Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000455
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65943/2023
LP/12948/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 30th of April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ANTHONY

Between

M N A
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms R Halim, Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms S Lecoint, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 8 April 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal by the appellant against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Reid (“the Judge”) who dismissed the appellant’s appeal on protection and human rights grounds (“the decision”).
Background
2. The appellant is a national of Bangladesh. The appellant applied for protection on the basis of asylum or humanitarian protection on 28 April 2023. The Secretary of State (“the respondent”) refused the protection claim on 17 May 2024. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal and the appeal was heard on 21 July 2025. The Judge dismissed the appeal in a decision promulgated on 23 July 2025.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
3. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal (“UT”) on 5 August 2025. Permission to appeal to the UT was granted on all grounds on 3 February 2026 by First-tier Tribunal Judge Dixon.
Upper Tribunal Hearing
4. Mr Halim addressed the UT on the matters set out in the appellant’s application for permission to appeal which can be categorised as follows: The Judge materially erred in a) failing to take account of material matters when concluding the appellant’s account was vague; b) failing to take account of material evidence and absence of evidence to support findings; c) failing to take account of expert and public domain country evidence.
5. I heard submissions in response from Ms Lecoint. Mr Halim then addressed me on matters arising from Ms Lecoint’s submissions.
6. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision. I do not propose to rehearse the oral submissions made but will consider and address these as part of my analysis set out below.
Analysis and Conclusions
Ground 1: Did the Judge err when concluding the appellant’s account was vague?
7. Ground 1 argue that the appellant’s account of his post 2018 activities were not vague. The grounds argue that the appellant had given a full account in the substantive asylum interview. It was also argued that the refusal letter does not state that the appellant’s account was vague. Mr Halim argued that the evidence provided in the substantive asylum interview was detailed, cogent and had the ring of truth.
8. The respondent in the Rule 24 response states that the Judge does not have to refer to all of the appellant’s evidence when giving the decision. It is argued that even if the Judge had referred to the substantive asylum interview, the Judge would have reached the same conclusion. Ms Lecoint argued that there were matters raised by the respondent in the review which was before the Judge and which the UT can take that the Judge had considered. Ms Lecoint argued that those matters are likely to have fed into the assessment the Judge made of the appellant’s evidence before concluding that it was vague.
9. I have carefully considered the Judge’s reasoning at paragraph 24, 25 and 26 of the decision, the substantive asylum interview, the appellant’s witness statement and the documentary evidence. Although the respondent did not accept the appellant was appointed Joint Secretary in 2018, the Judge, having placed weight on the documentary evidence found the appellant was appointed Joint Secretary in 2018.
10. I find the Judge was entitled to place weight on the absence of documentary evidence of minutes of meetings post October 2018. I find the Judge was entitled to place weight on the lack of specificity in the General Secretary’s letter and the appellant’s witness statement regarding his post October 2018 activities. However, the appellant’s evidence did not just consist of the witness statement and the documentary evidence. His evidence was also contained within the substantive asylum interview.
11. Having carefully considered the substantive asylum interview, it seems to me that the appellant did give details in respect of the work he carried out post October 2018 including recruitment and organising demonstrations and rallies. He gave detail as to how he would carry out recruitment, when he would carry this out and who he avoided approaching. He also gave detail as to the number of demonstrations or rallies he attended and his role in organising these meetings such as deciding who would give the first and last speech, providing guidance to juniors and providing feedback to the party leaders.
12. Whilst I accept there is no requirement for the Judge to refer to all the evidence considered, where the evidence is central to the issues in dispute and can affect the outcome, a Tribunal must engage with the evidence in substance and give reasons for the weight attached to it. If the evidence was rejected, the appellant is entitled to know the reasons why this was rejected. It is axiomatic that the decision discloses clearly the reasons for the Judge’s decision. If the Judge found the evidence to be vague, it is necessary for such findings to be supported by reasons and reference made to evidence central to the issues (MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 00641 (IAC)).
13. In this case, the Judge does not refer to the evidence given in the substantive interview which in my view were central to the issues in dispute and capable of affecting the outcome. If that was rejected when the Judge reached the conclusion that the appellant’s account was vague, the appellant is entitled to know why. I do not accept Ms Lecoint’s submission that it is sufficient that there was ample criticism of that evidence within the respondent’s review that the Judge must have considered before reaching the conclusion that the appellant’s evidence was vague. I find it must be apparent from the decision that the Judge did consider all the evidence relevant to the decision and it should be clear from the decision the basis upon which the Judge came to their conclusions. In this case, I find the failure to provide any reasons for why the account given in the substantive interview was rejected was an error of law. Given the materiality of the evidence concerned, I further consider that this error of law was material.
Ground 2: Did the Judge err in failing to take account of material evidence and failing to give adequate reasons?
First Limb: Documentary Evidence
14. The grounds argue that the Judge failed to take account of the letter from the local councillor of January 2025 (page 299) and the media report of AFM Kamal’s death dated 6 November 2022 (page 328).
15. The Rule 24 response states that the Judge did consider this and had concluded that the documents were unreliable.
16. Mr Halim argued that the letter from the local councillor was crucial as the author was aware of the appellant’s sentence and the attack on his brother. If the Judge was going to dismiss the evidence, reasons needed to be provided. Paragraph 33 of the decision is the only paragraph that deal with the letter and by the time the Judge had considered the letter, the appellant’s credibility had already been dismissed. As for the media report, Mr Halim accepts that there is nothing within the report that links the appellant to AFM Kamal.
17. Having considered the decision, I find the Judge referred to the documents at paragraph 33 of the decision. I find there was only a brief reference to the letter from the local councillor and the media report relied upon by the appellant. I find there was nothing to link the media report to the appellant. The conclusion reached by the Judge regarding the media report was rationally open to them. However, the letter from the local councillor was capable of corroborating both the appellant’s level of political involvement, the sentence he received, the wider context of political violence at the relevant time and the targeting of the appellant’s family. Whilst the Judge was not obliged to accept that evidence, the Judge was required to explain, with adequate reasons, why it was rejected or accorded little weight. I find, accordingly, that there was a failure on the part of the Judge to explain why it was rejecting the councillor’s letter. As there was a legal duty on the Judge to provide a reasoned explanation for this rejection, I consider that this failure constitutes an error of law. Given the important nature of the evidence concerned, I further consider that this error of law was material.
Second Limb: Ability to Leave Bangladesh
18. The grounds argue that the Judge failed to take account of the fact that when the appellant left Bangladesh, he was only subject to a FIR which is a private complaint to the police. It is argued there was no evidence before the Judge to justify its conclusion that there was a report communicated to border security forces only a few weeks later. As for the respondent’s reliance on Bangladesh CPIN Political parties and affiliation September 2020 Version paragraph 10.3.1 of reports of harassment and delay at airport, the grounds argue that this only applies to senior opposition officials. It is argued that the appellant does not claim to be a senior opposition official.
19. Mr Halim argued on behalf of the appellant that the Judge committed an error of logic and reasoning. Mr Halim argued that there was no evidence the FIR would have been communicated to the border force and would have prevented the appellant from leaving. It was argued that the appellant was locally prominent and sufficiently prominent to attract false charges, but he was not sufficiently prominent to attract the attention of border security because he was not a senior opposition official.
20. Ms Lecoint argued that the appellant’s ability to leave Bangladesh without being stopped is consistent with the fact that he is not of adverse interest. It is argued that the Judge was entitled to reach the conclusion that they had.
21. There were two matters considered by the Judge when concluding that the appellant was able to leave without difficulty – the appellant’s profile and the court case. The Judge found the appellant’s ability to leave Bangladesh consistent with the appellant not being a high profile member. Secondly, the Judge found his ability to leave inconsistent with there being a court case against him, even though the Judge acknowledge that at that stage, there was no arrest warrant.
22. The challenge in respect of the appellant’s profile in the grounds of appeal relies on the CPIN. I have carefully considered the Bangladesh CPIN Political parties and affiliation September 2020 Version, paragraph 10.3.1 and 10.3.2:
“10.3.1. In its report covering 2018 events, the USSD HR Report 2018 noted opposition members ‘were sometimes prevented from moving around the country or faced harassment and detention when attempting to do so’ and that ‘[s]ome senior opposition officials reported extensive delays renewing their passports; others reported harassment and delays at the airport when departing the country.’
10.3.2 The DFAT report also noted, ‘Authorities have also prevented opposition figures from leaving the country.’ It added ‘Many, including former BNP Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, have faced legal sanction[s], including sedition charges. In October 2017, authorities issued two further arrest warrants for Khaleda Zia, who was at the time travelling outside Bangladesh and who has spent extended periods in custody.’ ”
23. I find the grounds of appeal and the arguments advanced indicate a failure to read paragraph 10.3.1 and 10.3.2 as a whole. Whilst the USSD report at 10.3.1 refer to some senior opposition officials reporting harassment and delays when departing the country, I find that the DFAT report at 10.3.2 does not make that distinction. It is therefore possible that some non-high profile or junior opposition members have been stopped from leaving the country. Whilst the Judge did not specifically refer to this paragraph within the CPIN, I find even if the Judge did, the conclusion the Judge arrived at regarding the appellant’s profile was rationally open to the Judge.
24. In respect of the court case, I find the Judge’s findings that the appellant was able to leave Bangladesh without difficulty was inadequately reasoned. As the grounds and Mr Halim argued, at the time of departure, the evidence indicated that the appellant was subject only to an FIR. If the Judge came to the view that there was some evidential basis for the conclusion reached that the FIR would have come to the attention of border authorities, the Judge should have referred to such evidence. I find the appellant is entitled to know the reasons why the Judge reached such a conclusion. As there was a legal duty on the Judge to provide a reasoned explanation for this finding, I consider that this failure constitutes an error of law. Given the importance of this on the assessment of risk on return, I further consider that this error of law was material.
Third Limb: Letter from Wife
25. The grounds argue that the Judge criticised the appellant’s wife who was in the UK for not attending to give evidence. The grounds argue that the letter of support from the appellant’s wife required a distinct finding on credibility in the absence of any inconsistency or implausibility. Mr Halim argued that the appellant’s wife non-attendance at the hearing was not a basis to ignore the letter given no inconsistency or implausibility was identified by the Judge.
26. Ms Lecoint’s argument is that the Judge was entitled to reach the conclusion that they did. It is argued that the Judge was not obliged to accept the credibility of the witness if the witness was not present to give evidence.
27. I find the Judge is entitled to give no weight to the credibility of the witness if the witness was not present to give evidence and especially when it is reasonable to expect the witness to attend to give evidence. I find it is clear from the decision that this was why the appellant’s wife’s evidence was rejected. No reasons were recorded within the decision as to why the appellant’s wife did not attend to give evidence. If reasons were provided, the Judge would have recorded this at paragraph 14 of the decision. I find the appellant’s wife was in the UK on a Skilled Workers Visa and absent any cogent explanation for her non-attendance, the Judge was entitled to place no weight on her letter of support. I do not accept the evidence required a distinct finding on credibility in circumstances when it is reasonable to expect the witness to attend to give evidence and submit to cross examination. I find the weight attached by the Judge to the appellant’s wife’s letter was a matter for the Judge and rationally open to the Judge.
Fourth Limb: Delay from FIR to Charge Sheet
28. The grounds refer to the Bangladesh CPIN Actors of Protection (November 2023) at paragraph 2.1.13: which states that “Corruption and bribes are prevalent throughout the court system, especially in lower courts, and delays and backlogs limit the justice process.” The grounds argue that the Judge had provided no reasons to support the conclusion that it was implausible that it would take from September 2022 to March 2023 for the FIR to result in a charge sheet or arrest warrant. It is argued that the Judge’s findings were inconsistent with the background evidence in the CPIN. If the Judge wanted to disagree with the CPIN, they had to identify evidence to underpin that finding and in this case, they did not.
29. Ms Lecoint argued pursuant to Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 that unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, this Tribunal should assume that the Judge has taken the whole of the evidence into consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that the evidence was overlooked.
30. I agree with Ms Lecoint that the Judge does not have to identify and explain every factor which weighed with the Judge in their appraisal of the evidence. However, the issues the resolution of which were vital to the Judge’s conclusion should be identified and the manner in which it was resolved explained. In this case, I find the Judge stated at paragraph 31 that the appellant’s lawyer in Bangladesh did not explain why if the case was filed in September 2022 there was no charge sheet or arrest warrant until March 2023. It is unclear if the appellant’s lawyer in Bangladesh was ever asked to explain that issue. In essence, the Judge stated there was no evidence to explain the delay. As the grounds of appeal make clear, there was background evidence to support a cogent reason for the delay. I find the CPIN was material evidence the resolution of which was vital to the Judge’s conclusion. If the Judge disagree with the CPIN, it is necessary for such findings to be supported by reasons and reference made to evidence central to the issue in dispute. I find the Judge’s finding that the delay from FIR to charge sheet or arrest warrant was implausible was not rationally open to the Judge in light of the CPIN.
Ground 3
31. At paragraph 31 of the decision, the Judge criticised the appellant for failing to instruct lawyers in Bangladesh and treated this as undermining the likelihood that charges existed. In doing so, it is argued in the grounds and by Mr Halim that the Judge failed to properly to engage with the expert evidence describing the practical difficulties and risks associated with contesting politically motivated charges in absentia. Mr Halim also referred to the expert report at paragraph 38. Mr Halim argued the expert report supported the appellant’s evidence that he would be imprisoned for 3 months if he challenged the decision. The Judge rejected the appellant’s evidence on the basis that this was not mentioned in the letter from the appellant’s lawyer.
32. Ms Lecoint argued that the Judge had clearly stated that the expert’s report was general and did not relate to the appellant. Ms Lecoint argued that whilst the report demonstrates political unrest, it did not show how the appellant fitted into that unrest.
33. I find the Judge’s characterisation of the expert report as being of only general relevance does not absolve the Judge of the obligation to consider how that evidence bore on the specific adverse inference the Judge drew against the appellant. When rejecting the appellant’s evidence, the Judge was required to explain, with adequate reasons why it was rejected by reference to any material corroborative evidence. I find that paragraph 36 of the expert report supported the appellant’s account of the difficulties defending himself because he had absconded. I agree with Mr Halim that paragraph 38 of the expert report does support the appellant’s account that he would receive a sentence of imprisonment or bail on conditions. I find, accordingly, that there was a failure on the part of the Judge to explain why it was rejecting the appellant’s account when the expert evidence corroborated the appellant’s account. If the Judge was rejecting the expert evidence, there was a legal duty on the Judge to provide a reasoned explanation for this rejection. I consider the failure to do so constitutes an error of law. Given the errors identified go to the heart of the Judge’s credibility assessment, I consider this to be a material error of law.
Remaking
34. The effect of paragraph 7 of the ‘Practice Statement Immigration And Asylum Chambers of the First Tier Tribunal And the Upper Tribunal’ regarding disposal of appeals in the UT is that where, following the grant of permission to appeal, the UT concludes that there has been an error of law, then the general principle is that the case will be retained within the UT for the remaking of the decision. The exceptions to this general principle is set out in paragraph 7.(2)(a) and (b) Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal which I have considered carefully alongside the guidance set out in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC) and AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512.
35. Mr Halim submitted that were I to be satisfied that there is a material error of law, it would be appropriate to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal because of the level of factual findings required. Ms Lecoint had no objections to Mr Halim’s submissions.
36. I am persuaded that the nature and extent of the judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal. I conclude that this case should not follow the general procedure and should be treated as an exception under paragraph 7.2(b).
Notice of Decision
The making of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision did involve the making of material errors on a point of law.
The decision is set aside in its entirety with no findings preserved.
The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a hearing de novo by any Judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Reid.

Farin Anthony

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 April 2026