Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000524
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/57905/2024
LP/11571/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

23rd July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE D. CLARKE

Between

KO
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Litigant in Person
For the Respondent: Ms Everett, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 8 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant and any member of his family is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
INTRODUCTION
1. The Appellant, a citizen of Nicaragua, appeals against the Decision of First-Tier Tribunal Judge McMahon promulgated on 3 October 2025 (“the Decision”), dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the SSHD’s decision dated 13 March 2024 (“RFRL”), refusing the Appellant’s Protection claim dated 19 January 2023
BACKGROUND
2. On 17 January 2023 the Appellant left Nicaragua and travelled to Mexico before flying to the UK on 18 January 2023. On 19 January 2023 the Appellant claimed asylum, which was refused on 3 March 2024. It was against this decision that the Appellant appealed to the First-Tier Tribunal (“FTT”).
3. In summary, it was the Appellant’s case before the FTT that she was a political leader and member of the Ciudadanos Por La Libertad and that she feared imprisonment by the Nicaraguan authorities for her political activities.
FTT Decision of FTIJ McMahon
4. At paragraphs [6] – [12] of the Decision the FTIJ notes that the appeal had previously been adjourned due to non-attendance and that the Appellant was once more not in attendance. The court clerk then contacted the Appellant who claimed that she was unaware of the hearing and would not be able to attend. The FTIJ invoked rule 28 of the FTT procedure rules and satisfied himself that the Appellant had been duly notified of the hearing. The FTIJ noted that no application had been made to adjourn the hearing and having regard to the overriding objective found that rule 28 was met and that it was in the interests of justice to proceed.
5. Whilst the grounds of appeal impugn the FTIJ’s approach in this regard, permission to appeal was refused on this ground and I say no more about it.
6. For the purposes of the grounds of appeal before me, I set out the salient paragraphs of FTIJ McMahon’s decision as follows:
16. I have considered all of the evidence in the round and applied the above standards of proof. The Appellant has not provided any country background evidence to explain the situation in Nicaragua. However, I note the Respondent has referred to a limited suite of country background evidence in its decision letter, including the Human Rights Watch report on Nicaragua from 2023. I take this into account when I consider the Appellant’s claim, and I note that there is provides some objective evidence that the government of Nicaragua “repress all forms of dissent”, and is “cracking down on critics”, whilst there is also evidence of intimidation, harassment and surveillance. This broader context lends weight to the Appellant’s claim.
17. However, despite the above, I find that the Appellant’s account is not credible for the following reasons.
18. I find that the Appellant has not attended the hearing to be cross-examined on her account, having been notified of the time, date and place of the hearing, and having received further notices to make her aware that the appeal was progressing. Given the issues at stake, this conduct is inconsistent with her claim to fear persecution in Nicaragua.
19. I note that the Respondent accepts that the Appellant has been involved in demonstrations in Nicaragua, but that it is not accepted that the Appellant was a “high profile member of the opposition” or that she came to the adverse attention of the authorities in Nicaragua.
20. I have reviewed the Appellant’s interview records and reasons she has given for the appeal. The Appellant says she has experienced problems with Nicaragua since 2018 which she says are because of her opposition to the government. She has given an inconsistent account about her precise role in the opposition party – asserting in her substantive interview that she was a member of parliament, elsewhere that she was a “political leader”, and in her most recent reasons for appeal describing how she “participated as an Opposition party member running as a deputy in CXL…”. The Appellant could have clarified this inconsistency in her written evidence, or by attending the hearing to be cross-examined on it. However, she did not do so. I find the inconsistency in the Appellant’s account about her role is something which undermines her credibility.
21. I note that the Appellant refers to the publication of material on social media, but has failed to produce any evidence of this activity. I note the Appellant has given a vague explanation about her “old Facebook” which she describes as being “apparently blocked”. I found this element of the Appellant’s account to be vague and unclear, and I also note that the Appellant has produced what appear to be WhatsApp messages, which have not been translated. I cannot give any weight to these documents given they have not been provided in English, as required by the Tribunal’s Procedure Rules, because I do not know what they say.
22. I note the Appellant has produced photographs which she says show her attending demonstrations. I note the Respondent has accepted that the Appellant has attended demonstrations and would have found the same in light of this evidence in any event. However, what these photographs do not show (to the extent they offer any probative value) is the role the Appellant played in these demonstrations. At best, they show the Appellant as a participant among many other individuals.
23. Applying Tanveer Ahmed, I give little weight to the document at PDF page 115 of the bundle because it has not been properly translated, and there is no explanation about how or when it was obtained, or indeed the identity of the author of the document. To the extent there is an unverified translation, it contains spelling and typographical errors, which have not been adequately explained in the Appellant’s evidence.
24. Finally, if the Appellant’s account is to be believed that she holds such a significant profile and has attracted the adverse attention of the authorities for such a significant period, it is surprising that the Appellant was able to leave Nicaragua via an international airport without encountering any difficulties. This casts doubt on her account about her profile and the interests of the authorities.
25. Having considered all of the evidence in the round, I find from the evidence that there is nothing to support the assertion that the Appellant is anything more than one of the many thousands who have demonstrated against the government in Nicaragua. Whilst I note the Respondent has referred to a limited suite of country background evidence in the decision letter, the Appellant has not provided anything in the way of objective material to show that she would experience a risk on return given her profile as one of many opponents. I therefore do not find that the Appellant has shown that she fears persecution or serious harm, or indeed that it is reasonably likely that the Appellant would face persecution or serious harm on any return.
Grant of PTA and Grounds of Appeal
7. On 18 March 2026 Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick granted the Appellant permission to appeal the Decision of Judge McMahon on grounds 2(a) and (c), ground 4 and ground 7 only.
8. In AI generated grounds of appeal (see at [6.1] of the application for PTA to the UT) dated 17 March 2026, the portions of the grounds granted permission are as follows:
GROUND 2 — Failure to Apply Anxious Scrutiny & Inadequate Credibility Reasoning
The Tribunal’s credibility assessment is legally flawed for the following reasons:
(a) Failure to engage with Respondent’s concessions,
The Respondent accepted that the Appellant attended anti-government demonstrations. However, the Tribunal dismissed photographic evidence as merely showing her as “one of many,” without analysing whether attendance alone creates an enhanced risk in Nicaragua’s documented context of repression.
[….]
(c) Speculation regarding departure through an international airport The Tribunal inferred that the Appellant’s ability to leave Nicaragua via an airport undermined her claimed political profile. No country evidence was cited to support such an inference. This is speculative and contrary to Tanveer Ahmed principles.
Para 24. , …it is surprising that the Appellant was able to leave Nicaragua via an international airport without encountering any difficulties.
This remark at para 24 refers also to KO’s supposed high profile in Ciudadanos por la Libertad (“CxL”). Her prominence should not be essential to her case, as any political dissident is at risk of persecution. KO’s claim is not that she was a senior leader, but she was on the electoral candidates’ list for Managua ahead of the November 2021 general election. She never actually stood, due to the party being banned by the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) on 6 August 2021. KO was also CxL’s Organisation Secretary for Managua District 7. She was more than merely a party member or supporter, but not a figure of major national significance. She has not intentionally attempted to claim that she was a major figure, and any reference to her being a Member of Parliament results from linguistic misunderstandings.
CxL would be considered a moderate, centrist party by UK standards. It is affiliated to Liberal International, a global alliance of like-minded parties, which includes UK’s Liberal Democrats. (https://liberal-international.org/our-members/regions/europe/)
It is true that Nicaragua has on occasions prevented dissidents leaving the country, by refusing or removing passports etc, but the state does not always do that. In fact, it has sometimes taken the opposite course, of expelling opponents. For example, in Feb 2023 it deported 222 dissidents to USA ( https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-64582242), and in Sep 2024, it deported 135 opponents to Guatemala ( https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/nicaragua )
So the fact that KO was allowed to board a flight to UK must not be used to “cast doubt on her account.” Nor does it imply that she would not be at risk of persecution if she were returned to Nicaragua.
KO had received a summons to present to the authorities under the Special Cybercrimes Law, but she did not attend. Fearing that this would lead to her imprisonment at the notorious El Chipote prison, where she fears tortured, because that what the government does to the opposition. She decided to leave the country before her hearing. The summons was on paper, and she decided not to carry it with her to the airport. That was an understandable precaution, given that her bags were searched before boarding. No arrest warrant had been issued prior to her departure, so she was allowed to leave.
On the question of KO’s supposed claims to have been an MP, there seems to have been a misunderstanding during the interview:
[41] Q: were you a candidate in any specific election or did you play amy specific political role?
A: Yeah, I was a candidate for some Member of Parliemnet and I was registered in the Supreme Electoral Regisyter (Consejo Supremo Electoral)
[42] Are you still the member of this parliament? And are you still registered?
At 41 KO says she was a candidate, but 42 implies she had claimed to be an MP. This may have been due to language and translation difficulties, and looking at the interview transcript, much of it is written in unclear English. KO recalls that the interpreter had difficulties understanding the interviewer. Such problems have made it difficult for KO to put forward a coherent case.
The tribunal refers to this supposed inconsistency at para 20, specifically mentioning the interview record:
“I find the inconsistency in the Appellant’s account about her role is something which undermines her credibility.”
Any doubt cast on her credibility based on this interview cannot be maintained. In her interview, she explains the relationship between the Christian Democratic Union and Ciudadanos por la Liberand. This does not appear to be contentious, so we do not explain further here.
GROUND 4 — Failure to Properly Apply Objective Country Evidence
The Tribunal acknowledged objective evidence that the Nicaraguan authorities:
• “Repress all forms of dissent,”
• engage in surveillance, intimidation, and harassment,
• and “crack down on critics.”
Despite recognising this, the Tribunal failed to apply this evidence to the Appellant’s individual case. Instead, it concluded she was simply “one of the many thousands” opposing the government and therefore at no risk—an approach inconsistent with the accepted evidence that ordinary demonstrators can be targeted, especially in a system with pervasive surveillance.
This is a material misdirection.
There is an abundance of evidence from reputable sources that political repression is not limited to prominent opponents of the government. Reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch consistently report repression and surveillance at all levels. The United Nations Humans Rights Council (UNHCR) report on human rights in Nicaragua refers to “persecution and forms of repression … targeting an ever-growing group of individuals” and “forcing more and more Nicaraguans to leave their country.”
[see Annual report of the UN High Commissioner for HR and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and Secretary- General 26 February – 5 April 2024]
GROUND 7 — Overall Inadequacy of Reasons
Throughout the decision, conclusions are stated without adequate explanation, including:
• Why the accepted country evidence does not support even a low-level risk;
• Why internal relocation or state protection would be available;
• Why the statutory tests are satisfied.
The decision fails to enable the Appellant to understand why her appeal was dismissed. This is a material error of law.
9. In a rule 24 reply dated 31 March 2026, the SSHD argued that the FTIJ did not materially err. In particular, the SSHD argued that the Appellant had failed to provide any country evidence before the FTT, and in the light of the adverse credibility findings which are not challenged in the grounds, it was open to the FTIJ to find that the Appellant was not at risk, even if the SSHD’s country evidence confirmed that the government “repress all forms of dissent”.
10. The matter now comes before me to determine whether there is an error of law in the Decision of the Judge pursuant to s.12(1) of the Tribunal Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. If I find an error, I must then determine whether the error is material, such that the Decision should be set aside. If the Decision is set aside, I must decide whether to remake the Decision in the Upper Tribunal or remit the appeal to the First-Tier Tribunal, pursuant to s.12(2) of the 2007 Act.
ERROR OF LAW HEARING
Preliminary Matters
11. At the outset of the hearing, I ensured that the Appellant and the interpreter understood each other and I explained the proceedings.
12. The Appellant then requested that I allow a Mr Burns who was sat at the back of the court to speak on her behalf. In response to questions from me, the Appellant confirmed that Mr Burns was not legally qualified, had no experience of error of law appeals and had no financial interest in assisting the Appellant with her appeal. In reply, Ms Everett objected on account of Mr Burn’s lack of any expertise and because the SSHD and the bench were best placed to assist the Appellant during the hearing.
13. As I ruled at the hearing, I did not consider that Mr Burns would be of any assistance to the Tribunal or the Appellant in navigating whether the FTIJ erred in law. Rights of audience are regulated for good reason, given the technical nature of the law in this jurisdiction and because poor representation can significantly prejudice an Appellant.
14. The Appellant then asked whether Mr Burns would at least be able to assist her during the hearing with papers and advice. In reply, Ms Everett accepted that this would be an acceptable level of assistance for a McKenzie friend to offer in all the circumstances. Accordingly, I allowed Mr Burns to sit with the Appellant and assist her with papers and whispered advice. However, I made clear that I would not hear any argument or submissions from Mr Burns.
15. In discussions with the parties, it became evident that Ms Everett did not have the stitched hearing bundle consisting of 287 pages (“SB”) or the grounds of appeal, However Ms Everett confirmed that she did have the grant of permission and the FTT bundles, so she was familiar with the issues before me. In turn the Appellant confirmed that she also did not have a copy of the SB, including Judge McMahon’s decision. As such, I ensured that copies of the main procedural papers were made by the clerk and provided to the parties. The parties then confirmed that they were ready to proceed.
16. I then ensured that the Appellant and Mr Burns were sat by the interpreter with the necessary papers and I directed that although this was an appeal by the Appellant at first instance, it would be appropriate for Ms Everett to make her submissions first. In this regard, I directed Ms Everett to make her submissions in simple language so that they could be understood by the Appellant; to take her time and pause between points so that the Appellant could locate any necessary papers; and to ensure that the interpreter had time to read the relevant portions of any documents to the Appellant as they arose during the hearing.
17. After Ms Everett had completed her submissions, I took the Appellant through her main points to make sure that she had a full opportunity to respond.
18. At the close of the hearing the Appellant further handed up a 3-page document of further submissions that she wished to make. I confirm that I have taken this document into account when reaching my conclusions below.
DISCUSSION
GROUND 2(a) and Ground 4
19. Under ground 2(a) the Appellant argues that the FTIJ failed to engage with the SSHD’s concession that the Appellant had attended anti-government demonstrations. The ground argues that the FTIJ erroneously dismissed photographs of the Appellant at such demonstrations on the basis that she was “one of many”, in circumstances where attendance alone creates an enhanced risk.
20. As noted in Judge Ruddick’s grant of permission, this ground overlaps with ground 4 where the Appellant argues that whilst the FTIJ acknowledged the country evidence that Nicaraguan authorities repress all forms of dissent; engage in surveillance, use intimidation and harassment; and crack down on critics, the Tribunal failed to apply this country evidence. It is argued that this was a misdirection because the accepted evidence was that “ordinary demonstrators can be targeted”, and there is an abundance of evidence from reputable sources that political oppression is not limited to prominent opponents.
21. I do not accept that these grounds have any merit.
22. The immediate difficulty with ground 4, is its reliance upon a Human Rights Council report that was not before the FTT to support the assertion of an “abundance of evidence from reputable sources that political repression is not limited to prominent opponents”. I find that the FTIJ cannot be impugned for not taking evidence into account that was not before him. In this regard, the FTIJ makes plain at [16] that the Appellant had served no country evidence. At the hearing before me, when I asked the Appellant if the Human Rights Council report referred to in ground 4 was before the FTT she confirmed that it was not.
23. In terms of the country evidence that was before the FTIJ, at [16] and [25] the FTIJ notes the “limited suite” of country evidence cited in the RFRL. This country evidence was limited to a BBC report and a HRW report.
24. The BBC report is dated 10 May 2018 and titled “Nicaragua protests: Tens of thousands in new anti-government rallies”. The report states as follows,
Tens of thousands of Nicaraguans have taken part in fresh anti-government protests in the capital, Managua, and in Matagalpa y Chinandega.
Wearing the blue and white of the flag, Wednesday's protesters held pictures of people reportedly killed in last month's demonstrations.
Government supporters held a smaller rally in another part of the capital. Last month's unrest began after President Daniel Ortega approved cuts to pensions and social security.
Four police officers, two of them women, were shot at on Wednesday following the anti-government protest in Managua but officials said the attack was not related to the march.
"A group of vandals... fired their guns at a police patrol which was directing traffic," deputy police director Francisco Díaz said.
At last month's protests, pensioners were soon joined by students and other Nicaraguans who have become the biggest challenge to Mr Ortega's authority since he took office in 2007.
President Ortega revoked his plans to overhaul the social security system, but the move failed to quell the protests, in which more than 40 people have been killed according to human rights groups.
He also called for a "national dialogue" but meetings between his government and protesters which were meant to be mediated by the Catholic Church have yet to take place.
Demonstrators on Wednesday were demanding "freedom of expression and information and an end to violence" as well as calling for President Ortega to step down. There has been discontent with the president, who is serving his third consecutive term in office, for years in some parts of society.
The 2014 scrapping of presidential term limits has been seen as a threat to democracy and some of those who have been demonstrating have accused Mr Ortega and his wife of having "dictatorial tendencies".
25. In terms of the HRW 2023 report, the salient parts are as follows:
The government of President Daniel Ortega and his wife, Vice President Rosario Murillo, continued to repress all forms of dissent and isolate Nicaragua.
The government has tightened its grip on power by cracking down on critics, including members of the Catholic Church, and dismantling civic space. It has massively closed media outlets, NGOs, and universities, violating freedoms of expression and association and restricting the right to education.
Other persistent problems include a total abortion ban, attacks on Indigenous and Afro-descendent communities, and widespread impunity for human rights violations.
Persecution of Critics
As of October, 81 people perceived as government critics remained in detention, a Nicaraguan rights group reported, most charged with “undermining national integrity” and “propagating fake news.”
In February, the government stripped 317 people of their nationality, including 222 political prisoners the government expelled to the US, labelling them as “traitors” and confiscating their assets. The decision, which violated international human rights law, left many stateless.
Authorities removed birth certificates and academic records of some of those expelled from the civil registry, impeding the right to access personal information. They also erased critics’ personal data from the Nicaraguan Institute of Social Security, depriving many of their pensions. In May, the Supreme Court permanently suspended the licenses of 25 lawyers and notaries, ruling that because they were now considered “foreigners,” they could no longer exercise their profession in Nicaragua.
Freedoms of Expression and Association
Human rights defenders, journalists, and critics are targets of death threats, assaults, intimidation, harassment, surveillance, online defamation campaigns, and, as discussed above, arbitrary detention, prosecution, and deprivation of nationality.
Authorities had closed over 3,500 NGOs as of November 2023, including women’s, religious, international aid, and medical groups. This represents roughly 50 percent of NGOs officially operative in Nicaragua before April 2018. The closures have cut off essential services to many beneficiaries.
Between 2018 and 2022, the government closed at least 57 media outlets, 30 in 2022 and 2 in 2023, the Nicaraguan Platform of NGO Networks reported.
Abusive legislation enabled many of the closures. A 2020 “foreign agents” law, for example, allows the cancelation of legal status of organizations that obtain foreign funds for activities that “interfere in Nicaragua’s internal affairs.”
Between April and June, 23 journalists fled the country, civil society groups reported, bringing the total of media workers who fled Nicaragua since 2018 to 208.
Authorities have imposed restrictions to hinder several outlets’ operations, including censorship and blocking access to printing materials. Police have raided and seized assets from Confidencial, 100% Noticias, and La Prensa.
In August, a court sentenced journalist Victor Ticay to eight years in prison on charges of undermining national integrity and disseminating false news.
Impunity for 2018 Crackdown
Police, in coordination with armed pro-government groups, repressed massive anti-government protests in 2018, killing at least 328 people, injuring some 2,000, and detaining hundreds. Authorities reported that 21 police officers were killed in the context of demonstrations.
Many protesters were detained for months, subjected to torture and ill-treatment, including electric shocks, severe beatings, fingernail removal, asphyxiation, and rapes. Serious violations of due process and other rights marred prosecutions against protesters.
No police officer has been convicted in connection with abuses related to the crackdown.
26. At paragraph [16] the FTIJ clearly had regard to this evidence when finding that it “provides some objective evidence that the government of Nicaragua “repress all forms of dissent”, and is “cracking down on critics”, whilst there is also evidence of intimidation, harassment and surveillance”. Of particular importance, is that the FTIJ favourably finds that “this broader context lends weight to the Appellant’s claim.”
27. I find no error in this approach. The FTIJ evidently took the country evidence into account and gave it weight. As noted in Lewishon LJ’s guidance at paragraph [2(iv)] of Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, the weight that a judge gives to any evidence is pre-eminently a matter for him.
28. Whilst this country evidence paints a dark picture of repression, detention and killings, it does not go so far as to suggest than everyone who attended a demonstration must be at risk, it simply identifies an enhanced risk of persecution for activist opponents of the government.
29. Accordingly, whilst the Appellant’s claimed adverse interest was plausible in the light of the country evidence, the central issue before the FTIJ was the credibility of the Appellant’s claim to be of such adverse interest, in circumstances where the SSHD disputed the credibility of the adverse interest and where the FTIJ has given weight to the external consistency of the Appellant’s account.
30. Before setting out the FTIJ’s adverse credibility findings that weigh against the weight apportioned to the external consistency identified at [16], I find it appropriate to set out the salient features of the Appellant’s account of adverse interest and risk, as contained in her appeal reasons, to provide context to the FTIJ’s credibility findings:
• The Appellant participated in Marches in 2018.
• The Appellant later participated as an opposition party member running as a deputy in CXL, “the most important opposition party that the government had”.
• That since 2018 the Appellant had used her social networks to denounce the grievances and violations of the Human Rights of the people of Nicaragua.
• That since 2018, the Appellant had suffered political persecution, violence and violations of her human rights.
• That for 5 years the Appellant suffered from spies, CPC informants and threats from Sandinista paramilitaries. The police took away her cell phones on 3 occasions, took away her business which distributed cleaning products, took away the tender that she had in the La Fise financial center for the sale of properties and held her passport until December 2023.
• That the Nicaraguan police sent the Appellant a notice that if she did not stop publishing lies against the government of Ortega, the Civerdeliitos law would be applied to her. The Appellant left this letter at her mother’s or aunt's house, and they gave it up for lost.
• The letter from the police was deleted from her files because when the Appellant left the Puerto Agusto Cesar Sandino airport in Nicaragua, she was interviewed and both her laptop and cell phone were checked. The Appellant’s relatives’ phones were intercepted and monitored by a Russian company that operates in Nicaragua as a spy, so the Appellant does not know if the letter is lost.
• The Appellant will be arrested if she is returned to Nicaragua.
31. The FTIJ then makes the following adverse credibility findings:
32. First, at [18] the FTIJ finds that the Appellant’s failure to attend her hearing is inconsistent with the issues at stake and her claimed subjective fear of persecution.
33. Second, at [20] the FTIJ finds that the Appellant has provided an inconsistent account of her role in the opposition party (as considered further below under ground 2(c)), which could have been clarified had the Appellant attended the hearing.
34. Third, at [21] the FTIJ finds that whilst the Appellant asserts that she has published material on social media, she has failed to produce any evidence of activity and given a vague account of her old Facebook being blocked. The FTIJ further finds that whilst the Appellant has provided WhatsApp messages, they are untranslated and therefore carry no weight.
35. Fourth, at [22] the photographs of demonstrations simply show the Appellant as a participant amongst many individuals.
36. Fifth, at [23] the Christian Democratic Union Party letter (see SB [231]) has not been properly translated, there is no explanation as to how or when it was acquired or the identity of the author. It contains spelling and typographical errors and therefore carries little weight.
37. Sixth, at [24] whilst it is the Appellant’s account that she holds a significant profile and has attracted the adverse attention of the authorities for a significant period, it is surprising she was able to leave Nicaragua via the airport without difficulty. This casts doubt on her profile and the interests of the authorities (as considered further under ground 2(c) below).
38. In the light of these adverse credibility findings, at [25] the FTIJ finds “nothing to support the assertion that the Appellant is anything more than one of many thousands who have demonstrated against the government.”
39. Given that credibility was the central issue and the country evidence did not confirm that everyone who attended the 2018 demonstrations was now at risk, I find that the FTIJ has provided adequate reasons for rejecting the Appellant’s account of adverse interest and in so doing has had due regard to the country evidence, in circumstances where the Appellant did not attend her appeal hearing to have her evidence tested.
40. Accordingly, I find that grounds 2(a) and 4 do not disclose any material errors of law.
Ground 2(c)
Ability to Leave Through the Airport
41. The first point taken under ground 2(c) is that the FTIJ speculated at [24] when finding that the Appellant’s ability to leave unhindered through the airport undermined her claimed political profile because there was no country evidence before the FTT to this effect.
42. The ground goes on to argue that political prominence was not essential to the Appellant’s case, she had not claimed to be a senior political leader and – perhaps counterintuitively – any political dissident is at risk of persecution. The ground then relies upon links to a February 2023 BBC report and a 2024 HRW report to support the assertion that dissidents had been deported by the Nicaraguan authorities.
43. None of this country evidence was placed before the FTT.
44. As such, argues the ground, the FTIJ fell into material error when finding that the Appellant’s ability to pass freely through the airport “cast doubt on her account.”
45. Whilst the SSHD’s rule 24 reply resisted this ground of appeal and argued that the FTIJ’s conclusion at paragraph [24] was reasonable because “if she was wanted by the Police why did they return her passport to her”, Ms Everett before me conceded that it was an error of law for the FTIJ to make such findings at [24] in the absence of country evidence. However, Ms Everett further argued that the error was not material as it would not have affected the outcome of the appeal.
46. In discussions with Ms Everett at the hearing, I expressed my unease with this concession given that the RFRL had expressly raised this issue in the RFRL on the basis that,
It is not considered plausible that you would be able to leave Nicaragua using your own passport whilst the police were actively pursuing you for your political activity (AIR 2, 36-37, SCR 3.4). Your response when questioned regarding this inconsistency does not explain how you successfully left the country undetected (AIR 2 36-37), therefore, your credibility is impacted.
47. The evidence referred to in the RFRL is as follows:
SCR [3.4]
On 17 January 2023 I left Nicaragua to Mexico. On the same date, on 17 January 2023, I left Mexico to the UK and arrived on 18 January 2023
AIR
[36] Q: Did they threaten you?
A: They sent a notification saying I would be sent to prison.
[37] Q: How did she leave the country if the authorities were interested in you?
A: I took the risk, they could either let me leave or send me to prison, so I took the risk.
48. I further note that the Appellant’s appeal submissions before Judge McMahon were as follows:
[……] when I left the Puerto Agusto Cesar Sandino airport in Nicaragua I was interviewed and both my laptop and my cell phone were checked... said letter I left at my mother or aunt's house and they gave it up for lost... it is worth mentioning that the phones of my relatives are intercepted and monitored by a Russian company that operates in Nicaragua as a spy, so I really don't know if it was lost... With my relatives I only talk about the essentials so as not to cause them more problems [……]
49. It is in this context that the FTIJ found at [24],
Finally, if the Appellant’s account is to be believed that she holds such a significant profile and has attracted the adverse attention of the authorities for such a significant period, it is surprising that the Appellant was able to leave Nicaragua via an international airport without encountering any difficulties. This casts doubt on her account about her profile and the interests of the authorities.
50. When considering whether to accept the SSHD’s concession I am mindful that the question before me is whether the FTIJ erred on a point of law. In the House of Lords in Bahamas International v Threadgold 1 WLR 1514 it was held at [1525G]:
It is for the judge to decide for himself what the law is, not to accept it from any or even all of the parties to the suit; having so decided it is his duty to apply it to the facts of the cases. He would be acting contrary to his judicial oath if he were to determine the case by applying what the parties conceived to be the law, if in his own opinion it was erroneous.
51. Equally, in Armstead v Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Co Ltd [2025] AC 406, at [46] Lord Leggatt and Lord Burrows JJSC held:
"[i]t would be inappropriate to decide this appeal in reliance on a concession that we did not think was legally correct".
52. I find that Ms Everett’s concession, which is predicated upon an absence of country evidence being served by the SSHD, does not engage with the different point taken by the SSHD in the RFRL by reference to the Appellant’s own evidence, i.e. that she was being actively pursued by the state who wanted to send her to prison. If, as is argued in the grounds before me, the answer to that credibility issue is to be found in country evidence, none was placed before the FTIJ to that effect. I find that the Appellant clearly had a case to answer in this regard but failed to turn up to her hearing to be cross examined and failed to serve any country evidence to meet the credibility case advanced in the RFRL.
53. Indeed, I note that of the limited country evidence that was before the FTT, the 2023 HRW report stated,
In February, the government stripped 317 people of their nationality, including 222 political prisoners the government expelled to the US, labelling them as “traitors” and confiscating their assets. The decision, which violated international human rights law, left many stateless.
54. This limited evidence of expulsion before the FTT clearly identifies those being removed as having been stripped of their citizenship. The Appellant has made no such claim about herself.
55. Accordingly, I disagree that the burden was on the SSHD to provide country evidence as the point taken in the RFRL was not one based upon (absent) country evidence but rather the Appellant’s own evidence that the state actively wanted to send her to prison. I find that the FTIJ cannot be impugned for failing to take into account country evidence that was not before him. In the context of the credibility point taken by the SSHD by reference to the Appellant’s own evidence, I find that the evidential burden clearly fell upon the Appellant to rebut the credibility point taken by the SSHD.
56. I find it plain that the Appellant’s attempt to meet this credibility point in the appeal submissions was to suggest that the letter threatening prison had been lost or deleted, which is an entirely different point to the one now taken in the grounds. As such, I am further satisfied that it was simply not suggested to the FTIJ that the Appellant’s ability to leave Nicaragua unhindered was because the state was actively deporting dissidents.
57. I further note Dr Storey’s consideration of plausibility in KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 00491 (IAC) at [30],
30. The reference by Neuberger LJ at [28] of [HK v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1037] to the need to consider factors related to plausibility along with "other familiar factors… such as consistency" is also illustrative of the need to avoid basing credibility assessment on just one indicator [….]
58. As set out above, the FTIJ did not treat the plausibility of the Appellant’s unhindered escape from Nicaragua through the airport as a singular determinative factor of the Appellant’s credibility, but rather considered it amongst a variety of indicators, including: consistent country evidence of adverse interest; the Appellant’s failure to attend her hearing and have her evidence tested; her inconsistent account of political roles; her failure to provide Facebook evidence; photographs of the Appellant attending demonstration; and an unexplained and poorly translated Christian Democratic Union Party letter.
59. Accordingly, I reject Ms Everett’s concession and find the FTIJ’s reasons and findings at [24] within a reasonable range of responses to the arguments and evidence before him. As such, I find that the FTIJ did not materially err in law in this regard.
Political Role
60. The second point taken under ground 2(c) is that the FTIJ erred at paragraph [20] in his approach to the Appellant’s political role. The ground suggests that there may have been a misunderstanding during the AIR because the Appellant was only a candidate not an MP and therefore any doubt cast on the Appellant’s credibility by the AIR cannot be maintained.
61. In the RFRL at credibility point (c) the SSHD argued that,
You have stated that you are a political leader in Nicaragua (SCR 4.1, AIR 1, 49). You state that you were registered in the supreme electoral register (consejo supremo electoral) (AIR 1, 41), and that you are a member of parliament (AIR 1, 42). This element of your claim was unable to be externally verified.
62. In this regard, the evidence referred to in the RFRL is as follows:
SCR [4.1]
I am one of the leaders of a political party called Ciudadonas Por Libertad. Most of the leaders in this party have been arrested and detained by the ruling party that is why I left Nicaragua. I am going to be detained because they are pursuing me the government because the current political party arrest anyone who does not support them.
AIR 1
[49] Q: What information does the reference letter from the political party contain that you mentioned earlier?
A: It states that I was a well-known leader of the political party, to whom it might concern to grant me asylum because I was being persecuted as the rest of us. I am going to re-send it to you.
[41] Q: Were you a candidate in any specific election or did you play any specific political role?
A: Yeah, I was a candidate for some member of parliament, and I was registered in the Supreme Electoral Register.
[42] Q: Are you still the member of this parliament? And are you still registered?
A: I suppose we are still in the register, but the government just started to persecute all the members of the party, and they started to send them to prison. All the opposition members who are in prison they do belong to my political party because we are going to another political party.
63. In the Appellant’s appeal submissions, she stated as follows in relation to her political role:
Gentlemen, I participated in Marches in 2018 in my country. Later I participated as an Opposition party member running as a deputy in CXL, the most important opposition party that the government had, which left it without its legal personality and the majority of political prisoners belong to said Party […]
64. In the light of these arguments and evidence, at paragraph [20] the FTIJ finds:
She has given an inconsistent account about her precise role in the opposition party – asserting in her substantive interview that she was a member of parliament, elsewhere that she was a “political leader”, and in her most recent reasons for appeal describing how she “participated as an Opposition party member running as a deputy in CXL…”. The Appellant could have clarified this inconsistency in her written evidence, or by attending the hearing to be cross-examined on it. However, she did not do so. I find the inconsistency in the Appellant’s account about her role is something which undermines her credibility.
65. The point taken by the FTIJ is simply that these different strands of evidence seemingly describe the Appellant in inconsistent ways and that the Appellant did not appear at the hearing to clarify these inconsistencies. Accordingly, the FTIJ found that this lack of explanation undermined the Appellant’s credibility.
66. Whilst the grounds of appeal seek to impugn the interpreter at the Appellant’s first AIR, the first question asked at AIR 2 was whether the Appellant was happy with the information from the previous interview. In reply the Appellant stated “yes”. I can find nothing in the interviews or appeal submissions before the FTT to suggest that the Appellant ever raised interpreter issues before her application to appeal to the Upper Tribunal.
67. Equally, whilst the grounds blame interpreter issues for the Appellant’s implicit acceptance at AIR2 {42] that she was a member of parliament, the fact remains that the RFRL characterised the Appellant’s evidence at AIR [42] as the Appellant claiming to be a member of parliament. As noted by the FTIJ “the Appellant could have clarified this inconsistency in her written evidence, or by attending the hearing to be cross-examined”.
68. I find no error in the FTIJ’s approach to the evidence and his finding that the lack of explanation for apparent inconsistencies in the Appellant’s role undermined her credibility. Whilst the grounds argue that there were misunderstandings at interview, this was not raised before the FTT or in the papers. The fact remains that the Appellant alternatively claimed to be a party leader in the SCR; did not contradict the AIR interviewer when he suggested that she was an MP; and further suggested in her appeal submissions that she was a deputy leader candidate. I further note that in the grounds of appeal before me the Appellant now claims that she was “CxL’s Organisation Secretary”.
69. I find that the FTIJ was perfectly entitled to take the unexplained tensions in the evidence before him into account when assessing credibility, particularly when the Appellant was put on notice in the RFRL that the SSHD had construed her representations during the AIR as the Appellant being an MP.
70. I find that the FTIJ’s reasons and findings are within a reasonable range of responses to the evidence before him and accordingly find no material error of law.
71. I therefore dismiss ground 2(c).
Ground 7 — Overall Inadequacy of Reasons
72. Under ground 7 the Appellant argues that the FTIJ’s conclusions are inadequately reasoned; including why the country evidence does not support low level risk, why internal relocation and state protection would be unavailable or why the statutory tests are not satisfied.
73. I find the suggestion that the FTIJ did not adequately reason internal relocation and state protection misconceived, because the FTIJ found that the Appellant was not of adverse interest to the state.
74. For the reasons set out in my consideration of grounds 2(a), (c) and 4 above, I find that the FTIJ has given adequate and legally sustainable reasons for finding that the Appellant is not of adverse interest, in circumstances where the Appellant did not attend her hearing to be cross examined and where the country evidence did not go so far as to suggest that all attendees at demonstrations were of adverse interest to the state authorities.
75. Accordingly, I find that the FTIJ has provided adequate reasons for concluding that the Appellant’s removal would not breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention.
76. I therefore dismiss ground 7

CONCLUSION ON ERROR OF LAW
77. For the reasons above, I find that Decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge McMahon does not disclose any material errors of law.

NOTICE OF DECISION
1. The Decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge McMahon does not contain any material errors of law and therefore stands.
2. The Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

D. Clarke

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

9 July 2026