Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000458
First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/65929/2024
LP/14325/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24 July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

SSK (plus 1)
(Anonymity ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: The Appellant appeared as a litigant in person
For the Respondent: Ms Clewley, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 14 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. The parties are entitled to apply on notice to vary this direction.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant, a national of Pakistan, appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge GD Davison (“the Judge”) dated 11 August 2025 dismissing her international protection and human rights claim.
2. The Appellant had sent various e-mails to the Upper Tribunal, including on 11 May 2026 stating that she was not going to attend the hearing and was unable to afford to pay for legal representatives to attend on her behalf of either. The day before the hearing, the Appellant had filed a written skeleton argument 3 pages in length and which is dated 13 May 2026.
3. Despite her e-mails, the Appellant did attend the hearing and so she took a full part in the proceedings before me. I explained the procedure to her.
4. The hearing before is to consider whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. If I find that there is a material error of law in the decision, then the decision will have to remade. If I find that there is no material error of law in the Judge’ decision then the Judge’s decision which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal will stand.
The Grant of Permission to Appeal
5. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Pickering by way of a decision dated 3 February 2026.When granting permission the learned judge said:
“The application for permission to appeal has been lodged out of time. It should have been lodged on 25 August 2025 however it was not uploaded to the platform until 18 November 2025 thereby making it 83 days out of time. The breach is significant. However I note that the appellant had provided grounds for permission to appeal on the IAFT-5 form and lodged in line with the instructions on the form on 25 August 2025. The appellant I note from the attached evidence attempted to chase the application up subsequently. Additionally the appellant is not legally represented. The reason for the lateness is the appellant’s misunderstanding about the manner in which in the application needed to be lodged. I have decided notwithstanding the considerable breach to extend time as I am satisfied given all the circumstances that it was a genuine misunderstanding as to the procedure and that the appellant had attempted to engage with the process and rectified the mistake efficiently once pointed out.
2. In relation to ground 5 it is arguable that the Judge has misdirected themselves in their approach to the expert evidence. The expert evidence is addressed §39 however it is at least arguable that the Judge reached their credibility assessment prior to considering the expert evidence contrary to what is said in Mibanga [2005] INLR 377 §24. In light of my decision to grant permission on ground 5, this arguably impacts ground 2, 3 and 4.
3. Ground 1 submits that the Judge erred in their approach to Devaseelan. This is not arguable. The Judge directed themselves appropriately §16 and 17. In substance the Judge did not treat the previous determination as determinative of the outcome of the present appeal and treated it as a starting point §26.
4. In relation to ground 7 the ground is a disagreement with the findings. The difficulty is the ground is expressing how materially the Judge could have reached a different conclusion.
5. Permission is granted on grounds 2, 3, 4, 5. Permission is refused on grounds 1 and 6”
The Hearing Before Me
6. The Appellant is a litigant in person. Her English was of a good standard and she said she wanted to conduct the hearing in English. I invited her to make any submissions that she wished. She said she did not need to say anything additional to what appeared in her skeleton argument. She said she had brought her child’s original birth certificate. I had the name of HK and the father was said to be MAK.
7. Ms Clewley said she had not been provided with the Appellant’s skeleton argument. She invited me to permit her an opportunity to read that and which I acceded to. When the hearing resumed, Ms Clewley said that the grant of permission had concentrated on Ground 5. She referred me to page 555 of the bundle. It was submitted that the Respondent’s Reasons for Refusal Letter had accepted that the Appellant had had a child when not married and there had been threats from her family.
8. Ms Clewley said that page 53 showed that the expert had said,
“My methodology is to evaluate the appellant’s claim in light of objective sociological and legal data, assuming she is being honest about her claims. For me to assume otherwise would be inappropriate and would impinge upon the role of the First Tier Tribunal which must decide all aspects of the appellant’s claim and all points related to her credibility by deciding her appeal.”
9. Ms Clewley said that in view of the acceptance of the matters and the way it was put in the Reasons for Refusal Letter therefore the threats had to be considered with reference to the previous decision of the earlier Judge in 2023 and the findings which were made then.
10. Ms Clewely said that it was against that background that the expert report’s usefulness to the Judge had to be considered. Where the expert was asked by the Appellant’s solicitors to deal with plausibility, it was submitted that in fact was not a matter for the expert. Ms Clewley said that the issue in this case was that the Judge did not accept that relationship between the Appellant and her partner/husband was subsisting. This was not a matter that the expert could deal with.
11. Ms Clewley referred me to paragraph 31 of the Judge’s decision which stated:
“The burden of proof is upon the appellant. I find that there is no credible evidence that has been advanced to state that she is not in a relationship with the father of her child. She lives with his family and is supported by him. The family and him are also said to assist in the care of her daughter. (SB 127, 139 and 355 all mention the appellant living with family.)”
12. Ms Clewley said that whilst there was background evidence about children being born out of wedlock, the real issue was that the evidence was not accepted by the Judge about the child’s father’s relationship with the Appellant. Ms Clewley said all of the other grounds were parasitic on Ground 5.
13. After hearing from Ms Clewley, I invited the Appellant to say what she wanted to say in reply. She said she wanted to give a clear point of view. She said there was a practical reality. She said the expert was a human being and what was said was based on limited knowledge. She said the practical reality was a different thing. She said she was a lone woman with health issues and would be returning after many years. She said she was traumatised. She said she came from a country that knew law and order. She said recently a woman had been oppressed by her husband and that there was a court settlement. After 2 weeks the woman was found dead and this had been on the news. This was in Pakistan. The man had been beating the woman. She had been killed by her husband.
14. I had reserved my decision. I now provide this decision.
The Correct Approach to Appeals from the First-tier Tribunal
15. I remind myself that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688. In particular the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 makes clear:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:

‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:

(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.

(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.

(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
16. The legal test to be met by the Appellant to show a material error of law is to be found in the Court of Appeal’s decision in R(Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm. A.R. 535.
Consideration and Analysis
17. It is necessary to consider the Judge’s decision as a whole. The Judge said at paragraph 28:
“The appellant does not dispute that she still presently resides with her ex-partner and his family. Her claim is that she does this out of necessity as she has no alternative options.”
18. The Judge concluded at paragraphs 29 to 31 that she did not accept the Appellant’s evidence that she was not in a relationship with the child’s father:
“29. The appellant’s claim is that for a period of time her ex-partner lived away from his family home. In oral evidence she stated that he left the property in 2022 and came back in September or October 2023. I note that this is no more specific than the evidence given at the previous hearing (see paragraphs 15 and 16 of the previous determination). The Judge had made an adverse credibility finding. No evidence has been provided from any friend of her ex-partner to establish his whereabouts. No evidence has been provided by the ex-partner to set out the nature and extent of their relationship. 30. There is further the issue of the letter requesting they vacate the property in which they reside (SB 363). This notes that the appellant her child and ex-partner and her ex-partner’s brother are resident at 30 8B the Broadway. The landlord of the property has given “verbal notice” to the appellant’s ex-partner’s brother that they must vacate within 14 days. This letter is dated 26 March 2024. The family all still reside at this property. The letter also states that the ex-partner’s brother can no longer provide the family with any support. I find that this letter has been fabricated in support of the claim. The appellant was attempting to show no family support in the United Kingdom and that she was being evicted from her property. The reality is that at the time of application and at the date of hearing the appellant has remained with her ex-partner and his family. The appellant’s explanation at the hearing was that they simply spoke to the landlord who then agreed to let them stay. I did not find that this evidence had the ring of truth. The letter of eviction states that they cannot stay there due to overcrowding and they do not have permission to be there. The fact that the appellant’s ex-partner and his family have continued to support the appellant for well over a year since this letter was written also points to the fabrication that support could no longer be provided. 31. The burden of proof is upon the appellant. I find that there is no credible evidence that has been advanced to state that she is not in a relationship with the father of her child. She lives with his family and is supported by him. The family and him are also said to assist in the care of her daughter. (SB 127, 139 and 355 all mention the appellant living with family.)”
19. The Judge then concluded in respect of the previous hearing and in respect of the Appellant’s case now compared with the case before the earlier Judge in 2023:
“I find merit in the respondent’s admission that the appellant is simply seeking to re-argue the case that was run before the previous Tribunal. On this occasion she is simply seeking to argue it on the basis of asylum and Article 8 grounds rather than simply Article 8 grounds. There is no indication as to what her ex partners asylum claim is or even if one has been lodged. 33. There were other aspects of the appellant’s evidence that I did not find to be credible. She stated there had been no conversation with her ex-partner as to what would happen if the appellant were required to leave. Given the evidence concerning the close bond between her ex-partner and his daughter I find this evidence did not have the ring of truth. There is evidence within the paperwork submitted that the appellant made an application for Asylum Support where her ex-partner was a dependent. She stated that this was done on the instruction of 8 15 Appeal Number: PA/65929/2024 her solicitors as despite being separated they had a child together. I did not find this to be credible. No Birth Certificate has been provided. There is no dispute that the child exists. But when asked whether a Birth Certificate had been provided the appellant stated “I have given everything many times.” It was accepted by the appellant’s representative that no copy of the birth certificate has been provided. I find this is to hide the genuine nature of the relationship between the appellant and her partner. 34. In oral evidence the appellant claimed that her family are well connected. She stated that her father knows Members of Parliament and other members of the family work in influential areas such as ‘IT and Real estate’. I find this is a further example of the appellant seeking to embellish a claim. There is no mention of this powerful and influential family connections in the appellant’s witness statement (see specifically paragraph 28). 35. The respondent has accepted that the appellant’s family have made threats. Given the background information it is entirely possible that unlike her ex partners and family her own family have not accepted the relationship and child. The appellant claims not to have had contact with her family for approximately 2 years. Whilst I have some reservations over the credence of these claims as it is possible, just like her ex-partner’s family, that the passage of time has eased her family’s outrage at the relationship and birth of the child out of wedlock, I proceed to determine the rest of the appeal on the basis that the appellant’s relationship with her family is permanently fractured and they have made threats against her.”
20. The Judge went on to consider the further aspects of the case, including the child, the child’s father and the risk on return and the expert report, including that it was for her, the Judge, to consider the expert evidence but to make her decision on the whole of the evidence. The Judge said:
“The appellant’s ex-partner has no status in the United Kingdom and so could return with her as part of a family unit. I do not therefore accept that the appellant would be at risk upon return. 38. Even if the appellant had to internally relocate I find that the appellant would have family support. There is no evidence to suggest that her ex-partner’s family would not support the couple/ the appellant and her daughter if they had to go abroad. At the previous hearing it was found that they would. The family have continued to support the appellant to this day. I find there are no good reason to depart from the findings previously made. The appellant is well educated. It will “not be normally” unduly harsh for a single woman to relocate internally with family support. 39. In making the above findings I note the general societal attitudes ostracism and discrimination as set out in the refusal letter. I further note the content of the expert report. However, the expert has approached the evidence on the basis it is credible. For the reasons given above I have not accepted the same. The expert did also not consider relevant Country Guidance. I have borne in mind the findings of the expert but weighed and assessed the same in the round with all of the other evidence to arrive at the conclusion to set out above. 40. I do not find that the appellant has established a well-founded fear of persecution upon return. I find that the appellant could return with her daughter and ex partner. I find he has an extensive support network of family in Pakistan who could help them settle. No evidence has been provided to suggest that the appellant could not obtain medical treatment. Even if her medical needs were such that she could not work the appellant could be supported by her ex-partner and/or his family. 41. As the appellant has had no contact with her family for nearly 2 years if she were to return to Pakistan they would be simply unaware if she lived in a different part of the country. Pakistan has a very large population with many cities. The appellant could go and live in any of these and establish herself with her now established family unit.”
21. Ground 1 was not granted permission to appeal so there is no need to deal with it. The Appellant’s skeleton argument accepts that. Similarly, Ground 6 was not granted permission and that too was accepted in the Appellant’s skeleton argument. Therefore, I do not need to deal with Ground 6 either.
22. Ground 2 contends that the Judge did not appropriately consider risk on return and internal relocation. This is a hopeless ground. The Judge referred to the Country Guidance caselaw, the background material and indeed that in any event the Appellant had bene away for some 2 year and she could move within Pakistan. It is well know that Pakistan is very large country with a population of over 200 million people. The Judge referred in her decision to there being numerous large cities in Pakistan. The Judge in an unarguably lawful manner concluded:
“Even if the appellant had to internally relocate I find that the appellant would have family support. There is no evidence to suggest that her ex-partner’s family would not support the couple/ the appellant and her daughter if they had to go abroad. At the previous hearing it was found that they would. The family have continued to support the appellant to this day. I find there are no good reason to depart from the findings previously made. The appellant is well educated. It will “not be normally” unduly harsh for a single woman to relocate internally with family support.”
23. Ground 3 contends there were speculative findings. This is a hopeless ground. As the Judge explained, she had considered all of the evidence in the round, including the earlier Judge’s decision and the new evidence. The Judge reminded herself it was for the Appellant to prove her case. She had failed to do so. It was a curious situation that the Appellant was referring to continuing to live at the family home. The Judge had the benefit of seeing and hearing from the Appellant and she made lawful findings. The Appellant had failed to provide a birth certificate, despite knowing the issues. The burden of proof was on the Appellant. The Judge was entitled to make the findings that she did. Whilst the Appellant attempted to introduce the birth certificate as part of her case before me, that birth certificate was not before the Judge. In any event, the Judge had made extensive and numerous other findings, “even if” the father of the child was the father of the child. Ultimately, the Judge did not accept that the couple were not together. The Judge went on further to say, that even if they were not together as a couple, the Appellant would still not be at risk on return and could internally relocate within the vast country of Pakistan. Those were lawful findings which were open to the Judge who had considered the case on the basis of the evidence as a whole.
24. Ground 4 contends that there was a failure to consider the best interests of the child. This is a hopeless ground because contrary to the grounds. In addition to paragraph 31 of the Judge’s decision which I have referred to above, the Judge said, including in respect of medical issues as follows and which conclusion the Judge was entitled to reach on the evidence:
“I do not find that the appellant has established a well-founded fear of persecution upon return. I find that the appellant could return with her daughter and ex partner. I find he has an extensive support network of family in Pakistan who could help them settle. No evidence has been provided to suggest that the appellant could not obtain medical treatment. Even if her medical needs were such that she could not work the appellant could be supported by her ex-partner and/or his family.”
25. Ground 5 contends that the Judge considered the expert evidence towards the end of her judgment. In my judgment it is important to look at the actual situation in this case. The Judge did not accept the Appellant’s evidence, but the expert had assumed matters as reported by the Appellant. It makes no difference in this case that the Judge considered the expert evidence towards the end of her decision against the background of this case. The same result would have been inevitable even if the Judge had considered the expert evidence at some other stage. The expert evidence was a tool, but obviously the wrong tool in this case. In respect of Ground 5 which alleges a failure to engage with the expert evidence and reliance on the case of Mibanga v Secretary of State for the Home Department, as Ms Clewley persuasively submitted, in this case the Judge had considered the expert evidence. There had been previous decisions of an earlier Judge in 2023. Contrary to the grounds, the Judge considered this Appellant’s case at some length. The simple position is that the Judge did not believe the Appellant’s case. Indeed, it is not difficult to see why the Judge simply could not accept the Appellant’s curious case. The fact that the Appellant disagrees with the Judge’s decision does not mean that there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision.
26. This Appellant has been described as a well educated person and that showed before me too. Therefore, whilst I am grateful to the Appellant for attending this hearing, despite her previously insisting she would not, I am not able to agree with her written and oral submissions. Her submissions have no merit.
27. The Appellant’s appeal is a mere disagreement with the Judge’s decision. The Appellant has sought to reargue her case. That is not permissible.
28. I conclude that there is no material error of law in the Judge’s decision. Accordingly, the Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

NOTICE OF DECISION
There is no material error of law in the decision of the First tier Tribunal.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal stands. The Appellant’s appeal therefore remains dismissed on all grounds.

10 July 2026
Abid Mahmood
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber