Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000631
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62950/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
17th August 2026

Before

DEPUTY CHAMBER PRESIDENT PLIMMER

Between

JM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Mizen, Advocate
For the Respondent: Mr Mullen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Melville Street, Edinburgh, on 13 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The appellant is a citizen of Rwanda. He has appealed with permission, against a First-tier Tribunal (‘FTT’) decision dated 23 November 2025, dismissing his appeal on asylum and human rights grounds.

2. I have continued the anonymity order made by the FTT, as the requirements under the Refugee Convention in this particular case outweigh the demands of open justice. No party sought to argue otherwise.

Background

3. The FTT determined the appeal by taking the appellant’s account at its highest. A summary of the asylum claim is contained within an undated skeleton argument prepared by the appellant’s solicitors that was before the FTT. The appellant owns a plot of development land in Kigali. Between 2012 and 2017, he received repeated approaches from agents acting on behalf of a very senior military General in Rwanda. The General wanted to buy the appellant's land but for half of its value. The appellant refused to sell. The appellant was detained on two occasions in 2014 and in 2015 for refusing the approaches on behalf of the General. This included being taken to prison in September 2015, where he was kept in unsanitary and overcrowded conditions with limited food and water. The appellant was beaten by other prisoners at the direction of the guards, before being released on 3 October 2015. Upon his release the appellant contacted the relevant agent threatening to report the General for corruption. He was advised not to report the incident but to seek hospital treatment from a specific doctor, which he did. He then received further requests from a different agent in 2016 to sell the land. In response he moved to another part of Rwanda where he married but lived without incident. He moved back to Kigali in 2017 where his first child was born. In 2018 the requests for his land to be sold to the General re-started. For these reasons the appellant left Rwanda and arrived in the UK in September 2019, when he claimed asylum. His wife remains in Rwanda and has received three summons to report to the police station. It is noteworthy that although this skeleton argument noted the SSHD’s acceptance that the appellant is a Hutu, there was no meaningful attempt to link the appellant’s fears to being a Hutu and instead included this: “it is submitted that the appellant’s position as a businessman and landowner has marked him for his refusal to sell his property to a corrupt army general”.

4. Having heard evidence from the appellant, the FTT concluded that the appellant was not in need of international protection and dismissed his appeal on all grounds. The FTT considered that it was open to the appellant to sell his land to the General. Whilst that would mean he would not be able to maximise the profit from his investment, it would enable him to safely return to Rwanda to be reunited with his wife and child.

Appeal to the Upper Tribunal (‘UT’)

5. The appellant’s solicitors submitted a single ground of appeal challenging the decision of the FTT. It is necessary to set out the entirety of the single ground.

“The FTT erred in law in concluding that the appellant did not require international protection (paragraph 11(k)). It accepted the appellant's case at its highest (paragraph 11(f)). This means that it accepted that the appellant had been imprisoned and beaten (see paragraph 5 in his PIQ statement hearing bundle (HB) 322) in the past. A conclusion that protection is not required for the future is irrational if it has been accepted that persecution happened in the past (see IR 339K). It is not an answer to say that the appellant can return and comply with the demands of a person who it has been accepted persecuted him in the past if it is accepted that such a person has persecuted him in the past. It is not speculative to fear persecution in the future and that such a person might insist on sale to him of the land on even more disadvantageous terms. The appeal should be granted and the case remitted so that inquiry into and conclusions can be reached about a) allegations of past persecution and b) whether that is a sound basis on which to assess future risk.”

6. In a decision dated 10 February 2026, the FTT granted the appellant permission to appeal and provided these reasons.

“1. The application is in time.

2. The grounds assert that the judge erred in failing to make any credibility findings and simply proceeding on the basis of accepting the appellant's case at its highest and concluding that it would be open to the appellant to simply sell his land on less advantageous terms. The appellant contends that the question of past persecution is relevant as to the assessment of future risk and indeed as to the possibility of the alleged persecutor being prepared to enter into any sale with the appellant.

3. I find that the grounds, as drafted, are arguable and accordingly grant permission to appeal.”

7. In a rule 24 notice dated 18 February 2026 the SSHD opposed the appeal. The SSHD drew attention to the 339K presumption being rebuttable. The SSHD also noted that the submission that the terms of the sale might be more disadvantageous on return had not previously been relied upon in the FTT skeleton and could not now be relied upon, consistent with the reasoning in Lata (FtT: Principal Controversial Issues) [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC), [2023] Imm AR 1416. The Court of Appeal have recently underlined the importance of procedural rigour in SSHD v Hirtie [2026] EWCA Civ 1000 and drew attention to the principles in Singh v Dass [2019] EWCA Civ 360 [2019] 3 WLUK 105. An appellate court or tribunal should be cautious about admitting new points not raised below. Admitting this new point would require evidence that was not provided before the FTT. More fundamentally, as pointed out at [54] of Hirtie, permitting the point to be raised now would conflict with established procedural principles in Lata and AL v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 370, and embedded in the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014. Ms Mizen did not place any reliance on this issue in her submissions. I deal with this point briefly below for completeness.

8. The appellant was directed to file a skeleton argument for the UT error of law hearing by 24 July 2026. No skeleton was filed and no explanation was provided for not doing so. When I raised this at the beginning of the hearing I was told by the appellant’s solicitor that they relied on the single ground and the skeleton argument before the FTT. I pointed out that representatives are expected to comply with directions and if they wish to merely rely upon the grounds of appeal in lieu of a skeleton, a simple email would have avoided the UT staff wasting time and resources chasing the solicitors. When I pointed out that the FTT skeleton made no reference whatsoever to 339K, the single issue of concern raised within the single ground of appeal, Ms Mizen clarified that she only relied upon the single ground of appeal.

9. Ms Mizen then began her submissions by contending that the absence of any credibility assessment on the part of the FTT, infected the entire decision. I indicated that I could glean any such submission from the single ground of appeal, and there had been no application to amend the grounds of appeal. Ms Mizen correctly pointed out that the FTT seemed to suggest that the grounds made this assertion, but on reflection acknowledged the grounds made no such submission. The grounds certainly made no effort to particularise how taking the appellant’s claim at its highest could infect the whole decision. The FTT decision must be analysed on the basis that the appellant’s claim has been accepted. Ms Mizen accepted that in order to place reliance upon this issue, the grounds would have to be amended and it was too late to do so.

10. Ms Mizen then turned to the sole issue raised in the single ground of appeal - 339K. I was not taken to the wording of 339K and this was not set out in the single ground of appeal or the FTT skeleton argument. 339K of the Immigration Rules states that if a person has already been subjected to persecution, serious harm, or direct threats of such harm, this is considered a serious indication of their well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm in the future, unless there are compelling reasons to believe the harm will not be repeated (my emphasis).

11. The FTT was clearly aware that the appellant was detained on two occasions, having referred expressly to this at [4(b)]. The FTT was also aware of the contents of the appellant’s witness statement and recorded at [8] that the appellant adopted it before answering questions in cross-examination. The skeleton argument before the FTT also referred to the appellant’s past detention and accompanying ill-treatment. On the appellant’s own case, his past detention was part of the ongoing threats to make him sell his land at a reduced price. The FTT’s same logic applies to the risk any detention in the future. If the appellant sells the land to the General, there will be no reason to threaten him or detain him. 339K is a rebuttable presumption. To use the wording of 339K, there are compelling reasons to believe any serious harm perpetrated against the appellant whilst imprisoned will not be repeated. Those compelling reasons are predicated upon the appellant taking the option outlined by the FTT – selling the land to the General. As the FTT noted in the decision at [11(h)-(m)], the appellant’s refusal to sell the land is based solely upon financial reasons, and he has an alternative solution that would obviate the risk of any repeated serious harm. It follows that the single ground of appeal does not contain any material error of law.

12. Ms Mizen finally sought to suggest that such reasoning would require the appellant to modify his behaviour, contrary to the principles in the relevant authorities. Again this submission is not to be found in the single ground of appeal. There was no application to amend the grounds to place reliance upon this.

13. For completeness, I acknowledge the authorities that suggest in the context of the Refugee Convention that a person should not be expected to conceal a protected characteristic or modify their conduct so as to avoid persecution in the future – see HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 and RT (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2012] UKSC 38. However, this is not a case involving the modification of behaviour that is in any way linked to a Convention Reason. By way of example, the option identified by the FTT does not require the appellant to modify his approach to expressing his religion, political opinion or sexuality in order to avoid persecution.

14. The single ground of appeal suggests that the appellant might return to find the terms of sale have become even more disadvantageous. This does not take the matter any further. The FTTJ acknowledged that giving up the land, may be “unpalatable”, but it would provide a solution to the problem and his financial loss could be set off by returning to live with his family and re-establishing himself in familiar surroundings.

Conclusion

15. I therefore conclude that the FTT reached a conclusion that was open to it and the single ground of appeal does not identify a material error of law.

Decision
The appeal against the decision of the FTT is dismissed.

DCP Plimmer
Deputy Chamber President Plimmer

14 August 2026