Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal Number: UI-2026-000656
(PA/66619/2024)

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Field House Decision & Reasons Promulgated
On 17 April 2024
On 18th of May 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANBURY

Between

OCE
(anonymity direction MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Corban, Corban Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Khan, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal by the appellant, OCE, whose identity has been anonymised by earlier order.
2. The appeal is against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Sharma (the judge) to dismiss the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse asylum, humanitarian protection or to find that the appellant’s protected human rights would be unlawfully interfered with. The judge’s decision was promulgated on 4 December 2025, following a hearing at Taylor House on 25 November 2025. The judge decided not to accept the appellant's claim to being a member of a particular social group and being a potential victim of female-genital mutilation (FGM). The judge did not find the appellant to be a credible witness and found that she had delayed excessively in making her claim. The judge, therefore, applied section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 (the 2004 Act) believing the true reason for the claim was that she had no intention of returning to Nigeria.
3. The judge did not find her to be consistent, but, in any event, concluded that there was sufficient protection for the appellant in Nigeria and/or she could relocate to a different part of that country, where FGM was not as prevalent as in her home area. The appellant did not qualify for humanitarian protection and her family and private life in the UK rights were not such as to suggest ”exceptional compassionate circumstances” for allowing her to remain in the UK outside the Immigration Rules. Therefore, the respondent's decision to exercise her discretion in favour of removing the appellant from the UK was upheld.
4. The permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal was given by FtT Judge Le Grys on 10 February 2026. He/she considered there to be arguable errors of law in relation to the three grounds raised and those matters required a hearing. In particular, Judge de Grys considered it to be arguable that:
1) The appellant was not an illegal overstayer but she needed to show that the absence of this finding would have made a material difference to the outcome;
2) It was considered arguable that the appellant was not barred from asserting the risk of FGM on grounds of her age. She was 60 at the date of the hearing but her individual circumstances had to be considered before it could be determined she was not at risk;
3) FGM was still a widespread practice in Nigeria and it was arguable that the judge's conclusion, that she could safely relocate or she could call on the state services in Nigeria to protect her against this barbaric practice, was contentious.
5. The respondent submitted a response under rule 24 on 18 February 2026, indicating that:
1) The decision in relation to overstaying did not underpin the decision. Therefore, the attack on the basis that the judge had erred in fact including that she was an illegal overstayer was not sustainable;
2) Section 8 of the 2004 Act was not determinative of the outcome of the case. In any event, there were aspects to her immigration history which were properly matters for consideration when judging credibility;
3) Furthermore, in judging the credibility of the FGM fear claim, the respondent submitted that her age was a factor, but it was only one of several factors. A number of adverse credibility findings were made, including the fact that the appellant was an older business woman who would not be a typical victim of FGM;
4) The rule 24 response also notes numerous inconsistencies in her evidence and refers to the CPIN evidence and the statistics for FGM, which the judge had correctly used in reaching her/his overall conclusion.
5) As to the availability of internal police protection and the possibility of relocating within Nigeria (Ground 3), this was also a criticism that was not justified because the judge had considered a wide range of documentary evidence, including CPIN material, and had concluded that there was an adequacy of protection and therefore a reduced risk on return. This, it was argued, was not, therefore, established. Essentially, the respondent argued that the appellant was attempting to re-argue the appeal because she was disappointed with the result. This did not establish any material error of law.
6. Before the Upper Tribunal, I have been assisted by both representatives: Mr Corban, a solicitor, for the appellant and Ms Khan, a Home Office presenting officer. I have also considered a bundle of documents prepared by or on behalf of the appellant, containing 550 pages, and I have been taken to the key passages in that bundle.
7. I am not going to recite all the oral arguments advanced. However, essentially Mr Corban argued that:
1) The judge had mis-characterised the case as being one of unlawfully or illegally overstaying. He said that this was material to the judge's conclusions. Indeed, many of the credibility findings seem to be based on that. There was, in truth, no substantial “section 8 point” that the judge could properly raise;
2) The judge had been wrong in law in relation to ground 2 to consider the appellant's age, being 60 years at the time, as being particularly relevant to the question of FGM. Unfortunately, FGM was still commonly practised in Nigeria and the appellant’s circumstances needed to be carefully examined to see whether, in fact, she would be at risk on return;
3) In relation to ground 3, he argued that the CPIN material did not support the judge's conclusions to the extent that they have been set out in the decision. His client had shown herself to be, by virtue of the information given by her mother, at risk of FGM in the context of an enforced marriage or enforced domestic situation. Relocation would not be a practical option for the appellant in all the circumstances set out.
8. Ms Khan, in her submissions relied on the respondent’s rule 24 response. She summarised the following points:
1) The judge had made a holistic assessment in a detailed decision, which, principally, dealt with credibility issues at paragraph 52. The judge had found that the appellant was a business woman, that she had produced evidence which contained several inconsistencies, including the whereabouts of her children, and this tribunal should be reluctant to interfere with the decision made by the First-tier Tribunal on the evidence before it. It was wrong to characterise a mere disagreement with the outcome as a misdirection of fact or law;
2) On internal relocation, she submitted that the judge had come to a sound conclusion. She referred me to the specific paragraphs, including paragraph 52, which contained most of the key findings.
9. As for many appeals, considering the criticisms of the judge without having heard the evidence is not straightforward. Were there to have been a clear error it may have been that the respondent would have conceded the appeal. As Ms Khan submitted, the appeal tribunal must accord proper weight to the fact findings of the FTT and not characterise a finding, which is, for example, an unfortunate turn of phrase, as an error of law or fact.
10. Ground 1 asserts that the judge was wrong to treat the appellant as an overstayer. Ms Khan would probably accept that the use of the words "overstayer" or "illegal overstayer" would be incorrect. The appellant’s immigration history was, in fact, as follows:
1) The appellant came to the UK as a visitor in 2021;
2) In February 2022 she amended her application to bring a human rights and asylum grounds claim.
11. Therefore, Mr Corban validly makes the point that she had asserted her human rights claim at an earlier stage than February 2023 (see paragraph 47 of the decision). In substance, however, she is said to have been told of the risk that she would be required to marry a chief and undergo FGM in December 2021 (see paragraph 47 (b) (i)). Given that complaint was relayed to her in 2021, her evidence as recorded by the judge, the judge was entitled to conclude that she had not made the complaint at the earliest possible opportunity. Therefore, there was a “section 8 point”.
12. Section 8 is not determinative of any adverse credibility issue. The section merely provides that a delay in advancing a claim while in a safe country, for example, is a factor that must be considered when the judge assesses credibility. That appears to be what the judge has done when he/she determined credibility adversely. The respondent was, as a deciding authority in relation to an asylum or a human rights claims, entitled to treat as damaging the appellant’s credibility her failure to mention the information relayed to her in 2021. The FTT was entitled to conclude that this damaged her credibility. This is the type of behaviour to which the section applies. It does not therefore appear appropriate for the Upper Tribunal to criticise and/or interfere with the way the judge dealt with this issue. I am satisfied that the judge did not attach excessive weight to a section 8 argument. There was a credibility point which the judge was entitled to consider as part of his overall assessment. In the circumstances, it was a sustainable finding.
13. Ground 2 alleges excessive weight was attached to the appellant’s age. I agree with Ms Khan that that the appellant’s age was a factor the judge was entitled to take into account, provided this was part of an overall assessment. This included considering her business background, the inconsistencies in her evidence, the lack of apparent knowledge of her children and inconsistencies with documentary evidence that had been provided.
14. In relation to the adequacy of protection or the prospects of internal relocation within Nigeria (ground 3), if the appellant is unable to surmount the hurdle of showing that this ground for dismissing the appeal was not one that the judge was entitled to come to, this appears determinative of the appeal. If, on the other hand, the judge's findings in relation to credibility stand, as I have found that they should, it is unnecessary to consider adequacy of protection or internal relocation.
15. In any event, I have concluded that the judge was entitled to find an adequacy of protection. The judge had regard to the latest CPIN information (see paragraph 52(h)(ii)). He/she considered significant attempts had been made by the Nigerian authorities to tackle gender-based violence, including a greater level of police interest in this barbaric activity. The judge had regard to these factors in reaching his/her overall conclusion. She concluded that the appellant could call on the police to protect her from domestic coercion or FGM.
16. Further or alternatively, the judge considered other parts of Nigeria, where the appellant could live, which included, somewhat obliquely, a reference to Asaba, where I understand the appellant had studied (at paragraph 52(h)(ii)) and Abuja and Kogi (which are dealt with at paragraph 52(j)) There is also a reference to a letter at page 23. They were said to be dealt with in the CPIN which showed a low prevalence of FGM in the relevant areas.
17. For these reasons, I have decided to find that there was no error of law in the decision of the FTT. Accordingly, the appeal against the FTT’s decision is dismissed.

Signed Dated 1 May 2026.

Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Hanbury