Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000558
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/67300/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 19th of June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PICKERING

Between

JK
(ANONYMITY ORDERED)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Holmes, of counsel
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 11 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with permission of the First-tier Tribunal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the Judge”) dismissing her appeal against the decision of the respondent to refuse her claim for asylum.
2. We have decided to maintain the anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal. This is because we consider on the specific facts of this appeal, the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system and the appellant having raised a claim to international protection are such that an anonymity order is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice.
Background
3. The appellant claims to be an Afghan national from Ghazni province. She claims to have lived there until 1998, after which she moved to India. She remained in India until 2017.
4. During her time in India, she married and had two children: a son born in 2004 and a daughter born in 2009.
5. In 2017, the appellant, her husband, and their children came to the United Kingdom.
6. Her husband claimed asylum in 2017, and the appellant was treated as a dependent upon his claim.
7. The appellant’s husband’s asylum claim was refused and his appeal was heard before the First-tier Tribunal in October 2020 (we shall refer to this Judge as “the first Judge” as their determination is relevant to the decision under challenge). We shall continue to refer to her as “the appellant” for consistency, even when discussing the October 2020 determination, although at that time she was a dependent.
8. The argument advanced at the 2020 hearing was that the appellant’s husband and the appellant were both Afghan nationals. They had fled Afghanistan separately and later lived, met, and married in India. It was said that they were both Afghan nationals and held no other nationality. They explained that they had used bribery as a means of obtaining visas which the respondent relied upon to support that the appellant and her husband were Indian nationals.
9. The respondent did not accept the claim that the appellant and her husband were Afghan nationals. The respondent relied on a visit visa application made in December 2007 from India when they purported to be Indian nationals.
10. Their appeal was heard in October 2020. The first Judge heard evidence from both the appellant and her husband.
11. The first Judge found that the appellant and her husband were Sikhs [§14 of the 2020 determination]. The Judge also found them to be unreliable witnesses and concluded that they were Indian nationals [§48 of the 2020 determination], not Afghan nationals. The first Judge dismissed the appellant’s husband’s appeal.
12. On 7 July 2021, the appellant made an asylum claim in her own right. At the time of that application, she told the respondent that she was separated from her husband and in the process of divorce. Her husband was not a dependent upon that claim, although her two children were.
13. The appellant’s asylum claim was refused by letter dated 10 December 2023 (“the decision letter”). In the decision letter the respondent accepted that the appellant was a Sikh and that she had been born in Afghanistan. However, it was asserted that she was an Indian national, relying primarily on the visa application material.
14. By the time matters had reached the First-tier Tribunal the appeal had evolved. The respondent had withdrawn the concession made in the decision letter that the appellant had been born in Afghanistan. The appeal was also conceded on an article 8 family life basis because of the appellant’s children.
15. The appellant’s appeal was dismissed in a determination promulgated on 25 July 2025. In that determination, the Judge noted that it was accepted that the appellant and her family are Sikh.
16. At [15] of his determination, the Judge directed himself to Devaseelan v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 00702. He set out the previous Judge’s findings at [25-28] of his determination. The Judge set out his findings at [29-45].The Judge ultimately concluded that the appellant had not when considering all the evidence in the round discharged the burden of proof upon her to show that she was an Afghan national [47].
The Grounds
17. The grounds seeking permission to appeal are fivefold:

Ground (i) advances that the Judge failure to give adequate reasons as to why the holding of a Afghan passport was of no moment in assessing her nationality.
Ground (ii) avers a mistake of fact as to the approach to be taken to the Indian passport.
Ground (iii) submits a failure to give adequate reasons and/or properly apply authority concerning “self-serving” evidence in respect of the appellant’s son’s evidence.
Ground (iv) advances that there was a failure to take into account material matters and/or irrationality. The material matter was said to be the appellant’s ability to speak Dari.
Ground (v) avers that the Judge fell into error by requiring corroboration from the appellant.
The Hearing
18. Mr Holmes and Mr McVeety developed the written arguments before us orally and answered our questions. We are not persuaded that the Judge’s determination contains material errors of law that require it to be set aside for the following reasons.
19. Ground (i) asserts that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons as to why the fact that the appellant held an original Afghan passport was said to be of no moment to the assessment of her nationality. However, the ground itself acknowledges that, at [32] of the decision, the Judge expressly addresses the passport and provides reasons for attaching no weight to it. It is further contended that, in the absence of verification evidence, the Judge ought to have gone on to assess the documentary evidence in light of the background country material.
20. In reality Ground (i) properly understood is a challenge to adequacy of reasons. The recent authority MN (Vietnam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 485 helpfully summarises the law regarding the adequacy of reasons. The principles can be derived as follows:

(a) reasons must be intelligible and adequate;
(b) they must enable the losing party to understand why they have lost;
(c) reasons need not be lengthy or elaborate; and
(d) appellate restraint is required: a tribunal should not assume error merely because every step of reasoning is not set out.
21. With those principles in mind we are satisfied that the Judge gave adequate reasons.
22. There is no suggestion that the Judge failed to direct himself appropriately to Devaseelan. The Judge’s starting point although not his end point was the earlier findings made by the first Judge which included that the appellant lacked credibility and had previously been prepared to rely on false documentation to obtain an immigration advantage.
23. The Judge was entitled to weigh against the appellant, in that context, the continuing absence of verification evidence. Even though the first Judge ultimately treated this as a neutral factor within her determination, weight is a matter for the Judge and it was open to the Judge to weigh against the appellant her failure within the intervening period to address this point. That reasoning is given clearly at [32] of the determination.
24. Additionally to the reasons given at [32] the determination has to be read as a whole. When done so it is evident that the Judge gave further reasons for finding that the appellant had not discharged the burden of establishing that she is an Afghan national at [30]–[48] of the determination. Those reasons included, a lack of knowledge about her home area in Afghanistan, inconsistencies in the account, and the limited weight that the witness evidence attracted. It is evident also that the Judge gave positive weight to factors that were capable of enhancing the appellant’s claim [30 and 46 of the determination]. Put another way, when reading the determination as a whole, the Judge weighed the evidence in the round and explained why they had come to the conclusions that they had. The reasoning is adequate and it is apparent to the reader, notably the appellant, that even whilst she may disagree with the reasons given, the reasons are clear and ones that were open to the Judge to reach.
25. The second aspect of ground (i), namely that the Judge should have addressed the background evidence in relation to the Indian passport is not made out. The Judge can be assumed to have considered each piece of evidence, indeed there is no need to assume as the Judge confirms that he has [46]. This part of ground (i) in effect requiring the Judge to address each piece of evidence individually, is unsustainable. There is no requirement to deal expressly with every item of evidence provided the reasoning, taken as a whole, is adequate.
26. Ground (ii) is advanced on the basis of a mistake of fact. However, when invited to identify the alleged mistake, Mr Holmes clarified that his submissions were not framed by, nor confined to, the principles set out in E & R v SSHD [2004] QB 1044. Rather, he submitted that the Judge proceeded under a misapprehension as to the whereabouts of the passport. The appellant’s case is that the Indian passport was a genuine document, albeit fraudulently obtained, such that verification evidence would have been of limited utility. On that basis, Mr Holmes contends that the Judge erred by taking against the Appellant, as it is put in the grounds, for failing to take steps to have the Indian passport verified.
27. We have been cautious not to isolate particular paragraphs of the determination in favour of reading the determination as a whole. However the focus of this ground on [34] of the determination. It is worth recording precisely what the Judge found:
34. To a lesser extent, I note that the Appellant has not sought verification evidence to show that the Indian passport is not genuine. Whilst I accept that the burden of proving that the Appellant is Indian falls upon the Respondent, I also again note that my starting point is the decision of Judge Mensah. I take into account the Appellant attended the Indian Embassy, as established by photographs, evidence of travel and the unchallenged witness evidence of Mahinder Singh, who accompanied her. She states that Embassy staff were unable to confirm whether her Indian passport was genuine as she only had a photograph of the document. It is unsurprising that they required the actual document to be able to verify. I give her evidence of attending the Embassy weight, albeit it is no substitute to having obtaining the original passport to take to the Embassy or to obtain a verification report from a suitable expert.
28. It is evident that the Judge gave weight to the efforts made by the appellant in attending the Indian Embassy. We do not detect any mistaken understanding of the appellant’s case about the Indian passport. Rather the Judge merely explaining why the weight to the attached to the Indian Embassy had been attenuated because the appellant has been able to only produce a photograph of the passport which had in turn limited the steps that could have been taken by the Embassy staff. The Judge has also reminded himself that it was for the respondent to demonstrate that the appellant was an Indian national.
29. In reality, ground (ii) is not about a mistake of fact, but simply a disagreement with the weight the Judge gave to the evidence, which does not amount to an error of law
30. Ground (iii) challenges the approach of the Judge to the appellant’s son’s evidence. The Judge is said to have given inadequate reasons for rejecting the appellant’s son’s evidence and was also incorrect to reject the evidence for the sole reason that it was self‑serving.
31. The complaint is surrounding what the Judge found at [38] of his determination. The Judge states:
38. I heard evidence from S. He was a consistent and straightforward witness. He stated that he believes that his mother has proved their Afghanistan nationality. I assign his evidence weight but that is reduced by the fact that it is self-serving.
(our emphasis added)
32. In relation to the treatment of so-called “self-serving” evidence, it is evident, on a full reading of the determination, why the Judge attached limited weight to the evidence of the witness. Properly understood [38] of the determination does not suggest that the Judge attached no weight to the evidence but rather reduced the weight he was willing to attach to it. The Judge observed that S “believes” his mother to be from Afghanistan. The evidence came directly from the appellant’s son and was, as the Judge observed, intended to strengthen the appellant’s case. These were all factors that were balanced into the Judge’s assessment of that evidence.
33. The grounds rely on R (on the application of SS) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (“self-serving” statements) [2017] UKUT 00164 (IAC). It is useful to recall the guidance given in that case:
(1) The expression “self-serving” is, to a large extent, a protean one. It tells one little unless accompanied by reasons for its application.
(2) Whilst a statement from a family member may lend weight to a claim, the question is whether, viewed in the round, it does so in the individual case. Such evidence may be incapable of rescuing a claim which is otherwise lacking in credibility.
34. Whilst the Judge does refer to “self-serving” [38] has to be read holistically. The witness considered that he had established that his mother was from Afghanistan. However, this was not an objective assessment; rather, it was a finding that the Judge was entitled to make when evaluating the evidence as a whole.
35. We also note the observations at headnote (2) of SS and in doing so note that there were other credibility factors that weighed into the Judge’s ultimate conclusion that the appellant had not demonstrated that she as an Afghan national. The approach adopted by the Judge is therefore consistent with guidance given in SS.
36. In relation to ground (iv) we do not accept that the Judge did not take the issue of language into account when reaching his findings about the appellant’s nationality or was irrational in failing to do so.
37. The submission is that as the appellant spoke Dari, this was a significant piece of evidence that pulled towards the appellant being Afghani. It is submitted that this was a material factor pointing towards Afghan nationality.
38. This ground amounts in substance to a disagreement with the Judge’s evaluation of the evidence rather than an error of law. The Judge addressed the language issue at [40] of the determination. Language is not determinative of nationality. The Judge expressed concerns that the appellant had not disclosed her ability to speak Dari at her 2017 interview. This was a matter that the Judge was entitled to take into account and which he considered reduced the weight to be attached to that evidence. As expressed the Judge had to bear in mind that this was something that could have been learned later.
39. Finally in ground (v) it is submitted that the Judge erred in requiring corroboration of the evidence given by the appellant’s supporting witness. The witness evidence is discussed at [41] of the determination.
40. Properly read, the Judge did not unlawfully require corroboration. Rather, he was assessing the weight to be given to the evidence in light of the absence of supporting material. The Judge expressly acknowledges that the witness gave “on the face of it, … persuasive evidence.” .
41. The Judge was plainly referring to the superficial appeal of the witness’ evidence before going on to explain why he had concerns that the witness, who was based in the UK, did not produce apparently readily available records which he claimed underpinned his conclusions about the appellant’s nationality. In reality those were strikingly obvious and material gaps in his evidence with the Judge was entitled to have regard to when assessing the weight to give to his evidence.
42. The Judge was required to consider all the evidence in the round. This is what he did. The Judge as explained at [41] why, has some superficial appeal, on closer analysis there were some material limitations with the evidence which meant that ultimately the Judge limited the weigh to be attached to it.
43. Accordingly, this ground amounts to no more than a disagreement with the weight that the Judge attached to the witness evidence.
Conclusion
44. For the reasons that we have given we are not satisfied that any of the grounds advanced disclose a material error of law in the Judge’s decision.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain a material error on a point of law so the decision stands.
The appeal is dismissed.

RA Pickering

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10 June 2026