Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000512
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01603/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 8th of May 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

A E
(ANONYMITY ORDER continued)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Wood, Legal Representative instructed on behalf of the Appellant
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 29 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Caskie K.C) promulgated on 15 September 2025. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 18 March 2024 to refuse his protection and human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that his rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
Background:
3. The factual background can be briefly summarised as follows. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq. He sought protection on the grounds that he faced a real risk of serious harm and/or persecution based on a relationship with a woman in Iraq who worked at a local pharmacy. He visited the pharmacy regularly to collect medicines for his mother. The appellant asked the family of the woman if he might marry her but that was refused. Her father is said to be a high-ranking official in the Popular Mobilisation Force. The Appellant maintained the relationship by continuing to visit the pharmacy and found out that the woman was to be forced to marry someone else and he then took her by car to Kirkuk to go to a woman's protection organisation. It was said that the woman's father agreed to his daughter’s conditions for her return from Kirkuk. When returning the Appellant was arrested by three-armed men from the PMF who tortured him but then told him he would be released if he agreed to pass information to them regarding the PUK and KDP. Upon his release he went to the PUK seeking protection but was told he required to spy on the PMF.
4. He left Iraq on 8 September 2021 and arrived in the UK by small boat on 26 October 2021 and claimed asylum on the same day. Since arriving in the UK, he has participated in demonstrations against the government in the KRG and has made a number of posts on Facebook.
5. The respondent considered his application and, in her decision letter dated 18 March 2024 refused the claim. Beyond accepting his nationality and identity the respondent rejected the factual account given by him concerning the events in Iraq. The respondent in the decision letter and the review set out the issues raised as to the credibility and consistency of his claim.
6. The respondent also addressed the issues relating to documentation taking into account the country guidance decision of SMO, KSP(civil status documentation – Iraq CG[2022] UKUT 110.
7. The appeal came before the FtTJ. In a decision promulgated on 13 September 2025, the FtTJ set out his findings of fact and analysis of the evidence between paragraphs 17-27 ( including the Article 8 assessment). The FtTJ dismissed the appeal having rejected his account that he had been credible in his claim to have been at risk in Iraq on the factual basis as claimed and the claim made on his sur place activities.
8. The appellant sought permission to appeal on 4 grounds. They can be summarised as follows: (1) acting procedurally unfairly by having regard to his own experience without bringing this to the attention of the parties; (2) making a material mistake of fact as to whether or not Diyala was within the IKR, (3) making a material misdirection in law and/or failure to make findings of fact on the sur place aspect of the appeal, (4) failing to properly apply the principles in HK v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 in his assessment of plausibility.
9. Permission to appeal was granted by a FtTJ on 14 October 2025.
10. The hearing took place on 29 April 2026 at the Tribunal. The appellant was represented by Mr Wood, Legal Representative, and the respondent was represented by Mr McVeety, Senior Presenting Officer. It is not necessary to set out those submissions as they are contained within the written grounds and relied upon by Mr Wood and the Rule 24 response relied upon by Mr McVeety dated 11 February 2026. Additionally, both advocates provided their oral submissions. I will consider those submissions when assessing whether the decision of the FtTJ discloses the making of a material error of law.
11. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision which I now give.
Discussion:
12. I am grateful for the helpful submissions given by both of the advocates during the appeal and have considered them in the context of the factual appeal and the assessment of the evidence by the FtTJ.
Ground 1: Permitting a procedural unfairness
13. Dealing with ground 1, Mr Wood submitted that the FtTJ has permitted a procedural unfairness to operate in proceedings to the detriment of the appellant at paragraph 25 of his decision where he impugns the appellant’s account of having been in touch with a women’s support group in Kirkuk due to the lack of evidence of the same. He submitted that the last line of paragraph 25 demonstrates that he placed weight on the absence of that evidence.
14. He submitted that it is apparent that FtTJ has applied his knowledge of women’s agencies in Iraq and what he said derived from his own experience which was not raised in the decision letter nor was it a matter drawn to the attention of the appellant’s representative at the hearing.
15. It is therefore submitted that Judge Caskie has permitted a procedural unfairness to operate by his application of knowledge of Iraqi matters not shared with the parties. This unfairness has infected the finding at [25] which in turn must also infect the wider assessment of the appellant’s account.
16. He submitted that had the appellant been given notice of the point taken against him there was background evidence before the FtTJ in the CPIN (paragraph 12.1.5;p233) which gave a description of shelters which have to operate in secret and therefore not likely that they would have a website.
17. Mr McVeety submitted that there was no procedural unfairness in the FtTJ’s reference to his experience at [25]. At [25] the FtTJ correctly sets out, the matter of the existence of the women’s support group in Kirkuk was already in issue (see also paragraph 8 of the Refusal and paragraph 7 of the Review). The appellant had provided one piece of documentary evidence intended to go to this issue (original at [AB/8], translation at [AB/9]) but it was the webpage of an apparently nationwide political organisation rather than a network of shelters. That is the light in which must be read the FtTJ’s observation that there is no website for Kirkuk shelter. He clearly had in mind TK (Burundi) [2009] EWCA Civ 40 at [16]. If he had not mentioned his experience and simply pointed to the lack of any effective counter to the objective evidence cited in the Refusal there would not even have been an arguable error. The FtTJ had to reach a finding on whether there was a women’s shelter in Kirkuk and he made the only finding reasonably open to him on the evidence before him. In any event, paragraph [25] is just one of nine reasons given by the FtTJ for rejecting the very core of the appellant’s claim. Even if an error is made out as per Ground one it is highly unlikely to be material to the FtTJ’s overall rejection of the appellant’s credibility.
18. He submitted that even if he had used his own knowledge paragraph 25, it did not get over the problem that there was no evidence. It was a clear issue in dispute and he was unable to produce evidence to show the shelter existed and there was nothing before the FtTJ in terms of evidence in support of the appellant’s claim. Part of the conclusion concerning his knowledge did not change the fact that there was no evidence before the FtTJ. Therefore, even if there was an error it was not material given the other findings made by the FtTJ which were not challenged.
19. In his reply, Mr Wood submitted that the finding made used the FtTJ’s own knowledge and was a significant one and was based on his own understanding of circumstances in Kirkuk.
Conclusion on Ground 1:
20. I am satisfied that there is no procedural unfairness that has been shown to be material to the outcome. Mr Wood identifies the sentence, “Even in major cities such as Kirkuk such agencies are in my experience very likely indeed to have websites explaining their role and seeking financial support” when seeking to establish the ground of procedural unfairness. However, it is important to read that sentence in the context of the whole of paragraph 25 and not in isolation. The FtTJ set out his findings of fact at paragraph 25 as follows:
“The Secretary of State asserts that there was no women's support group such as that the Appellant claims to have been in touch with in Kirkuk at the time the Appellant claims he was in touch with such a group. Even in major cities such as Kirkuk such agencies are in my experience very likely indeed to have websites explaining their role and seeking financial support. The Appellant has produced no evidence to rebut the assertion by the Secretary of State that there was no such agency in Kirkuk. Indeed, in respect of the documents that the Appellant has produced he explained he had simply found by Google and the Appellant does not suggest that he has been in contact directly with that agency. That would represent substantial evidence in support of the Appellant’s account however, the absence of it weighs against the credibility and reliability of his claim.”
21. It had been part of the appellant’s factual claim that he had taken F to Kirkuk and had expressly identified Kirkuk as the place it had been located. The respondent had addressed this claim in the decision letter at paragraph 8 and challenged that factual account as being inconsistent with two pieces of objective country material which was footnoted as source 3 and source 4 and concluded from those two sources, one taken from 2019 and the other from 2022 and therefore spanning the period the appellant claimed to have taken F there in 2021, demonstrated his account was not supported by the objective evidence.
22. The appellant addressed this in his witness statement (paragraph 11) stating that they did not have a website and there may be reasons why they were not widely known and claimed that there had been such a place in Kirkuk since 2005.
23. Contrary to the submission made on behalf of the appellant, there was a clear evidential issue raised by the respondent that the appellant’s factual account of having taken a woman to a shelter/refuge in Kirkuk was not accepted. It referred to two sourced documents and that his account was inconsistent with the material that they had cited. The appellant was plainly aware of that because he sought to address it in his witness statement. It was against that background of the evidence that the FtTJ made his full assessment at paragraph 25. He was entitled to find that the evidence of the respondent had not been rebutted by the appellant. Whilst Mr Wood refers to the first article is being dated in 2019 and therefore prior to the appellant’s claim that he visited the woman’s shelter, that submission fails to take into account the contents of that piece of objective material when viewed with a second piece identified by the respondent. Footnote 3 relates to part of the CPIN relating to honour crimes from 2021 at paragraph 6.2.4 it refers to a sourced article dated 18 November 2019 from Kirkuk Now which stated that except for the Kurdistan region no women’s refuges are available in Kirkuk and the rest of the disputed territories. Therefore, they had to be transferred to the provinces of Erbil or Sulamaniyah. Footnote 4 related to another article from Kirkuk Now dated 31 October 2022 which related to the opening of a shelter for abused women opening in Kirkuk in November 2022. The content of that article relates to the importance of opening a shelter for abused women so that it means there will be no need for them to transfer to shelters in Baghdad and Sulamaniyah to protect them. Therefore, reading those two articles which emanated from the same source from 2019 and 2022, the FtTJ was entitled to rely upon that material as supportive of the respondent’s case. The FtTJ’s reference to major cities in Kirkuk likely to have websites is consistent with the material provided before him therefore he did not need to rely on his own knowledge.
24. Furthermore, the FtTJ was entitled to find that the appellant had provided no evidence to rebut those two sourced pieces of material. The FtTJ addressed the document the appellant provided in the bundle (p 176 – 177) entitled “Woman’s Leadership Institute”. As the respondent set out in the review, the agency did not purport to be a woman’s shelter/refuge nor did it show any evidence of interaction with the appellant. The FtTJ’s assessment at paragraph 25 was that the appellant claimed to have found it on Google but the evidence he had given did not suggest that he had been in contact with the organisation directly.
25. I do not accept the submission made by Mr Wood that the FtTJ’s reference to the likelihood of websites being available was material in circumstances where the appellant was plainly on notice that the evidence he had given was inconsistent with material provided from two sources and relevant to the time he claimed to have taken the woman to a shelter/refuge but also that he had provided no evidence to rebut that material. I observe that nowhere in his evidence did the appellant ever name the organisation or even provide its location/address. Nor did the appellant state that thus was a “ secret shelter” and thus the reference made to paragraph 12.1.5 does not apply.
26. I therefore conclude that the sentence identified by Mr Wood cannot be viewed in isolation but has to be viewed in the context of the full finding made at paragraph 25 but also in the context of the evidence. It has not been demonstrated in my judgement that it has been shown that the reference to his own experience was nothing more than in a generalised way and did not undermine his overall assessment of the evidence that dealt with this factual issue. Ground 1 is not made out.
Ground 2: Making a material mistake of fact on a material matter:
27. The ground refers to paragraph [23] of his decision. It is submitted that the FtTJ rejected the appellant’s account that he is unable to contact his family because “ I reject the appellant’s account of having been unable to contact his family in the Daliya [sic] district. That is in a relatively stable part of Iraq and is one of the three districts within the KRG…”
28. Mr Wood submitted that Diyala is not within the IKR and as the Upper Tribunal noted in SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 (IAC): “3. The situation in the Formerly Contested Areas (the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Ninewah and Salah Al-Din) is complex, encompassing ethnic, political and humanitarian issues which differ by region…”
29. Mr Wood submitted that the FtTJ has made a material mistake of fact as to the location and circumstances pertaining in the appellant’s home area. He submitted that the mistake of fact has infected the reasoning at [23] and therefore the finding made concerning contact with his family was an unsafe finding.
30. Mr McVeety submitted even if the FtTJ made a mistake of fact at [23] by treating Diyala as part of the KRG, it was not a material one. The point he was making was about the lack of even an attempt by the appellant to contact his family, despite the obvious route of doing so through his 25 contacts in Iraq. That observation stands whether the appellant’s home area was in the KRG, the Formerly Contested Areas, or territory long part of Federal Iraq.
31. He submitted that it was open to the judge to make the finding that he had not attempted to locate his family. This was not a point challenged in the grounds.
32. In his reply to Mr Wood submitted that there was evidence that the appellant had tried to engage with the Red Cross.
Conclusions on Ground 2:
33. I am satisfied that there is no material error of law in the FtTJ’s assessment of the issue of contact with his family and thus the issue of documentation based on the grounds advanced and explained above.
34. Whilst the FtTJ at paragraph 23 referred to rejecting the appellant’s account of being unable to contact his family in Diyala and that the appellant is not from Diyala, this was not the only finding made in relation to the appellant’s account of having lost contact with his family and therefore not being to access the documents that he claimed he had left in his home in Iraq.
35. Firstly, the FtTJ made findings of fact at paragraph 21 which addressed the account given by the appellant in his evidence. The FtTJ made the following finding:
“21. The Appellant’s father or uncle arranged for the Appellant to leave the country but when the Appellant did so his father disowned him. Not only did the Appellant’s father disown the Appellant but he also indicated he would destroy the Appellant’s INID. The Appellant singularly fails to plausibly explain what the purpose of that destruction would be. The Appellant indicated that the purpose of his father destroying the Appellant’s documentation was a means to demonstrate to the PMF that he was no longer acting as a guarantor. I do not accept that would have been sufficient to release the Appellant’s father from his guarantee or could have, in the mind of the Appellant’s father, been an effective mechanism of creating a barrier between the Appellant’s conduct in leaving the country and his own undertaking of a guarantee to a powerful armed group. This element of the Appellant’s account simply does not make sense and I reject it as being incredible.”
36. The FtTJ also made a further finding of fact at paragraph 22: he stated:
“22. The Appellant sought to persuade me that his father indicated he would destroy the Appellant’s documentation when the Appellant was in Turkey but at his screening interview the Appellant indicated he would attempt to obtain documentation from Iraq. The Appellant did not caveat his statement that he would obtain documents in any way and I consider that the allegation his father had said he would destroy the Appellant’s documents is fabricated.”
37. I am therefore satisfied that the reference to Diyala at paragraph 23 has not been shown to be a material error in light of the findings made at paragraphs 21 and 22 but also in respect of the further part of paragraph 23 where the FtTJ addressed the appellant’s evidence that he had a Facebook and WhatsApp account when in Iraq but also that he had 25 contacts in Iraq. The FtTJ made a finding of fact that the appellant had failed to undertake any searches of those 25 contacts in Iraq and that would have been very likely to allow the appellant to make contact with his family. The FtTJ concluded that the appellant did not wish to do so or had been untruthful about being unable to do so, because that would demonstrate that the appellant’s family faced no difficulties whatsoever in their hometown because the appellant’s account is untrue.
38. Whilst Mr Wood has submitted that the appellant had tried to contact his family by the Red Cross, this also failed to take into account the factual finding made at paragraph 24. The FtTJ stated :
“24,. The Appellant indicated he had been in touch with the Red Cross in Manchester and had provided the girl’s name to them as a person he wished to contact. The Appellant must have been aware of the patriarchal nature of Iraqi society and I consider that providing the girl’s name would be of little assistance to him without also providing her father's name. That he had There's no evidence before me that the Appellant attempted to make contact with any member of his own family through the Red Cross. I reject the Appellant’s claim to have been in touch with the Red Cross because of his failure to produce any evidence from that source.”
39. In conclusion, whilst the FtTJ did make a reference to Diyala, it has not been demonstrated that that slip was of any materiality when seen in the light of the number of findings made set out at paragraph 21, 22, 23 and 24. The reasoning given by the judge overall in those paragraphs alongside his rejection of the account given as the events in Iraq, the conclusion reached that the appellant had fabricated his account concerning contact with family members and the FtTJ was entitled to find that the appellant was likely to still have his documents in Iraq with his family members whom he could contact.
40. In summary, I remind myself of the need for appropriate restraint before interfering with the decision of the FTT, particularly where the judge below was heard and assessed a range of evidential sources relating to the reliability of an account. Not every evidential issue need be specifically addressed and there is no requirement to provide reasons for reasons. The FtTJ had regard to the evidence before him and gave adequate reasons to why he did not believe the appellant had no family in Iraq with whom he was in contact with or could so contact and that he would have access to his documents.
Ground 3: Making a material misdirection in law and/or failure to make findings of fact on material matters.
41. Mr Wood submitted that at [26] of his decision the FtTJ set out his findings in relation to the appellant’s sur place political activity. However, the failed to make any particularised findings of fact as to what the appellant has done at the number of demonstrations it is accepted he has attended. The failure to make such findings as indicated in the guidance in BA (Demonstrators in Britain - risk on return) Iran must render the assessment of risk from sur place activity as incomplete and unsafe.
42. He further submitted that the FtTJ has imposed an unrealistic evidential burden on the appellant in [26] of his decision. The finding in [26] is contrary to the learning set out above in terms of the ease with which sur place activity can and is monitored. In this context he relied upon the decision of MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 ( paragraphs 37-39). Mr Wood submitted that the FtTJ could have taken judicial notice of where someone can be photographed or filmed. Looking at the background evidence, there are people in the KRG who are interested in those attending demonstrations. The FtTJ did not make the findings he needed to make.
43. Mr McVeety submitted that although the FtTJ did not cite BA or MH in [26] (instead citing XX (PJAK) which is more specific to Facebook evidence), he neither expressly nor implicitly directed himself in a way which would have been inconsistent with their principles.
44. Even with MH in mind, the FtTJ was entitled to consider both the lack of background evidence of monitoring of the Kurdish diaspora and specific evidence that the appellant’s Facebook posts had attracted adverse attention when reaching the finding that the appellant had not garnered any sort of political profile which would survive even the timely closure of his Facebook account as envisaged by XX(PJAK).
45. He submitted that there was no objective country evidence provided to the FtTJ to show that the Kurdish authorities monitored demonstrations in the UK or were able to monitor Facebook. He submitted that the appellant in the case was asking the FtTJ to speculate however there had to be a real risk and there was no evidence concerning these issues before the FTT. Whilst reference had been made to people in the IKR who would be of interest, those are people who have a profile not someone who is found to be non-genuine. In this context the FtTJ did consider the appellant’s motives for protesting. He had rejected the core of the appellant’s claim; he found that his opposition to the Kurdish authorities was not genuine (see 1AIR Q34 tying the two together). This was a finding that has not been challenged in the grounds.
46. In his reply, Mr Wood accepted that the grounds had not challenged the finding made by the FtTJ that he was not someone with genuine political opinions, however he submitted that if the FtTJ had not undertaken a proper risk assessment it was flawed.
Conclusions on Ground 3:
47. The FtTJ’s assessment of the appellant’s political activities in the UK is set out at paragraph 26. The FtTJ states as follows:
“Regarding the Appellant’s claim to have been involved in demonstrations in the United Kingdom I accepted the Appellant has attended a number of anti-government protests in the UK but there is no evidence before me whatsoever that the authorities in Kurdistan have any interest any opposition from the diaspora Kurdish community. There is no evidence the Kurdistan authorities seek to locate those overseas who oppose them or have the means to do so and therefore I do not consider the Kurdish authorities would have any interest in the Appellant whatsoever. Although the Appellant has produced a small amount of documentation regarding a Facebook page I am not satisfied that the Appellant has a genuine commitment to opposing the Kurdish authorities and therefore he can be expected to take his Facebook page down before returning to Iraq. In any event the evidence produced by the Appellant does not contain the information he is expected to produce in order to support reliance on Facebook. Reference is made XX [PJAK]….”
48. The grounds assert that the FtTJ failed to make sufficient findings in relation to the appellant’s political activities. Having considered the decision of the FtTJ and having done so in the light of the evidence before him, I am satisfied that the FtTJ did not err in law.
49. Whilst Mr Wood referred to the decision of BA (demonstrations in Britain ) (as cited), I observe that the Appeal Skeleton Argument (“ASA”) made no reference to the appellant’s sur place claim nor did it cite any case law in support ( see p162-169). Furthermore, whilst it is said that the FtTJ did not make sufficient findings, in my judgement the evidence that was before the FtTJ was minimal. When the appellant was first interviewed (in August 2023) he said that he had attended one demonstration two weeks before the interview which would have been in July 2023. The appellant had entered the United Kingdom in October 2021 and his evidence in the interview was that he had attended one demonstration two weeks before the interview which would have been in July 2023. There is no reference in the witness statement filed to any demonstrations he had attended and whilst he claimed in oral evidence that he had attended five or six demonstrations before the interview in 2023, the only supportive evidence before the FtTJ related to a Facebook post showing a demonstration on 23 July 2023 which took place in a (northern town) in the respondent’s bundle (p376CB). There was no evidence in the appellant’s own bundle concerning his participation in demonstrations. The FtTJ did not question his account of having participated in demonstrations but there was minimal and limited evidence of this. Therefore, the finding that there was no evidence that the Kurdish authorities would have any interest in the appellant was open to him based on that minimal evidence. That finding also has to be seen in the context of the lack of any objective country materials in the appellant’s bundle relating to the authorities in Kurdistan/ Iraq and their ability to monitor those outside of the UK.
50. The FtTJ rightly concluded that there was no evidence before him that the authorities had sought to locate those overseas who oppose them nor have they the means to do so. As Mr McVeety pointed out, there was no evidence either identified in the ASA nor in the appellant’s own bundle. The respondent’s review would expressly raised this as an issue (see paragraph 9 of the respondent’s review).
51. Mr Wood relied upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for Home Department [2025]EWCA Civ 688, where guidance has been given that the fact finding tribunal should not place an unrealistic evidential burden upon asylum applicants who rely on sur place activities and that it is necessary for the tribunal to employ some common sense in determining the degree of likelihood that an applicant has been (or is being) subject to covert surveillance and/or monitoring. However, the Court of Appeal also drew attention to the relevant evidence and that the technical capabilities and methods of monitoring is a matter of expert evidence given that states differ in their capabilities. The appellant did not provide any evidence concerning the technical abilities of the authorities in either the KRG or Iraq to monitor political activities of the diaspora in the UK whether attending demonstrations or by reference to social media. On his own evidence, the appellant had stated that he had not been politically active in Iraq and had not supported any political party whilst there. On the FtTJ’s factual findings made in relation to events in Iraq, he had rejected them for the reasons that he had given therefore did not find that he was of adverse interest when he left Iraq and thus he could not have had any profile when he left Iraq.
52. As to the Facebook evidence the FtTJ was entitled to assess the evidence applying the guidance in XX (PJAK – sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG[2022] “XX (PJAK)” and that the evidence provided suffered from the deficiencies outlined in that case when applying the guidance in XX(PJAK) at paragraphs 127-128 and see paragraph 7 of the headnote). At Headnote 8, it states that; “ It is easy for an apparent printout or electronic excerpt of an internet page to be manipulated by changing the page source data. For the same reason, where a decision maker does not have access to an actual account, purported printouts from such an account may also have very limited evidential value.”
53. Whilst Mr Wood submitted the FtTJ had not made an assessment of his profile and by reference to the “social graph”, it was open to the FtTJ to find on the limited social media evidence provided and the fact that he not provided the “download my information” and the minimal evidence of the demonstrations that he had not shown that his place on the “social graph” would be such that he would likely be known to the authorities, either by his social media or his attendance at demonstrations.
54. The ground do not challenge the FtTJ’s assessment that this appellant’s political activities did not arise from any genuinely held political opinion. In this context the FtTJ was entitled to refer to XX(PJAK) and where it was said that the closure of a Facebook account is likely to neutralize the consequential risk of having had an account which was critical of the regime. It must also logically follow from the finding made that his conduct was not based any genuine politically held opinion that there were no reasons why he would seek to do so on return. His own evidence was that he had no political profile before he entered the UK. Additionally, the FtTJ rejected his account to be of interest to the authorities on account of his clamed relationship with F and the events he claimed to have occurred in Iraq. Thus, the FtTJ was entitled to reach the conclusion that the appellant had not demonstrated that he would be at a real risk on return based on his claimed political activities. Consequently ground 3 is not made out.
Ground Four – Making a material misdirection in law:
55. Mr Wood submitted that the FtTJ materially misdirected himself in law in his assessment of the appellant’s account of events in Iraq. He submits that between paragraphs [17] and [21] the FtTJ makes a series of findings as to the plausibility of the appellant’s account of events that unfolded in Iraq as regards his relationship with the woman who worked in the pharmacy where he obtained medicines for his mother. It is submitted that the findings made by Judge Caskie amount to a rejection of the account on the basis that it is implausible or incredible ( see HK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1037 paragraphs 28-30).
56. Instead, the FtTJ has stated a number of times that the appellant’s account is unbelievable. The appellant had remained consistent in his account of the events that led to him having to flee Iraq. Equally, as the terms of the Respondent’s own CPIN on Honour Crimes recognises the Appellant’s account is not implausible in the context of Iraq. The failure to apply the learning in HK to the appellant’s account must vitiate the adverse findings of fact made by the FtTJ.
57. Mr Wood submitted that at paragraph 19, the FtTJ referred to him as “little more than a boy”. It is not clear where that came from because at the time he was not a boy therefore that put a different complexion on the findings of fact made.
58. Mr McVeety submitted that this ground is essentially re-argument. It cites HK without mentioning Y [2006] EWCA Civ 1223, decided later the same year. [26] and [27] of Y clarify that there is ample scope for a tribunal of fact to reject an account as far-fetched and implausible provided it does not do so ‘merely because it would not seem reasonable if it had happened in this country’.
59. The FtTJ’s reasons for reaching each of the conclusions in [17] to [21] speak for themselves, are universal in their application and do not apply Scottish (or English) standards to Iraq.
60. He submitted that the FtTJ was entitled to consider his account against the background country evidence of the military forces of the PUK and the KDP who had been able to defeat ISIS without extensive help from others. He was entitled to consider the appellant’s profile someone with no contact or connections with the PMU to be a spy who had no training and no contact with the organisation. This is not speculation -that is common sense and the judge cannot be criticised for making a finding in that regard. Even on his own evidence he had had no training. The finding would have to be a perverse finding and one not open to the FtTJ to succeed and that high test is not satisfied here
61. In his reply, Mr Wood submitted that the finding at paragraph 19 and the submissions made by Mr McVeety was predicated on the appellant being “James Bond” material. However, his area is a mixed one therefore as the appellant was Kurdish he would be able to operate in a way that others could not.
Conclusions on Ground 4:
62. I begin consideration of this ground by reminding myself of the decision of Lowe v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 62, in which McCombe LJ stated:
31. Equally, it is to be recalled that judgments at first instance are necessarily an incomplete impression made upon the judge by the primary evidence. This FTT judge reached the conclusion that he did on the issues raised and he expressed himself succinctly on them. This is what Lord Hoffman said on the point in the well-known passage of his speech in the House of Lords in Biogen v Medeva plc [1997] RPC 1 at 45:
"The need for appellate caution in reversing the judges evaluation of the facts is based upon much more solid grounds than professional courtesy. It is because specific findings of fact, even by the most meticulous judge, are inherently an incomplete statement of the impression which was made upon him by the primary evidence. His expressed findings are always surrounded by a penumbra of impression as to emphasis, relative weight, minor qualification and nuance (as Renan said, la verite est dans une nuance), Of which time and language do not permit exact expression, but which may play an important part in the judges overall evaluation...."
63. Ground 4 challenges the findings of fact made by the FtTJ between paragraphs 17 – 21. However, for the reasons set out earlier in this decision, the conclusions reached between paragraphs 21 – 26 were also findings of fact made by the FtTJ which were open to him on the evidence.
64. The ground is based on what is described as reliance on inherent implausibility and that the FtTJ’s own subjective view as to the inherent probability of an account is an irrelevant consideration and that the FtTJ misdirected himself in law (see HK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1037).
65. Having considered the findings of fact made by the FtTJ and in light of the evidence before the FtTJ it is not established that the FtTJ erred in law in the way the grounds have set out. The conclusions reached by the FtTJ in his assessment was that the appellant was neither a credible nor reliable witness as to the core aspects of his claim of being at risk of harm due to having a relationship with a woman in Iraq who he claimed had a father who was a leading figure for the PMF. The FtTJ also assessed his claim that the PMF were forcing him to act as a spy for the PUK and the KDP. In reaching his assessment, the FtTJ stated that he had considered all the documents presented to him ( see paragraph 2 of his decision) which included the decision letter which outlined the credibility issues raised and by reference to the relevant CPIN’s from 2021 and the CPIN Iraq: Blood Feuds, Honour Crimes and Tribal Violence, July 2024 which was referred to in the ASA at paragraph 12. The FtTJ also had the advantage of considering the appellant’s evidence on the issues raised including the oral evidence.
66. It is plain in my view that the FtTJ have regard to the material in the background evidence including the CPIN’s which underpinned his assessment of the evidence and the factual circumstances. At paragraph 17, the FtTJ’s assessed the appellant’s factual account and the particular factual background the appellant claimed to have existed. This included the circumstances of how the relationship it began and in what circumstances. In particular, that they had different profiles and came from different ethnic tribal backgrounds. The woman was a daughter of a leading figure of the PMF and was an Arabic speaker and the appellant was a man of Kurdish ethnicity. The FtTJ made reference to the tribal differences and the mixed ethnic group of the area in which both resided ( see paragraph 17). The FtTJ was not making a credibility assessment based on what the FtTJ considered to be plausible but by setting the appellant’s factual account against the background evidence of tribal differences and the patriarchal nature of Iraqi society ( see paragraphs 3.2.6-3.2.8). The finding made that the circumstances described amounted to a “significant barrier to relationship developing that resulted in a proposal of marriage taking place” was a finding open to the FtTJ to make on the evidence, including the country evidence.
67. At paragraph 18 the FtTJ made further findings on the appellant’s factual account. This was not based on inherent plausibility but set against the background of the appellant’s own account of the circumstances in which he claimed to have left Iraq. The grounds do not set out a specific challenge this paragraph or the finding that was made. It is not suggested that he had misinterpreted the appellant’s evidence and the findings were further explained by the FtTJ in his assessment at paragraph 21 where the FtTJ explained that the appellant’s account was logically inconsistent. These were not findings made on inherent plausibility but by reference to the appellant’s own evidence and from reasonably drawn inferences. A tribunal is entitled to make reasonable findings based on implausibility’s, commonsense and rationality, and may reject evidence if it is not consistent “with the possibilities affecting the case as a whole” ( see Awala [2005] CSOH 73 at paragraph 24).
68. At paragraph 19 the FtTJ assessed the appellant’s account as to why had left Iraq. He had claimed that he would be harmed by the PMF for not providing them with information on the PUK and the KDP. The FtTJ had earlier in the decision set out the basis of the appellant’s claim that he had been arrested by the PMF who released him if he agreed to pass information to them regarding the PUK and the KDP (see paragraph 3). At paragraph 8, the FtTJ recorded his account that the PMF had said that the appellant needed to work for them, in essence as a spy.
69. The FtTJ therefore assessed the claim based on this background in the context of the country materials. There is no legal error in his assessment of this part of his claim and the FtTJ was entitled to take into account the appellant’s own evidence of his circumstances.
70. Thus, the FtTJ was entitled to find that the appellant had not indicated that he had any contact with either organisation before the PMF had sought to use him as a spy and also that there was no indication that the PMF would be able to obtain any useful information from him. As Mr McVeety submitted, the position of both of those parties are well established on the background evidence in relation to appeals concerning the KRG. The PUK and the KDP are the two main Kurdish political parties with each maintaining an independent security apparatus. The PUK and the KDP maintain separate control and have military units as well as separate police forces under the nominal Kurdish Regional Governorate Ministry. Both the each maintain their own Asayish forces and maintain separate intelligence forces. The FtTJ was therefore entitled to make the adverse finding that he did at paragraph 19.
71. The FtTJ was also entitled to find the appellant’s account was internally inconsistent and thus implausible and that on his own account if he had married the woman he would have been linked to the PMF and his ability to act as a spy would have been significantly diminished. The submission made by Mr Wood relating to the information he could have provided was entirely speculative and it has not been demonstrated in the evidence that any submission was made concerning information the appellant would have been able to provide.
72. Nor do I consider that the reference made to the appellant as “little more than a boy “has any bearing on the assessment. The FtTJ prefaced that by saying that the appellant was a young man. At the time of the events in 2021 he was a young man of 24. The appellant’s representative had outlined the appellant’s personal characteristics in his closing submissions which included that he was illiterate and not sophisticated (see paragraph 16). In those circumstances I am not satisfied that the reference highlighted by Mr Wood undermines the FtTJ’s findings of fact.
73. The FtTJ also make findings of fact concerning the appellant’s account between paragraphs 21 – 22 which are properly reasoned and in accordance with the evidence and also between paragraphs 23 – 24 he gave adequate and sustainable evidence-based reasons for rejecting his account of having no contact with his family. Those findings are the subject of separate grounds which were not found to have been established.
74. Returning to the grounds, the FtTJ ‘s findings are not based on inherent plausibility nor based on his own perceptions but was an assessment of the appellant’s own account of his particular factual circumstances and other actors against the background material to which this judge had regard.
75. For those reasons and having considered the decision of FtTJ Caskie K.C in light of the evidence and factual findings made I am satisfied that there is no error of law in the decision based on the grounds as advanced. Consequently, the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, therefore the decision shall stand.
Notice of Decision:
The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of an error of law and the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

5 May 2026
Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds