Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000403
UI-2026-000404
(PA/04092/2024 and PA/04093/2024)

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

22nd June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ALIS

Between

RK
PG
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
AND

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Unrepresented
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on the 22 May 2026

Anonymity

Unless and until a tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellants are granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify them or any member of their family. This direction applies both to the Appellants and to the Respondent. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellants are Ghanaian nationals. RK is PG’s mother. PG was dependent on RK’s claim. They appealed against a decision taken by the Respondent on 11 October 2024 to refuse to grant RK asylum.
2. An anonymity order was made by the FtT and we saw no reason to go behind that given this was a protection claim.
BACKGROUND AND MATTERS IN ISSUE
3. By its decision dated 24 September 2025 the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) dismissed both appeals.
4. The Appellants appealed this decision and although permission was refused by the FtT, Upper Tribunal Judge Sheridan granted permission to appeal on 2 March 2026 stating:
“In para. 12 of the skeleton argument before the FtT the first appellant referred to a Facebook post from the former Secretary of the National Democratic Party wishing her former husband happy birthday. This is not mentioned in the decision.
Whilst a judge does not need to refer to all of the evidence, it is arguable that the failure to engage with this evidence was legally erroneous given that it appears to be one of the strongest points advanced by the first appellant to support her contention about her former husband’s influence in Ghana.
It is also arguable that reliance on XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) [2022] UKUT 00023 was misconceived in respect of evidence not obtained from the Appellant’s own Facebook account.”
SUBMISSIONS ON ERROR IN LAW
5. RK confirmed she relied on the evidence provided which she stated had been sent to the Respondent and placed before the FtT. She had nothing to add to the grounds of appeal which had been submitted on the Appellants’ behalf by her former representatives.
6. Mr Tan adopted the Rule 24 response, dated 10 March 2026, and invited the Tribunal to find there had been no material error in law. He pointed out that whilst permission to appeal had been granted there was no evidence before the FtT about what was said about the Facebook message (birthday wishes).
7. The FtT had set out in §10 & §11, of its decision, what RK had said in oral evidence and there was no record of anything being said about this birthday wish. There was a skeleton argument (§12) which mentioned the message, but RK had not mentioned the message in her statement or interview and there was no record of her saying anything about it in her oral evidence. The message itself was not included within the bundle.
8. With regard to Facebook account the FtT gave the evidence on the threats little weight finding it lacked credibility the Appellant would accept a friend request from a person who would send threatening messages.
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
9. The renewed grounds advanced four principal challenges to the First-tier Tribunal’s decision: (i) failure to give adequate reasons; (ii) failure to attach appropriate weight to material evidence; (iii) error in the assessment of internal relocation; and (iv) error in the Article 8 (and related discretionary/medical) assessment. The central factual issue underpinning Grounds (i) and (ii) concerned RK’s former husband’s alleged political connections and influence within the National Democratic Congress, and the evidential significance of a Facebook post by a former party Secretary referring to him as “boss”.
10. In granting permission to appeal, the Upper Tribunal identified grounds (i) and (ii) as arguable because the FtT may have failed to engage with a material piece of evidence capable of supporting the claim that the former husband had influence, and further found that the FtT arguably erred in relying on XX when assessing material not obtained from the Appellant’s own account. The grant, whilst not limiting the grounds of appeal, confined the live issues to the adequacy of reasoning and the approach to the Facebook evidence, which in turn fed into the assessment of risk.
11. It was not disputed the FtT did not expressly refer to the Facebook post in which a former Secretary of the National Democratic Congress allegedly wished the Appellant’s husband “happy birthday” and referred to him as “boss”. The Appellant’s grounds argued this omission amounted to a failure to consider material evidence which may have had a bearing on the Appellant’s husband’s political influence.
12. However, as Mr Tan properly identified there was nothing in the bundle, apart from what was said in the skeleton argument, that this message had even been sent/received. There was nothing in the interview, statements or record of proceedings to demonstrate such a message was before the FtT. Mr Tan, in the alternative, argued that even taking the Facebook post at its highest it only showed a social message and did not “demonstrate political influence or risk”.
13. We are satisfied the FtT did not fall into error because there was no evidence this message was even before it. Consequently, the FtT cannot be criticised for not dealing with the same.
14. The grounds of appeal further argued that the post impacted on the influence RK’s former husband had but the question of whether the husband had meaningful political influence, was directly addressed at §20 of the decision. The FtT gave reasons for finding RK’s former husband neither had nor attracted national interest and those findings were properly open to it.
15. Turning to the secondary ground of appeal namely the Facebook evidence. There was within the bundle evidence of Facebook messenger threats, but the substance of those messages was not verified by a full download of the Appellant’s Facebook account which is something the Tribunal in XX placed weight on. Providing samples of evidence without the full download undermined the weight to be given to such evidence. This was the finding made by the FtT and that approach cannot be criticised in light of what the Tribunal in XX said.
16. The FtT addressed the Facebook threats in its decision and discounted them by reference to XX. We are satisfied that in relation to the Facebook evidence the FtT made findings that were fully open to it.
17. The issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation did not arise for consideration once the tribunal lawfully concluded that the appellants were not at risk on return.
18. Finally, as the grant of permission made clear there was no error in not considering RK’s new relationship as consent for this to be a new matter had not been given.
DECISION
19. There was no error in law and the FtT’s decision shall stand.

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Alis
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
11 June 2026