Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000618
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/69677/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 29th of April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BURGHER

Between

SH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Banham (Counsel) instructed by Barnes Harrild & Dyer
For the Respondent: Mr D Simpson, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 17 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The Appellant is a citizen of Iran, born on 2 March 2001.
2. The Appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of First tier Tribunal Judge S J Clarke (‘the Judge’), promulgated on 21 November 2025, dismissing his appeal on asylum and human rights grounds.
3. The Judge rejected the Appellant's account of events in Iran, finding him not to be a witness of truth. The core of the credibility assessment is set out at [11]-[19] of the decision. At [20], the Judge rejected the genuineness of the Appellant's sur place political activity in the United Kingdom, finding that he held no political interest at all and that his political activities were undertaken solely to bolster his asylum claim.
4. In assessing risk on return, the Judge relied on country guidance and concluded that the Appellant would not be at real risk, placing particular reliance on the ability to delete his Facebook account and the absence of evidence that the Iranian authorities were aware of him ([29]-[33]).
5. Permission to appeal was granted by First tier Tribunal Judge Bowen on 10 February 2026.
Anonymity Order
6. The Judge made an anonymity order. There was no request for the anonymity order to be set aside. I conclude that the Appellant’s rights to international protection outweigh the Article 10 rights of the public to know his identity as a party to these proceedings.
The Grounds of Appeal
7. Permission to appeal was granted on four grounds summarised as follows:
7.1 that the Judge erred in their credibility assessment by placing undue and determinative weight on inconsistencies between the screening interview and later evidence, without the required caution;
7.2 that the Judge erred in rejecting the genuineness of the Appellant’s sur place political belief and in finding that he held no political interest, without adequate reasons;
7.3 that the Judge failed to properly consider D8 v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Exclusion - Substantive) SC/179/2020 and failed to apply the principles in Danian v SSHD (2002) IMM AR 96 when determining on risk arising from sur place activity; and
7.4 that the Judge materially erred by engaging selectively with the objective country evidence, failing to consider material CPIN evidence concerning surveillance of diaspora political activity.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
8. I had before me a hearing bundle of 300 pages. I heard submissions from Mr Banham, Counsel for the Appellant, and Mr Simpson, Senior Presenting Officer. I reserved my decision to consider the submissions, and the authorities relied upon.

Appellant’s submissions
9. Mr Banham relied on the grounds of appeal in full. He argued that the credibility findings at paragraphs [11]-[19] were impermissibly anchored to the screening interview, particularly question 4.1, without adequate regard to the nature and purpose of such interviews. Reference was made to YL (China) and JA (Afghanistan) [2004] UKIAT 00145 requiring caution where omissions arise from screening interviews conducted shortly after arrival, often via interpreters. It was submitted that the decision does not demonstrate engagement with those principles.
10. In relation to sur place activity, he submitted that the conclusion at [20] was unsupported by evidence or reasoning, given the extent of the Appellant's political activity in the United Kingdom and the limited exploration of subjective belief.
11. He further submitted that the Judge’s approach at [29], suggesting that deletion of Facebook resolved risk, failed to apply Danian principles and ignored the pinch point on return.
12. Finally, it was submitted that [31]-[32] demonstrated a selective and incomplete engagement with the CPIN evidence, ignoring material evidence on diaspora surveillance and protest monitoring.
Respondent’s submissions
13. Mr Simpson submitted that the credibility findings were open to the Judge, relying on KD (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2007] EWCA Civ 1384, and that the Judge had identified a material change in the nature of the claim rather than mere elaboration.
14. He submitted that the finding at [20] was open to the Judge, given the lack of political activity prior to arrival and the Appellant’s acceptance that his activities assisted his asylum claim.
15. On sur place risk, he submitted that the Judge properly applied Danian guidance and XX (PJAK – sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG in the context if non genuine activities. He submitted that D8 was not binding.
16. Mr Simpson submitted that the Judge was not required to rehearse every paragraph of background evidence and that they had adequately explained its conclusions. It was submitted that the Judge was not required to cite each CPIN paragraph expressly and that the conclusions recorded at [25] – [30] were open to the Judge to find on the evidence available.
Legal Framework
17. The Upper Tribunal is confined to considering whether there are errors of law in First Tier Tribunal decisions. In R (Iran) & Ors v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982 Brooke LJ summarises what amounts to an error of law at paragraphs 9 and 10:
9. When the court gave this guidance in Subesh, it was aware that it would not be of any relevance to an appellate regime in which appeals were restricted to points of law. It may be convenient to give a brief summary of the points of law that will most frequently be encountered in practice:
i) Making perverse or irrational findings on a matter or matters that were material to the outcome ("material matters");
ii) Failing to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters;
iii) Failing to take into account and/or resolve conflicts of fact or opinion on material matters;
iv) Giving weight to immaterial matters;
v) Making a material misdirection of law on any material matter;
vi) Committing or permitting a procedural or other irregularity capable of making a material difference to the outcome or the fairness of the proceedings;
vii) Making a mistake as to a material fact which could be established by objective and uncontentious evidence, where the appellant and/or his advisers were not responsible for the mistake, and where unfairness resulted from the fact that a mistake was made.

10. Each of these grounds for detecting an error of law contain the word "material" (or "immaterial"). Errors of law of which it can be said that they would have made no difference to the outcome do not matter. This need to identify an error of law which would have made a material difference to the outcome…
18. A judge is not required to rehearse or cite every item of evidence or submission. However, the Tribunal must engage with the material issues and material evidence relied upon and give reasons sufficient to explain why the appeal has failed. That obligation is summarised in Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 341 (IAC) at paragraph 14 and Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464.
19. In SG (Iraq) v SSHD [2012] EWCA Civ 940 the Court of Appeal held that the Country Guidance procedure was aimed at arriving at a reliable and accurate determination and it was for those reasons, as well as the desirability of consistency, that decision-makers and tribunal judges were required to take country guidance determinations into account, and to follow them unless very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence, were adduced justifying them not doing so (paras 43 – 50).
Analysis and conclusions
Ground 1
20. In respect of ground 1, the credibility assessment is set out principally at [11]-[19]. At [11], the Judge contrasted the response given at question 4.1 of the screening interview with the later asylum interview and witness statements. At [15], the Judge characterised this not as mere elaboration, but as a shift from a local dispute to fear of state actors, namely the Mukhtar and the Ettelaat. The overall conclusions is expressed at [16] - [19].
21. While YL (Rely on SEF) China emphasises caution, it does not prohibit reliance on screening interviews where the discrepancy goes to the essence of the claim. The Court of Appeal in KD (Sri Lanka), per LJ Moses [8] - [11], confirmed that the absence of centrally important matters from an early account may legitimately bear weight.
22. I do not consider that the Judge treated the screening interview as determinative despite the reasoning being brief, it was clear that the Judge determined that the accounts the Appellant provided were materially different in substance. That was a conclusion open to the Judge on the evidence presented. I therefore do not conclude that ground 1 discloses a material error of law.
Ground 2
23. In respect of ground 2, the finding at issue appears at paragraph [20], where the Judge stated that the Appellant holds no political interest at all and that his sur place activity was undertaken solely to bolster his asylum claim. This finding is critical, as it underpins the subsequent risk assessment at paragraphs [29]-[33]. However, the decision does not adequately reason or explaining how that conclusion was reached. Specifically, the Judge did not engage with the sustained and overt nature of the Appellant's political activity in the United Kingdom, nor with his supplemental witness statement responding to the allegation of opportunism [4].
24. Further, although genuineness of belief is not determinative of risk (SR v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 828), where a tribunal makes an express finding extinguishing subjective belief entirely, it must explain, with clarity, how that conclusion is reached. I do not consider that the reasoning at paragraph [20] meets the required standard and the failure is one of reasoning, not a disagreement on weight. I therefore consider that ground 2 relating pollical activity and consequential sur place activities amounts to a material error of law.
Ground 3
25. In respect of ground 3 it was submitted that the Judge failed to apply the principles in Danian, that opportunistic sur place activity may nonetheless generate risk, and failed to engage with D8, which was relied upon in the Appellant’s skeleton argument. The focus of this ground is whether the Tribunal properly assessed risk on return by reference to the likely perception of the Iranian authorities, including at the pinch point of return or documentation.
26. The Judge did not cite Danian, D8 or XX (PJAK). However, the absence of an express citation is not determinative and I consider that the decision demonstrates that it followed the correct principles. At [25] the Judge expressly identified that what mattered was the perception by the Iranian authorities on return and treated return without travel documentation as a well known pinch point for scrutiny. The Judge then proceeded to assess the Appellant’s profile and visibility, including the nature of the photographs and the extent to which they would be likely to draw attention [26], before turning to the background material and CPINs [27]–[33] and culminating in a conclusion that the authorities have no profile of the Appellant and therefore the pinch point of applying for emergency travel documents will not reveal anything [35]. This amounts to an assessment of perceived profile and consequent risk, not a rejection of risk merely because the activity was said to be contrived.
27. The Judge’s reasoning on deletion of Facebook at paragraph [29] must be read in that context. The Judge did not state that contrivance automatically extinguished risk. The Judge reasoned that the Appellant did not hold genuine views, could delete the account, and that (with the passage of time before any travel document application) the authorities would not thereby acquire a profile evidencing anti‑regime activity. Whether that conclusion is correct on the facts is not, of itself, an error of law. It represents an evaluative application of the “perception/profile” approach the Judge had identified at paragraph [25].
28. Separately, D8 is a SIAC decision and is not binding. The Judge did not engage with it notwithstanding that it had been relied upon by the Appellant. I do not consider the omission to be a material error of law. The Judge identified the pinch point and undertook a profile‑based assessment of risk [25]–[35]. To the extent that the Appellant criticises the adequacy of the Judge’s engagement with background evidence, that criticism is addressed in respect of ground 4, which concerns the treatment of objective country material. However, I do not consider that leads to the ground 3 complaint to amount to a separate or material misdirection in law.
Ground 4
29. The Judge referred to background material at [27] and focused its analysis on facial recognition technology at [31]-[32]. However, the CPIN evidence relied upon by the Appellant included material concerning surveillance of diaspora activism, monitoring of protests outside Iranian embassies, and intelligence activity abroad. That evidence went directly to the risk assessment. While a tribunal is not required to cite every paragraph of background evidence, the failure to engage with these strands of evidence renders the analysis at [31]-[32] materially incomplete. The Judge has failed to explain how the significant CPIN references which were supportive of the Appellant’s position where balanced.
30. A judge is required to properly consider CPIN evidence and give adequate reasons for findings on material matters. The Judge erred in failing to do so in this regard and as such ground 4 discloses a material error of law.
Remaking
31. In Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC), the Upper Tribunal confirmed that remittal will ordinarily be appropriate where the nature or extent of fact finding required makes remaking in the Upper Tribunal inappropriate. Both representatives agreed that the matter should be remitted for a complete rehearing before a judge other than First Tier Tribunal Judge S J Clarke. The nature and extent of the fact finding required is substantial. The interests of justice plainly require that the appeal be reheard entirely afresh. In accordance with paragraph 7.2 of the Senior President's Practice Statements, remittal to the First Tier Tribunal is appropriate.
32. The appeal is therefore remitted to the First tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing, with the preserved findings at [11] - [15] regarding credibility of inconsistent accounts at screening interview and asylum interview only.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First‑tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law.
I set that decision aside and remit the appeal is remitted to the First‑tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) to be heard afresh by a judge other than First‑Tier Tribunal Judge S J Clarke.
The anonymity direction made below is preserved.

Benjimin Burgher

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24 April 2026