Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000393
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56851/2024
LP/05842/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 5 June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HARRIS

Between

RU
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Mukuerjee of Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Walker, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 1 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. He appeals with permission against the decision dated 30 July 2025 of First-tier Tribunal Judge O’Garro (“the FTTJ”) to dismiss his appeal on protection and human rights grounds.
2. The basis of the appellant’s claim is that he is a member of the Bangladeshi National Party who is at real risk in Bangladesh from members of the rival Awami League for the reason of political opinion.
3. The respondent has disputed that the appellant is credible in his claim and is at risk as claimed.
4. The FFTJ accepted that the appellant was credible about his involvement in the BNP, about his activities in the UK coming to the adverse attention of Awami League supporters and activists in Bangladesh, and that when the appellant made his asylum claim he had a fear of persecution in Bangladesh as a result of being a BNP member. However, the FTTJ went on to find that the appellant was not currently at real risk because of the political changes that have taken place in Bangladesh.
The Grounds of Appeal
5. In summary, the appellant has been given permission on these grounds:
(i) Ground 1: the FTTJ has given in adequate consideration of risk from non-state actors post the regime change
(ii) Ground 2: the FTTJ erred in finding the appellant had provided no evidence of a warrant for his arrest said to still exist against him
(iii) Ground 3: the FTTJ has failed to assess state protection lawfully
(iv) Ground 4: the FTTJ has failed to consider evidence about the chief of the Army being a loyal supporter and close relative of Sheikh Hasina
Is there a material error of law requiring me to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal?
6. In submissions Mr Mukuerjee for the appellant relied simply on what was advanced in the grounds of appeal for Grounds 1, 3, and 4. It was upon Ground 2 that he focussed before me. For that reason I shall start with my consideration of that Ground.
Ground 2
7. The respondent accepts that the FTTJ does err in her decision at paragraph 63 about the appellant producing no evidence of the claimed arrest warrant. This is because a copy of the warrant was included in the appellant’s subjective consolidated bundle.
8. At dispute is whether this error is a material one.
9. In essence, the respondent’s argument is that, notwithstanding the error about the warrant, the FTTJ made a proper and comprehensive assessment of the background evidence regarding the changes that have occurred in Bangladesh since the fall of the Awami League government to sustain a finding that, even with the warrant still existing, the appellant was not at real risk.
10. In the submissions before me, Mr Mukuerjee relied on what was said by the Bangladeshi advocate Mr Mominuzzaman that a consequence of the warrant still existing was that the appellant would “most likely” be subject to immediate arrest upon arrival and face detention in conditions amounting to inhumane and degrading treatment as courts are generally reluctant to grant bail to those who have previously absconded.
11. In her decision at paragraph 62 the FTTJ find that as Mr Mominuzzaman is not a country expert, therefore his views on the country situation in Bangladesh must be given limited weight.
12. Mr Mukuerjee was careful to acknowledge that Mr Mominuzzaman was not a country expert (and indeed was never claimed to be). Nevertheless, Mr Mukuerjee submitted the advocate was familiar with legal process and procedure in Bangladesh allowing for weight to be given to what he says about the risks faced by the appellant.
13. I note that it has always been the appellant’s case that the case brought against him is false.
14. I observe that at paragraphs 64 to 66 of the decision the FTTJ did effectively assess the appellant’s case on the alternative of there being the warrant for his arrest. I consider she makes findings that were open to her to make on the evidence before her about:
• the significance of the false case being in the hands of the court not the police: see paragraph 64 of the decision. At paragraph 58 of the decision the FTTJ has already noted the evidence of there no longer being the level of politicisation and pressure within the Bangladeshi judiciary which had previously existed.
• the lack of evidence that even when the Awami League were in power, political dissidents were arrested on return at the airport with this being even less likely now: see paragraph 64 of the decision.
• even if the appellant were arrested, there being no reason to suppose he would not be bailed or would suffer serious harm while in any interim detention, with it being speculation on the part of Mr Mominuzzaman that the appellant would be detained at Sunamganj District Jail in the poor conditions described: see paragraph 65 of the decision.
• even under the Awami League regime, many false cases against opposition activists were dismissed by the courts as being without legal merit; a fortiori there being no reason this would not be the outcome for the appellant now the Awami League regime has fallen: see paragraph 66 of decision.
15. I am satisfied it was open to the FTTJ to limit, as she did, the weight she attached to the evidence of Mr Mominuzzaman. Even allowing that the advocate may have first hand experience of the operation of the Bangladeshi legal system, he does not engage in his evidence with what was before the FTTJ in the country background information about the effect of the political changes in Bangladesh, particularly in the circumstances of a criminal case that is false and initiated for political reasons under the previous regime. In particular, the assertions made by the advocate in paragraph 6 of his letter about the consequences for the appellant do not explain why these consequences could still occur despite the significant political developments in Bangladesh noted by the FTTJ.
16. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied the error of the FTTJ regarding the existence of the warrant is a material one. Ground 2 is not made out.
Grounds 1, 3 and 4
17. I turn now to the grounds that were not focussed upon by Mr Mukuerjee in his submissions.
18. Ground 1 contends that the FTTJ has not given proper consideration, applying the lower standard of proof for future risk, to various pieces of background evidence concerning Awami League opponents still having the ability or influence to cause the appellant serious harm.
19. I am not satisfied ground 1 is made out. It can be noted that the grounds of appeal make no specific challenge to how the FTTJ assessed the evidence from the country expert relied upon by the appellant which advanced the opinion that the appellant might still be at real risk. The material cited by the appellant in ground 1 is raised to support the same point. I am satisfied that the FTTJ clearly had this issue in mind when assessing the appellant’s case and I consider it was open to her on the evidence in this appeal to prefer the evidence she found indicating that the appellant would no longer be at real risk on return to Bangladesh. The conclusion of the FTTJ was justified and without error.
20. For similar reasons I am not satisfied that ground 3 is made out. Sufficiency of protection as an issue arises, of course, only if the appellant is at real risk of being targeted by Awami League members but, in any event, I consider the FTTJ makes a proper and comprehensive assessment of the country background evidence that addresses the matters raised in ground 3 and which takes into account that the actors of persecution whom the appellant claims to fear are the Awami League, who are said to still have power and influence in Bangladeshi including over the Bangladesh police. There is no material error of law here.
21. Ground 4 is a narrow ground concerning one piece of evidence that the chief of the army is a loyal supporter and close relative of Sheikh Hasina of the Awami League. On the material that was put before this FTTJ there was a lack of evidence that since the fall of the Awami League regime any relationship or former loyalty which the chief of the army has had to Sheikh Hasina or the Awami League has significantly prevented the developments identified by the FTTJ as having taken place in Bangladesh in terms of the waning of Awami League power and influence. There is no material error of law here. Ground 4 is not made out.
Conclusion
22. The appellant does not succeed in this appeal.

Notice of Decision
There is no material error of law in the decision dated 30 July 2025 by First-tier Tribunal Judge O’Garro requiring the decision be set aside and remade. The appeal of the appellant is dismissed.

M Harris

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19 May 2026