Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000642
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/07816/2020

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 22nd of June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PICKERING

Between

MA
(ANONYMITY ORDERED)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Holt, counsel
For the Respondent: Mr McVeety, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 11 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction and Background
1. We have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear conditions which would breach his Article 3 human rights on return to Pakistan. In reaching this decision, we are mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but we are satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.
2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 14 November 2025, of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the judge’) to dismiss the appeal on human rights grounds.
3. The appeal arose in the context of deportation proceedings triggered by the appellant’s commission of serious sexual offences. The centrepiece of his claim is that he is dependent on alcohol, exacerbated by his mental health condition. He claims that there is such an intolerant and hostile environment in Pakistan to those who consume alcohol that he would be ostracised from his family, as well as the wider community, and would suffer mistreatment from the authorities and the public rising to inhumane and degrading conditions breaching his absolute Article 3 human rights.
The FtT Decision
4. For the purposes of the present proceedings, the following key matters emerge from the FtT decision:
• In setting out the procedural background and the appellant’s antecedent history, the judge noted, at [3], that he was convicted on 24 June 2020 for two offences of sexually assault against a child, and a woman over 16, in addition to four offences of assault, including three against emergency workers.
• Between [18] and [45], the judge set out his reasons for finding that the appellant had not established a real risk of encountering Article 3 conditions on return to Pakistan. Below are the judge’s key findings:
• The judge noted that he had taken the expert medical evidence into account and that the appellant suffered from a mild depressive episode and alcohol dependency ([20] & [22]).
• The appellant was found to have an extensive history of alcohol consumption and that all of the relevant offences were committed when he was intoxicated ([21]).
• While there were references to alcohol consumption in the appellant’s medical records, there were no such references between May 2024 and May 2025 ([22])
• At [23]-[24], the judge observed:
[23] The Appellant’s witness statement of 18 July 2025 states:
“Regarding my drinking alcohol, out of the £49 that I get from Asylum Support per week, I spent £20 on food, I spend some on my phone and buses and I spend the rest on alcohol - that is about £20 per week. I mostly buy beer with strong alcohol content - usually a Polish beer called Karpackie. I think there are different types. I drink the one that is higher in strength, I think it is 9%. I have not attended any groups to help me to stop drinking.” (para 8)
[24] The Appellant told Dr Falkowski in May 2025 that he was drinking 3-4 strong beers of 9% 4 days per week. He puts £25 aside for food and shopping. He did not drink on Fridays, Saturdays, or Sundays because these were religious days (Report 2 - 4.6). The fact that the Appellant stated he did not drink on these days of the week is significant. This is not a case of uncontrolled consumption, because the Appellant is able to exercise a significant amount of control in not drinking 3 consecutive days out of 7 due to religious reasons.
• His oral evidence about the extent of his alcohol consumption was at odds with the above account and did not tally with the funds he claimed to have available to him. The above account was treated as more reliable than his oral evidence. ([25])
• The appellant’s claim to have sought help from his GP about his dependence on alcohol was not reflected in the medical records. On the contrary, there was nothing to indicate that he had sought medical help since his release from custody in January 2024 and he was found to have “made little or no effort to actually stop drinking”. It was further noted that the claim to resist deportation “provides limited motivation for the Appellant to stop or reduce his alcohol consumption”. ([26])
• The judge referred to Dr Falkowski’s expert report and the medication prescribed to the appellant, including antidepressants and pointed out the striking difference between his interest in tackling his mental health issues, but not his alcohol dependency. ([27])
• It was noted that the appellant had not consumed alcohol during extended periods spent in custody or detention. ([28])
• Between [29] and [31], the expert opinion evidence relied upon by the appellant was assessed:
[29] I have considered the expert medical evidence relied upon by the Appellant. The first report of Dr Falkowski highlights the Appellant being prescribed Thiamine and seeking help to reduce alcohol intake in 2019. In 2020 while in prison he was started on an alcohol withdrawal regime including benzodiazepines. Reports in 2020 and 2022 state that the Appellant could be prescribed acamprosate to reduce alcohol craving. The evidence indicates that he was never prescribed this on release. The report states that the Appellant suffers from alcohol dependency syndrome. At the time of the first report this was in remission as the Appellant was in detention. I note that the report states that:
[MA] is likely to find a return to Pakistan very stressful. His depressive illness is likely to become worse and he is also likely to drink more heavily. He has a pattern of reinstatement of his drinking after abstinence which is a characteristic of alcohol dependency. It is likely that he will begin to drink heavily again once he returns to Pakistan and will not be able to control his drinking (13.5).
While I take this into account, I do not consider it a comprehensive assessment of this issue. For instance, there is no consideration of any of the issues that indicate that the Appellant may not drink heavily on return. I also note that the report considers that the Appellant would seek help for his alcohol dependency if he was to return to Pakistan (13.7).
[30] I have also considered the second report of Dr Falkowski. This report cites the Appellant stating as follows at 3.2.1.2:
[MA] was afraid that he would be unable to resist alcohol if he was to return to Pakistan, which would result in him being arrested and imprisoned (9). [MA] felt that he would be able to stop drinking and return to work if he remained in the UK (10).
There is no explanation as to why the Appellant considers that he would drink in Pakistan, despite the difficulties this may cause him, and why he would not drink in the UK, despite the fact that he continues to drink.
[31] The report records that the Appellant ‘has never received treatment for his alcohol dependency’ [4.7]. At 7.5 the report considers that the Appellant would continue to drink alcohol if returned to Pakistan due to his alcohol dependency. Again, in my view the opinion proffered does not take account of all the relevant factors in considering this issue.
• The judge referred to the appellant’s evidence that he maintained weekly contact with his family in Pakistan and that the risk of losing their support would function as an additional incentive to abstain from consuming alcohol out of fear that they would withdraw their support. The appellant’s account of the family’s strained resources in Pakistan was rejected. ([32]-[33])
• The country background information and expert evidence was considered. The prohibition of the sale of alcohol and the moral and religious opprobrium which goes with alcohol consumption in Pakistan, together with the extreme punishments meted out, were all noted. ([34]-[36])
• The appellant’s background of alcohol consumption before he left Pakistan was considered and the judge alluded to the stated reasons why he drinks to excess in the UK. ([37])
• The judge drew together his previous observations to come to his overall conclusions between [38] and [45]:
[38] Having considered all the evidence, I now reach my findings in relation to the Appellant’s claim to be at risk in Pakistan due to his alcohol dependency. While I have considered the expert evidence, it is for the Tribunal to make the necessary findings and determine whether the grounds of appeal are made out. I accept that the Appellant’s current level of alcohol consumption, and the repetition of the criminal acts he has committed while intoxicated, could cause him problems in Pakistan if he continued to drink to this level and act in this way in Pakistan. The Appellant was able to drink to moderation previously in Pakistan without issue, but given his current alcohol consumption, I also accept it would be difficult for the Appellant to consume alcohol moderately in Pakistan. So, I accept that if the Appellant were to drink some alcohol, it is at least reasonably likely that he would drink to excess. I also accept that deportation would be difficult for the Appellant and that this could adversely affect his depression in the short term at least.
[39] However, considering the evidence in the round, I find that even on the lower standard that applies, I find that there is not a real risk that the Appellant will drink alcohol on return to Pakistan. I take into account and accept that the Appellant has been diagnosed with alcohol dependency. The opinion of Dr Falkowski is that he would drink alcohol in Pakistan. However, I reach a different view. His own evidence was that he was not sure if he would drink. The Appellant exaggerated his alcohol consumption at the hearing. I found the Appellant’s account of his alcohol consumption to Dr Falkowski in May 2025 to be most significant. He stated that he did not drink 3 days a week for religious reasons. In my view that indicates that a significant level of control and the ability to modify his behaviour due to religious factors, notwithstanding his alcohol dependency diagnosis.
[40] His evidence about his efforts to seek help for his alcohol consumption was also unreliable. I find that other than in period of detention, the Appellant has not sought or received help to reduce his alcohol consumption since 2019. The medical notes and reports refer to medication being available to help individuals reduce their alcohol consumption. So far as I can see, the Appellant has never been prescribed such medication in the community. There is no evidence before me about the availability of such medication in Pakistan. Since his last release from detention, I find that the Appellant has not sought medical or professional assistance to reduce his alcohol consumption. The Appellant has engaged with medical professionals about various matters and takes regular medication, but has not recently sought help in relation to his alcohol consumption.
[41] Since his last release from detention, the Appellant has not been motivated to take steps to address his alcohol problem in the UK. The Appellant’s attempt to avoid deportation rests in part at least on his alcohol consumption. His family life in the UK has broken down. Alcohol in the UK is legal and widely available. Alcohol consumption is socially acceptable in the UK and to an extent, part of common culture. It is clear that while in the community the Appellant has lacked motivation to address his alcohol problem.
[42] While the Appellant has lacked the motivation to stop drinking in the community in the UK, the Appellant was nonetheless able to go for long periods of time without drinking alcohol. Each of the Appellant’s two custodial sentences have led to periods of being in detention for over a year. The Appellant’s oral evidence was that whilst in detention, his addiction went, it finished.
[43] I consider that the incentives and motivation for the Appellant to stop drinking alcohol, and the obstacles to drinking alcohol, in Pakistan, are far greater than in the UK. The Appellant’s attempt to avoid deportation rests in part at least on his alcohol consumption. As stated, alcohol in the UK is legal and widely available. Alcohol consumption is socially acceptable in the UK and to an extent, part of common culture. The contrast with Pakistan is stark. Alcohol in Pakistan is illegal for Muslims. It is thus more difficult to obtain. Merely possessing and drinking alcohol would put the Appellant at some risk of criminal conviction and imprisonment in difficult prison conditions. Drinking alcohol is not socially or religiously acceptable in Pakistan. Drinking alcohol to the extent he drinks in the UK and behaving as he has in the UK, would put the Appellant at some risk of prosecution, imprisonment, and societal reprisals. Then there is the question of family support. The Appellant’s brother states that he would not allow the Appellant to live in his house if he was drinking alcohol. In a society where drinking alcohol is forbidden by the dominant religion, and illegal, I do not find that surprising. Were the Appellant’s alcohol consumption to come to the attention of his brother, I accept that he would not allow him to live in the family home. The Appellant’s evidence is that he continues to speak to his family in Pakistan each week. That indicates to me that they continue to have a relatively close relationship. I am satisfied that the Appellant would be able to live in the family home in Pakistan provided he did not drink alcohol. I accept that if the Appellant were to drink alcohol in Pakistan, given his history, his family would be likely to discover this. I accept that the family would then reduce or indeed end, any support they provide. That is another strong reason why the Appellant is not likely to drink alcohol on return to Pakistan.
[44] The country evidence shows that rehabilitation support is available in Pakistan available for those suffering from alcohol dependency should that be required. There is no evidence before me about the availability of such medication in Pakistan. It was suggested that the Appellant would not be able to afford rehabilitation treatment in Pakistan. I do not accept this. Neither party has put a cost on any support from alcoholics anonymous. The only figure quoted was in the report of Dr Holden £85 per night. On the evidence before me, I do not accept that it is reasonably likely that funding such treatment for a limited period would be beyond the resources of the Appellant and his family, even if the family could not afford to pay the cost of a kidney transplant for the Appellant’s sister in law. I do not accept that the possibility of stigma would prevent the Appellant accessing such treatment. Hence the Appellant can access rehabilitation treatment should he require this.
[45] In sum, I do not consider that the Appellant’s alcohol dependency is such as to prevent him acting in his own interests on return. In view of the fact that the Appellant, despite his diagnosed alcohol dependency, has been able to abstain from alcohol three days a week for religious reasons, has had lengthy periods of abstinence when detained, has not sought any assistance in relation to his alcohol consumption in the community since 2019, and would wish to avoid the risks of considerable adverse consequences he would face associated with alcohol consumption in Pakistan, it is not even reasonably likely that the Appellant would drink alcohol on return to Pakistan. I therefore find that there are not substantial reasons for considering the Appellant will face a real risk of serious harm in Pakistan due to his alcohol consumption.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
5. The appellant applied for permission to appeal in reliance on the following ground:
• Ground 1 – the judge’s overall conclusion that the appellant was not at a real risk of drinking alcohol on return was founded on speculation, inconsistent with previous findings of fact, impermissibly at odds with the expert evidence and failed to reflect the diagnosis of depression.
6. In a decision dated 7 January 2026, a judge of the FtT granted permission for the appeal to be argued.
7. At the error of law hearing, we heard oral submissions from both parties. We address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below.
Discussion
8. In MN (Vietnam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 485, the Court of Appeal set out the principles which should guide any analysis of whether judicial reasons are lawfully adequate. Between [34] and [36], Dove LJ drew together the leading authorities:
[34] […] The question which then arises is by what standard those reasons are to be judged in order to determine whether or not they are legally adequate. Whilst given in a different public law context, the observations of Lord Brown of Eaton under Heywood in South Bucks County Council v Porter (No 2) [2004] UKHL 33; [2004] 1 WLR 1953 at paragraph 36 provide an important statement of principle applicable in the current context:
“36. The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in dispute, not to every material consideration…Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.”
[35] Accompanying these principles, it is also necessary to observe that the decision, in this case the FtTIAC determination, must be read as a whole and in context. Part of that context is that examining the determination’s reasons should be approached and undertaken purposefully, with the object of obtaining an understanding of the decision and its basis. It should not be read or construed in a manner more appropriate to a contract or statute. It requires what Lord Bingham MR described as a “straightforward down to earth reading” of the determination which seeks to identify whether there is “room for genuine as opposed to forensic doubt” as to what has been decided and why (see Clarke Homes Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment and East Staffordshire District Council [1993] 66 P&CR 263).
[36] This approach to the standard of reasons required as a matter of law can be set in the general understanding of approaches to appeals in respect of tribunals within the Immigration and Asylum Chamber provided by Lord Hamblen at paragraph 72 of HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] 1 WLR 3784; [2022] UKSC 22:
“72. It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probably that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 2 All ER 65, para 45 per Sir John Dyson JSC.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] 2 AC 48, para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead DPSC.”
9. In addition to the above statements of principle, the Upper Tribunal’s jurisdiction to decide whether an FTT decision involved a material error of law was recently considered by the Court of Appeal in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201; [2024] 1 W.L.R. 4055. At [26], Green LJ summarised the applicable principles (we have not reproduced those principles which are reflected above in MN (Vietnam) to similar effect):  
[26] Sections 11 and 12 of the TCEA 2007 restrict the UT's jurisdiction to errors of law. It is settled that:  
[…]
(iv)  The issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at [27];  
(v)  Judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] 4 WLR 145 at para 34;  
(vi)  It is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see R (MM (Lebanon)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] 1 WLR 771 at para 107.  
10. In DPP Law Ltd v Paul Greenberg [2021] EWCA Civ 672, the Court of Appeal, in the context of employment proceedings, considered adequacy of reasoning as an error of law. Popplewell LJ, stressed, at [57], the need to consider judicial reasons fairly and as whole without being hypercritical. Appellate restraint is required to read reasons benevolently. “Simple, clear and concise” reasoning was to be encouraged to enable to parties to broadly understand why they had won or lost. Further, it should not be assumed that an element of the evidence which was not expressly discussed was left out of account. While these observations were made in the context of employment proceedings, they are of relevance in the immigration and asylum sphere because this is also a jurisdiction in which decisions are made by expert tribunals attenuated by the need to give appeals anxious scrutiny.
11. While the appellant only advanced a single ground of appeal in challenge to the lawfulness of the judge’s assessment of his case, there were discrete arguments which underpinned this overarching head of challenge. Two of these discrete arguments were the focus of submissions during the hearing: the judge’s inadequate regard to the expert evidence and his over-reliance on brief periods of abstinence.
12. It was argued, both in writing in the grounds of appeal and in oral submissions, that the judge unlawfully sidelined expert evidence which was said to have weighed strongly in the appellant’s favour in the assessment of the risk he would face on return to Pakistan. We are not satisfied that the judge’s treatment of this evidence was in any way unlawful.
13. Firstly, as the judge explained in terms in his decision, the ultimate question in the appeal was whether the appellant’s proclivity to consume alcohol meant that he would lack the personal control to resist his urges to do so. Before coming to any conclusion on this point, the judge was duty-bound to consider the evidence which went to this question. This is distinct from a requirement in law to slavishly and mechanically itemise each and every point taken by the expert in support of the opinion he reached. Instead, the judge was required in law to come to his own independent conclusion, informed by the evidence which was before him, and to provide lawfully adequate reasons for that conclusion. It requires the most strained reading of the decision to suggest that the judge did not explain why he came to a different conclusion to the expert about the prospects of the appellant drinking alcohol on being deported to Pakistan. We have set out at some length above the full extent of the judge’s reasoning across almost 30 comprehensive and closely reasoned paragraphs. Included among those reasons were observations as to tensions in the appellant’s various accounts and how the expert had overlooked important factors which tended to undermine the cogency of his overall opinion.
14. Secondly, it was not a fair characterisation of the proceedings to suggest, as it was [5] of the skeleton argument, that the expert’s opinion was “unchallenged”. As the judge noted at [9] of his decision, the respondent did not challenge the expert’s qualifications to offer the opinions he did, but this does not equate to the expert’s evidence being “unchallenged”. On the contrary, the respondent did not concede the substantive issues, one of which was self-evidently whether the appellant would be unable to abstain from drinking and the Article 3 conditions that would risk on return to Pakistan. If that were not so, it is difficult to imagine how the respondent could sensibly contest the human rights appeal on Article 3 grounds. It would have been a distortion of the settled positions of the parties to treat the expert opinions as unchallenged (see MR (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 473, in particular [78]), nor did principles of procedural fairness require a different judicial approach. It is overly simplistic to suggest that the respondent did not challenge the expert evidence and is therefore taken to accept the opinions which were tendered in evidence.
15. Thirdly, while it is fair to say that the judge did not consider the appellant’s mild depressive disorder as closely as his dependency on alcohol, the reasons for this are clear to see. The centrepiece of the appellant’s case was that it was his dependency on alcohol which exposed him to the risk of Article 3 conditions in Pakistan. The mild depressive disorder fed into the severity of that risk but it remained one of a range of factors which might have an impact on the appellant’s prospects of being compelled to consume alcohol on return. This tends to explain why the judge was not minded to say any more than he did on the topic. The judge introduced his analysis of the risk of alcohol consumption derived from his depressive illness at [20], referred to the antidepressant medication he was taking at [27], expressly quoted the expert opinion about the interplay between the depressive disorder and likely alcohol consumption on return at [29] and that deportation might adversely affect his depressive disorder at [38]. When looking to the overall sweep of the judge’s fact-finding analysis, it simply cannot be sensibly suggested that this factor, one among several, was left out of account.
16. For all of these reasons, we are not persuaded that the judge fell into error in how he assessed the expert evidence.
17. A further central theme of the appellant’s submissions was that the judge over-relied on the appellant’s acceptance that he did not drink alcohol on three consecutive days of the weeks for religious reasons. It was suggested before us that this was not a relevant factor in any judicial analysis of whether the appellant might be able to abstain on an indefinite basis. We disagree, both on account of it being relevant background of his ability to resist the urges to consume alcohol and the stated reason for doing so. As the judge observed, the cultural pressures which would weigh on the appellant in Pakistan were of a different order of magnitude than the similar pressures brought to bear, and which caused him to moderate his behaviour, in the UK. The judge was more than entitled to look to this feature of the evidence to inform his prospective analysis of what would be likely to unfold were he exposed to the far greater cultural and religious pressures which would be brought to bear in Pakistan. In any event, it is worth noting that this was merely one facet of a multi-faceted rationale as to why the appellant was not found to be at a real risk of succumbing to his alcohol dependency in Pakistan. Other factors expressly relied upon in the overall consideration of this issue were the comparative lack of availability of alcohol in Pakistan, the considerably higher stakes for the appellant were he to consume alcohol, the family support he was found to have available to him to help him withstand the impulses he would feel to resume alcohol abuse and his track record of both weekly brief periods of abstinence for religious reasons and lengthier enforced periods of abstinence while detained.
18. Two further matters were raised in the written and oral arguments. It was suggested that the judge did not properly consider and assess the appellant’s narrative evidence about how firmly he was in the grip of alcohol dependency, as expressed at [12] of the skeleton argument. Again, the judge was not required to address the appellant’s witness statement in a mechanistic line-by-line analysis, but to reach lawfully reasoned conclusions. The judge drew attention to manifest discrepancies in the appellant’s various accounts and was doubtful about whether he genuinely had any motivation to give up drinking in view of it operating as a central plank of his case to resist deportation. It was more than open to the judge to reach these conclusions on the evidence he had before him. Equally, it was suggested that the appellant’s immediate resumption of drinking alcohol upon release from custody weighed heavily in favour of his inability to control the dependency which afflicted him. As pointed out by Judge Pickering during the hearing, we must exercise caution not to elevate matters of weight to errors of law. The apportionment of weight are matters for judicial assessment and judgement and we must resist any temptation to substitute differences of opinion going to matters of weight; we decline to do so here. Like many of the appellant’s challenges to the strength of the judge’s reasoning, this appeared to us to be a factual disagreement cloaked in the language of errors of law.
19. Read fairly and holistically, it is clear that the judge considered the evidence in the round and relied on a constellation of factors to inform his conclusion that the appellant was not at a real risk of consuming alcohol on return to Pakistan such that he would be exposed to a real risk of Article 3 conditions. We are satisfied that the judge’s analysis of the broad range of evidence in a careful and comprehensive decision was anxious scrutiny in action.
Notice of Decision
The judge’s decision did not involve errors of law. We dismiss the appeal.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 June 2026