Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026‑000417
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58711/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 15th of April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ATHWAL

Between

OV
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

Appellant
and
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Georget of Counsel, Malik and Malik Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Pugh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 1 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties may apply on notice to vary this order.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“the FtT”). On 13 October 2025 the FtT refused the Appellant’s appeal against the decision refusing his asylum, humanitarian protection, and human rights claim.
Background
2. The Appellant is an Albanian national, born in 2005. He entered the United Kingdom clandestinely on 10 October 2022, aged 16. He claimed asylum on the same day on the basis that he was a victim of forced criminality. He states that, at the age of 16, he commenced work at a car wash in Tirana. Shortly thereafter, he was instructed by his manager, “A”, to transport packages which he came to understand contained illicit drugs. When he refused to continue this work, A threatened both him and members of his family, whereupon he felt compelled to resume the activity. After a few weeks, he was trafficked to the United Kingdom and informed that he would be required to cultivate cannabis. He asserts that he was able to escape from those controlling him and subsequently claimed asylum.
3. A positive reasonable grounds decision under the National Referral Mechanism (“NRM”) was made on 17 October 2022. The Appellant’s asylum and human rights claims were refused on 6 October 2023. A positive conclusive grounds decision, based on forced criminality, followed on 1 November 2024.
4. The First‑tier Tribunal dismissed his appeal in a decision promulgated on 13 October 2025.
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
5. The FtT heard the appeal on 20 August 2025 and made the following findings;
i) It was found that the positive conclusive grounds findings addressed only the situation in Albania and the NRM did not find that the Appellant was trafficked to the United Kingdom.
ii) It did not accept that the Appellant had been forcibly transported to the United Kingdom for the purpose of cannabis cultivation. It considered it unlikely that A would invest significant resources in transporting someone who had already demonstrated unwillingness to participate in criminal activity and who had returned to work only under threats of extreme violence.
iii) It considered implausible the Appellant’s account of escaping through a window and immediately encountering an Albanian woman who directed him to the authorities and considered implausible the claim that traffickers provided him with an iPhone enabling communication with family members.
iv) It rejected the Appellant’s claim that three unknown men who allegedly confronted him in May 2023 were acting on behalf of A, finding it implausible that such individuals could have located him if A himself had no established means of doing so. It noted the absence of evidence of any mechanism by which they could have tracked him.
v) It found the Appellant’s lack of contact with his family to be inconsistent with his assertion that Albania is a small, closely connected society, and considered it unlikely that he could not have traced family members through the Albanian community in the United Kingdom.
vi) Taking the evidence cumulatively, it concluded that the Appellant did not face a real risk of being located, harmed, or re‑trafficked by A upon return to Albania. It therefore found that the Appellant was not a refugee, did not meet the requirements for humanitarian protection, and had not established substantial grounds for believing that removal would breach his human rights protections.
Issues on appeal to the Upper Tribunal
6. The Appellant sought permission to appeal from the FtT on the following basis:
i) Ground 1 concerned the FtT’s approach to the positive conclusive grounds decision. It was said that the FtT erred in three respects:
a) whilst the Appellant acknowledges that the FtT is not bound by an NRM decision as per MS (Pakistan) [2020] UKSC 9, it was submitted that the FtT erred by concluding that the conclusive grounds decision was restricted to events that had occurred in Albania;
b) by failing to address the submission that it was not open to the Respondent to advance credibility challenges that went beyond the findings of the conclusive grounds decision without clear evidential support; and
c) by penalising the Appellant for what it described as a “bland” conclusive grounds decision, and by speculating as to what might have been expected of the NRM process without affording the Appellant an opportunity to explain what material had been provided to the NRM or by seeking disclosure of that material.
ii) Ground 2 asserted errors in the FtT’s assessment of credibility. It was argued that:
a) the FtT failed to take account of the Respondent’s own country policy and information material when finding the Appellant’s account of being trafficked to the United Kingdom to be implausible, thereby reaching a conclusion that was not available on the objective evidence;
b) it did not take account of the Appellant’s claimed inability to contact his family when concluding that his family had not been subject to any adverse attention.
iii) Ground 3 contended that when considering the Appellant’s Article 8 private life claim, the Tribunal failed to take account of the guidance in DC (Trafficking, Protection/Human Rights appeals: Albania) [2019] UKUT 351 (IAC), and in particular failed to consider the relevance of the Appellant having been accepted as a victim of trafficking together with evidence of ongoing therapy relating to trauma.
7. Permission to appeal was granted on application to the FtT. Ground 2 was considered arguable on the basis that the FtT applied an inappropriate approach to plausibility, particularly given the need for caution where cultural or societal context may bear on what is considered inherently probable. The decision also found that Ground 3 disclosed an arguable error of law, noting that Article 8 had been a principal issue and that potentially relevant factors to the proportionality assessment had not been engaged with. As to Ground 1, the decision concluded that it remained open to the Tribunal to reach its own assessment of whether the Appellant had been trafficked. Considering the overlap between Ground 1 and Ground 2, permission was granted on all grounds.
The Hearing
8. Mr Georget withdrew Ground 3. The Appellant’s skeleton argument, prepared for the FtT, made clear that an Article 8 private life claim had not been raised, and such a claim was not advanced at the substantive hearing before the FtT. The error of law hearing therefore proceeded on the basis of the two remaining grounds.
9. Mr Pugh explained that he had located the NRM minutes, which recorded that the Appellant was accepted as having been trafficked and forced into criminality in Albania and the United Kingdom. This material was not before the FtT. Mr Pugh confirmed that the Respondent nonetheless wished to proceed with the error of law hearing, as the minutes were not material. The FtT had correctly and in accordance with MS (Pakistan), made its own findings as to whether the Appellant had been trafficked to the United Kingdom.
10. I heard submissions from Mr Georget and Mr Pugh. Mr Georget relied on the grounds of permission application, as amended. Mr Pugh relied on the Respondent’s response to the grounds of appeal under Rule 24. I reserved my decision.
Findings
11. I have followed the approach adopted by the FtT when granting permission and will address ground 2 first given the overlap between ground 1 and ground 2.
Ground 2
12. Mr Georget submitted that the FtT erred in its assessment of plausibility and risk. It found at [45] and [46] of the decision that it was implausible that the trafficker, A, would have brought the Appellant to the United Kingdom against his will, rather than relying on his supposed loyalty or financial incentive. It was argued that the FtT failed to consider relevant objective country material, including the Respondent’s Country Policy and Information Note on human trafficking in Albania (July 2024, version 16.0) (“CPIN”). The CPIN recognised at [8.1.13] that children may be subjected to compelled labour and criminality, and at [8.4.6] that threats and violence were routinely used to control victims. It was submitted that, by concluding that a trafficker would not have funded the Appellant’s journey if he were unwilling, the FtT effectively treated a recognised pattern of forced criminal exploitation of young men as inherently implausible, contrary to the available evidence. It was argued that the FtT therefore erred by making an implausibility finding without reference to objective material showing that such exploitation is consistent with known trafficking practices.
13. It was further submitted that the FtT erred in its assessment of whether there was any ongoing interest from traffickers. It relied on the absence of reported difficulties involving the Appellant’s mother and sister, and on a finding that the Appellant had made no effort to contact them. The Appellant’s evidence, however, was that he had repeatedly attempted to contact his mother through social workers and social media, and that he had been unable to reach her. It was argued that the lack of information about his family resulted from his inability to make contact, rather than from the absence of risk, and that it was therefore not rational to treat the lack of evidence of problems as demonstrating no ongoing threat.
14. Mr Pugh relied on the response to the grounds of appeal under Rule 24 which asserted that the Appellant had misunderstood the FtT’s reasoning on credibility. It was said that the FtT assessed plausibility by reference to the specific features of the Appellant’s account, including the threats said to have been made, the alleged risk of being shot, the significant financial outlay said to have been incurred in transporting him, and the scale of the journey across multiple countries. The Respondent contended that the FtT did not suggest that trafficking to the United Kingdom was inherently implausible, but rather that this particular account was implausible in light of those features. It further submitted that the CPIN did not assist the Appellant as [3.3.4] simply acknowledged the existence of some cases of trafficking to the UK, and [8.1.12] if anything, strengthened the FtT’s position on implausibility. It contained a passage from an article on Albanians being “tricked into travelling to Britain”, specifically referring to young Albanian men being lured to the UK for cannabis farming. The Appellant did not assert that he was willing or deceived into travelling; his account relied on his refusal to go and his earlier work for A. It was argued that this made the alleged investment in transporting him less plausible, and that the FtT was entitled to consider whether A would expend substantial resources to transport someone across multiple international borders in those circumstances. The FtT’s reasoning was also said to be supported by the unusual and resource‑intensive travel route described, which differed from typical Albanian travel patterns within the Schengen area.
15. The Respondent further submitted that the FtT did record the Appellant’s attempt to contact his mother through social media, which was acknowledged at paragraph [53]. Any mention of attempts made through a social worker arose only in oral evidence and was unsupported, such that its omission from the reasoning was not material. The FtT rejected the Appellant’s claim to have lost contact with his mother, relying on his lack of initiative in seeking assistance from other Albanians in the United Kingdom and his own evidence that Albania is a small and closely connected society. Given that finding, it was open to the FtT to expect evidence from the Appellant’s mother about any difficulties in Albania and to draw an adverse inference from the absence of such evidence. The Respondent submited that the Appellant sought to rely on an asserted loss of contact as a means of avoiding producing corroborative evidence, and that the FtT’s conclusion was rational.
16. Mr Pugh argued that the FtT was entitled to make the findings it did. Other credibility findings at [47], [50], [51], and [55] of the decision fed directly into the conclusion that the Appellant had not been trafficked to the United Kingdom. The CPIN does not address every scenario, and the FtT did not indicate any belief that trafficking necessarily involves willing participants or that cross‑border trafficking must follow a particular pattern. The CPIN does not address matters such as the provision of mobile telephones, and the FtT’s reliance on such features as part of its plausibility assessment was said to be a legitimate application of common‑sense reasoning. The Respondent contends that there was nothing material that the FtT failed to take into account.
17. In response Mr Georget argued that if the FtT erred in its assessment of plausibility at [45] and [46], that error could be cured by reference to any other parts of the reasoning. The core finding at [45] and [46] was that the Appellant had not been trafficked to the United Kingdom against his will. It was argued that this conclusion was unsustainable, as it was reached without reference to relevant country information, and that no additional findings elsewhere in the determination could remedy that omission. It was argued that the FtT’s reliance on this erroneous and material assessment of implausibility affected the entirety of its analysis, such that the FtT’s overall conclusion was infected by its flawed approach to plausibility.
18. I have reminded myself of the guidance provided in Y v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1223, KB and AH (Credibility – Structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491 (IAC), MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216, and MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49.
19. The first issue before me is whether the FtT erred in making an implausibility finding without reference to objective material addressing known trafficking practices. For the following reasons, I am satisfied that the FtT made an error of law.
20. I am satisfied that the Appellant argued before the FtT that his account was consistent with the CPIN. This argument is evidenced at [25] of the ASA, albeit that it refers to the version published in March 2024. Mr Pugh and Mr Georget clarified that the version published in July 2024 was considered at the substantive hearing. I am satisfied that the FtT did not adequately demonstrate that it considered this matter in its assessment of credibility. The FtT only referred to the CPIN at [13] and [15], when summarising the refusal decision, there is no reference to it in the section titled “My Findings.”
21. I turn to consider whether the FtT was required to consider the Appellant’s account against the country information. In KB & AH at [34] the Upper Tribunal reaffirmed that credibility assessment is a highly fact-sensitive affair. While reference to recognised “Credibility Indicators” may assist in ensuring that relevant aspects of the evidence are considered, a decision‑maker is not required to address each indicator in a step‑by‑step manner. Their use may be unnecessary where an account is inherently impossible or marked by significant inconsistency.
22. The starting point for the FtT ought to have been recognition that the Appellant was a child at the time of the events in question, and on the FtT’s own findings, he was a child victim of modern slavery or trafficking in Albania, compelled into criminal activity. There should have been consideration of what weight should be attached to these factors when assessing credibility. These matters are not recorded as having been taken into account by the FtT when evaluating the evidence.
23. The FtT made the following findings at [45] and [46];
“45. Having regard to the difficulties above, whilst I accept that the appellant has been forced to carry out the trafficking work he has described in his account, I do not accept that he was forcibly brought to the United Kingdom for the purpose of cannabis cultivation work. In my judgement, it is highly unlikely, that A would not have been sufficiently astute to know that he is dealing with an individual highly reluctant to get involved in the work he was made to do. A could not have not realised that in the end the appellant was only compelled to return to work on pain of death by shooting.
46. I do not believe that a person involved in the drug trade would risk incurring the expenses that would have had to be incurred to bring the appellant all the way from Albania through all the many countries through which he travelled involving the number of people and the costs associated with that to this country unless he was certain that he had someone sufficiently loyal and with the incentive to make money to remain with them.”
24. These findings do not demonstrate that the account of being trafficked to the UK was physically impossible or that it was marked by significant inconsistencies. The language used by the FtT indicates that its conclusion rested on inherent improbability, assessed by reference to the judge’s own experience rather than by considering relevant country information concerning the trafficking of children from Albania. As explained in HK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 at [30], the concept of inherent improbability in the asylum context was examined in Awala v Secretary of State [2005] CSOH 73. At [22] of that decision, Lord Brodie observed that it is “not proper to reject an applicant’s account merely on the basis that it is not credible or not plausible. To say that an applicant’s account is not credible is to state a conclusion.” At [24], he emphasised that rejection of an account on grounds of implausibility must be based on “reasonably drawn inferences and not simply on conjecture or speculation”. He further accepted, echoing the observations of Pill LJ in Ghaisari, that while a fact‑finder may properly rely on common sense, conduct that appears implausible by domestic standards may nonetheless be plausible when viewed within the applicant’s social and cultural context. Considering this guidance, I am satisfied that the FtT erred by making a subjective assessment of plausibility without evaluating the Appellant’s account against the available country information on child trafficking in Albania.
25. I turn to whether this amounts to a material error of law. The Rule 24 notice submits that the CPIN does not support the Appellant’s account. At [3.3.4] and [8.1.12] it notes that trafficking to the United Kingdom typically involves young men who are tricked or lured into travelling for cannabis cultivation, circumstances that do not align with the Appellant’s claim, which is based on his refusal to go and his earlier work for A. However, Mr Georget referred me to [8.1.13], which records that children may be subjected to compelled labour and criminality, and to [8.4.6], which notes that threats and violence are routinely used to control victims. I am satisfied that there are aspects of the CPIN which potentially support a core element of the Appellant’s account and which, if considered, could have affected the FtT’s findings. The failure to take this information into account when assessing credibility therefore amounts to a material error of law.
26. I finally turn to Mr Pugh’s arguments as set out at [16] above. I accept Mr Georget’s submissions that a material error in the assessment of plausibility at [45] and [46] cannot be cured by reference to any other parts of the reasoning. This is because, as established in Uddin v SSHD [2020] EWCA Civ 338, if a court concludes that a witness has lied about one matter, it does not follow that he has lied about everything. A witness may lie for many reasons because a person's motives may be different as respects different questions. Furthermore, in accordance with SB (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 160 genuine protection claimants might exaggerate or fabricate evidence to reduce the risk of the appeal being wrongly dismissed.
27. The findings at [47], concerning how the Appellant escaped his traffickers, his contact with an Albanian woman, and whether he was given an iPhone with internet access enabling him to contact his family; at [50], concerning the visit by three men about his debt and threats to harm his family; at [51], concerning the limited evidence of that visit; and at [55], concerning whether he lost contact with his family, are all matters that must be considered cumulatively with an assessment of the Appellant’s factual account of being trafficked into the United Kingdom. The material error in the findings at [45] and [46] means that the FtT did not conduct a cumulative assessment of all the material evidence when assessing the Appellant’s subjective fear of persecution or real risk of harm. For this reason, the errors at [45] and [46] cannot be cured by reference to any other parts of the reasoning.
Ground 1
28. It is not necessary to consider ground 1 because ground 2 established a material error of law.
Conclusion
29. The Judge’s decision involved a material error of law. I set aside the decision in its entirety and preserve no findings of fact.
Disposal
30. The parties invited me to remit the matter to the FtT. The starting point is paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal which provides:   
7.2. The Upper Tribunal is likely on each such occasion to proceed to remake the decision, instead of remitting the case to the First-tier Tribunal, unless the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that:    
(a) the effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the First-tier Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party’s case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal; or    
(b) the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal.   
31. In my judgment, it is fair and just to remit the appeal to the FtT. The Appellant was deprived of a fair hearing because, as acknowledged by Mr Pugh, the Respondent proceeded on the mistaken basis that the conclusive grounds decision established trafficking only in Albania. The substantive hearing in the FtT therefore proceeded on a factual error, which was compounded by the FtT’s failure to consider the CPIN. In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that the appropriate course is to remit the appeal to the First‑tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing.
Notice of Decision
The FtT’s decision involved a material error of law. I set aside the decision in its entirety and preserve no findings of fact. The matter is to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to hear the appeal de novo.

H.Athwal

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 April 2026