Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2026-000663
First-tier Tribunal No: EA/01159/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

12th June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES

Between

NAUSHAD RAMGOOLAM
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: In person
For the Respondent: Ms Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 1 May 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant, a national of Italy, appeals with the permission of the First-Tier Tribunal judge (“the FTTJ”) against her decision promulgated on 15 July 2025 dismissing his appeal under the Immigration (Citizens’ Rights Appeals) (EU Exit) Regulations 2020 (“the appeals regulations”) from the respondent’s decision of 23 May 2024 to deport him under section 32 (5) of the UK Borders Act 2007 (“the stage 1 decision”).
Grounds
2. The grounds were settled before the decision of the Court of Appeal in Molnar v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Vargova v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 31 (“Vargova”) and concluded that the Court of Appeal’s decision in Vargova would be directly determinative of the grounds. The FTTJ granted permission the day after the Court of Appeal’s judgment was handed down, but it is not clear from the terms of the permission whether she was aware of the judgment in Vargova.
3. The grounds aver that the FTTJ erred by failing to recognise that Vargova (as it was decided by the Upper Tribunal) did not preclude consideration of Article 8 representations and that natural justice principles required engagement with representations made by individuals. It was said to be procedurally unfair not to consider the appellant’s factual and legal representations under Article 8 ECHR notwithstanding their express submission under a section 120 notice. There was said to be structural unfairness resulting from the two-stage EUSS deportation process, denying appellants a comprehensive forum in which proportionality and fundamental rights could be assessed. The FTTJ had also erred, it was said, in failing to assess the proportionality of the stage 1 notice in the context of the appellant’s individual circumstances. The decision required appropriate scrutiny under domestic administrative law standards.
The hearing
4. Mr Ramgoolam appeared in person and spoke to me using a Mauritian Creole interpreter. Family members were also present and assisted him.
5. I explained to Mr Ramgoolam that the appeal turned on legal technical considerations, and particularly the effect of the judgment in Vargova. I explained that I had the grounds and the documents prepared when he was represented and I would be considering those legal arguments. I explained that I would not be considering anything today concerning any factual arguments about whether he should be deported and I would not be hearing any evidence from him. I explained that I did not have the power to order the Home Office to decide within a specific time whether they would pursue his deportation.
6. Mr Ramgoolam explained to me that he had pleaded guilty because he had been told that he would be released. However, he had spent six months in prison and then he had been placed on immigration bail. He was very depressed because his parents had passed away and he could no go to their funerals. He said everything was dragging on. He had lost everything in life and he only had his children. He expressed suicidal thoughts.
7. Ms Clewley is obviously not a decision maker within the team responsible for deciding whether deportation orders should be made. She could only see what was available to her on the respondent’s system and from that information she told me that there was no timescale for the stage 2 decision. She told me that she would note Mr Ramgoolam’s vulnerability.
8. I asked her for assistance on the law and she pointed me to the parts of Vargova where the Court of Appeal had said that the stage 1 decision was a restriction of residence rights, but she said that mattered not, because the Court of Appeal had also decided that conduct post 31 December 2020 (as this was) was considered in accordance with domestic law. She submitted that it was conceded by counsel for the appellant that his human rights were not being impinged because no deportation order or decision to deport had been made and that therefore, following Vargova there was only one answer.
9. I indicated to Mr Ramgoolam and his family at the hearing that I considered that the Court of Appeal’s decision meant that his appeal had to be dismissed. I explained that Mr Ramgoolam’s human rights and the submissions he had already made concerning his human rights would be considered within the context of a further decision by the Home Office and if they considered he should be deported he was likely to have a right of appeal against that decision. I repeated that I could not direct the Home Office to make any further decision within a particular timescale. I explained that I would set out my reasons for dismissing the appeal in writing.
Reasons for dismissing the appeal
10. The grounds relating to the FTTJ’s claimed failure to consider human rights/s120 representations refer to Balajigari and procedural fairness (also, I observe a case called Osman which does not exist under the reference provided and I was not able to find it on a quick search).
11. The only grounds of appeal under regulation 6 of the appeals regulations are that the decision breaches any rights under the Withdrawal Agreement, and/or the decision is not in accordance with the Immigration Act 1971. As this decision concerns conduct after 31 December 2020, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Vargova means that there is no breach of the Withdrawal Agreement in the appellant being considered for deportation under the domestic regime applying to foreign criminals. Whether the appellant’s deportation would be a breach of his human rights does not arise as a ground of appeal at this stage.
12. A further and significant point which does not depend on Vargova is that the decision in Vargova in the Upper Tribunal did not prevent s 120 representations being considered in this case. Within the stage 1 deportation decision, the respondent indicated that if the appellant had reasons to stay in the UK that he had not yet informed them of, then he had to do so. By s 120 (1) (c) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, if a decision to deport or remove a person has or may be taken, then the respondent can serve a notice on the person requiring him to provide a statement setting out his reasons and grounds for saying that he wished to remain in the UK and why he should not be required to leave.
13. Although human rights are not a ground of appeal against a stage 1 decision, regulation 9 (4) of the appeals regulations permits the relevant authority to consider any matter which it thinks relevant to the substance of the decision appealed against, including a matter arising after the date of the decision. The width of that phrase means that the tribunal does have a power to consider a human rights ground after s 120 representations have been made even where human rights are not an available ground for the decision under appeal – see Celik (EU exit; marriage; human rights) [2022] UKUT 220 and Ajmal & Hooi (new matter – “considered” – Reg 9 (6) (b) [2025] UKUT 379. However, that power is limited by regulations 9 (5) and (6) which provide that the tribunal must not consider a “new matter” without the consent of the respondent and that a matter is a new matter if the respondent has not previously considered the matter in the context of either the decision appealed against, or the section 120 statement.
14. The respondent’s position before the FTTJ was that consideration of the s 120 notice would be at the stage of deciding whether the stage 2 decision would be made (see [13]). That indicates they had not consented to the FTTJ deciding a “new matter” and counsel for the appellant does not appear to have argued that the respondent had previously considered the matter so that it was not a “new matter”.
15. Given that background I do not see that consideration of procedural fairness issues arise. Before the respondent makes an adverse decision on the appellant’s human rights, they will consider his representations. The FTTJ did not make any legal error in not considering the human rights arguments the appellant wished to make against his deportation, whether because of Vargova or by failing to allow the s 120 representations to be argued.
16. The next part of the grounds avers structural unfairness arising from the two-stage process. Firstly, and most importantly, this argument is independent of Vargova and there was nothing preventing it being made to the FTTJ. I cannot trace that it was made, rather counsel conceded that [11] “the appellant’s human rights were not currently being impinged.” It cannot be an error of law for a judge not to decide an issue which was not argued before her and this allegation in the grounds fails on this point alone. Secondly, I cannot see that there was evidence before the FTTJ to support the allegations made at paragraph 7b) of the grounds. There is no evidence in the appellant’s witness statement as to disruptions and the like caused by the two-stage process, as opposed to by simply considering his deportation. As the stage 1 decision makes clear, the appellant still has indefinite leave to remain until the deportation order is made. The appellant has restrictions on him because he is on immigration bail but there is power to place a person on immigration bail when the respondent is considering whether to make a deportation order, so that the restrictions do not arise from the fact the process is in two stages. Thirdly, the First-Tier Tribunal has no judicial review jurisdiction. The grounds do not explain how the allegation comes within the jurisdiction of the First-Tier Tribunal.
17. The final ground relates to the failure to examine whether the stage 1 deportation notice was lawful or proportionate in the context of the appellant’s individual circumstances. However, following Vargova, proportionality does not arise where, as here, the criminality postdates 31 December 2020, the end of the transition period.
18. There are therefore no errors of law in the FTTJ’s decision and it stands.
Next steps
19. The respondent will now consider the human rights claim made by the appellant. I discussed with the appellant and his family what they should do about any further evidence they wished to serve or any further representations they wished to make.
20. The family showed Ms Clewley a letter from probation services noting the appellant’s good behaviour on probation and expressing the appellant’s remorse for his actions. Ms Clewley explained that she had noted the letter, but it could not be taken as served on her.
21. Ms Clewley explained that the respondent might not ask for any further representations before making the stage 2 decision so she suggested that the probation letter and any further evidence or representations should be sent to the address in the stage 1 decision - FNO Returns Command, Home Office, Lunar House, 40 Wellesley Road, Croydon, CR9 2BY.
22. I am sure the respondent appreciates the stress that waiting for the stage 2 decision places on the appellant and his family, but as I have said all I can do is express the hope that the decision be taken quickly.
Notice of decision
The judge’s decision contains no error of law and stands. The appellant’s appeal fails and is dismissed.

A-R Landes

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

29 May 2026