Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Appeal Number: UI-2026-000491
EU/57708/2023
LE/03544/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House Decision & Reasons Issued
On 09 April 2026 On 11 June 2026

Before

Deputy upper Tribunal judge iqbal

Between

HELEN CORDERO MEDINA
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: No Attendance
For the Respondent: Ms Everett – Senior Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

Background
1. The application for permission to appeal was made by the appellant against the decision of the judge of the First-tier Tribunal ("the judge") who dismissed her appeal on the 9 October 2024, following the hearing on the same day. The appellant is a national of Spain, born in 1993. She appealed the decision dated 13 December 2023 in which the Respondent refused an application under Appendix EU submitted on the 27 July 2023.
First-tier Tribunal Decision
2. The judge in her decision of 9 October 2024 at [6] considered in the first instance, whether the appeal ought to be determined without an oral hearing. The judge noted the appellant requested a decision on the papers and it was open to her to attend as she says she was in the United Kingdom and had the ability to call witnesses from her employment or elsewhere to address the concerns of the respondent and to enable her to be tested in evidence in chief. Against this the judge concluded that it was the appellant's right not to attend and was satisfied that both parties were aware the appeal was progressing to a decision and had the opportunity to admit evidence on which they sought to rely. She outlined that the issues were clearly set out in the decision and review and the appellant had enough time to respond, therefore it was just and fair to proceed to determine the appeal on the evidence available.
3. At [7] she identified that the issue in the decision was whether the appellant was residing in the UK on the specified date and had completed a continuous qualifying period of 5 years as per Appendix EU11 and/or EU14.
4. At [9] the judge noted the evidence submitted suggested the appellant was continuously resident in the UK in the disputed period. At [10] the judge noted that the HSBC account showed regular transactions for UK based services between November 2018 to April 2019. The transactions from the 29 April 2019, continued in Spain up until August 2019 when the account was no longer in use, until 2022. The judge noted at [11] that the appellant's employment with TRC appeared to have ended in April 2019, according to what had been declared, which supported a chronology of return to Spain. At [12], the judge noted the appellant had failed to explain when she returned to the UK after travelling to Spain in April 2019 and that she could have done so supported by easily available evidence.
5. At [13] the judge noted that the Appellant relied on the letter from her employer ‘Success Recruitment’ which asserted that the appellant worked for them in the United Kingdom as a cleaner, contracted for 16 hours per week between 1 April 2020 and 31 March 2021. The judge found that the letter was not on a formal letterhead and did not contain any information about the company which prevented any verification by the respondent, also noting that the burden was on the Appellant to establish facts were as claimed, with reliable evidence.
6. In relation to payslips submitted for the same period, the judge considered at [14] –[15] that the appellant was paid in cash and whilst they showed her national insurance number, it did not break down the hours worked or hourly rate and were for a fixed figure each month.
7. The judge at [16] noted the respondent's concerns that whilst the Appellant stated she was paid cash from her employment during this period, her employment before and after this period with other employers demonstrated monies paid directly into her account, as could be seen on the statements, and even if she were not paying her salary into her account, it did not address why her account went dormant with no transactions at all which did not fit the pattern of use prior to and after the disputed period.
8. At [17] the judge considered the P60 for the same period, which ought to have been a reliable document. However, it was noted that the HMRC printout recorded a start date of 6 March 2021, nearly a year after the appellant claimed to have commenced employment, and an end date of 31 March 2021. This indicated that the entire claimed annual income of over £10,200 had been declared to HMRC as having been earned within a matter of weeks in March 2021. The judge concluded that this was suggestive of payslips having been produced retrospectively to align with the stated employment dates.
9. The judge also observed that the appellant’s work as a cleaner appeared to have taken place during the pandemic, at a time when there were significant restrictions on freedom of movement for EU nationals and when many businesses were closed. This raised the possibility that the appellant may not have been working, or may have been furloughed, yet the asserted working pattern did not reflect those circumstances. Of further concern was that the HMRC printout did not support the dates of employment in the payslips and supporting letter.
10. At [18] the judge recorded similar concerns in relation to the second period of claimed employment with Benz Burgers Limited. The appellant’s asserted income of £9,840 between April 2021 and January 2022. However, the payslips provided did not contain any breakdown, were expressed as fixed monthly payments and showed no deduction for tax.
11. The HMRC records, by contrast, indicated that the appellant was recorded as working only between 6 March 2022 and 31 March 2022, with the entirety of the salary declared as having been paid within that short period.
12. At [19] the judge concluded that the respondent’s concern that the appellant’s claimed periods of employment did not correspond with the HMRC records was justified. The records were said to suggest that evidence had been prepared retrospectively in order to present an appearance of residence and employment in the United Kingdom, rather than demonstrating genuine and continuous residence and work.
13. The judge further concluded that, when this was considered alongside the bank statements, which showed the appellant in Spain between April 2019 and August 2019 and a British account which remained largely dormant until 2022, these matters gave rise to significant concern. Therefore, the judge found that the appellant had been unable to demonstrate residence in the United Kingdom.
14. At [20] the judge noted the absence of any evidence addressing the respondent’s concerns. The judge observed that there were a number of evidential avenues available to the appellant by which residence in the United Kingdom could have been established, but these had not been pursued.
15. At [21] the judge concluded that the evidence indicated that the appellant had been present in the United Kingdom for a limited period between 2018 and 2019. However, she had not established, on the basis of sufficient reliable evidence, that she had completed a continuous qualifying period or acquired a right to permanent residence. Accordingly, the judge found that she was unable to meet the requirements of Appendix EU.
Grounds of Appeal.
16. The appellant is a litigant in person and sets out in her grounds, in summary, that she challenges the decision on the basis that it is wrong. She does not assert that she had accrued five years’ continuous residence in the United Kingdom but maintains that she arrived before 31 December 2020 and was therefore entitled to pre settled status. She claims to have arrived on 5 July 2018 and states that she did not breach the requirement not to be absent from the United Kingdom for more than six months.
17. She further asserts that, from April 2019, she was working part time and travelled frequently to Spain to visit her family. She relies upon payslips, a P60 and employment history obtained from her personal tax account, which she contends confirm that the documents originate from HMRC. She also states that she contacted her previous employers, who have provided letters confirming her employment.
18. In relation to her HSBC bank statements, she explains that transactions in Spain reflect her part time work and frequent visits to family and maintains that she was never absent for more than six months. She indicates a willingness to attend hearings and to call witnesses from her employment and elsewhere to address any concerns. However, she states that at the time of making her application and appeal she was uncertain as to the applicable procedure and time limits and therefore proceeded without requesting an oral hearing.
Grant of Permission.
19. The First-tier Tribunal judge, granting permission on 4 February 2026, noted at [4] that the application did not identify any specific error of law in the judge’s decision. However, in light of the appellant’s unrepresented status, the judge carefully reviewed the decision to determine whether there were any obvious errors which might justify a grant of permission.
20. At [5] the judge concluded that it was arguable that there had been procedural unfairness arising from the decision to determine the appeal on the papers without an oral hearing. In doing so, the judge had regard to the guidance in SSGA (disposal without considering merits: R25 Iraq) [2023] UK UT 00012 (IAC) in particular that a hearing should ordinarily be held where credibility is in dispute on any material issue of fact. Permission to appeal was therefore granted
The Hearing
21. I had before me a composite bundle prepared by the Tribunal comprising 422 pages, in light of the appellant’s unrepresented status. The appellant did not attend the hearing. I was satisfied that notice of the hearing had been sent to her, should she have wished to attend. Further, on the morning of the hearing, the Tribunal contacted the appellant by email, which was the only available means of communication, informing her of the proceedings. No response was received. In those circumstances, I proceeded to determine the appeal in her absence.
22. On behalf of the respondent, Ms Everett relied on the Rule 24 response. I accordingly summarise it here as follows. With reference to the sole ground of appeal that is whether there had ben procedural unfairness, the respondent relied on Durueke (PTA: AZ applied, proper approach) Nigeria [2019] UKUT 197 which set out that a judge could raise a ground of appeal if it were a Robinson obvious point that fell within paragraph 3 of the headnote in AZ (Error of law: jurisdiction; PTA practice) [2018] UKUT 245. It was submitted that the judge granting permission had failed to set out which part of AZ was met on the facts of the appellant's case, therefore had failed to demonstrate that the test in AZ was met.
23. It was further argued that proceeding without the appellant was not a ‘Robinson obvious’ point as the First-tier Tribunal had properly followed 4.2 of the Practice Direction (November 2024), and 25(1)(a) of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and asylum chamber) Rules 2014. Therefore, the obvious procedural rigour had been followed. The Respondent considered this was not an error which was a Robinson obvious one and therefore could not meet the AZ criteria and on this basis the appeal ought to be dismissed.
24. The rule 24 response further submitted that, applying the criteria in SSGA, the issue was one of sufficiency and reliability of evidence rather than credibility. It was noted that at [6] of the decision the judge had properly recorded the appellant’s request for the appeal to be determined on the papers and that she had been given adequate notice of the hearing, and therefore sufficient opportunity to respond. It was further contended that, in light of the evidential issues identified, oral evidence from the appellant would have been of limited assistance.
25. The respondent further addressed the issue of materiality, submitting that the appellant had been afforded the opportunity to provide evidence and could have requested an oral hearing. It was argued that, even had the appellant attended such a hearing, it was not apparent that this would have made any material difference to the outcome. In any event, it was noted that the grounds of appeal did not expressly assert procedural unfairness arising from the matter having been determined on the papers.
Analysis and Consideration
26. I remind myself at the outset of the need to exercise appropriate judicial restraint before concluding that there has been a material error in the judge's decision. I go on to consider the sole issue on which permission was granted that is, whether it was procedurally unfair on the facts of this case, for the judge to determine the matter on the papers without an oral hearing.
27. I consider whether the issue of procedural unfairness, as identified in the grant of permission, discloses an arguable error of law. In the first instance, it is clear that at [6] the judge addressed her mind to whether it was just and fair to proceed to determine the appeal on the evidence available. The judge further considered the appellant’s request for a paper hearing and the opportunity afforded to the parties to submit further evidence.
28. The judge was plainly aware of [4.2] of the Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal dated 1st November 2024, whereby an appellant may request in writing, at the time of the appeal or subsequently, that the appeal be determined without a hearing, in which case the Rule 25 of The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014 provisions apply and the appeal may be decided on the papers. Therefore, in circumstances where the appellant expressly elected for the appeal to be determined on the papers and did not subsequently seek to vary that position, the judge was entitled to proceed on that basis.
29. I have further considered as submitted in the respondent’s Rule 24 response, this case turns on the sufficiency and reliability of the documentary evidence rather than the assessment of credibility requiring oral examination. At [7] the judge clearly identified the issues to be determined namely, whether the appellant was resident in the UK on the specified date and had completed a continuous qualifying period. Accordingly, the judge went on to make findings relevant to that issue. The judge’s findings arose from careful consideration of the documentary evidence where she identified, objective inconsistencies within the documentation, including discrepancies between the claimed employment history and HMRC records and the absence of corroborative financial activity in the UK during the relevant period. These findings were clearly open to the judge on the evidence presented and I am satisfied even had the appellant attended, to give oral evidence, it is not apparent that this would have led to a materially different outcome
30. I am therefore not satisfied that any procedural unfairness arose from the decision to determine the appeal on the papers and I distinguish the present case from those in which credibility on a material issue necessitates an oral hearing, as discussed in SSGA.

31. I have considered the respondent’s submission, relying on Durueke, that the judge granting permission raised the issue of procedural unfairness of their own motion without identifying how the test in paragraph 3 of the headnote in AZ was satisfied. However, having considered the matter for myself, I am not satisfied that the issue raised demonstrates an arguable error of law with a strong prospect of success. For the reasons given above, nothing turns on the respondent’s submission.
32. Drawing these matters together, I am satisfied that the First-tier Tribunal has not materially erred in law. The decision discloses no procedural unfairness and the conclusions reached were open to the judge on the evidence. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall therefore stand and the appellant’s appeal remains dismissed.

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

S Iqbal
27th May 2026