Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2026-000526
& UI-2026-000528
First-tier Tribunal Nos: EA/01945/2024
& EA/01946/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 20th April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

MST SALEHA BEGUM
MD ANGUR MIA
(no anonymity order made)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M West, instructed by Rasel Chambers Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 April 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellants appeal, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing their appeals against the respondent’s refusal to issue them with EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) Family Permits.

2. The appellants, nationals of Bangladesh born on 20 September 1978 and 10 March 1965 respectively, applied on 12 December 2023 for EUSS Family Permits as the ‘family member of a relevant EEA citizen’, as dependents of their daughter and son-in-law. Their son-in-law, the sponsor, was a Spanish national who was living in the UK with settled status under the EUSS.

3. The appellants’ applications were refused on 23 February 2024 as the respondent was not satisfied that they were dependent on the sponsor for their essential living needs and was accordingly not satisfied that they met the eligibility requirements for an EUSS family permit. The respondent noted that the appellants had produced, as evidence of dependency, seven money transfer receipts, of which only three named the sponsor or themselves as beneficiaries. The respondent considered that that was not sufficient evidence to show that the appellants were financially dependent upon the sponsor. Further, the respondent considered that the appellants had failed to provide any evidence of their own domestic circumstances in Bangladesh and that she was therefore unable to sufficiently determine that they could not meet their essential living needs without the financial or other material support from the sponsor.

4. The appellants appealed against the respondent’s decisions under the Immigration (Citizens’ Rights Appeals)(EU Exit) Regulations 2020.

5. The appeals came before the First-tier Tribunal on 14 October 2025 and were heard by Judge Hussain at an oral hearing. In dismissing the appeals, in a decision promulgated on 17 December 2025 the judge recorded that the appellants were not present at the hearing either in person or through a representative and that he was therefore determining the appeals on the papers before him. The judge noted that the appellants had served a bundle of documents containing 158 pages, as well as a further supplementary bundle containing 52 pages, and he summarised the contents of the sponsor’s statement. The judge considered there to be no explanation as to why there were only three remittance receipts, given that the sponsor was claiming to have assumed responsibility for the appellants since 2019 and that there were no remittance receipts from when the sponsor was living in Spain. He also considered there to be no explanation as to how the appellants had managed to support themselves before 2019 and why that support had come to an end, and he concluded that the appellants had failed to discharge the burden of proof upon them.

6. The appellants sought permission to appeal the judge’s decision on two grounds: firstly, that he had failed to consider relevant evidence which had been provided in the appeal bundles, namely a number of further money transfer receipts; and secondly, that he had misdirected himself by requiring there to be an explanation as how the appellants were supported previously.

7. Permission was granted in the First-tier Tribunal, with particular reference to the first ground.

8. The respondent produced a rule 24 response opposing the appeal, but pointing out that, contrary to the judge’s observation, there had in fact been a face-to-face oral hearing where both parties were represented.

9. The appellants then sought to amend their grounds, to add a procedural unfairness challenge on the basis that, as mentioned in the respondent’s rule 24 response, there had in fact been an oral hearing where the sponsor had given oral evidence and both parties had made oral submissions, and that that had been overlooked by the judge who had failed to have regard to the oral evidence when making his decision.

10. At the hearing, Ms Keerthy did not oppose the application to amend the grounds and conceded that there had been a material error of law in that the judge had failed to acknowledge that the sponsor had given oral evidence for the appeal.

11. In the circumstances, given Ms Keerthy’s properly made concession, I agree that the judge’s decision cannot be upheld since it was based upon procedural unfairness and irregularity. Both parties are in agreement that the appeal proceeded as an oral hearing, with the sponsor giving oral evidence in support of the appellants’ appeals and both parties making oral submissions. None of that evidence was considered by the judge in his decision, who proceeded to determine the appeal on the basis that there had been no oral evidence and no attendance from either party. There is nothing in the judge’s decision to suggest that his reference to a papers determination was simply a typing error: on the contrary, the clear indication throughout the decision was that there was no appearance by either party and no oral evidence or submissions, which was clearly wrong. The appellants were therefore clearly deprived of a fair hearing on that basis. That error was further compounded by the judge’s failure to consider the additional money transfer receipts in the appellants’ appeal bundle.

12. Accordingly I set aside the judge’s decision on the grounds that it contains material errors of law. Given that the effect of the error has been to deprive the appellants of a fair hearing and to deprive them of an opportunity for their full case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal, the appropriate course is for the case to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing before a different judge.

Notice of Decision

13. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law. The decision is set aside.

14. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be dealt with afresh pursuant to section 12(2)(b)(i) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and Practice Statement 7.2(a), before any judge aside from Judge Hussain.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13 April 2026