not been given. To the extent that that is a new ground of appeal, I refuse permission for that to form part of this appeal. The appellant has had ample time to put his case and comply with directions. There was no good reason given as to why this was not included save to say that it was part of ground 1.
7. Mr Swain’s submissions also included an argument that there was such delay in the judicial review proceedings that this amounted to historic injustice. Delay has not been relied on in the grounds of appeal and no permission has been sought for this to be added as a ground of appeal. No good reason has been given for any delay in this forming the grounds of appeal. Therefore, I do not accept that this is part of the grounds of appeal and I do not give permission for it to form part of the grounds of appeal.
8. The main thrust of Mr Swain’s submissions were that the Judge fundamentally misdirected herself in the treatment of UTJ Owen’s Determination in a judicial review case dated 8 July 2022 (the “UT Determination”) and particularly the statement at [43] “The accepted fact is that UTJ Owens decision remains good law as permission to appeal was refused. I satisfied I am bound by UTJ Owens decision given it relates to this appellant and it is a decision which addresses material issues sought to be argued before this Tribunal in the context of historical injustice. In finding the 07 September 2015 validity decision was not unlawful, UTJ Owens specifically addressed the respondent’s duties and her residual discretion in exercising her immigration functions. She specifically addressed the argument that the respondent had not considered the appellants explanation of having lost his passport and found that:..”
9. In stating the above, Mr Swain submitted, the judge failed to appreciate the jurisdictional differences between judicial review proceedings and statutory appeals. Mr Swain also submitted that:
a. the judicial review dealt with whether the 2015 rejection was public law unlawful, it did not and could not determine if it was a wrongful operation of immigration functions that qualified the weight of the public interest in removal under Article 8 ECHR;
b. the judge elided the consideration of historical injustice in the sense of wrongful operation of immigration functions with the existence of judicial review type unlawfulness;
c. that [44] of the Determination did not save the error of treating the UT Determination as determinative. [44] sets out:

“In the alternative, even if I am not bound by this decision, I am satisfied I can take it into account as it is evidence before this Tribunal. I am also satisfied the reasons given by UTJ Owen are findings, I can attach significant weight to. There is no evidence before me, that the facts as set out in this decision are challenged. Accordingly, I am satisfied that there has not been a wrongful operation of immigration function by the respondent in consideration of this appellants 07 September 2015 application.”
10. Mr Swain made much of the fact that the UT Determination was made in the context of judicial review proceedings and that these were very different to the statutory appeal in front of the First-tier Tribunal.
11. At [36] the Judge addresses the historic injustice argument as established in Patel (Historic Injustice; NIAA Part 5A) [2020] UKUT 00351 (IAC).
12. At [37] the judge identifies that
“The weight to be given to this public interest is not fixed and, as Patel clarifies, may, in some instances, be reduced where an appellant has:
“suffered as a result of the wrongful operation (or non-operation) by the Secretary of State of her immigration functions”.
13. At [39] The judge sets out that she has carefully considered Patel and taken into account Ahmed (historical injustice explained) [2023] UKUT 00165 (IAC) and goes on to set out the headnote.
14. Ms Ahmed relied on Berdica [2022] UKUT 00276 headnote 2. I find that this is of limited assistance as it does not deal directly with the point in this case which is whether a decision of the Upper Tribunal in judicial review proceedings is binding on the First-tier Tribunal in cases involving the same parties.
15. The judge identifies at [42]:
“UTJ Owens decision is based on the same factual matrix and in essence the appellant is seeking to re-argue the points before me in the context of historical injustice. I accept I have to make findings of fact and UTJ Owens was considering permission for a Judicial review on public law grounds. However, this does not detract from the facts that she had before her which are materially the same. I note in Ahmed, the panel at paragraph 44 refer to Marepally [2022] EWCA Civ 85 where it was argued he suffered historical injustice…”
16. I find that the appellant’s submissions are, in part, based on a misreading of the Determination. Paragraph 42 expressly sets out that the judge is aware that she must make findings of facts. The judge repeatedly sets out that the UT Determination was made in the context of judicial review proceedings and I find that the submission that she elided the judicial review type decision with historical injustice/wrongful operation of immigration functions is not made out.
17. I do not consider that the Judge was strictly bound by UTJ Owen’s decision. I consider that as a result of [44] the Judge did not make an error of law. The judge was entitled to take into account that there was a decision by the Upper Tribunal in judicial review proceedings that the respondent's decision in 2015 was not Wednesbury unreasonable, unlawful or irrational. The judge was entitled to take into account the UT Determination in its entirety including the following sections which were (amongst others) quoted in the Determination:
“(16) It cannot be argued on the facts of this case that the respondent failed to exercise her residual discretion to delay the application for a reasonable period in order for the applicant to provide the passport. The applicant had already had four months to provide the document, had indicated that he had chosen to retain the original passport when he first made the application and was given a further opportunity to submit it with a warning of what would happen if the document was not submitted. The response to the request for further information gave a brief, unsubstantiated and vague estimation of when the document would be provided.
(17) It is manifest from the internal case note that the decision maker considered the applicant’s request (because there is explicit reference to it) and that she took the representations into account when making the decision to reject the application as invalid. The decision note is short but is unarguably sufficient to demonstrate that the respondent took into account the matters put to her. The respondent unarguably considered exercising discretion and decided not to. A decision maker does not need to set out every stage of their reasoning.
(18) During the hearing Mr Biggs also submitted that alternatively, even if the respondent did fail to exercise her residual discretion, s16(3C) to (3E) of the Tribunal, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 also apply because if the conduct complained of had not occurred, it is highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different.
(19) Although not raised in the written renewed summary grounds of defence, Mr Biggs was entitled to raise this issue at the hearing, and I have a statutory power in any event to consider issue on my own initiative when considering whether to grant permission. I clarify here that I considered this issue because it was raised by Mr Biggs.
(20) There had already been a four-month delay in submitting the original passport which was held by the applicant when he made his original application. He was clearly aware of the requirement to submit the original document with the application and chose not to submit it for reasons entirely within his own control. When he was asked to submit the document, he stated that he had lost it although he did not explain when or in what circumstances. His representations were very vague and did not explain why it was not possible to obtain an emergency replacement passport nor provide a precise timescale for when the document would be provided. There was nothing from the Bangladeshi embassy to explain why it would take so long. The information and evidence before the decision maker was very limited. I am satisfied that on these facts it would have been highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different because it is highly likely that the respondent would not have exercised discretion in favour of the applicant. I emphasise again that the applicant did not request the respondent to exercise her discretion for the application to be treated as valid without the original passport being submitted.
(21) The respondent’s decision not to delay consideration of the application and to treat the application as invalid because of the lack of an original document is unarguably reasonable, rational and lawful and the applicant’s grounds are not made out.”
18. The UT Determination was a fact that the Tribunal correctly took into account and there was no evidence today that the Judge did not consider evidence or arguments raised before her in giving the appropriate weight to the UT Determination. At [44] she sets out “I am also satisfied the reasons given by UTJ Owen are findings, I can attach significant weight to. There is no evidence before me, that the facts as set out in this decision are challenged. Accordingly, I am satisfied that there has not been a wrongful operation of immigration function by the respondent in consideration of this appellants 07 September 2015 application.”
19. Mr Swain referred to the appellant’s witness statement. I have considered this but it provides little to address the fundamental issue relating to the fact that the appellant did not present his passport to the respondent despite being required and requested to and that he did not ask for an exercise of discretion. The witness statement is vague, skirts the relevant issues and could not form the basis for undermining the UT Determination. In light of the strong evidence of the UT Determination, the judge inevitably and correctly found that the respondent did not exercise her functions in relation to immigration matters wrongfully and therefore there could be no historic injustice on that basis.
20. I find that there is no error of law.
Ground 2 – Mansur
21. The wording of the grant of permission specifically set out that the Determination does not reference Mansur.
22. The Mansur point is that the Determination did not address the point in the skeleton that the failings of the appellant’s immigration advisors should reduce the weight attached to the public interest in his removal.
23. The respondent’s submissions were that this was not a material error by the judge. It overlaps sufficiently with the judge’s findings on historic injustice such that those findings can be imported to the Mansur point. Further, the Mansur point is only one factor in the proportionality assessment and the facts of this case are such that the case did not fall within one of those rare cases identified in Ahmed where an adviser's behaviour would reduce the public interest in removal.
24. At [39] the judge sets out the following from the headnote of Ahmed (historical injustice explained) [2023] UKUT 00165 (IAC):
“1. As is clear from the decision in Patel (historic injustice; NIAA Part 5A) [2020] UKUT 351(IAC), the phrase “historical injustice” does not connote some specific separate or freestanding legal doctrine but is rather simply a means of describing where, in some specific circumstances, the events of the past in relation to a particular individual’s immigration history may need to be taken into account in weighing the public interest when striking the proportionality balance in an Article 8 case. In relation to the striking of the proportionality balance in cases of this kind we make the following general observations:
a. If an appellant is unable to establish that there has been a wrongful operation by the respondent of her immigration functions there will not have been any historical injustice, as that term is used in Patel, justifying a reduction in the weight given to the public interest identified in section 117B(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
Although the possibility cannot be ruled out, an action (or omission) by the respondent falling short of a public law error is unlikely to constitute a wrongful operation by the respondent of her immigration functions.
b. Where the respondent makes a decision that is in accordance with case law that is subsequently overturned there will not have been a wrongful operation by the respondent of her immigration functions if the decision is consistent with the case law at the time the decision was made.
c. In order to establish that there has been a historical injustice, it is not sufficient to identify a wrongful operation by the respondent of her immigration functions. An appellant must also show that he or she suffered as a result. An appellant will not have suffered as a result of wrongly being denied a right of appeal if he or she is unable to establish that there would have been an arguable prospect of succeeding in the appeal.
d. Where, absent good reason, an appellant could have challenged a public law error earlier or could have taken, but did not take, steps to mitigate the claimed prejudice, this will need to be taken into account when considering whether, and if so to what extent, the weight attached to public interest in the maintenance of effective immigration controls should be reduced. Blaming a legal advisor will not normally assist an appellant. See Mansur (immigration adviser's failings: Article 8) Bangladesh [2018] UKUT 274 (IAC).”
25. The head note of Mansur (immigration adviser's failings: Article 8) Bangladesh [2018] UKUT 274 (IAC) sets out:
“(1) Poor professional immigration advice or other services given to P cannot give P a stronger form of protected private or family life than P would otherwise have.
(2) The correct way of approaching the matter is to ask whether the poor advice etc that P has received constitutes a reason to qualify the weight to be placed on the public interest in maintaining firm and effective immigration control.
(3) It will be only in a rare case that an adviser's failings will constitute such a reason. The weight that would otherwise need to be given to that interest is not to be reduced just because there happen to be immigration advisers who offer poor advice and other services. Consequently, a person who takes such advice will normally have to live with the consequences.
(4) A blatant failure by an immigration adviser to follow P's instructions, as found by the relevant professional regulator, which led directly to P's application for leave being invalid when it would otherwise have been likely to have been granted, can, however, amount to such a rare case.”
26. The Judge did not reference that point and this is a material error of law.
Ground 3 - failing to properly assess TOEIC related historical injustice
27. Mr Swain made much of the appellant having suffered from historic injustice. The Judge found that the appellant did not suffer historic injustice. The historic injustice claim relies on two matters:
a. the respondent wrongfully exercised her functions in relation to immigration matters (in relation to the 2015 application) and
b. “in having a policy where those associated with the ETS/TOEIC test were prevented from securing any further CAS’s, thereby rendering this appellant as a victim of historical injustice”
28. I have dealt with the first matter above and for completeness I shall address the second. The Judge sets out the submission at [45]
“Mr Arafin also submitted the appellant had been a victim of historical injustice due the adverse impact of the ETS/TOEIC test scandal and the BBC Panorama investigation. This systemic issue it is argued prevented him from obtaining a Confirmation of Acceptance for Studies (CAS) and he found himself associated with the scandal, thereby unable to secure a CAS from other educational institutions due to the stigma.”
29. The historic injustice the appellant’s claims he suffered is that as a result of widespread TOEIC fraud the respondent “instructed/pressured academic institutions not to issue CAS’ to those who had undertaken the TOEIC”. These facts are very far from the historic injustice cases of Patel and Ahmed cited above. The judge also found that the appellant could not establish that the respondent had acted in that way.
30. At [47] the Judge makes clear findings on the evidence, that I find disclose no error and no error in relation to those findings has been argued in front of me. These findings include [47]:
“Thus, on the basis of his immigration history he was not seeking to remain in the UK for the purposes of pursing his education but moreover on grounds of family/private life. The appellant states he wanted to pursue further education and in support relies upon an application made to Ulster University. I have not been provided with evidence this was refused due to the respondent’s claimed policy or the inability to be given a CAS due to the TOEIC issue. At paragraph 10, the appellant states he tried to get into another education provider with professional assistance, yet he does not provide any details of what those efforts were or who his professional advisors were. I do not accept the appellant made such efforts and was refused as this is not established evidentially. Further, I find the fact that he lodged an application under Appendix FM undermines his claim that the Secretary of state threats/instruction were a wrongful operation of an immigration function, as the appellant did not apply on this basis within his 07 September 2015 application. Accordingly, I do not find there was historical injustice as claimed.”
31. Mr Swain also submits that the remedy in para 120 of Ahsan v SSHD EWCA Civ [2017] 2009 should have been applied to the appellant and that failure to apply that remedy amounts to historic injustice.
32. Ahsan v SSHD at [120] sets out:
“The starting-point is that it seems to me clear that if on a human rights appeal an appellant were found not to have cheated, which inevitably means that the section 10 decision had been wrong, the Secretary of State would be obliged to deal with him or her thereafter so far as possible as if that error had not been made, i.e. as if their leave to remain had not been invalidated. In a straightforward case, for example, she could and should make a fresh grant of leave to remain equivalent to that which had been invalidated. She could also, and other things being equal should, exercise any relevant future discretion, if necessary “outside the Rules”, on the basis that the appellant had in fact had leave to remain in the relevant period notwithstanding that formally that leave remained invalidated…”
33. The fundamental difficulty with the appellant’s submission is this regard is that the appellant has not claimed that he was an individual whose leave was cancelled on the basis he had cheated on a TOEIC test and he was found not to have cheated. These were the individuals with which Ahsan was involved as [3] makes clear: “All four Appellants are the subject of decisions taken by the Secretary of State on the basis (or, in one case, partly on the basis) that they had cheated in TOEIC tests.”
34. The Determination refers to all the relevant authorities, quotes from them and applies them. The Judge applied her mind to all relevant authorities and issues. As set out above, the appellant does not fall within the category of persons who would fall within para 120 of Ahsan. This submission is without merit. There is no error of law.
Ground 4 - inadequate assessment of very significant obstacles under paragraph 276 ADE
35. This ground argues that the Judge failed to consider the cumulative effect of the appellant's circumstances and submits the Judge erred in referring to the appellant’s connections with the Bangladeshi diaspora.
36. This ground does not disclose an error of law, the Judge took into account relevant facts and made a decision that was open to her.
Ground 5 - misapplication of section 117B considerations
37. This ground does not benefit from any merit. It is well established that the factors the Judge identified as neutral are neutral, Rhuppiah [2018] UKSC 58 at [57], which states:
“The subsections do not say that it is in the public interest that those who are able to speak English and are financially independent should remain in the UK. They say only that it is in the public interest that those who seek to remain in the UK should speak English and be financially independent… claimants may wish to highlight their ability to speak English and/or their financial independence; but the legitimate deployment of such factors in that context is to be contrasted with the erroneous further submission that the subsections propel a conclusion that, where those factors exist, there is a public interest in favour of the claims...”
Grounds 6 and 7
38. I have taken grounds six and seven together as I consider that they are interlinked. In essence the grounds refer to various typographical errors in the judgement and assert that these make the judgement unsafe. I consider that the typographical errors are obvious in the error that they make and that the judgement can be read correctly without difficulty. I do not consider that the errors are anything more than typographical and they do not disclose an error of law.
39. Ground six also mentions that the judge referred to family life. Article 8 ECHR encompasses family and private life and I do not consider that a reference to family life given the context of the Determination as a whole discloses an error of law.
40. Ground six and seven do not disclose an error of law.
Re-making
41. As I have found a material error of law, I have considered what is the appropriate course of action.
42. At the hearing Ms Ahmed submitted that I could remake the decision relying on the finding of the Judge in the Determination and those particularly relating to the historic injustice issues. Mr Swain did not agree with that suggestion and considered that the case would need to be remitted or reheard because of the flawed reasoning he said permeated the Determination.
43. I have decided to preserve the Determination’s findings of fact and all the decision except for the article 8 balancing exercise and the ultimate conclusion that the appellant’s appeal failed on article 8 ECHR outside the immigration rules. I consider that these preserved findings of fact and the uncontested evidence about the appellant’s previous advisors are sufficient for me to decide the case on the papers as the respondent requested me to. The respondent did not contest the claimant’s evidence about his advisors and the standard Upper Tribunal directions set out that the expectation is that the appeal will be remade in the Upper Tribunal on the day on this hearing. In these circumstances, I consider that it is appropriate for me to remake the decision.
44. The decision of Upper Tribunal lawyer Nadia Manzoor, dated 6 June 2023, sets out the failings of the appellant’s previous immigration advisors. This sets out:
“[2] At the time that JR was filed, in 2015, the Applicant had instructed Immigration4u Solicitors. The Applicant asserts that he was told by Immigration4u Solicitors that they were acting on his behalf and that all correspondence would also be sent to them and accordingly they would deal with any correspondence sent by the Tribunal. However it has since transpired that Immigration4u Solicitors in fact lodged the application in the applicant’s name and not as his acting representative. The directors of the firm have since been imprisoned for 31 years for filing fraudulent immigration claims.
[3] The proceedings were struck out on 26 January 2016 the non-compliance with Rule 28A. The history on CMS (Tribunal database) is incomplete and no documents have been uploaded relating to the strike out. The information relating to the strike out has been provided by the new representative, Zyba Law, who were instructed in 2020, following advice received by OSIC that Immigration4u Solicitors had been submitting fraudulent immigration claims. A UTIAC 16 form was filed by them and is on record.”
45. Ms Manzoor made a decision to re-instate the Upper Tribunal proceedings and those proceedings eventually led to the UT Determination which rejected the appellant’s claim that the respondent had treated his claim unlawfully.
46. The question is does this mean that the public interest in his removal is reduced as per Mansur.
47. I have quoted from Mansur extensively above. This sets out the limited circumstances in which an appellant can benefit from a reduction in the public interest in his removal as a result of poor immigration advice.
48. Mr Swain relied on the “nightmare” the appellant had suffered at the hands of his previous advisors. However, the failings of his previous advisors are focused on the judicial review. These were Mr Swain’s submissions he did not allege that Immigration4u Solicitors had acted against instructions or without the Appellant’s instructions in the 2015 application. It cannot be established that the advisors acted contrary to his instructions in making the 2015 application nor in their response to the Home Office’s request for the passport, the appellant does not claim this.
49. The appellant’s witness statement dated 12 February 2020 stated:
“[5] I confirm that a few years ago I had engaged the services of immigration advisers named Immigration4U Solicitors although it may well be that they were directly linked with a company called Immigration Solutions Limited also. I had instructed them to assist me with submitting an application for further leave to remain. I believe that their name was Immigration4U as this is the name on the door of the office when I visited, this was the name that was used routinely and also the name that he my apron when I was referred to the company by someone I knew and also the name of the company with whom I recall signing a letter of authority with stop the specific representative assisting the most part was a Mr Tamij Uddin who I last spoke to up until around last year when I was advised that a colleague named Kamal would be taking over from him as he would be away for a little while.
[6] I confirm that Immigration4U had earlier assisted me with submitting an application to the Home Office for further leave to remain. At the time, my passport had been lost and this had been fully explained to my representatives who advised me that they would take appropriate steps to explain this. However, on 26 August 2015, the Home Office wrote to my legal representatives advising that them [sic] that had until 9 September 2015, to provide my passport or forward an acceptable reason as to why the passport cannot be provided. Through a letter dated 4 September 2015, my legal representatives confirmed that the passport could not be provided for reasons beyond my control as it had been lost and they enclosed a letter from the Metropolitan police confirming that the loss had been reported. This letter was sent by recorded post and been received by the Home Office on 7 September 2015, two days prior to the respondent’s deadline to be provided with the same. The letter had gone out in the name of Immigration Solutions Limited which I believed was perhaps the main company name for Immigration4U or just another name that they were known as. At the time, I did not give it much thought and assumed they were the same organisation and even to this day, I am still not clear if they were or if they were two different companies.
[7] Following my legal representatives sending the letter to the Home Office, by letter dated 7 September 2015, the Home Office advised me through my legal representative that my application was invalid due to not complying with the deadline set out in their letter dated 26 August 2015 despite their confirmed deadline having been 9 September 2015. Irrespective of this and equally importantly, I had met the Home Office’s request as confirmed in a letter dated 26 August 2015 by confirming the loss of passport and also evidence that it had been reported as lost to the police. In the absence of a passport, this is the evidence that would be deemed to be acceptable by the Home Office for a lack of passport. Therefore, the refusal seemed to be a very unfair decision bearing in mind that the requirement had been complied with and the Home Office had also drafted the letter and forwarded it to the applicant two whole days prior to the actual deadline of 9 September 2015. Having discussed this with my legal representatives, I was advised to challenge the matter few judicial review proceedings as there was no right of appeal…”
50. The appellant’s witness statement dated 10 September 2024 set out the poor advice/conduct of his previous advisor’s he relies on:
“[12] At the time the JR was filed in 2015, I had instructed Immigration4U Solicitors to represent me. I was assured by Immigration4U that they were acting on my behalf and that all correspondence, including from the Tribunal would be sent directly to them for action. However, I later discovered that Immigration4U had filed the JR application in my name, not as my acting representative. The directors of Immigration4U were subsequently imprisoned for 31 years for submitting fraudulent immigration claims, leaving me in a precarious legal position.”
51. [14] of that statement provides some more information:
“I respectfully submit that my circumstances, as a victim of fraudulent and negligent immigration advice, should be considered in light of the established case law on this matter. My situation is similar in that I was also a victim of poor and fraudulent advice from Immigration4U, who failed to act in my best interests and misled me into believing they were pursuing my case when, in fact, they were involved in a fraudulent scheme. As a result of their actions, I have faced prolonged legal battles and uncertainty about my immigration status, despite my continuous efforts to comply with the law and secure lawful residence in the UK. The fraudulent conduct of my legal advisers is not something to which I should be held accountable, as it was entirely outside my control, and I took prompt action to rectify the situation by instructing new legal representatives as soon as I became aware of the misconduct.”
52. I find that the appellant has not been able to identify that he falls within a “rare case” which should qualify the public interest in removal. He has identified issues with the JR which was ultimately re-instated and then decided against him albeit with some delay. The complaints about the 2015 application are about the Home Office decision to refuse it, not that the advisor’s made an application that he did not request or an application on a false basis or contrary to his instructions.
53. I make the following findings in relation to the balancing exercise in the article 8 ECHR proportionality assessment:
54. Factors in favour of the appellants removal include:
a. The public interest in the maintenance of effective immigration controls (see
section 117B(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002);
b. Little weight should be given to private life established at a time when a person’s
immigration status is unlawful or precarious (section 117B(4)(a), (5)). The time the appellant has spent without leave equates to almost 10 years and 5 months, all of this time is unlawful;
c. The appellant does not have a relationship with a qualifying partner or child (Section
117B (4) (b) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002;
d. The appellant is unable to meet the requirements of the immigration rules;
e. The appellant retains social ties to Bangladesh, he has family there and he has a Masters degree which will help him obtain work in Bangladesh. He will be able to re-integrate.
55. Neutral factors include:
a. The appellant has been financially independent whilst in the United Kingdom
(Section 117B (3) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002).
b. The appellant has never accessed any public funds during his residence in the
UK and so has not been a burden on taxpayers (see section 117B(2) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002);
56. Factors mitigating against the appellant’s removal include:
a. The appellant has 5 years and 4 months lawful leave;
b. The appellant has no criminal convictions;
57. The appellant’s case is weak. He has remained in the United Kingdom for many years without leave and knowing he does not have leave. He has limited ties to the United Kingdom and retains ties to Bangladesh. The few factors in the appellant’s favour do not outweigh the significant factors in favour of his removal.
58. The appellant’s claim under article 8 ECHR fails.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First tier tribunal dated contained a material error of law. I remake the decision and dismiss the appellant’s claim under article 8 ECHR.

Judge Bartlett

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10 April 2026