Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000461
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64401/2023
LP/13289/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 14 April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BUTLER

Between

URS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A. Slatter, counsel
For the Respondent: Mr E. Tufan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 3 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh whose appeal against the refusal of his protection and human rights claims was dismissed by FTTJ Dieu (‘the Judge’) in a determination dated 16 December 2025. The Judge granted permission to appeal on grounds which I will discuss further below on 3 February 2026. For the reasons which follow, I allow the appeal in relation to the Appellant’s Article 8 ECHR claim (both on error of law and substantive grounds) and otherwise dismiss the appeal.
Grant of permission to appeal
2. The preliminary issue in this matter was the extent of the grant of permission to appeal. The Judge’s decision states “Permission to appeal is partially granted”. The ‘reasons for decision’ section purports to grant permission to appeal “on the limited basis under Ground 2 and 3 only”.
3. The Appellant sought to pursue Grounds 2, 3, and 5 (the latter concerning Article 8) notwithstanding the apparently limited grant of permission. The Respondent’s Rule 24 review stated that “the grant of permission to appeal attempts to limit permission to the grounds relating to Art. 8, but the form it takes fails to do so”. Mr Slatter filed a skeleton argument prior to the hearing which likewise contended, in reliance upon Safi [2018] UKUT 388 (IAC) and the Joint Presidential Guidance 2019 on Permission to Appeal to UTIAC that, while the decision states that permission was only partially granted, it did not effectively limit the grant.
4. At the hearing, I agreed with the parties that there had not been any effective limitation of the grant of permission to appeal. In Safi the Tribunal held at §42 that:
“We do not consider that it is appropriate to state "Permission is granted, limited as hereafter set out", unless the limitation occurs specifically in the section of the completed document which contains the decision, as opposed to the reasons for that decision; that is to say, in the first and not the second section”.
5. The Presidential Guidance does not replicate this ruling in terms, instead stating at §49:
“If nevertheless it is decided permission should only be granted on limited or restricted grounds, the Judge must state this clearly and expressly in the in the section of the standard form that contains the decision. The judge must also set out reasons why permission has been refused on some grounds. It is only in very exceptional circumstances that the UT will be persuaded that a decision which, on its face, grants permission to appeal without express limitation is to be construed as anything other than a grant of permission on all of the grounds accompanying the application for permission, regardless of what might be said in the reasons for decision section of the document (see Safi and others (permission to appeal decisions) [2018] UKUT 388 (IAC)).”
6. I consider that, as Safi is clear in its position on the approach to be taken in a case such as this and as the Presidential Guidance relies upon Safi, I should follow the Upper Tribunal’s approach as set out in §42 of its determination. On that basis, it is clear that the Judge fell into the error identified by the Tribunal in Safi by including a decision purporting to limit grounds without specifying the limitation.
7. While no written application for renewal of permission to appeal had been made, Mr Slatter confirmed that he would be seeking to renew such an application out of time in the event that I had concluded that the grant of permission had been limited. I confirmed orally at the hearing that, if I were wrong in my primary position on the permission decision, I would in any event have been willing to grant the renewal application. This is appropriate given the apparent strength of Ground 5 and the lack of clarity in the permission decision.
Error of law
8. The Appellant only pursued Grounds 2, 3, and 5 at the hearing before me. Grounds 2 and 3 relate to the Judge’s consideration of the Appellant’s protection claim (which relates to a fear of serious harm due to his claimed political activities in Bangladesh and sur place activities in the UK). Ground 5 relates to the Judge’s treatment of the Appellant’s Article 8 human rights claim, noting that by the time of the determination (albeit not the time of the hearing before the Judge), the Appellant had lived in the UK for 20 years.
9. Ground 2. The Appellant alleges that the Judge’s adverse credibility findings were vitiated by process and (it appears) outcome rationality. In particular, the Appellant criticises the Judge’s treatment of the timing of his claim and argues that the Judge failed to apply the RT (Zimbabwe) principle. The Respondent characterises this as mere disagreement not amounting to any error of law.
10. In reviewing the factual findings of the Judge who had the opportunity to hear from the Appellant at an oral hearing, I remind myself of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Majera v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1597, which restated the well-established principles at §38:
“An appellate court or tribunal should not lightly interfere with such [factual and evaluative] conclusions (see such well-known decisions as Fage UK Ltd v Chobani UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5, [2014] FSR 29 and Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, [2022] 4 WLR 48). Caution is particularly appropriate when considering decisions of an expert tribunal: AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2008] 1 AC 678, [30] (Baroness Hale).”
11. The Judge’s findings on the Appellant’s account of fearing persecution on the basis of his political activities are set out between §§25-36 of the First-tier Tribunal’s determination. The Judge considered the Appellant’s screening and asylum interviews, his witness statement, and oral evidence. The Judge noted significant inconsistencies in the Appellant’s account and in his claim to have memory issues. The Judge also relied upon the lack of “any reasonable explanation given by the appellant as to why he did not claim arrival in the UK when on his account he had experienced adverse interest from the Awami League before he came to the UK” (§35). As the Appellant came to the UK in 2005, this was a significant aspect of his claim which required explanation and in any event the Judge was required to consider s. 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004.
12. The Appellant has not disputed any specific aspects of the evidence taken against him by the Judge. While the written grounds refer broadly to “a lack of fair consideration”, the Appellant does not identify any material about his time in Bangladesh which should have been taken into account but was not. There is no coherent argument of process rationality in relation to the evidence of the Appellant’s experiences in Bangladesh.
13. The Appellant also contends that there was a failure to apply the RT (Zimbabwe) principle in relation to the Appellant’s sur place activities in the UK. I accept that the Judge did not make findings about the Appellant’s sur place activities or factor these into the findings about credibility and risk. I accept that this was likely a failure to give anxious scrutiny to that element of the Appellant’s claim. However, I do not consider that any error was material. The Appellant’s activities in the UK were the subject of very limited evidence throughout his claim and no submissions have been made as to why his claim would succeed on the basis of such limited activity, given the changes in country position and the Judge’s negative findings about his previous activities in Bangladesh. Even if I were to find an error of law and proceed to determine the matter considering the Appellant’s sur place activities together with the Judge’s lawful factual findings, I would reach the same conclusion on the outcome of the protection claim given the extremely limited nature of the Appellant’s activities in the UK, the findings that he has not previously faced difficulties in Bangladesh, and the fact that the political situation in Bangladesh has changed considerably, with the Awami League no longer holding power.
14. Ground 3. The Appellant’s submissions in relation to Ground 3 are largely identical to those under Ground 2. No freestanding argument is raised in relation to the very significant obstacles the Appellant claims to face as a result of his political affiliations. This Ground fails for the same reasons given in relation to Ground 2.
15. Ground 5. I accept that the Judge erred in dismissing the Appellant’s Article 8 ECHR claim. The Judge accepted that the Appellant had remained continuously in the UK since his arrival in the UK. However, the Judge concluded that the Appellant’s Article 8 claim could not succeed because “He still cannot meet the rules at date of hearing because he is a few weeks shy. There is no near miss principle, that is trite […] By the time of the decision, the appellant will have exceed [sic] 20 years in the UK but that will have to be a matter for the respondent”. Notwithstanding this point, Mr Tufan confirmed at the hearing before me that the Respondent has taken no action in relation to the Appellant’s long residence.
16. The parties were in disagreement as to the relevant date for the Article 8 analysis. Mr Slatter invited me to conclude that the Judge was obliged to assess the Appellant’s Article 8 claim as at the date of the decision while Mr Tufan submitted that the relevant date was the date of the hearing. Neither party provided any authority in support of their position, despite my providing an opportunity for them to make any post-hearing submissions they wished.
17. In my view, the answer to this question lies in s. 85(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Headed ‘Matters to be considered’, this subsection provides that “on an appeal under s. 82(1) … against a decision the Tribunal may consider any matter which it thinks relevant to the substance of the decision, including … a matter arising after the date of the decision”. Therefore, the Tribunal has a broad discretion to take into account all relevant matters. For the purposes of a long residence private life claim under Article 8, the fact that someone will (as at the date of the hearing) shortly meet and / or (as at the date of the determination) meets the 20-year requirement is plainly a material consideration. I consider that there is no prohibition on the Tribunal considering all relevant matters before it as at the date of its decision as any other approach would lead to an artificial and unworkable approach, in which the Tribunal would be unable to consider post-hearing submissions. This is flatly contrary to the ECHR’s aspiration to make Convention rights “real and effective” rather than “theoretical and illusory” (Magyar Helsinki Bizottág v Hungary (18030/11), (2020) 71 EHRR 2, §121).
18. I therefore conclude that the Judge was required to take into account the fact that the Appellant had spent 20 years in the UK as at the date of the determination, as this was a relevant consideration which was likely to be decisive of his Article 8 appeal. The reference to the ‘near miss’ principle was insufficient to dispose of this point, as (i) the Appellant’s length of residence was still a relevant consideration and (ii) the Appellant in fact satisfied the 20-year requirement as at the date of the determination. This involved an error of law.
19. At the hearing, I asked the parties if they were willing for me to determine the Appellant’s Article 8 matters without a hearing in the event that I found an error of law. Both parties agreed. I will therefore proceed to do so.
Redetermination
20. On the basis of the Judge’s unchallenged findings, the Appellant has lived in the UK continuously for 20 years. There is undisputed evidence from his uncle and friend in the UK confirming that he has an established private life in this country. He also describes a “strong social and emotional bond with the British community” as well as a sister in this country in his witness statement. None of these features has been challenged.
21. There is no suggestion that the Appellant has any criminal convictions or other adverse history which would lead to the refusal of an application under the Private Life rules if made today. The Rules set out the Respondent’s position on the public interest considerations. Therefore, while s. 117B of the 2002 Act places little weight on private life established by a person whilst in the UK without permission, the Rules acknowledge that after 20 years even this irregular form of residence will constitute a sufficiently established private life to mean that there is no public interest in an individual’s removal (provided the other aspects of the Rules are met). There is no suggestion that the Appellant falls within the grounds for refusal set out within Part Suitability of the Rules.
22. I consider that the Appellant can meet the requirements of the Rules as at the date of this decision. There is no dispute that he has lived in the UK and I find that he has an established private life here. The fact that he can meet the requirements of the Rules means that there is no countervailing public interest in his removal from the UK, notwithstanding the little weight provisions of the 2002 Act.
23. I therefore conclude that the Appellant’s removal from the UK would constitute a disproportionate interference with his private life and allow his appeal on Article 8 grounds.

Notice of Decision
The error of law appeal is allowed on Ground 5. Following redetermination, I allow the substantive appeal on Article 8 grounds.
The appeal is otherwise dismissed.

Miranda Butler

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13 April 2026