Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000625
First-tier Tribunal No: PA /02928/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 10 July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BURNETT

Between

W.M.
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Sepulveda legal representative form Fountain Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Ms Gilmore, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. He has made a protection claim.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) dated 22 December 2025, who dismissed the appellant’s appeal from a decision of the respondent to a refuse a protection claim. The decision of the respondent is dated 12 January 2024.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by a judge of FtT. Permission was granted on the basis of ground 1, that there was no findings about whether the appellant held a genuine political opinion. There is no comment about the second ground of appeal. The grant of permission was not limited.
3. I note that there is no separate and independent challenge to the finding regarding the appellant’s ability to obtain either a CSID or INID.
4. The decision granting permission is dated 10 February and was not limited in scope.
Background
5. The appellant is a national from Iraq. He claimed protection on the basis that he had an illicit relationship with a girl whose family were powerful and influential. He claimed he was at risk on return from this family and in respect of his own family due to the dishonour he had brought upon them.
6. The appellant also claimed his sur place activities put him at risk on return to Iraq.
The decision of the FtT
7. The FtT dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The judge set out why he found the appellant’s claims not credible [20] and [21]. The judge also rejected the appellant’s sur place activities {22] and why the appellant could redocument himself with either a CSID card or INID {23] to [25]. The judge also rejected the appellant’s article 8 claim.
Grounds of appeal.
8. There are two distinct grounds of appeal. The first alleges that the judge failed to make findings regarding a material matter, that of the appellant’s political opinion and his sur place activities. The second ground of appeal is that the decision is not adequately reasoned in respect of the credibility findings. A number of aspects are pointed to in respect of the findings of the judge. There is cross over between this ground and ground 1, as it is also stated that the judge made inadequate findings regarding the appellant’s political activity.
The hearing and submissions
9. The parties made submissions. These are fully set out in the record of proceedings. I have provided a brief summary below and mean no disrespect to the submissions made. Ms Sepulveda focused upon paragraphs [19] to [22] of the decision. She submitted that there were inadequate reasons given. She referred to the substantial evidence which had been provided by the appellant in the bundle of evidence and supplementary bundle. She also referred to the appellant’s witness statement and that he had set out why he held a political opinion.
10. Ms Gilmore relied upon the written rule 24 response dated 18 February 2026 and expanded upon some aspects. She submitted that it was clear that the judge was stating that the appellant had been inconsistent in his evidence as to when he had been shot. Although she accepted that there was an error in [20], the point made was about the inconsistent evidence. Ms Gilmore submitted that a finding of a lack of a genuine political opinion could be inferred from the short form the judge had used “ none of the factors favoured the appellant”, as motive was a consideration in BA (Demonstrators in Britain- risk on return) [2011] UKUT 36.
Analysis and conclusions.
11. Relatively recent authority (Ullah v SSHD [2024]EWCA Civ 201, Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, and Chowdhury v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 36) has emphasised that the Upper Tribunal should not rush to find an error of law simply because they would have expressed themselves differently from the First-Tier Tribunal, that the Upper Tribunal should be slow to infer that a point had not been taken into account even if not expressly mentioned, and that judicial restraint should be exercised even though not every step in the reasoning was fully set out, as the issues might be set out by inference. I have borne those principles in mind.
12. I also had regard to the Court of Appeal’s dicta in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 that it is not the role of an appellate court to come to its own conclusions on the evidence before the Judge. It is essential that there is appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with the decision of the expert first instance judge. In his general observations at para 2, Lewison LJ said that certain principles are well-settled. In particular, at sub-para (vi), Lewison LJ observed that the reasons for a judgment will always be capable having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to an overly textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as if it were a piece of legislation or a contract. Further, as he observed at sub-para (iii), an appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that it was overlooked.
13. I have considered carefully the decision of the FtT Judge. I start with the challenge to the judge’s findings regarding the credibility of his claims. The appellant submits that the judge’s reasons are inadequate. I am very conscious that an appeal to the UT from the FtT lies only on a point of law. I am also conscious that the FtT is a specialist tribunal in the field of immigration and asylum law, and on well-established authority, the Upper Tribunal should be slow to interfere with the judgments of that tribunal.
14. I conclude that many of the criticisms which have been made on behalf of the appellant of the judge’s reasoning in the present case do not, in my view, amount to errors of law.
15. The judge set out the appellant’s claims. The evidence provided to the judge was set out. The judge stated that he had regard to all the evidence in reaching the decision. Although there is an error recorded in the decision in [20], I am satisfied that the point being made was that the appellant’s evidence was inconsistent. The error is in the second sentence “This is despite what he states in his WS that he was shot in 2021”. This should read 2020.
16. I conclude that the judge provided adequate reasons for his findings that the appellant was not at risk due to his claimed relationship.
17. I turn to the challenge to the appellant’s political activities. It is submitted by the appellant that the judge provided inadequate reasons and failed to make a finding as to the appellant’s political opinion. The judge’s decision and reasons are condensed. The findings about the appellant’s sur place activities and the risk to him are set out in [22]. The judge stated that the appellant was not a member of either organisation “Regay Azadi” nor “Dakok”. It was noted that the appellant could not remember the dates of his attendance and had not made his activities part of his claim made to the respondent. The judge set out the factors to be considered regarding risk on return. The judge stated that “none of these factors favour the appellant”. The judge in essence was stating that the appellant was not a leader, he was simply a member of the crowd and was passive. The judge had also found that there was no evidence that the Iraq regime monitored such events in the UK. Although this could have been better expressed and clearer, I conclude that the decision is adequate regarding the reasons provided as to why the appellant was not at risk on return from the sur place activities.
18. The appellant also submits that the judge failed to make a finding as to the political opinion the appellant held. The issue here would be the risk to the appellant if he engaged in genuine political activity in Iraq. The genuineness of his activity in the UK and what he would do if returned was thus important. This issue was set out in the ASA at paragraph 9. In his witness statement the appellant claims he has a commitment to promoting human rights in Iraq (see paragraph 37).
19. The respondent points to the factors set out in BA and that the judge stated that “none of the factors favour the appellant” The headnote in BA at paragraph 4 provides:
Role in demonstrations and political profile – can the person be described as a leader; mobiliser (e.g. addressing the crowd), organiser (e.g. leading the chanting); or simply a member of the crowd; if the latter is he active or passive (e.g. does he carry a banner); what is his motive [my emphasis], and is this relevant to the profile he will have in the eyes of the regime
20. The judge referred to these factors in [22]. The judge was aware and referred to the ASA and the judge recorded the submissions made about the appellant’s political activity. The judge also stated that the appellant’s evidence was not coherent and plausible [16]. In stating that none of these factors favour the appellant this included the appellant’s motive. Although it would have been clearer if the judge had listed each factor and his analysis against each, I am satisfied that the judge included that the appellant did not have a genuine political opinion and this can be inferred from [22].
21. I remind myself again of the principles. In particular, at sub-para (vi) of Volpi v Volpi (set out above), Lewison LJ observed that the reasons for a judgment will always be capable having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to an overly textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as if it were a piece of legislation or a contract. Further, as he observed at sub-para (iii), an appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that it was overlooked.
22. I am not satisfied that the grounds of appeal set out any material errors of law.
23. I should note one matter, and that is the question of whether consent was given by the respondent for the judge to consider the political activities. Ms Gilmore could not assist the Tribunal as to whether the respondent had explicitly given consent. However the judge recorded that submissions were made by the presenting officer regarding the political activities. I also note that this point was not raised in the rule 24 response by the respondent in this way, stating that the First-tier judge did not have jurisdiction to consider this issue. It is too late for the respondent to raise this issue now and in any event there was nothing before me to say that the respondent had not given consent, given that submissions were made by the Presenting Officer. In any event, I have considered the substance of the challenge made by the appellant to the decision above and concluded that the grounds do not establish a material error of law in the decision.
24. I conclude that the grounds amount to no more than a disagreement with the findings made.

Notice of Decision
Appeal dismissed
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

Iain Burnett

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

1 July 2026.