Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000449
Case No: UI-2026-000450
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01490/2025
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01491/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 23rd of June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DEAKIN

Between

ZG
NG
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr Shahid, counsel, for AJO Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Khan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 20 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. ZG and NG are Ethiopian nationals. ZG is the main appellant in these proceedings. She is the mother of NG (who was born in the United Kingdom in 2024). By decision promulgated on 13 November 2025, FTJ Alis dismissed the Appellants’ appeals on refugee, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds. The Appellants now appeal against the Judge’s decision. For the avoidance of doubt both ZG and NG rely on the same grounds of appeal and they are addressed together below.
Material Background
2. ZG is of Tigrayan ethnicity. She claims that she was called-up for conscription in August 2018, that she refused to comply with these instructions, and that she left accordingly left Ethiopia illegally. ZG maintained that she was at particular risk because of her ethnicity.
3. ZG travelled through a number of countries before arriving in the United Kingdom on 5 August 2022. She underwent a screening interview on the same day.
4. NG, ZG’s child, was born in August 2024. Neither ZG nor NG maintain a relationship with NG’s father.
5. ZG underwent an Asylum Interview on 23 January 2025.
6. The Secretary of State refused ZG’s protection claim by decision of 28 March 2025. NG’s claim was considered under the Family Asylum Claim process and refused on the same day.
7. Both ZG and NG appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. The hearing took place on 7 November 2025. ZG appeared in person, assisted by an interpreter. The Judge dismissed ZG’s and NG’s appeals by decision of 13 November 2025.
8. ZG and NG’s application for permission to appeal was refused by FTJ Parkes on 15 January 2026. They renewed their application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal on the basis of seven overlapping grounds of appeal. In his decision of 3 March 2026, UTJ Hoffman granted permission to appeal along with further directions to confirm which grounds of appeal were being pursued and to clarify a number of the grounds of appeal relied on.

The Grounds
9. The Appellants’ representatives accordingly filed a skeleton argument dated 18 March 2026 consolidating her appeal into the following three grounds:

(i) failure to address the objective risk on to the Appellant account of her particular circumstances (former grounds 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7);
(ii) procedural fairness owing to the Appellant’s vulnerability (former ground 6); and
(iii) inadvertent mistake of fact as to the fact of forced recruitment of the Tigray in Ethiopia (former “Additional Grounds”).
10. These grounds were developed further in the Appellants’ skeleton argument and in oral submissions before me.
11. I will address each of these grounds in turn.
Ground (i): failure to address the objective risk on to the Appellant account of her particular circumstances
12. The Appellants argue that the Judge failed to address, adequately or at all, the risk that would be posed to ZG on return given, in particular, (a) her Tigray ethnicity; (b) her gender; (c) her return as a single mother; (d) her length of absence from Ethiopia; and (e) her lack of meaningful family support in Ethiopia. The Appellants argue that ZG’s Tigray ethnicity and gender were of particular importance and point to the background evidence before the Judge.
13. The Appellants rely in particular on passages from Genocide in Tigray (A New Lines Institute Report from June 2024), The Tigray Enquiry (an All-Party Parliamentary Group on International Law, Justice and Accountability report dated September 2023); and Starvation as a Weapon of War (an article in The Conversation from 2 November 2025). The Appellants submit that these reports are “reflected” in Tigrayans and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, a Country and Policy Information Note [‘CPIN’] from December 2024. In oral argument counsel for the Appellants referred me in particular to paras. 3.2.5 (violence against Tigrayans) and 14.3.2-14.3.3 (sexual violence and gender based violence in Tigray) of the CPIN.
14. The Appellants argue that the Judge failed to deal with “the breadth of the country background evidence” and instead treated ZG’s credibility as the “start and end point of the assessment” (Appellant’s Skeleton Argument at para. 18).
15. I remind myself that that the reasons provided for any decision must be proportionate. They need only refer to the main issues and evidence in dispute and explain how those issues essential to the Tribunal’s conclusion have been resolved: Secretary of State for the Home Department v TC [2023] UKUT 164 (IAC). It is, however, “necessary for judges to identify and resolve key conflicts in the evidence and explain in clear and brief terms their reasons, so that the parties can understand why they have won or lost”: Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 00341 (IAC). I note further that the First-tier Tribunal is an expert tribunal and that I should approach appeals from the First-tier Tribunal with a degree of caution: AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] 1 A.C. 678, at [30].
16. It is clear from the decision that the Judge in fact undertook a broader analysis than his comment, “[this] case is all about credibility” (para. 39), might suggest:
a. At para. 13, the Judge recorded that ZG had produced articles in support of her submission that, despite the Pretoria Agreement of November 2022, atrocities against Tigrayans continued; that these included arbitrary detention, ethnic profiling, and systemic discrimination; that there was evidence of mass killings, sexual violence, and starvation during the Tigray war and that instability and humanitarian crises continued. The Judge recorded ZG’s submissions that there were incidents of hate speech against Tigrayans and that international bodies had found evidence of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including ethnic cleansing in Western Tigray and that risk factors for atrocity crimes remained present even after ceasefire.
b. At para. 14 the Judge made reference to the CPIN, noting that the Home Office Presenting Officer had relied on para. 3.1.1:
“Tigrayans in areas under the control of the Tigrayan Interim Regional Administration (TIRA) in Tigray and in Addis Ababa are unlikely to face treatment from state actors because of their ethnicity that amounts to persecution or serious harm. However, factors such as a person's gender, age, social and educational background, whether they are a long-term resident of Addis Ababa, their ID documentation and support network, are likely to affect the risk they face. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise."
c. At paras. 31-34 the Judge considered, and rejected, ZG’s claim to be in fear of conscription on return. He noted that ZG had failed to raise this issue until her substantive asylum interview (some 3½ years after she first claimed asylum), he noted that ZG’s account was not supported by objective evidence, and he rejected her claim to being in fear of conscription.
d. At paras. 36-39 the Judge considered, and rejected, ZG’s claim to be at risk as a result of “the genocide happening in Ethiopia and the ethnic profiling of Tigrinya people”. The Judge accepted that there was some objective evidence of issues of concern in Tigray, including the targeting of those of Tigrayan ethnicity, but he went on to find that there was no evidence that ZG had herself faced any such issues or that she would herself face any difficulties on return.
e. At paras 40-41 the Judge considered and rejected ZG’s claim that she had cut herself off from her family in Ethiopia.
17. The central issue in this appeal, then, is whether the Judge’s engagement with the background evidence was adequate. In my judgment it was:
a. As set out above, the Judge cited CPIN para. 3.1.1. This made clear that (i) that Tigrayans in areas under the control of the Tigrayan Interim Regional Administration in Tigray were unlikely to face treatment amounting to persecution or serious harm (ii) various particular factors were likely to affect that risk and (iii) the onus was on an appellant to demonstrate that they would be at risk on return.
b. The Judge considered ZG’s claim to be based on three main pillars: the fact that she had evaded conscription, the fact that she would have no support should she be returned to Ethiopia, and that fact that, as a female Tigrayan, she was at risk due to the genocide and ethnic profiling of the Tigrayan people generally.
c. The Judge considered and rejected ZG’s claim to be at risk as a result of her conscription. He also rejected ZG’s claim to have cut off ties with her family in Ethiopia.
d. As to the general claim, the Judge found that ZG had provided no evidence to suggest that she would be at risk should she be returned to Ethiopia. Given the Judge’s quotation of CPIN 3.1.1, this passage can only sensibly be read as meaning that the Judge did not accept that ZG had demonstrated particular factors in her case which were sufficient to displaced the general position that Tigrayans in areas under the control of the Tigrayan Interim Regional Administration in Tigray are unlikely to face persecution or serious harm. The Judge plainly considered this to be supported by the fact that ZG had not, in fact, been targeted in the past.
18. In my judgment the Judge was not required to address the background material in more detail than he did. The approach taken by the Judge was consistent with that required by the CPIN and the reasons for his conclusions, while brief, were clear. I therefore dismiss Ground 1.
Ground (ii): procedural fairness owing to the Appellant’s vulnerability
19. The Appellants argue that the Judge failed to take account of ZG’s vulnerability and that this rendered the first-instance proceedings procedurally unfair. The Appellant relies on a Supplementary Witness Statement (dated 4 March 2026) in which she asserts that:
a. She was not represented at the hearing: the Judge failed to ask detailed questions about her military recruitment; she struggled to explain the difference between her screening interview and later evidence; she did not know how to explain that screening interviews are short and that she was frightened and confused when she first arrived in the United Kingdom; she did not know to challenge “certain points [I pause to note these are not specified] raised by the Home Office”; and she did not refer to specific country evidence or properly explain it.
b. She was under significant emotional pressure at the time of the hearing due to the stress of the asylum process, being sole carer for her child, and anxiety about return to Ethiopia; and
c. She did not request reasonable adjustments such as “clearer explanations of the questions” and “more time for me to explain my answers”.
20. The Appellants accept that these issues were not raised with the Judge but submit that, as ZG was unrepresented, the onus was on the Judge to identify and address them himself. In oral argument counsel for the Appellant referred to AM (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Lord Chancellor intervening) [2017] EWCA Civ 1123.
21. I do not accept that the Appellants have demonstrated any procedural unfairness in this case. The facts that ZG was unrepresented before the First-tier Tribunal, anxious about the asylum process and possible return, and acting as sole-carer for her child do not, without more, suggest that ZG fall to be treated as a vulnerable witness. This case is very different to that of AM which concerned a minor with learning difficulties (evidenced by an expert psychologist’s report). There was no unfairness in the Judge proceeding as he did. My conclusion is supported the fact that at no point did ZG ask the Tribunal to treat her as a vulnerable witness. I accordingly dismiss this appeal on Ground (ii).
Ground (iii): inadvertent mistake of fact as to the fact of forced recruitment of the Tigray in Ethiopia
22. At para. 34 the Judge held that “there was no country evidence supporting her claim that women (or men) were forcibly recruited”. The Appellants now claim that such evidence does exist and point to a Reuters Article: Some Ethiopians claim forced recruitment by Tigrayan forces (16 May 2022) in support of this submission. The Appellants accept that this article was not before the Judge. However, they rely on MM (unfairness; E & R) Sudan [2014] UKUT 00105 (IAC) to argue that the Judge erred in law by (inadvertently) failing to take this article into account.
23. In my judgment the Appellants’ reliance on MM is misplaced and Ground (iii) demonstrates no error of law.
24. MM turned on the existence of a solicitor’s letter. The appellant in that case asserted under cross-examination that there were errors in her interview record, that she had instructed her solicitors to this effect, and that she had been informed by her solicitors that they would write to the Secretary of State accordingly. The First-tier Judge found there to be was no such letter and built on this to support his central finding that the appellant’s account was not credible. The Judge’s finding that there was no letter was, in fact, wrong. Such a letter did exist but it was not before the Judge.
25. On appeal, a Presidential Panel of the Upper Tribunal set the Judge’s decision aside. The Upper Tribunal applied the principle articulated in E&R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 49, in which Carnwath LJ held (without laying down a precise code) that that mistake of fact giving rise to unfairness would give rise to an appeal on point of law where the following conditions were met:

“…there must have been a mistake as to an existing fact, including a mistake as to the availability of evidence on a particular matter. Secondly, the fact or evidence must have been "established", in the sense that it was uncontentious and objectively verifiable. Thirdly, the appellant (or his advisers) must not been have been responsible for the mistake. Fourthly, the mistake must have played a material (not necessarily decisive) part in the Tribunal's reasoning.” [66]
26. Lord Carnwath also confirmed at E&R para. 91 that the admission of new evidence to prove such a claim was to be governed by Ladd v Marshall principles, save that these “may be departed from in exceptional circumstances where the interests of justice require.”
27. The facts in the present case are very different: (i) the Reuters article on which the Appellants now seek to rely was available prior to the hearing (ii) the Appellants are responsible for the failure to adduce it and (iii) the new evidence is not “established” (indeed, it is in tension with the objective evidence cited at para. 16 of the Refusal Letter of 28 March 2025 as relied on by the Judge at para. 33 of his decision).
28. In those circumstances I am satisfied that there was no unfairness in the Judge deciding the appeal on the basis of the material before him. Ground (iii) is accordingly dismissed.
Notice of Decision
1. The appeals are dismissed.

ANDREW DEAKIN

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16 June 2026