Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000515
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/70150/2024
LP/12877/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 6th of July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREY

Between

FA
(Anonymity Order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation
For the Appellant: Ms A. Radford, Counsel instructed by Turpin Miller Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr J. Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 June 2026
Decision and Reasons
Introduction
1. This is an appeal brought by the appellant against the decision of a First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the Judge”) promulgated on 16 October 2025, in which the Judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of her protection and human rights claim made in response to the respondent’s decision to deport her.
2. The appellant is a female citizen of Pakistan. The background to this appeal and the appellant’s immigration history is set out in detail in the papers before me and does not require verbatim repetition herein.
3. In brief, the appellant arrived in the UK in 2006 with leave as a student valid until May 2008. Her leave was extended until 31 December 2011. The appellant was arrested on the 8 December 2011 on suspicion of attempting to obtain leave to remain by deception by entering a sham marriage. She was served as an overstayer with an IS.151A and removal directions were set, however, she claimed asylum on the 11 December 2011. Her asylum claim was refused and she appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (“FtT”). Her appeal was dismissed on the 23 July 2014 and she became appeal rights exhausted on the 5 August 2014.
4. On the 23 December 2019 the appellant was convicted of eight counts of fraud/embezzlement and sentenced to four years and two months’ imprisonment. She became eligible for automatic deportation under the UK Borders Act 2007 and was served with a stage one notification of liability to deport on the 22 July 2020. The appellant then raised a further asylum claim which was refused on the 27 August 2024. Following a NRM referral the appellant received a negative conclusive grounds decision on 6 October 2023. On the 23 August 2024 a decision was made to make a deportation order by virtue of section 32(5) of the UK Borders Act 2007. The respondent’s refusal of the appellant’s asylum claim and human rights submissions on 27 August 2024 and the FtT dismissal of the appellant’s appeal against that refusal is the subject of the appeal before me
The FtT Decision
5. The First-tier Tribunal hearing took place at Hatton Cross IAC on 26 August 2025. The decision dismissing the appellant’s appeal was promulgated on 16 October 2025.
6. The Judge recorded at [11] of the decision the disputed issues between the parties and set out her findings in respect of those issues at [14] to [56].
7. The Judge recorded that she took the previous judicial findings from 2014 as her starting point in accordance with the Devaseelan principles. Those previous findings included the FtT concluding that the appellant was not credible in relation to her claimed fears of risk on return to Bangladesh and that the appellant had fabricated her claim to remain in the UK. The appellant’s submissions in response to the previous judicial findings included that she had not previously disclosed her traumatic experience of domestic violence and the evidence now produced demonstrated she suffered with PTSD with strong symptoms of avoidance. Further, that in 2014, she was not treated as a vulnerable witness such that the effects of trauma on her memory, evidence and approach claiming asylum were not taken into account. The appellant relied on the expert report of Dr Isaacs, Chartered Clinical Psychologist, dated 1 May 2025 in relation to her mental health condition.
8. In relation to the appellant’s claim that she was at risk from former business associates, at [16] to [18] the Judge found that there was no new evidence since the previous appeal save for some further explanations provided by the appellant. The Judge noted that the previous judge had comprehensively considered this aspect of the appellant’s claim before rejecting it and she found there was no basis to depart from the previous judicial findings.
9. At [19] the Judge sets out why she did not accept the appellant’s account that she had been stabbed and found that it added nothing to her claim.
10. At [20] to [36] the Judge examined the appellant’s account regarding her claim to be a victim of domestic abuse and to be suffering from PTSD. The Judge found that the appellant’s description of her relationship with her ex-husband, who she claims was the perpetrator of the abuse, was inconsistent with the appellant’s ability to continue her studies and then go on to work and set up a successful business. The Judge noted at [24] that “There has also been negative conclusive grounds based on these facts and no further challenge to that decision”.
11. In relation to the medico -egal report of Dr Isaacs, the Judge records at [26] that: “I am therefore satisfied considering the evidence in its totality it is of ‘significant potential value’ and that it provides a reliable assessment of the matters reported on, in particular the diagnosis of the Appellant.”
12. Dr Isaacs opined that the appellant’s flash backs and other symptoms were a result of what happened to her in Bangladesh from her ex-husband and business associates. However, the Judge went on to find that Dr Isaacs had not addressed the impact of a number of other traumatic matters identified at [28] which the Judge considered could have caused her PTSD symptoms.
13. The decision goes on to state:
30. I have considered Ms Isaacs, clinical opinion at [64], that if the Appellant were removed her PTSD symptoms would worsen as she would feel under increased threat of harm and potential death and that her depressive and PTSD symptoms would escalate if returned. However, I cannot be satisfied that Ms Isaacs has fully considered all the Appellant’s experiences in the United Kingdom, which I find no doubt has to the lower standard have also had a profound impact on her life and mental health.
31. I have already rejected the Appellant’s account in relation to any fears that she says arose in Bangladesh and whilst I accept the diagnosis of the Appellant, I find the report in all the circumstances does not corroborate or take her fears on return to Bangladesh any further.
14. At [33] the Judge refers to the sentencing remarks in criminal proceedings which “further disclose her deliberate actions and dishonesty” and that the appellant in the past had been found attempting to enter into a sham marriage to remain in the UK. The Judge records that, considering the evidence in its totality, she did not accept the appellant has been subject to domestic abuse at the hands of her ex-husband – [36].
15. At [37] to [46} the Judge addresses the appellant's claim regarding her claimed involvement with the BNP when in Bangladesh and between 2014 to 2018 in the UK. The Judge finds that nothing turns on these claims by the appellant now that the circumstances in the country have changed with the departure of Sheikh Hasina.
16. In relation to the appellant’s Article 3 claim on medical grounds, the Judge confirms at [47] that she accepts Dr Isaacs’ diagnosis of depressive disorder and PTSD but not the reasons the appellant put forward for her mental health condition. The Judge finds that the appellant has failed to demonstrate that she is a seriously ill person who faces a real risk in Bangladesh of being exposed either to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline in her health resulting in intense suffering, or to a significant reduction in her life expectancy such as to engage Article 3 of the ECHR. The Judge notes that the appellant is currently being treated with anti-depressants and finds that there is no evidence that she could not continue to access this treatment in Bangladesh.
17. At [50] to [56] the Judge addresses “very compelling circumstances” for the purposes of section 117C(6) NIAA. The Judge takes into account the length of the appellant's residence in the UK and her vulnerability due to her mental health and that there has been no further offending by the appellant. However, the Judge concludes that the factors weighing in the appellant’s favour did not holistically amount to very compelling circumstances whether “by themselves or in conjunction with other factors relevant to the application of Article 8”.
18. The appellant’s appeal was dismissed on all grounds.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
19. The appellant claims the decision of the FtT is vitiated by material errors of law in the following respects:
1) The NRM decision – the Judge made a material mistake of fact about the respondent’s position in relation to the appellant’s account of persecution by her business associates, went behind a concession by the respondent in the NRM decision and failed to consider that in the NRM process the respondent had found the appellant’s account to be credible when applying the higher standard of the balance of probabilities.
2) Dr Ashraf ul-Hoque’s Opinion – the Judge materially erred in failing to consider or engage with the opinion of Dr Hoque, a professor of social anthropology at UCL with expert knowledge of Bangladesh, who had provided a report on the appellant’s case. Dr Hoque’s report concluded that the appellant would be at risk of persecution and would not have access to the mental healthcare she needs. The Judge erred in falling to take into account the report of Dr Hoque in her credibility assessment (Mibanga [2005] EWCA Civ 367 at [24]) or any background evidence relating to Bangladesh.
3) Dr Juanita Isaacs’ opinion – the Judge erred by assessing the credibility of the appellant first and then considered whether the expert report changed that conclusion, as demonstrated at [31] of the decision, and that this amounts to an error of the kind considered in Mibanga. Additionally, the Judge erred in concluding that the appellant’s mental health had been impacted by her experiences in the UK to the lower standard of proof, whereas the pertinent question was whether, to the lower standard, they had been caused by her claimed experiences in Bangladesh. Furthermore, the Judge did not consider the availability or accessibility of the treatment recommended for PTSD (rather than depression) in Bangladesh.
20. Permission to appeal was refused by the Judge but granted on 13 April 2026 by UTJ Owens in the following terms:
1. It is arguable that the judge erred by failing to take into account that in the NRM decision the Secretary of State accepted the appellant’s account of being threatened by her former clients and that the judge has gone behind that concession without providing reasons for departing from it.
2. The judge arguably failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the expert opinion of Dr Ashraf ul-Hoque in respect of the lack of availability of medical treatment in Bangladesh for the appellant as a lone female with no male family members to support her. In assessing whether the appellant’s account of being the victim of domestic violence was credible, the judge arguably failed to take into account the expert opinion that the account was plausible. It is also arguable that the judge erred in the assessment of the medical evidence in accordance with Mibanga [2005] EWCA Civ 267.
3. All grounds are arguable.
The Hearing
21. In submissions Ms Radford adopted the grounds of appeal and Mr Nappey responded to Ms Radford’s submissions. Mr Nappey raised a further issue which had not been raised in the grounds or by way of a rule 24 response. In his submission the Judge had erred in failing to address at any stage the provisions of section 72 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (‘NIAA 2002’). I am grateful to the advocates for their helpful submission which I do not rehearse here but refer to where necessary to explain my decision.
22. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision and sought representations regarding onward disposal of the appeal in the event that I determined the Judge had materially erred in law.
Decision on the grounds
23. I have limited my discussion below to aspects of the grounds (from ground 1 and ground 3) which relate to the Judge’s assessment of credibility. For the reasons set out below, I find that the Judge materially erred which has resulted in unsafe credibility findings. The effect of this, I find, has had a potential ‘knock-on’ effect. Further aspects of the decision must also be considered unsafe in light of the flawed credibility assessment such that the decision should be set aside in its entirety with no findings preserved. In the circumstances, I do not consider it necessary or helpful to determine ground 2 or address it in any detail, although I record that my preliminary view is that the ground as pleaded has merit.
24. The first ground of appeal relates to the Judge’s treatment of the NRM decision dated 6 October 2025 (HB/159). The only reference to this decision by the Judge is at [24] of the decision, in the section addressing the appellant's claims of domestic violence. The Judge records: “There has also been negative conclusive grounds based on these facts and no further challenge to that decision.”
25. The fact that there is a negative conclusive grounds decision is undoubtedly correct. However, this is not the end of the story because it is apparent that the content of the decision potentially has some bearing on the factual matters which fell to be determined by the FtT.
26. Whilst in relation to the appellant’s claim to be a victim of domestic abuse from her ex-husband, the NRM decision states that there is insufficient evidence to support the appellant’s claim, in relation to the appellant’s account regarding risk from previous business associates, the decision records that the appellant’s account was accepted as credible on the balance of probabilities. The reason provided for the negative NRM decision was that the circumstances did not constitute modern slavery, not that the appellant’s account was found to lack credibility.
27. The NRM factual findings in relation to the appellant’s claim to be at risk from previous business associates appear to have been entirely overlooked in the respondent’s refusal decision and review. I accept Ms Radford’s submission that the respondent’s position across the NRM decision and refusal decision under appeal is inconsistent and incoherent. I further accept that the respondent is required to take a consistent stance on matters of fact as they relate to different legal decisions (R (on the application of Gally) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWHC 2415 (Admin)).
28. The refusal decision dated 27 August 2024 (HB/632), which post-dates the NRM decision, states that the appellant’s claim to be at risk from previous business associates was rejected in her previous appeal and there is no additional evidence to depart from the previous judicial findings. In the respondent’s review at [16] (HB/662), the respondent relies on the negative conclusive grounds decision to submit that there is no evidence in respect of the appellant’s business associates to justify departing from the previous judicial findings where the FtT rejected the appellant’s account in this regard. The respondent does not appear to have any regard to the factual conclusions within the NRM decision.
29. I am in no doubt that it was the respondent’s approach to the NRM decision in her refusal decision and review that led the Judge to disregard or overlook potentially relevant material in her assessment of the credibility of a core aspect of the appellant’s account.
30. The Judge was, of course, not obliged to follow the conclusions of the NRM decision when assessing credibility. However, there is no indication that the content of the decision was even taken into account by the Judge. The reference to “no new evidence” at [16] would tend to suggest that it wasn’t. If it was taken into consideration, the Judge has not provided any reasoning to indicate why she did not follow the factual conclusions in the NRM decision in relation to this aspect of the appellant’s account. I find on this basis that the Judge erred either by failing to consider material evidence or by failing to give adequate reasons. This error is undoubtedly material to the credibility assessment undertaken, which I find would have potentially had an impact on other issues that fell to be determined.
31. In a holistic assessment of the credibility of the appellant’s account, I accept that the unsafe credibility findings in relation to one aspect of the appellant's claim potentially impacted the Judge’s approach to credibility of further aspects of the appellant’s case, including her claim to be a victim of domestic abuse and to be suffering from PTSD and depression as a result of these experiences.
32. Although the Judge accepted the appellant’s diagnosis of PTSD, she did not accept the cause of the PTSD, and stated at [29] that Dr Isaacs had not addressed the impact of other matters on the appellant’s mental state. The Judge’s findings and reasoning in this respect does not, however, address [70] of Dr Isaacs’ report which does consider other matters such as the appellant’s immigration uncertainty, but concludes that the appellant’s PSTD was most likely caused by her “reported experiences” (in relation to her ex-husband and business associates). I note that in her report Dr Isaacs addresses various criteria for the diagnosis of PTSD and that “Criteria A” refers to a person having been exposed to a traumatic event in which “the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others, and, the person's response involved intense fear, helplessness or horror”. The assessment for diagnostic purposes, albeit based to a large extent on the appellant’s self-reporting, would appear to indicate that the expert did not attribute the appellant’s PTSD to the other matters identified by the Judge at [28] of the decision, but rather to matters which gave rise to a fear of death or serious injury or a threat to personal integrity. The Judge was not bound to accept the opinion of the expert witness. However, the statement at [29] of the decision appears to overlook certain aspects of Dr Isaacs’ report, including at [70].
33. In relation to a further matter raised at ground three, I accept that [31] of the decision points to an error of the nature considered by the Court of Appeal in Mibanga. Although I accept that at [16] the Judge indicates she has taken the medical evidence into account whilst undertaking her credibility assessment, the finding at [31] is suggestive of a sequential rather than holistic approach to her credibility assessment and gives the impression that the expert evidence could not corroborate the appellant’s account or take it any further because she had “already rejected the appellants’ account”.
34. In light of the nature of the material errors of law outlined above, and supported by the position of both representatives, as well as the Judge’s failure to assess section 72 NIAA, applying paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal, I am satisfied that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing so that the appellant can benefit from the two-tier appeal process. The decision is set aside with no findings preserved.

Notice of Decision
The appellant’s appeal is allowed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is vitiated by material errors of law and is set aside. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a hearing before another judge.

S. Grey
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
15 June 2026