Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000562 (1)
UI-2026-000567 (2), UI-2026-000568 (3)
UI-2026-000564 (4), UI-2026-000563 (5)
& UI-2026-000565 (6)

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/55225/2025 (1)
HU/55226/2025 (2), HU/55228/2025 (3)
HU/55236/2025 (4), HU/55234/2025 (5)
& HU/55233/2025 (6)

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

17th June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREER

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

HS (1)
YA (2)
FA (3)
AA (4)
MA (5)
MA (6)
Respondents

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mrs Newton, Senior Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Ms Mair, Counsel instructed on behalf of the Respondents

Heard on 2 June 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Secretary of State appeals, with permission, against the decision of a First-tier Tribunal promulgated on 7 January 2026 allowing the Respondents’ appeals on Article 8 ECHR grounds. For continuity and ease of reference, we refer to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal. Accordingly, HS and the linked family members are referred to as ‘the Appellants’ and the Secretary of State is referred to as ‘the Respondent’.
2. We note at the outset that Mrs Newton confirmed what had already been communicated to the Appellants in writing, namely, that Ground 1 was being abandoned. She further confirmed that, before the First-tier Tribunal, Mr Hall conceded that family life existed between the Sponsor and each of the Appellants for the purposes of Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Secretary of State did not make an application to withdraw that concession.
3. An anonymity order was made by the First-tier Tribunal. Given that the proceedings concern a refugee sponsor and minor family members, and no application has been made to discharge the order, we maintain anonymity.
4. The Appellants are Syrian nationals. The first and second Appellants are the parents of the sponsor in the United Kingdom. The remaining Appellants are the sponsor’s siblings, several of whom are minors.
5. The sponsor is a recognised refugee in the United Kingdom. At the date of the applications he was a child refugee, although by the time of the First-tier Tribunal hearing he had become a young adult. He resides in the United Kingdom in foster care arrangements and has been pursuing education in the United Kingdom.
6. The Appellants applied for entry clearance to join the sponsor in the United Kingdom pursuant to Appendix Family Reunion (Protection) of the Immigration Rules.
7. By decisions dated 1 April 2025 the Respondent refused the applications. The Respondent concluded that the Appellants had failed to establish that they met the relationship requirements under Appendix Family Reunion. In particular, the Respondent was not satisfied that the evidence demonstrated the claimed family relationships for the purposes of paragraphs FRP 4.1 and 5.1 of Appendix Family Reunion (Protection). The Respondent further concluded that refusal would not amount to a breach of Article 8 ECHR.
8. The Appellants appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. Before the First-tier Tribunal the Appellants relied upon documentary and witness evidence concerning the family relationships, the sponsor’s refugee status and circumstances in the United Kingdom, and the circumstances confronting the Appellants in Syria. The evidence included statements from the sponsor, his foster carer and educational professionals, together with expert psychological evidence concerning the sponsor’s mental health.
9. The evidence before the First-tier Tribunal additionally included material concerning attacks and harassment experienced by the family in Syria, injuries sustained by members of the family, and the adverse impact of ongoing separation upon the sponsor’s mental health, education and daily functioning.
10. In summary, the Appellants’ case before the First-tier Tribunal was that they enjoyed subsisting family life with the sponsor and that the ongoing separation between the sponsor and his immediate family members gave rise to exceptional circumstances such that refusal of entry clearance constituted a disproportionate interference with family life protected by Article 8 ECHR.
11. The Respondent opposed the appeals. The Respondent maintained the position set out in the refusal decisions and submitted that the Appellants could not satisfy the Immigration Rules. The Respondent further contended that there were no exceptional circumstances sufficient to outweigh the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control.
12. At the outset of the First-tier Tribunal hearing, the Respondent accepted that family life existed between the sponsor and the Appellants for the purposes of Article 8(1) ECHR. That concession was subsequently confirmed in correspondence before the Upper Tribunal.
13. In a decision promulgated on 7 January 2026 the First-tier Tribunal allowed the appeals on Article 8 grounds.
14. In summary, the Judge made detailed findings concerning the Appellants’ circumstances in Syria and the impact of prolonged family separation upon the sponsor. The Judge accepted evidence concerning attacks upon the family, harassment experienced by female family members, injuries sustained by the first Appellant, and the sponsor’s exposure to distressing information regarding the death of an older sibling.
15. The Judge further accepted evidence from the sponsor’s foster carer, educational provider and psychologist concerning the deterioration in the sponsor’s mental health caused by separation from his family and continuing anxiety for their welfare. The Judge accepted that the sponsor was suffering from significant depression and anxiety which adversely affected his ability to pursue education and daily activities.
16. The Judge concluded that there existed exceptional circumstances such that continued separation would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the Appellants and the sponsor. The Judge found that, notwithstanding the Appellants’ inability to satisfy the Immigration Rules, the cumulative circumstances outweighed the public interest in maintaining the refusals and rendered the decisions disproportionate under Article 8 ECHR.
17. The Respondent sought permission to appeal.
18. The Respondent’s grounds may be summarised as follows.
Ground 1: Family life
19. The Respondent initially argued that the First-tier Tribunal erred in finding that family life existed between the sponsor and the Appellants for the purposes of Article 8 ECHR.
20. However, following the grant of permission, the Respondent accepted that family life had been expressly conceded by the Home Office Presenting Officer before the First-tier Tribunal. Accordingly, Ground 1 is no longer pursued.
Ground 2: Giving weight to immaterial considerations
21. The Respondent contends that the Judge materially erred by placing determinative weight upon the Appellants’ living conditions and circumstances in Syria when conducting the Article 8 proportionality assessment.
22. The Respondent submits that the Judge improperly focused upon matters more properly relevant to Article 3 ECHR or private life considerations rather than the assessment of family life under Article 8. Reliance is placed upon the Court of Appeal decision in IA [2025] EWCA Civ 1516.
23. The Respondent further argues that the Judge effectively determined proportionality solely by reference to the Appellants’ conditions in Syria and failed properly to distinguish between humanitarian concerns and the requirements of Article 8 family life jurisprudence.
Ground 3: Failure properly to assess proportionality and public interest
24. The Respondent further argues that the Judge materially erred in the Article 8 balancing exercise.
25. It is submitted that the Judge failed in practice to attach appropriate weight to the Appellants’ inability to satisfy the Immigration Rules and failed adequately to engage with the public interest considerations in section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
26. The Respondent additionally contends that the Judge failed sufficiently to identify exceptional circumstances beyond the conditions experienced by the Appellants in Syria and failed properly to explain why the circumstances outweighed the strong public interest in immigration control.
27. Permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on 6 February 2026.
28. In granting permission, the Judge considered it arguable that the First-tier Tribunal may have erred in its approach to proportionality and the weight attached to conditions in Syria within the Article 8 assessment.
29. The Appellants filed a Rule 24 response opposing the appeal. In the Rule 24 response the Appellants contend, amongst other matters, that the First-tier Tribunal undertook a holistic and lawful proportionality assessment taking account not merely of the conditions in Syria but also extensive evidence regarding the sponsor’s mental health, educational deterioration, and the impact of prolonged family separation.
30. The Appellants further submit that the Judge expressly considered the public interest and the inability of the Appellants to satisfy the Immigration Rules before concluding that exceptional circumstances rendered refusal disproportionate under Article 8 ECHR.
31. The matter therefore comes before the Upper Tribunal to determine whether the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law.
Discussion
Ground 1
32. We remind ourselves that Mrs Newton confirmed what had already been communicated to the Appellants in writing, namely, that Ground 1 was being abandoned. She further confirmed that, before the First-tier Tribunal, Mr Hall conceded that family life existed between the Sponsor and each of the Appellants for the purposes of Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.
33. That concession was properly made on the basis of settled instructions, and the First-tier Tribunal cannot be criticised for accepting it. This is particularly so given that the appeal came before the Judge following the promulgation of IA , and the parties before the Tribunal can be assumed to have been familiar with that authority. No application was made before us to withdraw that concession. Mrs Newton indicated that, in consequence, Ground 1 was no longer pursued.
Ground 2
34. The Respondent argued that the FtT erred in law by focusing solely on the Appellant’s living conditions in Syria and by placing determinative weight on those circumstances.
35. For the reasons that follow, we find that this ground is not made out. In our judgment, the FtT treated the Appellant’s circumstances in Syria as one of the material considerations, as it was entitled to do, and not, as the Respondent contends, the sole consideration.
36. In support of this submission, the Respondent made 2 points. The first was to point to [10] of the FtT decision in which the Tribunal states that it starts its ’consideration of whether there are exceptional circumstances by looking at the circumstances in which the Appellants are living’. This, Ms Newton argued, is evidence that this consideration was at the forefront of the Tribunal Judge’s mind to the extent that he did not look at the other considerations in the case. We reject this submission. As Ms Mair reminded us at the hearing, a judge has to start somewhere. In this case the Judge started his consideration with an assessment of the Appellants’ own circumstances. What matters is not where the analysis begins, but how it is conducted overall.
37. The Judge did not finish there. What is of greater importance in this case, is the Tribunal’s assessment of the sponsor’s own circumstances. In particular, the Judge noted at [19] – [25] the impact upon the Sponsor of the prolonged separation from his family. That assessment was informed by the unchallenged evidence of psychologist Dr Lewis diagnosing the Sponsor with a severe major depressive disorder with co-morbid anxiety due to his preoccupation with the ongoing risks to of his family.
38. The Tribunal’s principal focus was therefore the family life of the person within the jurisdiction, namely the Sponsor. However, that family life properly fell to be assessed as a unitary whole, encompassing both the Sponsor in the United Kingdom and the Appellants abroad. The relevant inquiry for the purposes of the proportionality assessment was the unitary family life between them. In our judgment, that approach accords with the analysis endorsed by the Court of Appeal at [142] of IA.
39. The second point was to refer to the Tribunal’s conclusion at [27], where the Tribunal stated:
I do find that there are exceptional circumstances which mean continued separation would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the Appellants or the Sponsor. I have taken into account the public interest, and that the Appellants do not meet the Immigration Rules. I do find however, that the Appellants’ circumstances outweigh the public interest in maintaining the refusals and the decisions are therefore disproportionate.
40. It was submitted that the final sentence demonstrates that the Judge treated the Appellants' circumstances alone as outweighing the public interest in the maintenance of effective immigration control. We do not accept that submission. The paragraph must be read in its proper context. The Judge had already devoted [19]–[26] to an assessment of the Sponsor's circumstances and the impact upon him of continued separation. Moreover, the opening sentence of [27] expressly refers to unjustifiably harsh consequences for both ‘the Appellants or the Sponsor’. It is therefore clear that the Judge was weighing the position of the family unit as a whole, and not exclusively the Appellants overseas.
41. Properly understood, the reference in the final sentence to ‘the Appellants' circumstances’ is not an indication that the Judge disregarded the Sponsor's position. Rather, it is a shorthand reference to the circumstances giving rise to the Article 8 claim, including the consequences of continued separation for both the Appellants and the Sponsor. Read fairly and as a whole, the decision demonstrates that the Judge undertook a holistic proportionality assessment and did not confine himself to the Appellants' living conditions in Syria.
42. Accordingly, Ground 2 is not made out.
Ground 3
43. Here, the Secretary of State makes 2 distinct points. The first is that the FtT failed to undertake a balancing exercise. The second is that the FtT failed to attach the correct weight to the public interest. We shall take each of those submissions in turn.
44. In respect of the first, it is apparent on a fair reading of the determination that the FtTJ did conduct a balancing exercise. This much is apparent from the reference at [27] to the public interest being outweighed and the self-direction at [9] which says:
I take into account the factors set out in s.117B Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and balance the public interest considerations against the factors relied upon by the Appellant.
45. This, in our judgment, clearly demonstrates that the FtTJ conducted a balancing exercise both in substance and in form. An evaluative conclusion that one side outweighs the other is itself evidence that a balancing exercise has occurred. Therefore, the first submission under Ground 3 is not made out.
46. The second submission is, in substance, a disagreement with the weight which the FtTJ attached to the competing considerations. It is well established that appellate restraint must be exercised in this context. The assessment of proportionality is a fact-sensitive evaluative judgment for the First-tier Tribunal. The question for this Tribunal is not whether it would have struck the balance differently, but whether the conclusion reached was one that was reasonably open to the Judge on the evidence, and on the facts as he found them to be.
47. The grounds refer to IA. That decision was promulgated before the decision came before the FtT and, whilst the Judge did not refer to it directly on the face of the decision, it is apparent that he applied it in substance. It is important to note that the facts of the present case are materially distinguishable from those in IA. In that case, the sponsor was a British citizen who commenced his relationship with the appellants after October 2023. By contrast, in the present case, the Sponsor is a recognised refugee who formed part of the same family unit as the Appellants prior to his departure from Syria to seek asylum in the United Kingdom. There has been no substantive interruption to the family life enjoyed by the Sponsor and the Appellants, save for the period of physical separation occasioned by the Sponsor’s journey to the United Kingdom. During that period, the underlying family life protected by Article 8(1) ECHR was not severed. There continues to be mutual dependency in the present day. There is no dispute over this.
48. As Ms Newton confirmed at the hearing, there was no challenge to the factual findings made by the First-tier Tribunal Judge. She properly acknowledged that many judges would have reached the same conclusion on those facts. Whilst the Secretary of State plainly disagrees with the outcome, disagreement with an evaluative judgment does not, without more, establish an error of law. In the circumstances of this case, the Judge's conclusion was plainly one that was open to him on the evidence. The decision falls well within the band of reasonable decisions and discloses no material error of law.
49. For those reasons, none of the grounds of appeal disclose a material error of law. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.
Notice of Decision:
1. The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of an error of law and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.

J. Greer

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Greer