Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000660
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/03802/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Directions Issued:

On 30th of June 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE R THOMAS KC

Between

SCCO
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Ceesay of counsel, instructed by the Immigration Advice Service Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr M Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This appellant is a national of Nigeria. She made a protection claim in 2023 on the basis of a risk of harm arising from being witnessed partaking in same sex intimacy. That had resulted in her being assaulted and she had been forced to flee Nigeria in 2010. Whilst she now did not identify as a lesbian, she remained at risk on return on the basis that she would still be identified as such given past events. There was a significant delay in making her protection claim and she sought to rely additionally on the private life she had established whilst in the United Kingdom. That claim was refused by the Respondent and her appeal heard by the First-tier Tribunal on 22nd October 2025. The First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) rejected the appeal, both on protection and private life grounds.
2. Leave to appeal was granted by the Upper Tribunal on 24th March 2026 in these terms:
It is arguable that although the panel found the appellant’s credibility to be damaged, it failed to make any findings of fact on the substance of the appellants claim. Any error there is clearly material to whether she would be at risk of persecution or serious harm on grounds of being perceived as a lesbian on return to Nigeria which the panel arguably did not address at all.
3. The grounds of appeal (as limited and refined in the hearing) amounted to a criticism of the FtT’s determination on the basis:
(i) There was a failure to make findings on material issues, otherwise expressed as a failure to assess the risk on return.
(ii) Adverse credibility findings were made without adequate reasoning.
4. The reasons for the grant of leave are directed to the first ground, but the scope of leave was not limited. I have therefore considered both grounds but, for reasons set out below, it was unnecessary to make a concluded finding on the second ground.
5. The FtT’s consideration of the account given by the appellant in support of her protection claim (at paragraphs 13-16) give rise to some concern: the appellant’s account, as it was disclosed throughout proceedings and in evidence, was entirely consistent with a young person exploring their sexuality and identity against a background of adverse societal views on homosexuality. Equally, that she had intimate same-sex experiences is not inconsistent with her not now identifying as a lesbian. What is said to be “confusion” as to her case (paragraph 15) is in fact entirely consistent with her own confusion at the time. The credibility finding in paragraph 15 appears to be addressed to whether she was a lesbian in Nigeria (which is to misunderstand the effect of her evidence) rather than to whether the incident of same sex intimacy was inadvertently witnessed by another girl and reported (a key piece of evidence but not analysed by the FtT).
6. On the other hand, the FtT plainly was entitled to consider the delay in claiming protection was not reasonably justified and to point to inconsistencies in her account of being stabbed.
7. Despite the written grounds being drafted more broadly, at its heart the first ground of appeal is directed not at the FtT’s approach to credibility, but to the failure to ultimately make a finding on risk on return. The appellant acknowledges the FtT’s opinion on the matters set out above are said to “call her credibility into question” (paragraph 16) and “calls into question the reliability of her overall narrative” (paragraph 18). The final sentence of the section in the Determination entitled "…whether the appellant would be persecuted for that Refugee Convention reason” concludes that the delay in making the asylum claim “undermines her credibility” (paragraph 20). There is however, crucially, no explicit finding on whether the appellant was watched during the intimate encounter or whether she was attacked as a result, and no finding on the key question of risk on return.
8. On behalf of the Respondent, Mr Parvar sought to argue that it was “overwhelmingly clear that the [FtT] was not satisfied that she was conducting herself in a way that could be perceived as a lesbian in Nigeria” and that the adverse findings on the risk on return for the purposes of the protection claim were plainly “implicit” and could be “inferred”. This was a necessary development of the Respondent’s position in the ‘Rule 24 response’ which sought to argue that the comments noted above on credibility sufficed. There is some foundation for Mr Parvar’s position in the language of paragraph 20 when discussing delay, namely “…had the appellant’s fears been genuine” and the thrust of the comments made about her credibility noted above were plainly negative. But that has to be measured against the fact there was in fact no analysis by the FtT of the key evidence of her being watched and so the inferential exercise would have to extend into making assumptions not only to parts of the evidence on which there was some analysis but no conclusion, but also into key parts when there was not even some analysis.
9. Despite the authority being quoted in the appellant’s skeleton argument before the FtT, this is not a case where it was necessary to consider the four-stage test in HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) [2010] UKSC 31 given the appellant does not now identify as a lesbian or seek to engage in same sex relationships. But it was still necessary for the FtT to make an assessment of the risk that she claimed was still extant due to events of 2010. It is trite law that a court or Tribunal should make clear findings on the factual conclusions that shape its determination. There were no findings on the key events or on current risk and it would not be safe to uphold the FtT’s determination on the basis that such findings can be inferred.
10. As to the private life claim, it was plainly open to the FtT to note those matters (paragraphs 23-26) which weigh heavily against the appellant’s claim. However, the matters on which no findings were made in the protection claim are relevant also to the “very significant obstacles” test under the Rules. It follows that the appeal succeeds on the first ground and applies to both the protection and private life claim.
11. It is therefore unnecessary to reach a finding on the second ground that criticises the credibility findings, albeit I have noted the competing submissions above to the extent they are relevant to the first ground.
12. Given this appeal has been allowed on the basis the FtT failed to make relevant findings, it is appropriate to remit the case to the FtT with no preserved findings of fact.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is allowed and the case remitted to the First Tier Tribunal with no preserved findings of fact.

Richard Thomas KC

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22nd June 2026