Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000399
First-tier Tribunal No: EU/52761/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 6 August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DOYLE

Between

Mrs MERCY AGHEDO
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr K Forrest, counsel, instructed Norman Lawson & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms E Blackburn, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Melville Street, Edinburgh, on 22 July 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal by the Appellant against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Prudham, dated 14/09/2025, which dismissed the Appellant’s appeal.
Background
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Nigeria. On 27/12/2023 the appellant applied for a Family Permit under the EU Settlement Scheme as the family member of her son, a Spanish citizen who lives in Motherwell. On 18/3/2024 the respondent refused the application.
The Judge’s Decision
3. The Appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. On 14/09/2025 First-tier Tribunal Judge Prudham (“the Judge”) dismissed the Appellant’s appeal.
4. The Appellant lodged grounds of appeal, and, on 30/01/2026, First-tier Tribunal Judge Adio granted permission to appeal. He said
1. The Applicant seeks permission to appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Prudham) who in a decision promulgated on 14th September 2025 dismissed the Applicant’s appeal in respect of the residence scheme Immigration Rules.
2. The grounds for permission to appeal argue as follows. It is argued that the judge in Ground 1, misinterpreted the bank evidence. Ground 2, procedural unfairness re sibling support. Ground 3, incorrect approach to community transfers. Ground 4, misapplication of dependency test. Ground 5, exclusion and treatment of evidence.
3. Ground 5 does raise any arguable error of law. The judge noted that the video evidence was not provided before the hearing. Although the documents had been provided, the video had not been provided before the hearing and there was no advanced notification of this request. The judge also noted that photographs had already been provided regarding the video.
4. With regards to ground 1, it is arguable that the judge had misinterpreted the bank evidence by referring to ‘’INT PD’’ as meaning a regular payment for pension rather than interest paid. This would have affected the judge’s overall findings as to whether the Applicant was dependent on her own income, namely pension.
5. Ground 2 refers to deposits made from individuals bearing the same surname as the Applicant and Sponsor. It is arguable that this issue should have been put to the Sponsor. It is also arguable in view of the error identified in ground 1. It also contradicted the oral evidence that only the Sponsor provided the Applicant with support and therefore the matter should have been put to the Sponsor. Ground 3 raises an arguable error of law as the judge identified the transactions which matched and therefore there is a possibility that there is a misinterpretation of the transfers in the bank statement bearing in mind such mistake had been made already with regards to the pension, which it is argued that the Appellant never received.
6. Ground 4 raises an arguable error of law as the judge has already made a finding concerning the Applicant receiving income or pension which is argued as not being in existence.
7. Overall it is arguable that the judge has misinterpreted the evidence of the Sponsor and that would have led the judge to a wrong conclusion in this matter. Permission to appeal is granted as set out above.
The Hearing
5. For the appellant, Mr Forrest moved the grounds of appeal. He adopted the terms of the rule 25 response. Taking the 1st and 3rd grounds of appeal together, Mr Forrest took me to [16] of the decision. There, he said, the Judge misinterpreted evidence contained in bank statements. The Judge thought that certain entries were income for the appellant (as either a salary or a pension) when in fact it was bank interest. Mr Forrest said that the Judge's error of fact is a material error of law.
6. Mr Forrest then it took me to [17] of the decision where he told me that the Judge had misinterpreted another sequence of bank statements, believing community fund transfers were a source of income for the appellant. Relying on the third ground of appeal, Mr Forrest said that at [17] the Judge had reversed the burden of proof.
7. Mr Forrest moved the second ground of appeal and told me that at [18] the Judge found that the appellant received money from each of her children, but that was not a matter taken by the respondent and it was not a matter put to any of the appellant's witnesses. Instead, the Judge had analysed the bank statements, lifted the names of payees, and presumed that they were family members.
8. Mr Forrest said that the 4th ground of appeal goes to the heart of this case. The central issue in this case is dependency for essential living needs. At [21] of the decision the Judge recites the correct test, but in the preceding paragraph (Mr Forrest said) the Judge had misdirected himself and said that only an appellant with no income whatsoever could succeed.
9. Mr Forrest insists the errors are material errors of law. He urged me to set the decision aside.
10. For the respondent, Ms Blackburn resisted the appeal. Miss Blackburn produced the record of proceedings before the First-tier Tribunal. Ms Blackburn relied on the respondent’s rule 24 note and said that the grounds of appeal identify an error of law, but that error of law is not material. Ms Blackburn told me that the Judge carried out a holistic assessment of each strand of evidence and then reached conclusions well within the range of reasonable conclusions available. Ms Blackburn asked me to dismiss the appeal and allow the decision to stand.
Analysis
11. The fourth ground of appeal proceeds on a misinterpretation of what the Judge said at [20] of the decision. There, the Judge did not say that only an appellant with no income whatsoever can succeed. What the Judge said was
I found that the sponsor gave evidence in which he sought to portray the appellant as having no income whatsoever, which I find not to be the case. The sponsor also sought to portray the appellant as living in a small town with very limited access to facilities, when in fact she lives in Benin City, the capital of Edo State. Looked at in the round, I attached little weight to the sponsor’s evidence.
12. At [20] of the decision the Judge is not rehearsing the legal test of dependency for essential needs. At [20] of the decision the Judge is explaining why he found the sponsor to be an unreliable witness. As the appellant accepts, it is at [21] of the decision that the Judge correctly sets out the legal test.
13. The second ground of appeal is directed at [18] of the decision. There, the Judge tries to reconcile bank statements from July 2023 to January 2024. The Judge has not taken a determinative point which has not been put to parties for comment. All the Judge does is analyse the documentary evidence relied on by the appellant.
14. The bank statements were not produced so that they could be ignored. The bank statements were part of the evidence that the appellant and sponsor offered. The Judge was correct to read them and draw conclusions from the contents of the documents. The Judge's conclusion that the appellant has more than one source of income is drawn from an analysis of the Union Bank statements. His conclusion is one which is well within the range of reasonable conclusions available to the Judge.
15. The first and third grounds of appeal focus on [16] and [17] of the decision and identify an error of law. At the start of the hearing, before Mr Forrest’s submissions, Ms Blackburn confirmed that [16] and [17] contain an error of law because the bank statements from First Bank have been misinterpreted. Parties agree that [16] and [17] are incorrect, the question is whether or not the error contained in [16] and [17] is material.
16. The error of fact and law at [16] and [17] is not a material error. If [16] and [17] were deleted from the decision, the decision would still stand. [16] and [17] are not necessary to the overall decision because of what the Judge has said at [19] and [21] of the decision.
17. Parties agree that at [21] the Judge rehearses the correct test in law. To succeed, the appellant has to show that she is dependent, in whole and part, on the sponsor to meet her essential living needs.
18. At [19] the Judge identifies the determinative matter in the appeal. There, the Judge says that he does not have details of the appellant's essential living expenses. There, the Judge says that he has inadequate and contradictory evidence about the appellant's expenditure. There, the Judge says that the fundamental issue was not addressed in the evidence before him.
19. The Judge was provided with evidence of income, but no reliable evidence of expenditure. He was, therefore, only given a limited glimpse of the appellant’s circumstances, and did not have sufficient evidence to determine whether or not the contribution made by the sponsor was relied upon to meet the appellant’s essential living expenses.
20. The decision contains an error of fact and law at [16] and [17]. If that error is removed from the decision, the decision would still stand because the Judge applied the correct test. This appeal was dismissed in the First-tier Tribunal because insufficient evidence was produced to discharge the burden of proving that the appellant is dependent, in whole or in part, upon the sponsor to meet her essential living needs.
21. The Judge has made a mistake, but the mistake is not material because it does not go to the heart of the decision in the appellant’s appeal.
22. If [16] and [17] of the decision are removed, the Judge’s decision is still sustainable and complete. The first and third grounds of appeal are without merit.
23. The decision does not contain a material error of law. The Judge’s decision stands.
DECISION
The appeal is dismissed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 14 September 2025 stands.

Signed Paul Doyle Date 28 July 2026
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Doyle