Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000426
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59797/2024
LP/02115/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 24th of June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PAUL LEWIS

Between

WLD
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr. Allison, counsel
For the Respondent: Ms. Keerthy, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Order Regarding Anonymity

Anonymity was ordered by the Upper Tribunal. No application to discharge was made. It remains in force in the terms below.

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
Background
1. The appellant is a citizen of Ethiopia of Oromo ethnicity. She entered the UK and claimed asylum in November 2022 because of her political opinion. The appellant says she she was working in Dubai and sending money (from her employment ) to her husband in Ethiopia for the express purpose of funding the Oromo Liberation Front [‘OLF’], a political organisation promoting the right of self-determination for the Oromo people. The OLF is in conflict with the government of Ethiopia.
2. The appellant claims that when she was in Dubai her husband was arrested. Their appellant’s matrimonial home was searched and money receipts discovered. The receipts were in a form that enabled her to be identified as the sender and that the purpose of the funds was to support the OLF. These actions placed her at risk on return where she is wanted by the authorities.
3. Her claim was refused by the respondent and her appeal to the First-tier Tribunal Judge [the ‘judge’] was also refused in a decision dated 14th November 2025.
This appeal
4. Permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision was refused by the First-tier Tribunal. A refined and renewed application for permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman on 3rd March 2026 on five grounds:
(1) The judge failed to correctly apply the Country Guidance in Roba (OLF-MB confirmed) Ethiopia CG [2022] UKUT 00001 (IAC).
(2) The tribunal erred in failing to apply the Country Guidance case of BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC).
(3) The judge erred in failing to have regard to and apply the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No.2 of 2010: Child, vulnerable adult, and sensitive appellant guidance.
(4) The approach of the Judge to the remittances from Qatar was unreasonable.
(5) The Tribunal erred in failing to consider the relevant background evidence as to risks to the Oromo ethnic group in Ethiopia.
5. At the error of law hearing, counsel for the appellant applied, pursuant to Rule 5(3)(c) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 ,to add a sixth ground of appeal, identifying an error of fact in the judge’s decision:
(6) The judge erred by making a material error of fact as to whether it was appellant’s case that the Ethiopian authorities had approached her family.
6. Rule 5(3) provides a discretionary power to the Tribunal to permit a party to amend a document, in this case, the grounds of appeal.
7. Mr. Allison acknowledged that the proposed ground (6) not raised in any previous application for permission to appeal. The application was made late following a change in counsel and Mr. Allison’s own review of the material.
8. The respondent noted the narrow nature of the additional ground and conceded that the matter could be dealt with in oral submissions without delaying the error of law hearing. Nonetheless the respondent opposed the application relying on the decision in Talpada and Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 841 at [67] to [69] as to the importance of procedural rigour.
[67] it cannot be emphasised enough that public law litigation must be conducted with an appropriate degree of procedural rigour. I recognise that public law litigation cannot necessarily be regarded in the same way as ordinary civil litigation between private parties. This is because it is not only the private interests of the parties which are involved. There is clearly an important public interest which must not be overlooked or undermined. In particular procedure must not become the master of substance where, for example, an abuse of power needs to be corrected by the court. However, both fairness and the orderly management of litigation require that there must be an appropriate degree of formality and predictability in the conduct of public law litigation as in other forms of civil litigation.
[68] In the context of an appeal such as this it is important that the grounds of appeal should be clearly and succinctly set out. It is also important that only those grounds of appeal for which permission has been granted by this Court are then pursued at an appeal. The Courts frequently observe, as did appear to happen in the present case, that grounds of challenge have a habit of “evolving” during the course of proceedings, for example when a final skeleton argument comes to be drafted. This will in practice be many months after the formal close of pleadings and after evidence has been filed.
[69] These unfortunate trends must be resisted and should be discouraged by the courts, using whatever powers they have to impose procedural rigour in public law proceedings. Courts should be prepared to take robust decisions and not permit grounds to be advanced if they have not been properly pleaded or where permission has not been granted to raise them. Otherwise, there is a risk that there will be unfairness, not only to the other party to the case, but potentially to the wider public interest, which is an important facet of public law litigation.
9. There is no doubt that the litigation in this case has evolved. With some hesitation I granted permission to appeal on the additional ground. In doing so I do not in any diminish the importance of procedural rigour and the impact that a late amendment may have to the timely disposal of an appeal. However, I must balance the importance of procedural rigour within the overall test of fairness. The ground relied upon by Mr. Allison is discreet and simply made. The issue would not cause a delay to this appeal. The ground has prima facie merit and may be important to the ultimate disposal of this appeal.
10. I considered the parties oral and written submissions. The respondent opposed the appeal on all grounds setting out reasons in a Rule 24 response dated 8th April 2026.
Discussion
11. Unfortunately, the grounds of appeal as enumerated do not follow a logical or convenient route to reach a determination. Grounds (3), (4), (5) and (6) relate to the judge’s assessment of the evidence. Grounds (1) and (2) refer to the whether the judge followed country guidance, and to the conclusions drawn by the judge from his findings of fact. The merit of these grounds is somewhat dependent on the judge’s findings of fact. For that reason I deal with the grounds in the order set out above.
Ground 3
12. It is submitted that the judge agreed to treat the appellant as a ‘vulnerable witness’ but then failed to apply the appropriate the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No.2 of 2010: Child, vulnerable adult, and sensitive appellant guidance (the ‘Guidance’). The Guidance is explicitly referred to within the First-tier Tribunals’ Practice Directions. A purpose of the Guidance is to ensure effective participation by parties to litigation. Relevant extracts are reproduced below:
…
[13] The weight to be placed upon factors of vulnerability may differ depending on the matter under appeal, the burden and standard of proof and whether the individual is a witness or an appellant.
[14] Consider the evidence, allowing for possible different degrees of understanding by witnesses and appellant compared to those [who] are not vulnerable, in the context of evidence from others associated with the appellant and the background evidence before you. Where there were clear discrepancies in the oral evidence, consider the extent to which the age, vulnerability or sensitivity of the witness was an element of that discrepancy or lack of clarity.
[15] The decision should record whether the Tribunal has concluded the appellant (or a witness) is a child, vulnerable or sensitive, the effect the Tribunal considered the identified vulnerability had in assessing the evidence before it and this whether the Tribunal was satisfied whether the appellant had established his or her case to the relevant standard of proof. In asylum appeals, weight should be given to objective indications of risk rather than necessarily to a state of mind."
13. Failure to follow the Guidance will most likely be a material error of law, per AM (Afghanistan) and Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 1123 at [30]. Not every failure to follow the guidance will be material.
14. The complaint on behalf of the appellant is that judge failed to record what he agreed to do: treat the witness as vulnerable.
15. The respondent submits that it was never argued that appellant’s vulnerability was material to the credibility issues raised by the respondent. It was not argued she had issues with memory or recollection of evidence.
16. I find that the only basis on which appellant was to be treated as vulnerable was the positive conclusive grounds decision as to her trafficking in Qatar. This had no material bearing on her ability to give reliable evidence and properly recall her account regarding her political opinion in Ethiopia. There was no medical or other opinion before the judge as to how the appellant’s evidence might be so affected; there were no adjustments to the evidence asked for by counsel for the appellant who appeared at the First-tier Tribunal. The judge’s assessment of the evidence was not unfair to the appellant in this regard and does not amount to a material error of law.
Grounds (4), and (6)
17. These grounds are conveniently taken together because they criticise the fact-finding exercise undertaken by the judge.
18. In assessing the judge’s reasoning, I bear in mind the observations of Lord Brown in South Bucks County Council -v- Porter [2004] UKHL 33; 2004 1 WLR 1953 at para [36]. His guidance is cited with approval by the Presidential Panel in TC (PS compliance - “Issues-based reasoning”) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 00164 (IAC).
19. In Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ. 464, at [2], the Court of Appeal reiterated the caution with which an appellate tribunal must approach findings of fact. Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
Ground (4)
20. In rejecting the appellant’s account to have sent money from her wages in Qatar to be used in part to support a political organisation in Ethiopia, at [15] the judge found it:
‘Highly unlikely that as a domestic worker in Qatar who...was sending money to support her sister in Ethiopia (the appellant) would also have sufficient funds to be able to make a contribution to a political party or as she claimed part of small cell of individuals who were providing financial support.’
21. Mr Allison submits the judge’s findings as to the remittances from Qatar were irrational. In her asylum interview, the appellant said that when she was working in Qatar, her accommodation and basic needs were met as part of her wider remuneration package. The appellant had some disposable income and so it was not ‘highly unlikely’ for the appellant to have sent money back to Ethiopia such that the judge made finding(s) without properly considering the evidence.
22. The respondent submits that the Judge made a number of significant credibility findings against the appellant in a multi-layered decision. There was no documentary evidence of the funds being remitted or a proper explanation of how they were. The judge found the appellant’s account of when suspicion first fell upon her to have been inconsistent. At [14] the judge finds the appellant’s account to be vague and inconsistent in that she claimed to have operated in secret and to have expressly stated the money transfers were for the use of the OLF which is how she came to be detected. In so far as the judge expressed a view as to the likelihood of events this was done so in the context of the evidence as a whole and reflects in part that the appellant had limited resources.
23. Read in isolation, the judge’s findings at [15] could have been more fully reasoned or better expressed. When considered in the context of the judge’s decision as a whole, per Volpi (supra) they do not disclose and error of law.
Ground (6)
24. At ground six it is submitted that the judge erred in making a material error of fact as to whether the appellant’s case that the Ethiopian authorities had approached her family. At [19] of the judge finds:
‘The appellant speculates but has provided no evidence to support any assertion that she is wanted by the authorities. Her evidence is simply that her sister-in-law says that she is wanted (AIR3 Q51-56). There is no claim that her family have been approached or questioned by the authorities which would be expected if there was any interest in the appellant who is absent.’
In her third asylum interview [13 March 2024] the appellant was asked about the on-going interest in her from the Ethiopian authorities as follows:
55. Has [your sister-in-law] seen the arrest warrant for you or anything like that?
She was at home while he was arrested, and whilst that happened, they said to her they were looking for me as well
56. And have you had any contact from the authorities, Ethiopia?
They come and check and ask whether I am home or not
57. Clarify your parents are asked?
Yes, my parents and my sister-in-law as well
58. And do you remember the last time the authorities went there and asked where you were?
I think about three months or two months ago.
25. Mr Allsion submits that the judge’s finding that there was no claim that her family have been approached or questioned by the authorities was plainly in error in light of the passage set out above.
26. The respondent submits that the judge’s specific reasoning should be examined within the entirety of the judge’s wider findings which clearly rejected the appellant’s account. The respondent says that even if the judge erred, this was not material to the outcome of the appeal.
27. I do not find there to be an error or law. The judge’s reasoning at [19] expressly refers to the appellant’s third interview. The judge correctly identified that the information the appellant relied upon came via her sister-in-law, there was no evidence for example in the form of an arrest warrant. It is clear to me that this ground of appeal is predicated on a narrow textual analysis.
28. Further, at [12] the judge makes detailed findings about the appellant’s claimed involvement with the OLF. The findings are summarised at [23] thus:
‘But looking at the facts in the round and the number of credibility issues I am unable to find that she ever supported the group, is currently wanted by the authorities or was perceived to be a supporter by virtue of her link to her husband.’
29. Here the judge found the appellant was not involved with the OLF. His findings at [19] were consistent with other aspects of the evidence and I do not find there to be an error or law.
Ground 5
30. This ground asserts that the judge erred in failing to consider the relevant background evidence as to risks to the Oromo ethnic group in Ethiopia. Although the judge claimed to have examined the appellant’s evidence against the background evidence, the judge failed to expressly refer to any of the numerous sources of background evidence relied upon by the appellant in her appeal and that such material was relevant to a proper assessment of the risk to the appellant upon her return to Ethiopia.
31. The respondent submits that judge is not obligated to list every piece of evidence in a decision.
32. I agree with the respondent’s submission. At [5] the Judge clearly states they have considered the evidence as a whole in reaching a decision. At [18] the judge states they have assessed the appellant’s claim against the background evidence throughout. I find the judge clearly engaged with the evidence. This ground does not disclose any material error of law.
Grounds (1) and (2)
33. These grounds are taken together because they relate to whether the judge correctly applied relevant Country Guidance.
Ground (1)
34. The appellant submits that the judge failed to correctly apply the Country Guidance in Roba (OLF-MB confirmed) Ethiopia CG [2022] UKUT 00001 (IAC) [‘Roba’]. In rejecting the appellant’s account on the lower standard, the judge found:
[25] the appellant has not established that she is likely to be perceived by the authorities as possessing an anti-government agenda in line with headnote (iv) of Roba (OLF - MB confirmed) Ethiopia CG [2022] UKUT 00001 (IAC). Namely “a person is perceived by the authorities as possessing an anti-government agenda.”
[26] I am unable to conclude that the appellant’s activities in Ethiopia and her sur place activities sufficient to engage headnote (iii) of Roba namely “Those who have a significant history, known to the authorities, of OLF membership or support, or are perceived by the authorities to have such significant history will in general be at real risk or persecution by the authorities.”
35. The appellant submitted specifically that the judge failed to properly carry out a fact sensitive assessment of the risk to the appellant on return by failing to consider either properly or at all: the appellant’s vulnerabilities as a victim of trafficking; her ethnicity; her gender and the likelihood on his findings that she will be alone; her Oromo ethnicity and minority Islamic faith; her attendance at various demonstrations in UK against the Ethiopian regime and the publication of those demonstrations and the current situation for Oromo in Ethiopia.
36. It is further submitted that the judge’s assessment failed to properly address the evidence. The threshold of evidence there being no requirement for a ‘very high level of involvement of support’.
37. The respondent characterises this as a disagreement with the judge’s findings, particularly when the judge’s decision is read as a whole.
38. In my view it is important to note the relevance of Roba. The determination, at Headnote 1, applies as country guidance ‘in respect of persons who are members and sympathisers, or supporters, of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and those specifically perceived by the Ethiopian authorities to be such members or sympathisers.’
39. Here, the judge had already found the appellant not to be a supporter of the OLF or perceived to be such a supporter.
40. There is no merit in the argument that the judge failed to properly consider all relevant matter in the appellant’s background and personal circumstances which are considered throughout the decision. At [25] and [26] the judge expressly references the test in Roba. At [21], the judge dismisses the suggestion that the appellant was known or wanted by the Ethiopian authorities.
Ground 2
41. The tribunal erred in failing to apply the Country Guidance case of BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC).
42. Whilst in the UK the appellant attended demonstrations against the Ethiopian government. Here the issue is what is the background evidence that targeted. The ASA at para 37 [46] says she is likely to have aroused suspicion.
43. The appellant relied on background evidence suggesting that such demonstrations are published across various media and that the authorities do target those perceived to be affiliated to the OLF by their social media output. The appellant submits that it is not sufficient simply to dismiss the appellant’s sur place activities as self-serving without any analysis of how those activities would be perceived.
44. Again, the respondent submits that it is important to consider the judge’s findings as a whole. This ground does not disclose any material error of law as the Judge has clearly answered the issue as to whether the appellant would be at a real risk in light of her sur place activities at [26].
45. I find the judge did consider the appellant’s sur place activities at [22], noting the purpose of the demonstrations, the number of attendances, her role at them. The judge recorded that the appellant had not posed photographs online and simply speculated that others may have done so. The appellant produced no evidence of photographs of her being online and merely speculate that this may be possible. Here, the judge’s findings reflect fairly the evidence before him.
46. It is something of a stretch to suggest the judge erred by failed to consider and Iranian Country Guidance case in the context of an Ethiopian asylum seeker. I have considered the appellant’s skeleton argument. There is no reference to BA Demonstrators made within it.
47. Ground 2 does not reveal an error of law.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the Judge does not contain an error of law. The appeal is dismissed.

Paul Lewis

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

19th June 2026