Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000594
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53546/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 23rd of June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JARVIS

Between

JA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M. Rahaman, solicitor/advocate on behalf of Morgan Hall Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr S. Walker, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 11 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The Appellant has appealed the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (promulgated on 18 November 2025) which dismissed his international protection and human rights claims.

2. Permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on 10 February 2026.

Relevant background

3. The Appellant claims to have been a supporter of the Bangladeshi National Party (“the BNP”) since childhood before joining the party in 2011. The Appellant asserts that he was appointed as an organising secretary of the youth wing of the BNP.

4. The Appellant contends that on 14 March 2022 he was stabbed and beaten by a member of the youth wing of the Awami League and the Jubo League; he further asserts that the police took no action after the attack was reported to them.

5. The Appellant also contends that a false criminal claim was brought against him.

The decision of the Judge

6. In the decision, the Judge ultimately concluded at §30 that the Appellant had established that he was involved in BNP politics in Bangladesh and the UK and that he had been a victim of violence at the hands of the Awami League in Bangladesh.

7. The Judge however went on to conclude, by reference to previous adverse credibility findings, that the Appellant had not credibly established that he had a materially significant political profile in Bangladesh or the UK.

8. As part of the adverse credibility findings, the Judge reemphasised at §33 that they did not accept that the Appellant had been subject to a false criminal case in Bangladesh and therefore the Appellant’s submissions about the potential risks of serious harm arising from prison conditions in Bangladesh were not relevant.

9. At §32, the Judge reflected on the finding that the Appellant was a previous victim of political violence and concluded that the change in the political situation in Bangladesh meant that any risk to the Appellant had considerably dissipated and observed that it was likely that a sufficiency of protection would exist or the Appellant could otherwise internally relocate. For completeness I have noted the Judge’s apparent suggestion that there would not be a sufficiency of protection at §35(a) (the unhelpful second sub-paragraph (a)) but I consider that this must be a typographical error by reference to §§32 & 34 and also note that this was not a point advanced by the Appellant.

The error of law hearing

10. At the beginning of his submissions, Mr Rahaman asserted that he was relying upon the three core grounds of appeal as pleaded by Ms Bayati on 1 December 2025.

11. Mr Rahman then sought to argue an additional new ground of appeal: he asserted that the Judge had not given sufficient reasons for preferring the Respondent’s view of the change in circumstances in Bangladesh by reference to the CPIN document from December 2024.

12. I note that the Appellant had not sought to give prior notice to the Tribunal or the Respondent that an application to amend the grounds would be made. Mr Rahaman did not explain why the Appellant had not raised the point in the grounds of appeal.

13. I heard a response from Mr Walker in respect of the additional ground but have ultimately concluded that permission should not be given to amend the grounds under the circumstances I have applied Talpada, R (On the Application Of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 841 at §69 and conclude that there is no good reason to give permission. In any event I would go on to observe that Mr Rahaman’s submission failed to properly, or clearly, particularise why the Judge was not entitled to reach the conclusion that they did in respect of the current circumstances in Bangladesh by reference to any of the material before them.

14. In his response to the three grounds upon which permission was given, Mr Walker submitted that any errors were not material as the Judge had made lawfully permissible findings about the Appellant’s false criminal charge claim and the material change in circumstances in Bangladesh which would allow for a sufficiency of protection and/or viable internal relocation by reference to §§33 & 35 of the judgment. Mr Walker did however candidly accept that the Judge had not dealt with the additional evidence in the supplementary bundle to the First-tier Tribunal which had been uploaded onto the CCD portal on 30 October 2025.

Findings and reasons

15. I should say from the outset that the Appellant’s grounds of appeal lack proper structure and fail to clearly identify what public law errors are being alleged.

16. It is also evident that some of the discursive points raised in the grounds are mere disagreements with the Judge’s conclusions.

17. There is however force in the Appellant’s overall point that the Judge appears not to have had regard to the Appellant’s supplementary bundle which was within the stitched bundle from page 253 onwards. The Appellant is right to say that the Judge has failed to make any reference to the new translations carried out by a certified translator in the United Kingdom (which had been adduced in light of criticisms made of those documents by the Respondent) and a verification letter from a lawyer in Bangladesh purporting to confirm the outstanding criminal case against the Appellant (from October 2025) along with that advocate’s ID documentation.

18. There is also a message said to be from the Appellant’s mother indicating that the police had come to the family home looking for the Appellant two to three months before, and then again on 23 September 2025; she adds that they threatened and abused the family.

19. In my view, these documents are at least arguably relevant to the Appellant’s contention that there are extant criminal proceedings against him in Bangladesh and his claim that there was ongoing adverse interest from the police despite the removal of the Awami League in August 2024.

20. I therefore conclude that the Judge materially erred in law by failing to have regard to prima facie relevant evidence when purporting to carry out the holistic assessment of the Appellant’s credibility.

21. I therefore conclude that the Judge’s decision that the Appellant had not established that he was of a sufficiently elevated political profile in Bangladesh either through his activities in that country or in the UK, as well as the conclusion that the Appellant had lied about the existence of the fabricated false case against him is infected by material legal error.

22. I have come to the conclusion that the error is material, despite Mr Walker’s reliance upon the Judge’s other findings (that there has been a material change of circumstances in Bangladesh) on the basis that, at its highest, the Appellant’s mother’s message indicated an ongoing adverse interest from the police in Bangladesh in September 2025 which significantly postdates the collapse of the Awami League government.

23. The Judge’s error in respect of the assessment of the Appellant’s evidence also means that they materially erred when declining to consider the Appellant’s further argument in respect of prison conditions in Bangladesh.

24. I therefore conclude that the Judge’s errors materially undermine the assessment both of the Appellant’s credibility and the issues relating to risk on return to Bangladesh.

Notice of Decision

25. As a consequence I find that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge should be set aside in its entirety applying section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.

26. I have decided that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal on the basis that the Judge did not consider the totality of the Appellant’s evidence and that there needs to be full fact-finding. I further conclude that the Judge’s error meant that the Appellant did not receive an entirely fair hearing and I factor in the material difference in appeal rights between the First-tier and the Upper Tribunal should the appeal be reheard and dismissed.

27. The remitted appeal should be heard by a judge other than the Judge who dismissed this appeal on 18 November 2025.

I Jarvis

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16 June 2026